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Gertz v 
You may fin I have. It 
raises a question we have discussed from time to time--the 
responsibility of the press to set aside sensation for 
,,-,.i,Q[]fft.a:z - .. 
fact. I perceive two related questions in this case. 
(1) Sullivan applied the First Amendment's pro-
tections to newspapers and magazines when they commented 
on "public figures." Subsequent cases have expanded that 
protection to circumstances in which the person libelled 
is not himself a "public figure" but is l.'d.# tied in with 
a matter of "public importance or interest." In Rosen--bloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, the Ct held that a ... , 
story regarding the arrest of a distributor of adult 
magazines touched on a matter of public interest. That 
case is probably controlling on this aspect of the case. 





and Petr's involvement thrust him into the public eye. - --(2) The harder issue for me is whether there was --on the facts of this case sufficient evidence upon which 
the jury might have found "actual malice or reckless 
._ ___ ,,.,,,_ cw:_, 
disregard for the truth." There is no question that the 
magazine had no actual ~Ali knowledge of the falsity 
of the assertions. But there seems to be a serious 
question whether the magazine was reckless in its 
disregard for the truth. No effort was made to check 
out the author's story and, since the theme of the story 
conformed with the John Birch Society's general view of 
world, they were probably delighted with the accusations. 
The CA regarded this as a close issue but found that 
two factors tipJ ed the scale: (1) in a close case the CA 
sh_9 uld defer to t the TC ju~ge who heard the evidence and 
could test the 4emeanor of the defendant; and (2) when -the issue is in doubt in a case touching on First Amendment 
rights, the balance should swing in favor of free press. -The CA also noted, correctly, that mere failure to 
check out the story has been held to be insufficient in 
itslef. 
While the case bothers me , my bias in favor of the 
First Amendment overcomes my dislike for journalistic 
irresponsibility and foundationless name-calling. At 
any rate, there seems to be little to be gained by taking 
the case, unless the Ct is interested in a thorough re-
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ROBERT WELCH, INC. 
Preliminary Memo 




1. This is a libel suit brought by the petr in the N.D. Ill. 
(Decker) for damages resulting from the resp's publication of an 
article defamatory to the petr. The district judge directed the 
\\ 
'' jury that the article was libelous per se and the jury found for 
the petr, awarding him $50,000 in general damages. On the resp's 
motion the judge then awarded the judgment to resp n.o.v. on the 
ce -2-
ground this case fell within the scope of New York Times v. Sullivan 
and no actual malice had been proved. The Seventh Cir affirmed 
unanimously; Judge Kiley concurring. 
2. Facts: In 1968 a young man named Nelson was shot and killed 
by a policeman named Nuccio. The policeman was subsequently tried and 
convicted of murder. The petr is a lawyer of good reputation who has 
practiced law in Illinois for over 40 years. He was hired by the 
family of Nelson to handle civil litigation against Nuccio in connection 
with the shooting.
1 
The resp is the publisher of "American Opinion" a magazine affiliat 
• ed with the John Birch Society. In March 1969 the magazine ran anarticl 
on the criminal trial against Nuccio. The article was entitled "Frame u 




Nuccio ' s trial was part of a communist conspiracy to discredit the polic 
in this country. Although the article's thrust was with the criminal 
proceedings, at several places it mentioned the petr. The article 
variously referred to him as a "Leninist", a "Communist", and a "Red". 
There is no question that the statements are false. There is also 
apparently little doubt that the petr would be injured by these state-
ments as he alleges that he has been engaged in a general law practice 
with many business clients. 
The district judge held that New York Times was applicable because 
"by representing the victim's family in litigation brought against the 
policeman, Gertz thrust himself into the vortex of this important public 
• -3-
controversy." The district court apparently held that the petr was not 
a public figure in the New York Times sense and the Seventh Cjr assumed 
that he was not a public figure. The Seventh Cir held, however) that the 
resp was protected by the First Amendment because the article was of 
significant public interest and the "comments about plaintiff were 
- - -- -
integral to its central thesis." The court further found that the 
evidence was insufficient to show actual malice. 
3. ·Contentions: 
a. The petr's principal argument is that New York Times should 
not apply because the resp was not really publishing an article about 
• him or about the civil proceedings. Its thesis was aimed purely at the 
criminal trial but that the article's author went out of his way to 
gratuitously bring petr into the article to defame him. Since the 
statements about him were not necessary to the article he contends that 
New York Times should not apply. , 
b. The petr also argues that he was denied the right to a 
fair trial because the judge never led him to believe that the case 
would fall into the New York Times rule until he so stated in the 
post-judgment motions. 
c. The petr also alleges that it was a denial of due process 
for the Seventh Cir to tax costs against him in the appeal because the 







4. Discussion: The case is apparently controlled by Rosenbloom v. 
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29. Unless this Court is prepared to 
reconsider Rosenbloom the petition should probably be denied. On the 
facts, however, this is a hard case to turn away. I would at least 
recommend a call for a response. 
There is no response. 
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Unless Justices are confident that there is basis 
for reconsideration of Rosenbloom or Sullivan, the response 
buttresses my former conclusion that there is no basis for 
taking this case. It is undoubted that this was a matter 
-------.. 
of public interest. And, apart from that question, the 
case turns on whether there was adequate evide nce of 
actual malice. This is a factual question that is probably 
not worth considering. 
DENY? LAH 
tr(~~~ ~ ~~ 
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No . 72-617 Gertz v . Robert Welch, Inc. 
Summer Memorandum 
This is a brief memorandum, dictated after having 
read most of the briefs . It is entirely preliminary and, 
in large degree superficial . Further study is indicated. 
Statement of the Case 
We granted this case because it appears to reach, 
if not pass, the outer limits of Rosenbloom (403 U. S . 29 ) 
and Sullivan (376 U.S. 254 ) . 
Petitioner (Gertz), described as a llprominent lawyerll 
in Illinois , brought this libel suit against respondent, the 
publisher of a llhouse organll by the Birch Society. 
r, .. ~ 
~olice officer (if@li@}:l) kill ed a Chicago youth 
named ,l+uooio under circumstances whic£1.g~nerated a good deal 
~'.s 
of publicity . Gertz was retained by ~ooio's family to 
represent them in private civil suits, and was not involved 
in the criminal proceeding against Nelson. The Birth Society 
publication tJAmerican Opinionll ran a lead story in March 1969 
under the heading tJFrameup, Richard Nuccio and the War on 
Police", which contained false and defamatory statements 
concerning Gertz - linking him with various Communist front 
organizations and characterizing him as a Marxist . The Birch 




Communists and their fronts for an alleged conspiracy to 
discredit and weaken the police forces in this country . 
2 . 
The author of the article Alan Stang, was a regular 
contributor to American Opinion, but not a staff member or 
employee of it . The suit was against Robert Welch, Inc ., 
publisher of American Opinion and Stang was not a defendant. 
editor of 
Stanley,/American Opinion, admitted that he had made no effort 
to verify the accuracy of Stang 1 s article or its accusations 
against Gertz; and that he had never heard of Gertz. But 
Stanley did say that Stang had contributed a number of articles 
over a period of years, that none had been questioned as to 
accuracy, and that he had been recommended as an "accurate 
researcher and analyst" . 
Gertz won a jury verdict of $50,000, which was set 
aside by the district judge on defendant's motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict . The District Court found that 
defendant was responsible for the libel, which was libel per 
se; that the issue did not turn upon whether Gertz was a 
"public figure" within the rationale of Sullivan, but that the 
critical question was whether a "matter of public interest 11 
~ 
was involved, which would afford First Amendment protection 
~ 
to the publisher in the absence of "actual malice or reckless 






CA 7 affirmed (with an interesting concurring opinion 
by Judge Kiley) . It held that under Sullivan - as extended by 
subsequent cases - the First Amendment privilege did protect 
the publisher even though the material was libelous, and that -
as a matter of law - there was insufficient evidence to permit 
the jury to find either actual malice or reckless disregard 
for the truth . CA 7 agreed with the District Court "that there 
is a significant public interest in the subject matter of the 
article", and that Sullivan rrand later cases extending its 
rationale" protect "not only comments on public officials, 
but public figures and public issues as well." Citing Rosenbloom 
v. Metromedia,403 U. S . 29, 47-52 (opinion of Brennan) . 
In holding that the evidence did not meet the 
Sullivan test as to falsity or reckless disregard of truth, 
CA 7 held : (i) that the mere fact that a publisher failed to 
verify the accuracy of an article submitted by an author whom 
it could reasonably rrassume to be trustworthy is not sufficient 
to establish a reckless disregard for the truth. 11 (ii) the 
evidence establishing reckless disregard for the truth must 
be clear and convincing,"and in a close case "the policy of 
encouraging free and uninhibited expression is to be preferred 
over the conflicting policy of deterring irresponsible 
defamatory comment," and (iii) where the issue of facts is 
doubtful, CA 7 said it should "defer to the conflusion of the 




of CA 7 
The far - reaching position/as indicated by its 
footnote 13 (petition, p . lla) . There, in discussing what 
constitutes malice, and~in relying upon Justice Brennan's 
opinion in Rosenbloom, CA 7 said : 
11 Thus, the kind of malice which will, for 
example, defeat a conditional privilege in 
the traditional tort law of libel, will not 
satisfy the New York Times standard . However 
bad its motives, a publisher is protected by 
the First Amendment as long as the allegedly 
libelous statements were not made with know-
ledge of falsity or reckless disregard of 
whether they were true or false . '' 
Question Presente d 
4 . 
Even if be assumed that ti an article alleging a 
Communist conspiracy to harrass the police (with little or 
no evidentiary support therefor) is a matter of such public 
interest as to come within the Sullivan doctrine, the First 
Amendment privilege protects the publisher even where the 
person libeled has only a peripheral or remote connection 
with the subject of the article? 
None of the parties states the question precisely 
as I have (see petitioner 1 s brief, p . 3) and see also first 
paragraph of CA 7 1 s opinion. The important underlying question 
is whether this Court is to extend further the Sullivan doctrine 
beyond Rosenblatt, Rosenbloom and Time, Inc . v . Hill . 
Discussion 
My own thoughts, at this time, are too prel i minary 





and petitioner 1 s brief . I have not yet read the cases, although 
I am generally familiar with them. 
I voted to grant cert in this case because I believe 
the Court has gone too far already in protecting the First 
Amendment rights of the media aa against the individual rights 
(whether characterized as a right of privacy or the common law 
right not to be defa med) of individuals who may be permanently 
damaged or quite literally destroyed by the powerful news media . 
Everyone concedes that there is "tension" - if not a head- on 
conflict - between the competing interests and rights , and 
drawing any rational line has proved so far to be extremely 
difficult . But the Court has been pursuing its own logic to 
what may well be the ultimate conclusion of abolishing the law 
of libel altogether . For all practical purposes, this has 
already been achieved with respect to anyone who holds a 
"public position!: however lowly, or anyone (like the Hill family) 
who happens to find itself unwittingly - and even tragically -
dragged into the news . I would like to think that our society 
places a greater value on the sanctity of an individual's 
privacy and reputation, and would like to find a rational 
and principled basis of decision whi ch would protect the obvious 
and important rights of the media, would prevent the media 
from feeling inhibited to print legitimate news, and yet at 
the same time afford some reasonable protection to individual 
rights . The English - who certainly have a c i vilized system 




law of libel in full vigor, even putting newspaper editors 
and publishers behind bars . 
6 . 
But I do not prejudge the case, as I may well be 
bound by existing precedents unless the Court is willing to 
reconsider them. Thus, I want my law clerk (assigned to this 
case) to endeavor to find a more rational adjustment between 
the competing interests than has yet been articulated. In 
this connection, we should take a good look at what has been 
written by Justices Harlan and Stewart in particular (see 
Harlan ' s opinion in Rosenbloom and Stewart's opinion in 
Rosenblatt . 
Judge Kiley, concurring in the CA 7 opinion, shares 
my own concern. He stated his ''fear that we may have in this 
opinion pushed through what I consider the outer limits of the 
First Amendment protection against liability for libelous 
statements and have further eroded the interest of non-public 
figures in their personal privacy." 
I have noted in a memorandum to the file that we 
should take a look at Archibald Cox 1 s comment on what the 
Supreme Court has done to the law of libel and to the private 
rights of individuals in the line of cases grounded in 
Sullivan . 
Petitioner in this case (Gertz) argues that a 
standard of "probable cause" would be a rational solution of 
the tension between the competing interests. See petitioner's 





once a publication is found to be libelous, the publisher 
thereof must show that it had probable cause to believe that 
the statements were true . This is probably too simplistic an 
answer but we should take a look at it nevertheless . 
. r JCJjr/ gg 9-19-73 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: John C. Jeffries, Jr. 
No. 72-617 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 
No. 72-ll80 Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin 
Introduction 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 
In 1968 a Chicago policeman named Nuccio shot and killed a youth 
named Nelson. Petitioner Gertz is a prominent attorney who was hired 
to represent the Nelson family in civil litigation against Nuccio. 
Respondent publishes "American Opinion," the house organ of 
the John Birch Society. In March, 1969, the magazine ran an article 
denouncing the pending criminal prosecution against Nuccio as part of 
a nationwide communist conspiracy to discredit the police. Although 
Gertz was not involved in the criminal proceeding, the article subjected 
him to expansive defamation. He had a police file which took a "big, 
Irish cop to lift." He had been an official of the !'Marxist League for 
. ' 
2. 
Industrial Democracy" and had represented the "Communist 
- Chicago Peace Council." He was a "Leninist," a "Red," and a 
"Communist-fronter." These statements were wholly without foundation 
in fact. 
The district court entered judgment for respondent notwithstanding 
a jury award of $50,000 to Gertz. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on the 
authority of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). 
Old Dominion Branch 
Appellants are recognized union representatives for all letter 
carriers in Richmond, and appellees are Richmond letter carriers who 
refused to join the union. In its monthly newsletter, the union included 
appellees' names in a "list of scabs" published with a long essay 
villifying non-union workers. The three appellees then sued under 
Virginia's insulting words statute, and each recovered a total of 
$55,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. 
Appellants attacked the Virginia statute for over breadth. They 
argued that the law could not be sustained under Chaplinsky because it 
makes actionable insulting words not spoken in the presence of the 
subject and therefore unlikely to provoke an immediate violent response. 
The Virginia Supreme Court said that while construing a "fighting words" 
statute to reach such speech could present problems, the Virginia law 
- t 
3. 
had been interpreted to reach defamation generally and was therefore 
-subject to the saving limitations applicable to such laws. That court 
then held that Rosenbloom did not bar recovery because the dispute 
involved no matter of general or public interest. 
Gertz and Old Dominion raise a number of secondary issues. In 
Gertz the petitioner urges that Rosenbloom is inapplicable because he 
was not actually involved in the matter commanding public interest 
(the criminal trial). He also disputes the CA determination that the 
evidence was insufficient to show actual malice. In Old Dominion 
appellants argue that publication of the list of scabs did involve a matter 
of general or public interest. They also contend that the Virginia statute 
is overbroad under Gooding v. Wilson and that it is preempted by federal 
labor law. These questions will be addressed in Part N of this 
memorandum. The important general issue is the continued vitality 
of Rosenbloom. Part I of this memorandum is a summary of the relevant 
cases, while Parts II and III contain more detailed explication of the 
positions you may wish to consider. 
I. 
History 
The following is nothing more than a roadmap of the cases on this 
subject. Hopefully, it provides useful background to Parts II and III, 
but it is descriptive rather than analytical. If you feel familiar with 
these cases, you may wish to skip Part I entirely. 
A. 
New York Times 
The law of private defamation was first constitutionalized in 
1 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). At the 
4. 
request of A. Philip Randolph, the Times ran a political advertisment 
concerning civil rights activities in Alabama. A local police commissioner 
established that certain misstatements in the ad constituted libel 
~ se under state law. That left the Times with the single defense of 
truth. Under Alabama law, neither good faith nor reasonable care 
would protect the newspaper from civil liability. 
2 
Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice Brennan began with the 
proposition that criticism of public officials is protected speech under 
the First Amendment. Recognizing only truth as a defense would lead 
to intolerable self-censorship: "Allowance of the defense of truth, with 
the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not mean that only false 
1. Prior to New York Times the Court had accorded an absolute 
privilege to statements made by responsible public officials in the line 
of duty. Barr v. Mattes, 360 U.S. 564 (1959). 
2. Mr. Justice Brennan's reasoning was joined by the Chief Justice 
and Justices Clark, Harlan, Stewart and White. Justices Black, Douglas 
, - , ,... ,. ; , .. .. . .. .. . ' . - . 
5. 
speech will be deterred." 376 U.S., at 279. Brennan then enunciated 
the constitutional standard which has since been applied to an expanding 
variety of situations: 
"The constitutional guarantees require, we think, 
a federal rule that prohibits a public official from 
recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating 
to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement 
was made with "actual malice" - that is, in the knowledge 
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it 
was false or not." 376 U.S., at 279-80. 
Justice Brennan's application of the new standard illustrated his meaning. 
The fact that the Times ran the advertisement without checking its 
accuracy against news stories in the paper's own files could not establish 
"reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Rather, the 
responsible parties had to have some subjective awareness of indicia 
of falsity. Justices Black, Douglas and Goldberg disagreed with this 
test, wishing instead to announce an absolute constitutional privilege 
to criticize official conduct. 
Later decisions further explicated the meaning of the New York 
Times rule. In Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 
(1967), the Court hammered in the distinction between constitutional 
malice ("knowing falsehood or reckless disregard") and malice in the 
sense of ill-will. In St. Amantv. Thompson, 390U.S. 727 (1968), 
the Court reiterated the near equation of recklessness with culpability: 
"There must be sufficient evidence to permit the 
conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained 
serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. 
Publishing with such doubts shows reckless disregard 
for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice." 
390 U.S. , at 731. 
6. 
Recklessness in the ordinary tort sense of extreme negligence will 
not suffice; the speaker must have some inchoate knowledge of falsity 
before he can act in "reckless disregard of whether it is false or not." 
Other cases dealt with the applicability of the New York Times 
rule. In Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (19 64), the Court applied 
the new test to criminal libel laws as well as to civil actions and further 
held that a defense of truth may not be overriden by showing that the 
speaker intended to cause harm. Like New York Times, Garrison 
involved criticism directed at a public official. Again writing for the 
Court, Mr. Justice Brennan defined the kind of criticism to which the 
New York Times would apply: 
"[ Al nything which might touch on an official's fitness 
for office is relevant. Few personal attributes are 
more germane to fitness for office than dishonesty, 
malfeasance, or improper motivation, even though 
these characteristics may also affect the official's 
private character." 379 U.S. , at 77. 3 
3. In 1971, the Court returned to this question and ruled that: 
"as a matter of constitutional law that a charge of criminal 
conduct, no matter how remote in time or place, can never 
be irrelevant to an official's or a candidate's fitness for 
public office for purposes of application of the 'knowing 
falsehood or reckless disregard' rule of New York Times Co. 
v. Sullivan. 
A l"\'I TT ,..., n ,,,- n,..,,.., /,I"\,...,.,\ 
7. 
Justices Black, Douglas, and Goldberg reiterated their absolutist 
view, but Brennan's majority remained solid. 
Having defined the range of issues for which the critic of a public 
offical could claim New York Times protection, the Court the~ turned to 
identifying public officials. In Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 7 5 (19 66), 
Mr. Justice Brennan announced: 
"[Tl he 'public official' designation applies at the very 
least to those among the heirarchy of government 
employees who have, or appear to the public to have, 
substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct 
of government affairs." 383 U.S., at 85. 
Later, in Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 2 65 (1971), the Court 
ruled that a candidate for public office must be treated as a public 
official. 
Rosenblatt and Monitor Patriot saw no significant deterioration of 
Brennan's majority. In Rosenblatt Mr. Justice Harlan dissented on a 
collateral issue, while Mr. Justice Fortas thought certiorari had been 
improvidently granted because the trial record had been developed 
before New York Times was handed down. Justices Black and Douglas 
continued to adhere to their absolutist position. 
In retrospect, the most interesting thing about Rosenblatt is the 
nascent discontent revealed by Mr. Justice Stewart's concurrence. He 
joined Brennan's majority opinion but also emphasized how close the 
8. 
_criticism of a public official came to libel on government. Then he 
added the following remarks: 
"The right of a man to the protection of his own 
repuration from unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt 
reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential 
dignity and worth of every human being - a concept at 
the root of any decent system of ordered liberty. The 
protection of private personality, like the protection of 
life itself, is left primarily to the individual States under 
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. But this does not mean 
that the right is entitled to any less recognition by this 
Court as a basic of constitutional system." 383 U.S. , at 92. 
His remarks indicated his uneasiness with application of the New York 
Times standard to defamation of private persons: 
"That rule should not be applied except where a 
State's law of defamation has been unconstitutionally 
converted into a law of seditious libel. The First and 
Fourteenth Amendments have not stripped private 
citizens of all means of redress for injuries inflicted 
upon them by careless liars." 383 U.S. , at 93. 
B. 
All the cases discussed above involved the New York Times standard 
as applied to libellous criticism of public officials. Except for relatively 
minor disagreements on collateral issues, the Court remained united on 
these questions. Disintegration began when the Court addressed the 
fate of defamation victims who do not hold public office. 
9. 
Time, Inc. v. Hill 
Unfortunately, the first such case to come before the Court was 
exceptionally difficult. In Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 37 4 (1967), 
the Court had to consider the constitutionality of holding Life magazine 
liable under a bizarre New York statute. 
The Hill family had been held hostage by three escaped convicts. 
A popular novel was based on their experiences. Some time later Life 
magazine ran a picture story about the conversion of th :,oak into a play 
and later into a movie. The Hill family sued under a 1 liar New York 
statute redressing invasions of privacy rather than defamation. The 
play, while inaccurate in many respects, portrayed the Hill family in a 
decidedly favorable light. The New York statute purported to provide 
a remedy for unwanted publicity (the magazine did not invade the Hills' 
privacy in the ordinary sense of an intrusion) but only if the publicity 
were inaccurate. Thus, although the harm was caused by exposure to 
public attention rather than by any factual distortions or misstatements, 
the statute recognized truth as a defense. In other words, the factual 
inaccuracies were taken to defeat the privilege to cover newsworthy 
events which Life would otherwise have enjoyed and render the magazine 
liable for something akin to invasion of privacy. 
10. 
4 
Mr. Justice Brennan again wrote for the Court. His 
-analysis is not an application of New York Times but rather a parallel 
line of reasoning. He said that sanction against negligent misstatement 
would discourage the press from exercising constitutionally protected 
rights. To avoid that end, he adopted the same test for press liability 
as was enunciated in New York Times. Mr. Justice Harlan disagreed. 
After a complicated analysis discussed in Part II, Harlan concluded 
that negligent misdescription of the affairs of purely private persons 
should be actionable. 
Butts and Walker 
Not long after Mr. Justice Harlan parted company in Time v. Hill, 
there arose a pair of cases which threw the Court into splendid disarray. 
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 
130 (1967), were once introduced by Harry Kalven under the apt heading, 
"You Can't Tell the Players Without a Score Card." 
Butts involved the Saturday Evening Post's charge that Wally Butts 
4. Nominally, Mr. Justice Brennan spoke for himself and Justices 
Black, Douglas, Stewart and White. This is misleading. Black and 
Douglas joined only to make a Court on the issue. Mr. Justice Fortas, 
joined by the Chief Justice and by Mr. Justice Clark, dissented on the 
ground that the particular instruction given in this case satisfied the 
New York Times standard required by Brennan. Thus there were three 
camps: Black and Douglas in their old absolutist stance; Brennan with 
Stewart and White, and less clearly with Warren, Clark and Fortas; and 
Harlan standing alone. 
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-had conspired with Bear Bryant to fix a football game between Georgia 
and Alabama. The jury found malice in the traditional tort law sense 
and tacked some $3,500,000 in punitives on to a compensatory award 
of $60,000. Although Curtis' counsel knew of the progress of the New 
York Times litigation, they raised no constitutional defense. This 
purported waiver became the basis for the CA affirmance and confused 
the Supreme Court's decision. Walker involved an inaccurate AP 
account of a University of Missis s ippi campus riot in which General 
Walker played some part. Since Butts was actually paid by a private alumni 
association and Walker had retired from the Army, neither was a public 
official. 
Although Mr. Justice Harlan announced both judgments in an 
opinion joined by Justices Clark, Stewart, and Fortas, in both cases 
Mr. Justice Brennan carried the day. The odd man out was Chief 
Justice Warren, who was the only Justice to accept the CA finding of 
waiver in Butts and who consequently voted with Harlan et al. in that 
case. On the constitutional issue, however, Warren agreed with Brennan. 
Walker was unanimous as to the result. 
Thus there were again three camps. Black and Douglas continued 
to urge recognition of an absolutist press privilege. Warren, Brennan and 
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White abjured any distinction between public officials and prominent 
private persons and so insisted that the "knowing falsehood or reckless 
disregard" standard should apply to defamation in either case. Harlan, 
Clark, Stewart, and Fortas wanted to hold that a "public figure," as 
distinct from a "public official," could recover from the press for 
defamatory falsehood "on a showing of highly unreasonable conduct 
constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation 
and reporting ordinarily adhered to by reasonable publishers." 388 U.S., 
at 155. Note that of the four Justices who took this view, only Mr. Justice 
Stewart is left. 
Rosenbloom 
Now at long last we come to the dee ision th<l:t actually controls the 
cases docketed for this Term, Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 
29 (1971). R_o_s~p.Q1:_0.0P1 distributed nudist magazines. While making 
.»«.,WV~:..V.» -4FS 
a delivery, he was arrested, and the police later obtained a warrant to 
seize his inventory. He sued the local radio station for failing to note in 
one of its newscasts that the 3,000 books seized were only "reportedly" 
obscene. Rosenbloom was neither a "public official" nor a "public figure" 
but only a private citizen involved in a matter of general interest. 
Mr. Justice Brennan announced the judgment of the Court in an 
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opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun. Brennan 
denounced the attempt to distinguish between public and private persons. 
He said that all citizens are public in some respects and private in others 
and held that the New York Times standard applies to any person defamed 
by the press coverage of a matter of "public or general int ere st . " 403 
U.S. , at 43. Mr. Justice Douglas did not participate in Rosenbloom , but 
it is fair to suppose that he would have joined in Black's concurrence, 
again calling for absolute immunity. Last, Mr. Justice White also 
concurred. Justice White insisted that everyone else had addressed the 
issues too broadly. He limited himself to the pronouncement that the New 
York Times standard should apply to defamatory remarks published about 
any person in the course of press coverage of "the official actions of 
public servants." 403 U.S. , at 62. He thought it inappropriate to dee ide 
whether the private person involved in a different sort of public issue 
would be so vulnerable. 
Mr. Justice Harlan dissented, and Mr. Justice Marshall filed a 
dissent in which Stewart joined. On most points Harlat and Marshall 
agreed. Harlan detailed the coincidence of their views: 
"I, too, think that, when dealing with private libel, the 
States should be free to define for themselves the 
applicable standard of care so long as they, do not 
impose liability without fault; that a showing of actual 
damage should be a reguisite to recovery for libel; 
and that it is impermissible, given the substantial 
constitutional values involved, to fail to confine the 
amount of jury verdicts within any ascertainable limits. " 
403 U.S. , at 64. 
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They parted company over the issue of punitive damages. Marshall 
would rule out all punitive damages, while Harlan would only require 
that they be limited to those situations in which ill-will is shown 
and that they bear a reasonable relationship to the actual harm shown. 
These views will be developed more fully in Part II. 
II. 
These cases reveal three broadly different approaches to the 
problem of reconciling the law of defamation with the First Amendment. 
Not surprisingly, the prize for conceptual clarity goes to Mr. Justice 
Black. Without deviation from New York Times to Rosenbloom, Black 
urged an absolute and unco~ tutional press immunity from liability for 
defamation. In his view, the "knowing falsehood or reckless disregard" 
standard "seriously menace[ dl the very life of press freedom." Curtis 
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 171 (19 67). As Professor Kalven 
put it, Black thought that "we must overprotect speech in order to protect 
5 
speech that matters." The only question that Black never answered, 
5. H. Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: 
Hill, Butts, and Walker, 19 67 Sup; Ct. Rev. 2 67, 294 (19 67). 
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and the issue which nominally remains open for Mr. Justice Douglas, 
-is whether this absolute privilege should also extend to non-media com-
municators. 
The criticism of this approach is obvious. It extracts a painfully 
high cost for protecting press freedom. Moreover, the absolutist 
position is politically moribund. Of the Justices now sitting, only Mr. 
Justice Douglas adheres to this view, and all save you and Mr. Justice 
Rehnquist have gone on record against an indefeasible press privilege. 
Perhaps the primary importance of the Black-Douglas view is that it 
portrays Mr. Justice Brennan as charting a middle course. 
Brennan wrote for the Court in New York Times, Garrison, 
Rosenblatt, Hill and Rosenbloom. Together with Chief Justice Warren's 
statement in Butts , these opinions define the dominant view. Although 
the total doctrinal development is imposing, the essentials may be 
simply stated. The evil to be avoided is press self-censorship. Brennan 
sees no value in defamatory falsehood. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 
64 (1964). Rather he is concerned lest a state tort remedy for false 
speech deter protected speech as well. To avoid that result the First 
Amendment requires that the press enjoy some immunity from liability 
for defamation. The scope of this constitutional privilege, what 
Professor Kalven terms the ambit of constitutional protection, is 
~-==ii..,MJ'• •· ------- --
determined by the newsworthiness of the· issue. In terms of the 
public's interest, distinguishing among public officials and public 
figures, and purely private persons is wholly artificial: 
"If a matter is a subject of public or general 
interest it cannot suddenly become less so merely 
because a private individual is involved, or because 
in some sense the individual did not "voluntarily" choose 
to become involved. The public's primary interest is · 
in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the 
participant and the content, effect, and significance 
of the conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity 
or notoriety. 
* * * 
"We honor the commitment to robust debate on 
public issues, which is embodied in the First Amendment, 
by extending constitutional protection to all discussion 
and communication involving matters of public or 
general concern, without regard to whether the persons 
involved are famous or anonymous." Rosenbloom, 403 
U.S., at 43-44. 
This defines the scope of constitutional concern. The level of 
16. 
constitutional protection, to return to Professor Kalven' s terminology, 
is the same throughout: D3famatory falsehood is actionable only if 
the plaintiff can show by clear and convincing evidence that it was 
published "with kn vledge that it was false or with reckless disregard 
of whether it was false or not." New York Times, 376 U.S., at 279. 
It does not matter whether the person defamed is a Cabinet officer or 
a private citizen, the danger to pr~ss freedom . is the same. 
6 
A lesser 
6. The status of the person defamed may, however, be relevant 
to deciding whether the issue addressed is one of public or general interest. 
Thus an accusation of criminal conduct by a public official, however remote 
in time and nlace. would always be a matte:1' of _public or general interest, 
- . . - . , 
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degree og constitutional protection "must inevitably cause self-
censorship and thus create the danger that the legitimate utterance will 
be deterred." Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. , at 50. 
Two addendums and the exposition of Brennan's theory will be 
finished. First, it seems likely that Brennan would apply the same 
standard to actions for defamation against a non-media speaker. In 
Rosenbloom he stated: 
"[ Wl e think the time has come forthrightly to announce 
that the determinant whether the First Amendment applies 
to state libel actions is whether the utterance involved 
concerns an issue of public or general concern, albeit 
leaving the delineation of the reach of that term to future 
cases." 403 U.S. , at 44-45. 
The ambit of constitutional protection clearly hinges on the subject 
matter of the speech rather than the identity of the speaker. It seems 
probable that Brennan would also hold the identity of the speaker as 
irrelevant to determining the level of constitutional protection as is 
the status of the def amee. 
Second, Brennan has asserted that the "public or general interest" 
standard for determining the applicability of the constitutional privilege 
does not swallow the law of defamation in its t :tirety. In a footnote to 
Rosenbloom he stated: 
"We are not to be understood as implying that no 
area of a person's activities falls outside the area of 
public or general interest. We expressly leave open the 
question of what constitutional standard of proof, if any , 
controls the enforcement of state libel laws for defamatory 
falsehoods published or broadcast by news media about 
a person's activities not within the area of public or 
general interest." 403 U.S. , at 44, note 12. 
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At least where media reporting is concerned, this caveat is likely 
to prove illusory. Before Mr. Justice Brennan coined the phrase "public 
or general interest," Professor Kalven addressed the same issue under 
the guise of "newsworthiness": 
"The tort law of privacy has wrestled with the matter 
for some years now; and it is a rough generalization 
that the courts will not, and indeed cannot, be arbiters 
of what is newsworthy. Newsworthiness will almost 
certainly become a descriptive and not a normative term. 
In brief, the press will be the arbiters of it and the 
Court will be forced to yield to the argument that whatever 
the press prints is by virtue of that fact newsworthy." 
1967 Sup. Ct. Rev., at 283-84. 
The third approach is that of Mr. Justice Harlan. His view is 
decidedly more elaborate than its competitors. It is only slight distortion 
to say that Harlan and Brennan do not differ on the ambit issue. While 
Brennan purports to limit the New York Times immunity to press coverage 
of issues of public or general concern, Harlan attempts a general accomo-
dation between the First Amendment and the law of libel (or a quasi-
privacy statute which permits truth as a defense). 
7 
Theoretically, at 
least, Brennan might identify issues so lae; king in public or general 
interest that the media would have no constitutional privilege, while 
Harlan would still consider the case within the s~ope of constitutional 
7. Harlan expressly reserved the question of the impact of New York 
Times reasoning in genuine privacy litigation. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 
65, note 2. 
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concern. Unlike Brennan, however, Harlan would differentiate among 
levels of constitutional protection at different point within the ambit of 
concern. Harlan joined Brennan's opinion in New York Times, and he 
never retreated from the basis of that decision: 
"[ A] !though libel law provides that truth is a complete 
defense, that principle, standing alone, is insufficient 
to satisfy the constitutional interest in freedom of 
sp~ech and press .... 
Moreover, any system that punishes certain 
speech is likely to induce self-censorship by those 
who would otherwise exercise their constitutional 
freedom." Rosenbloom, 403 U.S., at 64-65. 
But Harlan thought the New York Times rule appropriate only for the 
circumstances of that case. It involved criticism of a public official 
and was therefore close to seditious libel. Public officials ordinarily 
have some opportunity to rebut defamatory falsehood through counter speech, 
and in any event they have to some extent assumed that risk by taking 
public office. The same considerations did not obtain for libel of a 
"public figure." Of course, a Wally Butts or a General Walker had to 
some extent voluntarily exposed himself to public comment, and each would 
have sufficient access to the means ci counter argument "to expose 
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies of the defamatory statements." 
Butts, 388 U.S., at 155. But these cases lacked the close analogy to 
seditious libel: "Neither plaintiff has any position in government which 
would permit a recovery by him to be viewed as a vindication of 
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governmental policy." Id., at 154. Therefore, Harlan proposed a 
different standard: 
"We consider and would hold that a 'public figure' who 
is not a public official may also recover damages for 
a defamatory falsehood whose substance makes 
substantial danger to reputation apparent, on a 
showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting 
an extreme departure from the standards of 
investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to 
by responsible publishers. , Id., at 155. 
The case of the purely private person was different still. The Hill 
family in no sense waived the state's protection by voluntarily entering 
public life, nor could they find a forum for rebuttal. He therefore 
concluded that the press should be held liable for merely negligent mis-
statement. 
In Rosenbloom Harlan modified his views somewhat. In this case 
he undertook a still more discriminating calculus of the interests 
involved. First, he noted that none of the cases yet considered really 
involved invasion of privacy; in each, truth was a complete defense. The 
legitimate function of libel law was not to deter false speech simply because 
it is false, but to compensate individuals for "actual, measurable harm 
caused by the conduct of others." 403 U.S., at 66. Harlan was prepared 
to accept a different rule for defamation of public personalities, but he 
thought that the state's legitimate interest in the redress of actual, 
measurable, and reasonably foreseeable injury to private individuals 
did not necessarily conflict with the values of free speech. He again 
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_distinguished pr ivate parties from public personalities in terI?-s of the 
likely opportunititie s for r ebuttal, and he restated the assumption of 
risk point in a more sophis ticiated fashion: 
"[ Ol ur willingness to assume that public personalities 
are more impervious to criticism, and may be held 
to have run the risk of publicly circulated falsehoods 
concerning them, does not rest solely upon an empirical 
assertion of fact, but also upon a belief that, in our 
political system, the individual speaker is entitled to act 
upon such an assumption if our institutions are to be held 
up, as they should be, to constant scrutiny." Id., at 70-71 
Harlan concluded that a purely private plaintiff should be able to 
recover for defamation on showing a failure of reasonable care. 
8 
In most aspects of this analysis, Mr. Justice Harlan is in accord 
with his fellow Rosenbloom dissenters, Justices Marshall and Stewart. 
Marshall complained that Brennan's "public or general interest" test 
for applicability of the New York Times formula would either swallow up 
defamation completely or put the courts into the unwelcome business of 
8. He amplified his position by saying that the media should be 
liable only for foresee able harm. Thus the press would not have to pay 
for actual harm caused to an unusually sensitive person by negligent mis-
statement: "I think the First Amendment does protect generally agains t 
the possibility of self-censorship in order to avoid unwitting affronts to 
the frail and queasy." 
- deciding "what information is relevant to self-government." 403 
U.S., at 79. And Harlan explicitly joined Marshall's attack on 
"constitutionalizing the fact finding process:" 
"The Court is required to weigh the nuances of each 
particular circumstance on its scale of values regarding 
the relative importance of society's interest in protectirig 
individuals from defamation against the importance of a 
free press .... [ S] uch an approach will require this 
Court to engage in a constant and continuing supervision 
of defamation litigation throughout the country." Id, at 81. 
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Justices Harlan and Marshall differed on the question of punitive 
damages. Marshall concluded the punitive damages should never be 
awarded for defamation. Punitive damages are merely private fines, 
limited only by the gentle rule that jury awards not be "excessive." 
"The manner in which unlimited discression may be 
exercised is plainly unpredictable. And fear of the 
extensive awards that may be given under the doctrine 
[ of punitive damagesl must necessarily produce the 
infringement on freedom of the press recognized in 
New York Times. " Id., at 83. 
Marshall saw the same evil in the awarding of presumed damages, 
and he concluded that defamation awards should be limited to actual loss --
"more than direct pecuniary loss but ... related to some proved harm." 
~-, at 86. 
Harlan thought Marshall's wholesale condemnation of punitive 
damages unnecessary. Restricted to situations 'involving actual malice 
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(presumably in the tort law sense of ill-will), punitive damages served 
- the legitimate function of allowing the state to punish ,morally blameworthy 
conduct. Harlan recognized the danger of self-censorship but did not 
agree that it always outweighed this legitimate state interest. He concluded 
that punitive damages must be disapproved when they "bear no relation 
to the actual harm caused." He would allow jury awards of exemplary 
damages that bear a "reasonable and purposeful relationship" to the 
actual harm caused. Id., at 77. 
The principle shortcoming of Harlan's scheme is complexity. 
As Professor Kalven observed, "It makes at a constitutional level more 
discriminations than two centuries of tort law has worked out at a 
common-law level." 1967 Sup. Ct. Rev., at 299. And Harlan's scheme 
rests on generalizations about different categories of defamation plaintiffs 
which do not always obtain. Some public officials undoubtedly lack the 
access to the means of rebuttal that most possess. Furthermore, it is 
by no means clear that an opportunity to respond is an effective 
corrective for false factual statements about individuals, as distinguished 
from false ideas. These criticisms notwithstanding, at least Harlan 
made an energetic effort to provide some meaningful redress for the 
purely private defamee. 
At the highest level of generality, the choice among Black, Brennan, 
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and Harlan may be easily posed. On the one hand, there is the danger 
of self-censorship. On the other, there are individuals who are 
unjustifiedly injured by media defamation. For this purpose, at least, 
it is possible to differentiate broadly among classes of citizens. Given 
no 
the fact that defamatory falsehood has t::( value in itself, the root 
question is just how far to overprotect protected speech. In a way, these 
opinions are conflicting essays on the firstness of the First Amendment. 
III. 
The following is a tentative statement of another view. I have 
! 
tried to allow a healthy breathing space for the First Amendment and yet 
accommodate your lack of enthusiasm for Rosenbloom (which I share) . 
At the same time, I have attempted to observe the precedents as far 
as possible and to suggest a view with some prospect of political viability 
on the Court. You will perceive that the following discussion is, at best, 
a fir st step . 
Essentially, I think Harlan was wrong in Hill, wrong again in Butts, 
but largely right in Rosenbloom. First, take Butts. In Rosenblatt v. 
Baer, the supervisor of a county recreation area was termed a "public 
official" for purposes of the New York Times doctr ine. Given the broad 
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reach of that designation, it does not seem sensible to carve out a lesser 
-standard of media immunity for defamatory falsehood about some of the 
extraordinary prominent people in this society who do not happen to hold 
public office. Mohammed Ali, Walter Cronkite, Dean Rusk, and William 
Kunstler are all examples of private citizens who have significantly 
greater access to the avenues of rebuttal than a county recreation officer 
or a local sheriff. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (19 68). 
The only real difference between defamation of a "public official" and 
defamation of a "public figure" is that the former may come close to 
seditious libel. Yet this distinction is relevant neither to the need to 
avoid media self-censorship nor to the characteristics of the person defamed 
(access to the means of rebuttal and voluntary assumption of risk). And 
whatever the merits of Harlan's opinion in Butts, his attempt to enunciate 
a separate standard for libel of a "public figure" seems politically dead. 
In his Rosenbloom dissent, Harlan admitted as much by acquiescing in 
Butts. 
Hill is a harder case. The Hill family were thrust into the 
limelight in a particularly unpleasant context by events wholly beyond 
their control. It is difficult not to sympathize with their desire to avoid 
reliving their experiences in the press. Yet there is no question that the 
Life story would have been privileged had it been accurate. In his 
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- Rosenbloom opinion Harlan brought Hill within his scheme by noting 
availability of truth as a defense and treating the New York statute 
as something in the nature of a libel law. This analysis seems to me 
misguided. Although liability under the New York law was conditioned 
on inaccuracy, the evil to be remedied was not defamatory falsehood 
but the fact of publicity itself. In terms of the minimizing the impetus 
for press self-censorship, this is a very significant distinction. 
To illustrate the point, compare Hill with Gertz. Both involved 
plaintiffs who were neither public officials nor public figures, who cannot 
be said to have volunteered for public scrutiny. Assume that both 
were involved in a matter of public or general interest. In terms of 
their characteristics (the grounds on which Harlan distinguishes New 
York Times), they are not different. Yet in terms of the effect of 
potential liability on the media, their cases seem to me quite different. 
In Gertz, the John Birch Society press would surely know that calling 
someone a Red, a Leninist, and a Communist-£ ranter would, if not t r ue , 
be injurious to him. In Hill whatever damage Life magazine could have 
forseen was quite unrelated to whether the account had been fictionalized 
or not. In the latter case the press did not have the same impetus to 
investigate before publication. Reasonable editors would not view the 
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the story as potentially defamatory, and potential liability for publication 
would carry a greater likelihood of prompting self-censorship. Thus, in 
my view, Brennan's fault was his failure to account for those differences 
among potential defamation plaintiffs, while Harlan focused only on those 
differences and thereby lost sight of the ultimate danger of media self-
censorship. 
If this analysis has merit, it requires not only a distinction 
between libel and the odd defamation-privacy hybrid involved in Hill 
but also a distinction between different kinds of defamation. Without 
entering the smothering technicalities of the common law of libel, I 
would differentiate between a statement which is defamatory on its face 
I 
and one which is defamatory, if at all, only because of extrinsic circum-
stances known to some listeners. Thus, to print that Lawyer Jones had 
defrauded his client, Local Stores, by intentionally drafting a losing 
contract would be libellous on its face. Merely to state that lawyer 
Jones had drafted a contract on behalf of his client Local Store would 
be innocuous enough. If, however, the listeners knew that Jones had been 
retained for some years by the other contracting party, the statement 
might be defamatory. This is a silly illustration, but hopefully it makes 
the point. The first statement should put a newspaper on notice; the 
second would not. Of course, if the publisher knew of the relevant 
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-extrinsic facts and of the falsity of the apparently innocent statement, 
liability would obtain under New York Times. Statements defamatory 
on their face would include primarily imputation of a crime, charge 
of sexual perversion, and perhaps description of widely abhorred 
politic al views, ~· g. , Communist. 
To repeat, I am attempting a distinction between kinds of defamatory 
remarks about purely private persons because of a difference in the 
likelihood that potential liability would lead to self-censorship. This 
distinction is not the same as the old common-law concept of libel per se. 
As I understand it, that notion concerned the nature of the defamatory 
imputation without reference to whether its defamatory potential appeared 
from the face of the statements. Thus imputation of a crime is libel 
per se even though that meaning can be shown only by extrinsic circum-
stances. The rule I am suggesting requires a distinction between 
statements which on their face alert the publisher to their defamatory 
potential and those that do not. It is emphatically not dependent on or 
related to any of the intricate and widely varying formulations of the 
common law. 
Having made this distinction, it remains only to confront Rosenbloom. 
The standard for liability and the limitations on recovery advocated by the 
dissenters seem to me appropriate. The dispute between Harlan and 
Marshall about punitive damages is largely unimportant. A jury that 
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is prevented from awarding exemplary damages may partially offset 
that restriction by a more generous computation of the compensatory 
award. To the extent that you must choose between the two approaches, 
I recommend that you follow Marshall. His argument that unpredictable 
and largely uncontrolled private fines increase the likelihood of self-
censorship has some merit. Furthermore, two sitting Justices have 
endorsed Marshall's view. Unless you feel strongly, it seems unwise 
to split a minority camp over an issue of secondary import. 
The differentiation between purely private persons and public 
personalities surely presents some line-drawing difficulties, but they 
should not be substantial. The key should be voluntary submission 
to public scrutiny. Public officials and most public figures have 
sought some position which exposes their lives to the public view. Other 
public figures have taken some overt action to bring themselves and 
their views to the attention of th€ public at large. The purely private 
citizen is identifiable by the absence of some sort of voluntary assumption 
of risk. 
In summary, I would follow the rule of New York Times in all 
circumstances save one -- injury to a purely private person by a 
public_ation that was defamatory on it 1::, face. This view comports with 
New York Times, Butts, and a retrospective interpretation of Hill. 
30. 
-unfortunately, it cannot coexist with Rosenbloom. Assuming for the 
moment that you choose to pursue this line of reasoning, you face a 
political problem beyond my competence. I should think this view 
would prove acceptable to Justices Stewart and Marshall. Assuming 
that is so, and further assuming that you gather Mr. Justice Rehnquist, 
there are still only four votes to overrule Rosenbloom. Since neither 
the Chief nor Mr. Justice Blackmun has written on this issue, I cannot 
speculate on whether they may be willing to shift ground. 
Note on Probable Cause 
Along with his persistent misdescription of defamation as an 
invasion of privacy, petitioner Gertz suggests that, on a showing of 
falsity, the press be charged with showing "probable cause" for 
publication. Thus he seeks to import a concept entirely alien to the 
First Amendment. The first thing wrong with this solution is that it 
places the burden of proof on the defendant. More to the point, the 
concept of probable cause simply has no ascertainable meaning when 
applied in this context. It is not clear whether the press would have to 
show merely a reasonable belief in the veracity of what was published, 
or a reasonable effort to determine its truth, o:i;- something more. 
Furthermore, the "probable cause" connotes a certain quantum of 
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_ supporting data, which is unwelcome in this context. The question 
before you has little if anything to do with the Fourth Amendment. 
Damage to reputation is not an intrusion of state power but an injury like 




If Rosenbloom is rejected, Gertz becomes an easy case. 
Respondent publish~d clearly defamatory statements without any trace of 
an effort to verify them. The only possible question is whether a new and 
stricter standard of media accountability should apply only prospectively. 
If Rosenbloom stands, I think Gertz must be affirmed. Petitioner 
argues that, assuming the subject of the libellous article (the criminal 
trial) was a matter of public or general interest, he was not actually 
involved in it. Therefore, the publisher is nc., _ entitled to the New York 
Times protection for defamatory falsehood about petitioner. On this 
point, the CA opinion is persuasive. Assuming that linking petitioner 
with the allegedly Communist-inspired criminal prosecution was false, 
it was nevertheless made in an exposition of a public issue and is 
therefore entitled to the New York Times privilege. In the words 
of the CA: 
"[ Ul nder the reasoning of New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, even a false statement of fact in support of a 
false thesis is protected unless made with knowledge 
of its falsity or with reckless disregard of its truth or 
falsity. It would undermine the rule of that case to 
permit the actual falsity of a statement to determine 
whether or not its publisher is entitled to the benefit 
of the rule." Pet. App. , at 9a (emphasis added). 
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Otherwise, respondent' s factual error in associating petitioner with 
the criminal proceedings somehow destroys his immunity from liability 
for all the other factual errors in the article. This makes no sense. 
Respondent published that Gertz was involved in the criminal proceeding 
against Nuccio, whereas in fact he had participated only in the civil 
litigation. On its face this falsehood is innocuous enough. In any event, 
it is clearly not defamatory. But respondent also labelled Gertz a 
Leninist and a Communist-fronter. These statements were also false, 
and they are clearly defamatory. Under petitioner's view, respondent 
is accorded a nearly indefeasible constitutional immunity for the 
.scurrilous attacks on Gertz' s good name and his personal and political 
integrity but is liable for what appears to be the perfectly innocent 
error of confusing Gertz' s role in litigation against officer Nuce io. 
I see no reason to distinguish among the inaccuracies. 
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Petitioner also contests the conclusion that the evidence was 
insufficient to support a finding of malice in the New York Times sense. 
According to the precedents of this Court, that is not so. A reckless 
disregard of petitioner's welfare does not suffice; respondent must have 
shown a reckless disregard for the truth. Apparently, that finding 
must rest on some subjective awareness that the statements might be 
false. See pp. 5-6, infra; New York Times; St. Amant v. Thompson. 
The question is not entirely free from doubt, but I am persuaded by 
the CA opinion. See Pet. App., 9a-13a. 
Old Dominion Branch 
Leaving aside the issues of overbreadth and preemption by federal 
labor law, the Virginia Supreme Court determination that respondents' 
refusal to join the union was not a matter of public or general interest 
should be reversed. Federal labor law may not preempt this statute, 
but it does establish a public policy in favor of handling employer-employee 
relations on a collective basis. As you well know from Central Hardware , 
the interest of union organizers in persuading non-member workers to 
sign up may override even an employer's property rights. The means 
of persuasion that may be used is the subject of. a large and well-developed 
body of law. Since union recognition depends on majority status, the 
34. 
_efforts of union members to persuade others to join the union is 
necessarily a matter of general interest. Of course, the union in this 
case had already obtained recognition, but that could be withdrawn if 
attrition reduced the union to non-majority status. The presence 
of non-union workers thus represents a potential threat. Furthermore, 
deciding whether issues of this sort are of public or general interest 
is the worst sort of line-drawing for this Court to get into. It makes 
the protection of the First Amendment depend on categorization by 
subject matter and carries a disturbing potential for censorship. 
I shall be happy to address the specifics of these cases in greater 
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Introduction 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 
In 1968 a Chicago policeman named Nuccio shot and killed a youth 
named Nelson. Petitioner Gertz is a prominent attorney who was hired -
to represent the Nelson family in civil litigation against Nuccio. _______ __,,,....____ --- ...,...._.,,, ----
Respondent publishes "American Opinion," the house organ of 
the John Birch Society. In March, 19 69 , the magazine ran an article 
denouncing the pending criminal prosecution against Nuccio as part of 
a nationwide communist conspiracy to discredit the police. Although 
Gertz was not involved in the criminal proceeding, the article subjected 
him to expansive defamation. He had a police file which took a "big, ----- ~ -





Industrial Democracy" and had represented the "Communist 
Chicago Peace Council." He was a "Leninist," a "Red," and a 
"Communist-fronter." These statements were wholly without foundation 
in fact. 
The district court entered judgment for respondent notwithstanding 
a jury award of $50,000 to Gertz. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on the 
authority of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). 
Old Dominion Branch 
Appellants are recognized union representatives for all letter 
carriers in Richmond, and appellees are Richmond letter carriers who 
refused to join the union. In its monthly newsletter, the union included , 
appellees' names in a "list of scabs" published with a long essay 
villifying non-union workers. The three appellees then sued under - --
Virginia's insulting words statute, and each recovered a total of 
$55,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. 
Appellants attacked the Virginia statute for over breadth. They 
argued that the law could not be sustained under Chaplinsky because it 
makes actionable insulting words not spoken in the presence of the 
subject and therefore unlikely to provoke an immediate violent response. 
The Virginia Supreme Court said that while construing a "fighting words" 





had been interpreted to reach defamation generally and was therefore 
subject to the saving limitations applicable to such laws . That court 
then held that Rosenbloom did not bar recovery because the dispute 
involved no matter of general or public interest . 
Gertz and Old Dominion raise a number of secondary issues. In 
Gertz the petitioner urges that Rosenbloom is inapplicable because he 
was not actually involved in the matter commanding public interest ---------(t~llal trial). He also disputes the CA determination that the 
evidence was insufficient to show actual malice. In Old Dominion 
appellants argue that publication of the list of scabs did involve a matter 
of general or public interest. They also contend that the Virginia statute 
is overbroad under Gooding v. Wilson and that it is preempted by federal 
labor law. These questions will be addressed in Part IV of this 
memorandum. The important general issue is the continued vitality -----
of Rosenbloom. Part I of this memorandum is a summary of the relevant 
cases , while Parts II and III contain more detailed explication of the 
positions you may wish to consider. 
I. 
History 
The following is nothing more than a roadmap of the cases on this 
-
subject. Hopefully, it provides useful background to Parts II and III, 
but it is descriptive rather than analytical. If you feel familiar with 
these cases, you may wish to skip Part I entirely. 
A. 
New York Times 
The law of private defamation was first constitutionalized in 
1 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). At the 
4. 
request of A. Philip Randolph, the Times ran a political advertisment 
concerning civil rights activities in Alabama. A local police commissioner 
- established that certain misstatements in the ad constituted libel 
-
per se under state law. That left the Times with the single defense of 
truth. Under Alabama law, neither good faith nor reasonable care 
would protect the newspaper from civil liability. 
2 
Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice Brennan began with the 
proposition that criticism of public officials is protected speech under 
the First Amendment. Recognizing only truth as a defense would lead 
to intolerable self-censorship: "Allowance of the defense of truth, with 
the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not mean that only false 
1. Prior to New York Times the Court had accorded an absolute 
privilege to statements made by responsible public officials in the line 
of duty. Barr v. Mattes, 360 U.S. 564 (1959). 
2. Mr. Justice Brennan's reasoning was joined by the Chief Justice 
and Justices Clark, Harlan, Stewart and White. Justices Black, Douglas 





speech will be deterred." 376 U.S., at 279. ~re1:_nan then enunciated 
the constitutional standard which has since been applied to an expanding 
'-
variety of situations: -
"The constitutional guarantees require, we think, 
a federal rule that prohibits a public official from 
recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relati11g 
to_!!is official conduct unless he proves that the stateme nt 
was made with "actual malice" - that is, in the knowledge 
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it 
was false or not." 376 U.S. , at 279-80. 
Justice Brennan's application of the new standard illustrated his meaning. 
The fact that the Times ran the advertisement without checking its --
accuracy against news stories in the paper's own files could not establish 
- -
"reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Rather, the 
responsible parties had to have some subjective awareness of indicia 
of falsity. Justices Black, Douglas and Goldberg disagreed with this ---
test, wishing instead to announce an absolute constitutional privilege 
to criticize official conduct.. 
Later decisions further explicated the meaning of the New York 
Times rule. In Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 
(1967) , the Court hammered in the distinction between constitutional 
malice ("knowing falsehood or reckless disregard") and malice in the 
sense of ill-will. In St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968), 





Justices Black, Douglas, and Goldberg reiterated their absolutist 
view, but Brennan's majority remained solid. 
Having defined the r__?.nge of issues for which the critic of a public 
offical could claim New York Times protection, the Court then turned to 
' I\ identifying public officials. In Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966), 
Mr. Justice Brennan announced: 
"[Tl he 'public official' designation applies at the very 
least to those among the heirarchy of government 
erri.ployees who have, or appear to the public to have, 
substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct 
of government affairs. 11 383 U.S., at 85. 
Later, in Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 2 65 (1971), the Court 
I ' ruled that a candidate for public office must be treated as a public ---
official. 
Rosenblatt and Monitor Patriot saw no significant deterioration of 
Brennan's majority. In Rosenblatt Mr. Justice Harlan dissented on a 
collateral issue, while Mr. Justice Fortas thought certiorari had been 
improvidently granted because the trial record had been developed 
before New York Times was handed down. Justices Black and Douglas 
continued to adhere to their absolutist position. 
In retrospect, the most interesting thing about Rosenblatt is the 
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I 
"There must be sufficient evidence to permit the 
conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained --se_Ij_Qus doubts as to the truth of his publication. 
Publishing with such doubts shows reckless disregard 
for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice." 
390 U.S. , at 731. 
Recklessness in the ordinary tort sense of extreme negligence will - -
not suffi~e; the speaker must have some inchoate knowledge of falsity 
before he can act in "reckless disregard of whether it is false or not." 
Other cases dealt with the applicability of the New York Times 
rule. In Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), the Court applied 
the new test to criminal libel laws as well as to civil actions and further 
held that a defense of truth may not be overriden by showing that the 
speaker intended to cause harm. Like New York Times, Garrison 
involved criticism directed at a public official. Again writing for the 
Court, Mr. Justice Brennan defined the kind of criticism to which the 
New York Times would apply: 
"[ Al nything which might touch on an official's fitness 
for office is relevant. Few personal attributes are 
more germane to fitness for office than dishonesty, 
malfeasance, or improper motivation, even though 
these characteristics may also affect the official's 
private character." 379 U.S. , at 77. 3 
3. In 1971, the Court returned to this question and ruled that: 
"as a matter of constitutional law that a charge of criminal 
conduct, no matter how remote in time or place, can never 
be irrelevant to an official's or a candidate's fitness for 
public office for purposes of application of the 'knowing 
falsehood or reckless disregard' rule of New York Times Co. 
v. Sullivan. 






criticism of a public official came to libel on government. Then he 
added the following remarks: 
"The right of a man to the protection of his own 
reputation from unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt 
reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential 
dignity and worth of every human being - a concept at 
the root of any decent system of ordered liberty. The 
protection of private personality, like the protection of 
life itself, is left primarily to the individual States under 
j ~ 
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. But this does not mean 
that the right is entitled to any less recognition by this 
Court as a basic of constitutional system. 11 383 U.S., at 92. 
His remarks indicated his uneasiness with application of the New York 
Times standard to defamation of private persons: 
"That rule should not be applied except where a 
State's law of defamation has been unconstitutionally 
converted into a law of seditious libel. The First and 
Fourteenth Amendments have not stripped private 
citizens of all means of redress for injuries inflicted 
upon them by careless liars. 11 383 U.S., at 93. 
B. 
All the cases discussed above involved the New York Times standard 
as applied to libellous criticism of public officials. Except for relatively 
minor disagreements on collateral issues, the Court remained united on 
these questions. Disintegration began when the Court addressed the ------





Time, Inc. v. Hill 
Unfortunately, the first such case to come before the Court was 
exceptionally difficult. In Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), 
the Court had to consider the constitutionality of holding Life magazine 
liable under a bizarre New York statute. 
The Hill family had been held hostage by three escaped convicts. 
A popular novel was based on their experiences. Some time later Life 
magazine ran a picture story about the conversion of the book into a play 
and later into a movie. The Hill family sued under a peculiar New York 
statute redressing invasions of privacy rather than defamation. The 
play, while inaccurate in many respects, portrayed the Hill family in a 
~ -
decidedly favorable light. The New York statute purported to provide 
'-- -
a remedy for unwanted publicity (the magazine did not invade the Hills' 
privacy in the ordinary sense of an intrusion) but only if the publicity 
were inaccurate. Thus, although the harm was caused by exposure to 
public attention rather than by any factual distortions or misstatements, 
the statute recognized truth as a defense. In other words, the factual 
inaccuracies were taken to defeat the privilege to cover newsworthy 
events which Life would otherwise have enjoyed and render the magazine 





Mr. Justice Brennan again wrote for the Court. His 
analysis is not an application of New York Times but rather a parallel 
line of reasoning. He said that sanction against negligent misstatement 
would discourage the press from exercising constitutionally protected --- -
rights. To avoid that end, q_e_ adopted the same test for press liability 
as was enunciated in New York Times . Mr. Justice Harlan disagreed. S-o Q 
IJ.,1> I , ..__ 
After a complicated analysis discussed in Part II , Harlan concluded 
that negligent misdescription of the affairs of purely private persons 
should be actionable. 
Butts and Walker 
Not long after Mr. Justice Harlan parted company in Time v. Hill , 
I 
there arose a pair of cases which threw the Court into splendid disarray. 
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 
130 (1967), were once introduced by Harry Kalven under the apt heading, 
"You Can't Tell the Players Without a Score Card." 
Butts involved the Saturday Evening Post's charge that Wally Butts 
4. Nominally, Mr. Justice Brennan spoke for himself and Justices 
Black, Douglas, Stewart and White. This is misleading. Black and 
Douglas joined only to make a Court on the issue. Mr. Justice Fortas, 
joined by the Chief Justice and by Mr. Justice Clark, dissented on the 
ground that the particular instruction given in this case satisfied the 
New York Times standard required by Brennan. Thus there were three 
camps: Black and Douglas in their old absolutist stance; Brennan with 
Stewart and White, and less clearly with Warren, Clark and Fortas; and 





had conspired with Bear Bryant to fix a football game between Georgia 
and Alabama. The jury found malice in the traditional tort law sense --------
and tacked some $3,500,000 in punitives on to a compensatory award 
of $60,000. Although Curtis' counsel knew of the progress of the New 
York Times litigation, they raised no constitutional defense. This 
purported waiver became the basis for the CA affirmance and confused 
the Supreme Court's decision. Walker involved an inaccurate AP 
account of a University of Mississippi campus riot in which General 
Walker played some part. Since Butts was actually paid by a private alumni 
association and Walker had retired from the Army, neither was a public 
official. -------
Although Mr. Justice Harlan announced both judgments in an 
opinion joined by Justices Clark, Stewart, and Fortas, in both cases 
Mr. Justice Brennan carried the day. The odd man out was Chief 
Justice Warren, who was the only Justice to accept the CA finding of 
waiver in Butts and who consequently voted with Harlan et al. in that 
case. On the constitutional issue, however, Warren agreed with Brennan. 
Walker was unanimous as to the result. 
Thus there were again three camps. Black· and Douglas continued -





White abjured any distinction between public officials and prominent 
- --
2rivate persons and so insisted that the "knowing falsehood or reckless 
~ -
disregard" standard should apply to defamation in either case. Harlan , 
Clark, Stewart , and Fortas wanted to hold that a "public figure," as 
distinct from a "public official , " could recover from the press for 
defamatory falsehood "on a showing of highly unreasonable conduct 
~ ...----- ----- ----- - --- ·-
constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation 
- - -
and reporting ordinarily adhered to by reasonable publishers." 388 U.S. , 
~ ""'-- -
at 155. Note that of the four Justices who took this view, only Mr. Justice 
Stewart is left. ---
Rosenbloom 
Now at long last we come to the dee ision that actually controls the 
cases docketed for this Term, Rosenblo_om v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U. S. 
29 (1971). Rosenbloom distributed nudist magazines. While making ---
a delivery , he was arrested, and the police later obtained a warrant to 
seize his inventory. He sued the local radio station for failing to note in 
one of its newscasts that the 3 , 000 books seized were only "reportedly" 
obscene. Rosenblq_om was neither a "public official" nor a "public figure" - 1 ... 
but only a private citizen involved in a matter of general interest. -







opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun. Brennan -
denounced the attempt to distinguish between public and private persons. 
He said that all citizens are public in some respects and private in others ------
( 
and held that the New York Times standard applies to any person defamed 
by the press coverage of a matter of "public or general int ere st . " 403 -
U.S., at 43. Mr. Justice Douglas did not participate in Rosenbloom, but 
it is fair to suppose that he would have joined in Black' s concurrence , 
again calling for absolute immunity. Last , Mr. Justice White also 
concurred. Justice White insisted that everyone else had addressed the 
issues too broadly. He limited himself to the pronouncement that the New 
York Times standard should apply to defamatory remarks published about 
any person in the course of press coverage of "the official actions of 
public servants." 403 U.S., at 62. He thought it inappropriate to decide 
whether the private person involved in a different sort of public issue 
would be so vulnerable. 
Mr. Justice Harlan dissented, and Mr. Justice Marshall filed a 
----
dissent in which Stewart joined. On most points Harlan4 and Marshall ---------- --- -
agreed. Harlan detailed the coincidence of their views: 
"I, too, think that , when dealing with QTivate li_bel , the 
States should be free to define for themselves the 
applicable standard of care so long as they do not 
impose liability without fault; that a showing of actual 
damage should be a reeuisite to recovery for libel ; 
and that it is impermis sible , given the substantial 
constitutional values involved, to fail to confine the 
amount of jury verdicts within any ascertainable limits." 




They parted company over the issue of punitive damages. Marshall -- -
· would rule out all punitive .9amages, while Harlan would only require 
l th~ ~ m~ ·to those situations in which ill-will i~-shown 
\ ------
1 and th~t t~ t>e~ a reasonable relationship to the actual harm shown. 
\ These views will be developed more fully in Par; II. 
II. 
These cases reveal three broadly different approaches to the - ~ ...... 
p~ }em of reconciling the law of defamation with the First Amendment. 
Not surprisingly, the prize for conceptual clarity goes to Mr. Justice 
:, Black. Without deviation from New York Times to Rosenbloom, Black 
_µrged an absolute and unconstitutional pre§_§. immunity from liability for 
- -
defamation. In his view, the "knowing falsehood or reckless disregard" 
& 
standard "seriously menace[ dl the very life of press freedom. 11 Curtis 
Publishing Co . v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 171 (1967). As Professor Kalven 
put it, Black thought that "we must overprotect speech in order to protect 
5 
speech that matters. 11 The only question that Black never answered , 
5. H. Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: 





and the issue which nominally remains open for Mr. Justice Douglas, 
is whether this absolute privilege should also extend to non-media com-
municators. 
The criticism of this approach is obvious . It extracts a painfully ---high cost for protecting press freedom. Moreover, the absolutist ----
position is politically moribund. Of the Justices now sitting, only Mr . ..___ 
Justice Douglas adheres to this view, and all save you and Mr. Justice 
Rehnquist have gone on record against an indefeasible press privilege. 
Perhaps the primary importance of the Black-Douglas view is that it 
portrays Mr. Justice Brennan as charting a middle course. [u:!,._ /v>/ 
Brennan wrote for the Court in New York Times, Garrison , 
Rosenblatt, Hill and Rosenbloom. Together with Chief Justice Warren's 
statement in Butts, these opinions define the dominant view. Although -- - - - -~ -
the total doctrinal development is imposing, the essentials may be --- - -· - -
simply stated. The evil to be avoided is press self-censorship. Brennan 
.._ ----....- -
sees no value in defamatory falsehood. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 
64 (1964) . Rather he is concerned lest a state tort remedy for false 
speech deter protected speech as well. To avoid that result the First 
Amendment requires that the press enjoy some immunity from liability 
for defamation. The scope of this constitutional privilege, what 






determined by the newsworthiness of the issue. In terms of the 
public's interest, distinguishing among public officials and public 
'---
figures, and purely private persons is wholly artificial: 
"If a matter is a ~ubject of public or general 
intere st it cannot suddenly become less so merely 
because a private individual is involved, or because 
in some sense the individual did not "voluntarily" choose 
to become involved. The :Q!lblic's prj.mary_ interest ~s 
ip_Jhe event; the public focus is on the conduct of the 
participant and the content, effect, and significance 
16. 
of the conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity 
or notoriety. 
* * * 
; 
--·•-" 
"We honor the commitment to robust debate on 
public issues, which is embodied in the First Amendment, 
by extending constitutional protection to all discussion 
and communication involving
1
6.atters of public or ,, -...,,..-,- ~ ·-
general concern, without regard to whether the persons -----
mvo lved are famous or anonymous. 11 Rosenbloom, 403 ----,'- i_ ~ , -~ U.S. , at 43-44. (~'
This defines the scope of constitutional concern. The level of yl I~ 
constitutional protection, to return to Professor Kalven' s terminology, 
is the same throughout: Defamatory falsehood is actionable only if 
the plaintiff can show by clear and convincing evidence that it was 
published "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard 
of whether it was false or not." New York Times, 376 U.S., at 279. 
It does not matter whether the person defamed is a Cabinet officer or 
a private citizen, the danger to press freedom is the same. 6 A lessei: 
6. The status of the person defamed may, however, be relevant 
to deciding whether the issue addressed is one of public or general interest. 
Thus an accusation of criminal conduct by a public official, however remote 
in time and place, would always be a matter of public or general interest, 
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 2 65 (1971), but the same charge made 




degree og constitutional protection "must inevitably cause self-
censorship and thus create the danger that the legitimate utterance will 
be deterred." Rosenbloom, 403 U.S., at 50. 
Two addendums and the exposition of Brennan's theory will be 
finished. First, it seems likely that Brennan would apply the same 
IL ""' 
standard to actions for defamation against a non-media speaker. In 
Rosenbloom he stated: 
"[ Wl e think the time has come forthrightly to announce ~ .... ,. • •"'-' 
that the determinant whether the First Amendment applies 
to state libel actions is whether the utterance involved ~ 
concerns an i~sue of public or general ~cern, albeit ' '~ 
leaving the delineation of the reach of that ferm to future 
cases." 403 U.S. , at 44-45. 
~•-.(,,,, .. 
.Jc...r .;,o 
The ambit of constitutional protection clearly hinges on the subject ,-,. . 
~-... 114-., 
matter of the speech rather than the identity of the speaker. It seems ""'-
- ~ 
probable that Brennan would also hold the identity of the speaker as A.a,,.~ 
i~relevant to determining the level of constitutional protection as is 
the status of the def amee . 
Second, Brennan has asserted that the "public or general interest" 
standard for determining the applicability of the constitutional privilege 
does not swallow the law of defamation in its entirety. In a footnote to 
Rosenbloom he stated: 
"We are not to be understood as implying that no 
area of a person's activities falls outside the area of 
public or general interest. We expressly leave open the 
question of what constitutional standard of proof, if any, 
controls the enforcement of state libel laws for defamatory 
• 
- falsehoods published or broadcast by news media about 
a person's activities not within the area of public or 
general interest." 403 U.S., at 44, note 12. 
18. 
At least where media reporting is concerned, this caveat is likely 
to prove illusory. Before Mr. Justice Brennan coined the phrase "public 
or general interest," Professor Kalven addressed the same issue under 
the guise of "newsworthiness": 
"The tort law of privacy has wrestled with the matter 
for some years now; and it is a rough generalization 
that the courts will not, and indeed cannot, be arbiters 
of what is newsworthy. Newswortluness will almost 





Court will be forced to yield to the argument that whatev~r 
th~ press prints E by virtue of that fact newsworthy." 
\ 
In brief, the press will be the arbiters of it and !!!_e ) 
~- ,; 
-
1967 Sup. ct. "Rev., at 283- 84 . 
The third approach is that of Mr. Justice Harlan. His view is 
decidedly more elaborate than its competitors. It is only slight distortion 
to say that Harlan and Brennan do not differ on the ambit issue. While 
Brennan purports to limit the New York Times immunity to press coverage 
of issues of public or general concern, Harlan attempts a general accomo-
dation between the First Amendment and the law of libel (or a quasi-
..__ 
privacy statute which permits truth as a defense). 7 Theoretically, at 
least, Brennan might identify issues so lacking in public or general 
interest that the media would have no constitutional privilege, while 
Harlan would still consider the case within the scope of constitutional 
7. Harlan expressly reserved the question of the impact of New York 
Times reasoning in genuine privacy litigation. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 




concern. Unlike Brennan, however, Harlan would differentiate among 
levels of constitutional protection at different point within the ambit of 
concern. Harlan joined Brennan's opinion in New York Times, and he 
never retreated from the basis of that decision: 
"[ A] lthough libel law provides that truth is a complete 
defense, that principle, standing alone, is insufficient 
to satisfy the constitutional interest in freedom of 
speech and press . . . . 
Moreover, any system that punishes certain 
speech is likely to induce self-censorship by those 
who would otherwise exercise their constitutional 
freedom." Rosenbloom, 403 U.S., at 64-65. 
But Harlan thought the New York Times rule appropriate only for the 
circumstances of that case. It involved criticism of a public official 
and was therefore close to seditious libel. Public officials ordinarily 
have some opportunity to rebut defamatory falsehood through counter speech, 
_,- and in any event they have to some extent assumed that risk by taking 
-
public office. The same considerations did not obtain for libel of a 
~ 
"public figure." Of course , a Wally Butts or a General Walker had to 
some extent voluntarily exposed himself to public comment, and each would 
have sufficient access to the means cf counter argument "to expose 
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies of the defamatory statements." 
Butts, 388 U.S., at 155. But these cases lacked the close analogy to 
seditious libel: "Neither plaintiff has any position in government which -





governmental policy." Id. , at 154. Therefore, Har Ian proposed a 
different standard: 
"We consider and would hold that a 'public figure' who 
is not a public official may also recover damages for 
a defamatory falsehood whose substance makes 
substantial danger to reputation apparent, on a 
showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting 
an extreme departure from the standards of 
investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to 
by responsible publishers. Id. , at 155. 
~-#4.,,,J. 
The case of the purely private person was different still. The Hill --- -
family in no sense waived the state's protection by voluntarily entering 
public life, nor could they find a forum for rebuttal. He therefore 
concluded that the press should be held liable for merely negligent mis-
statement. 
In Rosenbloom Harlan modified his views somewhat. In this case 
he undertook a still more discriminating calculus of the interests 
involved. First, he noted that none of the cases yet considered really 
involved invasion of privacy; in each, truth was a complete defense. The 
legitimate function of libel law was not to deter false speech simply because 
it is false, but to compensate individuals for "actual, measurable harm 
caused by the conduct of others." 403 U.S., at 66. Harlan was prepared 
to accept a different rule for defamation of public personalities, but he 
thought that the state's legitimate interest in the redress of actual, 
measurable, and reasonably foreseeable injury to private individuals 





distinguished private parties from public personalities in terms of the 
likely opportunitities for rebuttal, and he restated the assumption of 
risk point in a more sophisticiated fashion: 
"[ Ol ur willingness to assume that public personalities 
are more impervious to criticism, and may be held 
to have run the risk of publicly circulated falsehoods 
concerning them, does not rest solely upon an empirical 
assertion of fact, but also upon a belief that, in our 
political system, the individual speaker is entitled to act 
upon such an assumption if our institutions are to be held 
up, as they should be, to constant scrutiny." ~-, at 70-71 
Harlan concluded that a purely private plaintiff should be able to -
recover for defamation on showing a failure of reasonable care. 
8 
In most aspects of this analysis, Mr. Justice Harlan is in accord 
with his fellow Rosenbloom dissenters, Justices Marshall and Stewart. 
Marshall complained that Brennan's "public or general interest" test 
for applicability of the New York Times formula would either swallow up 
defamation completely or put the courts into the unwelcome business of 
8. He amplified his position by saying that the media should be 
liable only for foreseeable harm. Thus the press would not have to pay 
for actual harm caused to an unusually sensitive person by negligent mis-
statement: "I think the First Amendment does protect generally against 
the possibility of self-censorship in order to avoid unwitting affronts to 





deciding "what information is relevant to self-government. 11 403 
U.S. , at 79. And Harlan explicitly joined Marshall's attack on 
"constitutionalizing the fact finding process:" 
22. 
"The Court is required to weigh the nuances of each j ~ 
particular circumstance on its scale of values regarding 
the relative importance of society's interest in protecting 
individuals from defamation against the importance of a 
l \ 
free press .... [ S] uch an approach will require this 
Court to engage in a constant and continuing supervision 
of defamation litigation throughout the country." Id, at 81. 
Justices Harlan a nd Marshall differed on the question of punitive ......__ 
damages. Marshall concluded the punitive damages should never be 
'- ---
awarded for defamation. Punitive damages are merely private fines , 
limited only by the gentle rule that jury awards not be "excessive. 11 
"The manner in which unlimited discression may be 
exercised is plainly unpredictable. And fear of the 
extensive awards that may be given under the doctrine 
[ of punitive damagesl must necessarily produce the 
infringement on freedom of the press recognized in 
New York Times. " Id. , at 83. 
Marshall saw the same evil in the awarding of presumed damages , 
l<'l.,A<, 
and he concluded that defamation awards should be limited to actual loss ----
"more than direct pecuniary loss but ... related to some proved harm." 
- ~ 
Id. , at 86. 
Harlan thought Marshall's wholesale condemnation of punitive 





(presumably in the tort law sense of ill-will), punitive damages served 
the legitimate function of allowing the state to punish ,morally blameworthy -
condu<:_t. Harlan recognized the danger of self-censorship but did not 
agree that it always outweighed this legitimate state interest. He concluded 
that punitive damages must be disapproved when they "bear no relation 
to the actual harm caused. 11 He would allow jury awards of exemplary 
da~~ that bear a "reasonable and purposeful relationship" to the 
actual harm caused. Id., at 77. 
The principle shortcoming of Harlan's scheme is co~~le3ity. ___ ... - -
As Professor Kalven observed, "It makes at a constitutional level more 
discriminations than two centuries of tort law has worked out at a 
common-law level. 11 1967 Sup. Ct. Rev., at 299. And Harlan's scheme 
rests on generalizations about different categories of defamation plaintiffs 
which do not always obtain. Some public officials undoubtedly lack the 
access to the means of rebuttal that most possess. Furthermore, it is 
by no means clear that an opportunity to respond is an effective 
corrective for false factual statements about individuals, as distinguished 
from false ideas. These criticisms notwithstanding, at least Harlan 
made an energetic effort to provide some meaningful redress for the 
purely private defamee. 





and Harlan may be easily posed. On the one hand, there is the danger 
of self-censorship. On the other, there are individuals who are 
unjustifiedly injured by media defamation. For this purpose, at least, 
it is possible to differentiate broadly among classes of citizens. Given 
~ the fact that defamatory falsehood has..,.. value in itself, the root 
question is just how far to overprotect protected speech. In a way, these 
II ~ 
opinions are conflicting essays on the firstness of the First Amendment. 
III. 
The following is a tentative statement of another view. I have 
tried to allow a healthy breathing space for the First Amendment and yet 
accommodate your lack of enthusiasm for Rosenbloom (which I share) . 
At the same time, I have attempted to observe the precedents as far 
as possible and to suggest a view with some prospect of political viability 
on the Court. You will perceive that the following discussion is , at best, 
a fir st step. 
Essentially, I think Harlan was wrong in Hill , wrong again in Butts , 
but largely right in Rosenbloom. First , take Butts. In Rosenblatt v. - .... ~.--- -
Baer, the supervisor of a county recreation area was termed a "public 






reach of that designation , it does not seem sensible to carve out a lesser 
standard of media immunity for defamatory falsehood about some of the 
extraordinary prominent people in this society who do not happen to hold 
public office. Mohammed Ali, Walter Cronkite, Dean Rusk, and William 
Kunstler are all examples of ~_!_vate citt_zen~ who have significantly 
greater access to the avenues of rebuttal than a county recreation officer 
or a local sheriff. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (19 68). 
The only real difference between defam ation of a "public official" and 
defamation of a "public figure" is that the former may come close to 
seditious libel. Yet this distinction is relevant neither to the need to 
avoid media self-censorship nor to the characteristics of the person defamed 
(access to the means of rebuttal and voluntary assumption of risk). And 
whatever the merits of Harlan's opinion in Butts, his attempt to enunciate 
a separate standard for libel of a "public figure" seems politically dead. 
In his Rosenbloom dissent, Harlan admitted as much by acquiescing in 
Butts. 
Hill is a harder case. The Hill family were thrust into the 
limelight in a particularly unpleasant context by events wholly beyond 
their control. It is difficult not to sympathize with their desire to avoid 
reliving their experiences in the press. Yet there is no question that the 






Rosenbloom opinion Harlan brought Hill within his scheme by noting 
availability of truth as a defense and treating the New York statute 
as something in the nature of a libel law. This analysis seems to me 
misguided. Although liability under the New York law was conditioned 
"""'- /~. 
on inaccuracy, the evil to be remedied was not defamatory falsehood 
~ 
but the fact of publicity itself. In terms of the minimizing the impetus -
for press self-censorship, this is a very significant distinction. 
To illustrate the point, compare Hill with Gertz. Both involved 
plaintiffs who were neither public officials nor public figures, who cannot 
be said to have volunteered for public scrutiny. Assume that both 
were involved in a matter of public or general interest. In terms of 
their characteristics (the grounds on which Harlan distinguishes New 
York Times), they are not different. Yet in terms of the effect of 
potential liability on the media, their cases seem to me quite different. 
In Gertz, the John Birch Society press would surely know that calling 
someone a Red, a Leninist, and a Communist-fronter would, if not true, 
be injurious to him. In Hill whatever damage Life magazine could have 
forseen was quite unrelated to whether the account had been fictionalized 
or not. In the latter case the press did not have the same impetus to 





the story as potentially defamatory, and potential liability for publication 
would carry a greater likelihood of prompting self-censorship. Thus, in 
my view, Brennan's fault was his failure to account for those differences 
among potential defamation plaintiffs, while Harlan focused only on those 
differences and thereby lost sight of the ultimate danger of media self-
censorship. 
If this analysis has merit, it requires not only a distinction 
between libel and the odd defamation-privacy hybrid involved in Hill 
but also a distinction between different kinds of defamation. Without 
entering the smothering technicalities of the common law of libel, I 
would differentiate between a statement which is defamatory on its face _________, -----~------ ---=--- -
and one which is defamatory, if at all, only because of extrinsic circu 111 -
stances known to some listeners. Thus, to print that Lawyer Jones had 
defrauded his client, Local Stores, by intentionally drafting a losing 
contract would be libellous on its face. Merely to state that lawyer 
Jones had drafted a contract on behalf of his client Local Store would 
be innocuous enough. If, however, the listeners knew that Jones had been 
retained for some years by the other contracting party, the statement 
might be defamatory. This is a silly illustration, but hopefully it makes 
the point. The first statement should put a newspaper on notice; the 





extrinsic facts and of the falsity of the apparently innocent statement , 
liability would obtain under New York Times. Statements defamatory 
on their face would include primarily imputation of a crime, charge 
of sexual perversion, and perhaps description of widely abhorred 
politic al views, ~- g. , Communist. 
To repeat, I am attempting a distinction between kinds of defamatory --- - --
remarks about purely private persons because of a difference in the 
likelihood that potential liability would lead to self-censorship. This ----
distinction is not the same as the old common-law concept of libel per se. 
As I understand it, that notion concerned the nature of the defamatory 
imputation without reference to whether its defamatory potential appeared 
from the face of the statements. Thus imputation of a crime is libel 
per se even though that meaning can be shown only by extrinsic c ircum-
stances. T~e rule I am suggesting requires a distinction between 
statements which on their face alert the publisher to their defamatory ---
potential and those that do not. It is emphatically not dependent on or 
related to any of the intricate and widely varying formulations of the 
common law. 
Having made this distinction, it remains only to confront Rosenbloom. 
The standard for liability and the limitations on recovery advocated by the -
dissenters seem to me appropriate. The dispute between Harlan and 





is prevented from awarding exemplary damages may partially offset 
that restriction by a more generous computation of the compensatory 
award. To the extent that you must choose between the two approaches, 
I recommend that you follow Marshall. His argument that unpredictable 
and largely uncontrolled private fines increase the likelihood of self-
censorship has some merit. Furthermore, two sitting Justices have 
endorsed Marshall's view. Unless you feel strongly, it seems unwise 
to split a minority camp over an issue of secondary import. 
The differentiation between purely private persons and public 
-- - -
personalities surely presents some line-drawing difficulties, but they 
should not be substantial. The key should be voluntary submission -
to public scrutiny. Public officials and most public figures have 
-. 
sought some position which exposes their lives to the public view. Other 
public figures have taken some overt action to bring themselves and 
their views to the attention of the public at large. The purely private 
citizen is identifiable by the absence of some sort of voluntary assumption 
of risk. 
In summary, I would follow the rule of New York Times in all 
circumstances save one -- injury to a purely private person by a 
......__ -- - - -
publication that was defamatory on its face. This view comports with 




Unfortunately, it cannot coexist with Rosenbloom. Assuming for the 
moment that you choose to pursue this line of reasoning, you face a 
political problem beyond my competence. I should think this view 
would prove acceptable to Justices Stewart and Marshall. Assuming 
that is so, and further assuming that you gather Mr. Justice Rehnquist, 
there are still only four votes to overrule Rosenbloom. Since neither 
the Chief nor Mr. Justice Blackmun has written on this issue, I cannot 
speculate on whether they may be willing to shift ground. 
Note on Probable Cause 
Along with his persistent misdescription of defamation as an 
invasion of privacy, petitioner Gertz suggests that, on a showing of 
falsity, the press be charged with showing "probable cause" for 
publication. Thus he seeks to import a concept entirely alien to the 
First Amendment. The first thing wrong with this solution is that it 
places the burden of proof on the defendant. More to the point, the 
concept of probable cause simply has no ascertainable meaning when 
applied in this context. It is not clear whether the press would have to 
show merely a reasonable belief in the veracity of what was published, 
or a reasonable effort to determine its truth, or something more. 




supporting data, which is unwelcome in this context. The question 
before you has little if anything to do with the Fourth Amendment. 
Damage to reputation is not an intrusion of state power but an injury like 




~ If Rosenbloom is rejected, Gertz becomes an easy case. 
Respondent publish~d clearly defamatory statements without any trace of - - -
an effort to verify them. The only possible question is whether a new and -
stricter standard of media accountability should apply only prospectively. 
If Rosenbloom stands, I think Gertz must be affirmed. Petitioner 
argues that, assuming the subject of the libellous article (the criminal 
trial) was a matter of public or general interest, he was not actually 
involved in it. Therefore, the publisher is not entitled to the New York 
Times protection for defamatory falsehood about petitioner. On this 
point, the CA opinion is persuasive. Assuming that linking petitioner 
with the allegedly Communist-inspired criminal prosecution was false, 




therefore entitled to the New York Times privilege. In the words 
of the CA: 
"[ Ul nder the reasoning of New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, even a false statement of fact in support of a L( 
false thesis is protected unless made with knowledge r 
of its falsity or with reckless disregard of its truth or 
falsity. It would undermine the rule of that case to 
permit the actual falsity of a statement to determine 
whether or not its publisher is entitled to the benefit 
of the rule." Pet. App. , at 9a (emphasis added). 
? 
Otherwise, respondent's factual error in associating petitioner with 
the criminal proceedings somehow destroys his immunity from liability 
for all the other factual errors in the article. This makes no sense. 
Respondent published that Gertz was involved in the criminal proceeding 
against Nuccio, whereas in fact he had participated only in the civil 
litigation. On its face this falsehood is innocuous enough. In any event, 
it is clearly not defamatory. But respondent also labelled Gertz a -
Leninist and a Communist-fronter. The se statements were also false, -
and they are clearly defamatory. Under petitioner's view, respondent 
is accorded a nearly indefeasible constitutional immunity for the 
scurrilous attacks on Gertz' s good name and his personal and political 
integrity but is liable for what appears to be the perfectly innocent 
error of confusing Gertz's role in litigation against officer Nuccio. 




Petitioner also contests the conclusion that the evidence was 
insufficient to support a finding of malice in the New York Times sense. 
According to the precedents of this Court, that is not so. A reckless 
disregard of petitioner's welfare does not suffice; respondent must have 
shown a reckless disregard for the truth. Apparently , that finding 
- -
must rest on some subjective awareness that the statements might be ----
false. See pp. 5-6 , infra; New York Times; St. Amant v. Thompson. 
The question is not entirely free from doubt , but I am persuaded by 
the CA opinion. See Pet. App., 9a-13a. ~- a- /.·t.-lJ~ uJ.-, 
Old Dominion Branch 
Leaving aside the issues of overbreadth and preemption by federal 
labor law , the Virginia Supreme Court determination that respondents' 
re~ sal to join the union was not a matter of public or general interest 
should be reversed. Federal labor law may not preempt this statute , 
but it does establish a public policy in favor of handling employer-employee 
relations on a collective basis. As you well know from Central Hardware , 
_,J 
the interest of union organizers in persuading non-member workers to 
sign up may override even an employer's property rights. The means 
of persuasion that may be used is the subject of a large and well-developed 
body of law. Since union recognition depends on majority status , the 






efforts of union members to persuade others to join the union is 
necessarily a matter of general interest. Of course , the union in this 
case had already obtained recognition, but that could be withdrawn if 
attrition reduced the union to non-majority status. The presence 
of non-union workers thus represents a potential threat. Furthermore, 
deciding whether issues of this sort are of public or general interest - ... 
is the worst sort of line-drawing for this Court to get into. It makes 
the protection of the First Amemdment depend on categorization by 
subject matter and carries a distur bing potential for censorship. 
I shall be happy to address the specific s of these cases in greater 
detail as the dates for argument approach. 
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IpTBl5 :ruuer R n --:Tft"r1._......,. 
_..,,. 
Add, keyed to the point indicated on page 36, a note substantially ··as· follows: 
It is suggested that petitioner ''thrust himself into the vortex" 
-· 
of the public issue addressed by respondent's article. This concept, 
alluded to in Rosenbloom ( ? ), is not a talisman in itself. It requires 
a thorough weighing of the relevant n evidence and where the 
ti••11wie defamed complainant is not a public official, the burden of 
proving sufficient fame or notoriety .to. qualify as a publid figure 
is up'on the defamer. Not :every thrusting into 
the "vortex" of a public is~ue n~ce-ssarily: res:ults· in the creation .of 
a public figure. The degree of the ''thrust", its result in terms of 
elevating the party into a posture of genuine public interest, and 
other relevant facts must be weighed. ~e are persuaded In this ~ase --('" 
that the trial court did not err in refusing to characterized petitioner 
as a public figu~ 
ss 
Add a note, keyed to an appropriate sentence (perhaps on p. 28), 
substantially. along the following ~ines: 
There is an inherent flaw in the Rosenbloom test of whether 
a "general or public interest" issue is involved. We are dealing her~ 
with the communications media, and a defamation suita is instituted 
ooly where a story is wblished in which .· the plaintiff is implicated. 
It will surely be argued that the mere fact .that the defendant deemed 
.12; rKA"1. t-L-t. · , . 1.-1,,.,,1 ' I_J .-#- r.'. ~ • 
the 4a~worthy of publication is strong prooff f Wi general o public 
interest. After all, the business. of the media - certainly in its news 
and editorial columns - is to address only matters of such interest. 
It is also commonplace for a story published in one news~er or 
magazine ( or broadcast by one of the electronic media) to. be republished. 
&th~. 
It could then be argued that substantial republicatioo P•••d the 
" 
~~ 
JBOUll\Of public interest, thus frustrating a recovery by 
the very . fact i: of aggravating the injury. 
Note to John: The above is fairly rough but a strong point 'in my 
view. I do not have before me your memorandum, but I recall 
the excellent quote from Prof. Kalvem. I would certainly include 







Mr. Justice Powell 
John Jeffries 
DATE: January 2, 1974 
?2--617 Gertzv. Welch 
You asked me to determine whether Mr. Justice stewart's prior 
opinions in this area are in any way inconsistent with the discussion of 
the public figure doctrine in Part V of your draft in Gertz v. Welch. 
I think not. 
In Greenbelt Coop. Pub. Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970), 
the Court reversed a libel judgment in favor of Bresler, a local real 
estate developer and state legislator. Bresler was involved in negotiations 
with the Greenbelt city council to obtain zoning va riances that would allow 
him to construct high-density housing. The alleged libel was the 
characterization of Bresler's negotiating position as ''blackmail" by 
several people who attended council meetings on the subject and the 
repetition of that word by the local newspaper in its news coverage of 
those meetings. Although it seems plain that Bresler was a public official, 
the Court did not need to reach that question, for Bresler's attorney 
conceded that his client was a public figure within the meaning of Curtis 
Publishing Co. Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice stewart commented 
that that concession was "clearly correct": 
• 
-
"Bresler was deeply involved in the future development of 
the city of Greenbelt. He had entered into agreements with 
the city for zoning variances in the past, and was again 
seeking such favors to permit the construction of housing 
units of a type not contemplated in the original city plan. 
At the same time the city was trying to obtain a tract of 
land owned by Bresler for the purpose of building a 
school. Negotiations of significant public concern were 
in progress, both with the school officials and the city 
council. " 298 , u. s., at 8-9. 
This concession would be as "clearly correct" under Gertz v. Welch. 
, a state legislator, 
Br~sler/had plainly assumed a role of especial prominence in the 
2. 
resolution of the public issues involved in the contemplated land transaction 
and the proposed zoning variances, and the alleged libel directly concerned 
his participation in those controversies. 
In Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971), the alleged 
libel was the description of a candidate for the Democratic nomination 
for United States Senator from New Hampshire as a "former small-time 
bootlegger. " Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice Stewart stated that Roy 
could be characterized as either a public official or a public figure, but 
he applied the standard applicable to public officials rather than the 
standard proposed for public figures by the plurality in Curtis Publishing Co. 
( of which Mr. Justice Stewart was a member). Regardless of whether 
a candidate for public office is properly viewed as a public official (I 
tend to believe that he is), it is plain that Roy would be a public figure 
under Gertz v. Welch. As a candidate for major public office, he thrust 
- 3. 
his personality into the vortex of a public controversy. As this Court 
noted in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), the legitimate 
societal interest in public officials (and in those who campaign to become 
public officials) is not limited to the formal discharge of official duties 
but extends to all personal characteristics Felevant to fitness for office. 
In Time, Inc. v. PQpe, 401 U.S. 279 (1971), Mr. Justice stewart 
wrote the opinion for the Court in a "conveyer-belt" case. There Time 
magazine covered the publication of the fifth volume of the Report of the 
United states Commission on Civil Rights. The news magazine reported, 
by direct quotation and paraphrase, the Commission's description of the 
facts of Monroe v. PQpe, without indicating that the charges were made 
in Monroe's complaint rather than independent findings by the Civil 
Rights Commission. The application of the New York Times standard 
to this case did not rest on the public figure doctrine. Rather, all three 
federal courts agreed that PQpe was a public official by virtue of his 
position as Deputy Chief of Detectives of the Chicago Police Department. 
and that the allegations made in the Time story concerned his official 
conduct. 
Finally, in Ocala star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 
(1971), the newspaper published a false story that Damron had been charged 
with perjury in a federal court. Again the basis for applying the New York 
Times rule was not the public figure doctrine. At the time of the 
. 
- 4. publication, Damron was the mayor of Crystal River, Florida, and a 
candidate for county tax assessor. As such he was plainly a public 
official. 
In short, I find nothing in these four cases even arguably 





TO: Mr. Justice Powell DATE: January 2, 1974 
FROM: John Jeffries ~ ~~ 
Gertz v. Welch 
You asked me to determine whether Mr. Justice stewart's prior 
opinions in this area are in any way inconsistent with the discussion of 
the public figure doctrine in Part V of your draft in Gertz v. Welch. 
I think not. 
In Breenbelt Coop. Pub. Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970), 
the Court reversed a libel judgment in favor of Bresler, a local real 
estate developer and state legislator. Bresler was involved in negotiations 
with the Greenbelt city council to obtain zoning variances that would allow 
him to construct high-density housing. The alleged libel was the ~ 
characterization of Bresler's negotiating position as "blackmail" by 
several people who attended council meetings on the subject and the ~ 
repetition of that word by the local newspaper in its news coverage of 
those meetings. Although it seems plain that Bresler was a public official, 
the Court did not need to reach that question, for Bresler's attorney 
conceded that his client was a public figure within the meaning of Curtis 
_Publishing Co. Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice stewart commented 
that that concession was "clearly correct": ~ 
-
"Bresler was deeply involved in the future development of 
the city of Greenbelt. He had entered into agreements with 
the city for zoning variances in the past, and was again 
seeking such favors to permit the construction of housing 
units of a type not contemplated in the original city plan. 
At the same time the city was trying to obtain a tract of 
land owned by Bresler for the purpose of building a 
school. Negotiations of significant public concern were 
in progress, both with the school officials and the city 
council. " 298 U. s., at 8-9. 
2. 
This concession would be as "clearly correct" under Gertz v. Welch. 
Bresler had plainly assumed a role of especial prominence in the 
resolution of the public issues involved in the contemplated land transaction 
and the proposed zoning variances, and the alleged libel directly concerned 
his participation in those controversies. 
In Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971), the alleged 
libel was the description of a candidate for the Democratic nomination 
for United states Senator from New Hampshire as a "former small-time 
bootlegger. " Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice stewart stated that Roy 
could be characterized as either a public official or a public figure, but 
he applied the standard appliaable to public officials rather than the 
standard proposed for public figures by the plurality in Curtis Publishing Co. 
(of which Mr. Justice stewart was a member). Regardless of whether 
a candidate for public office is properly viewed as a public official (I 
tend to believe that la is), it is plain that Roy would be a public figure 
under Gertz v. Welch. As a candidate for major public office, he thrust 
- 3. his personality into the vortex of a public controversy. As this Court 
noted in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), the legitimate 
societal interest in public officials (and in those who campaign to become 
public officials) is not limited to the formal discharge of official duties 
but extends to all personal characteristics eelevant to fitness for office. 
In Time, Inc. v. Pope, 401 U. S. 279 ( 1971 ), Mr. Justice stewart 
wrote the opinion for the Court in a "conveyer-belt" case. There Time 
magazine covered the publication of the fifth volume of the Report of the 
United states Commission on Civil Rights. The news magazine reported, 
y direct quotation and paraphrase, the Commission's description of the 
facts of Monroe v. Pope, without indicating that the charges were made 
in Monroe's complaint rather than independent findings by the Civil 
Rights Commission. The application of the New York Times standard 
to this case did not rest on the public figure doctrine. Rather, all three 
federal courts agreed that Pope was a public official by virtue of his 
position as Deputy Chief of Detectives of the Chicago Police Department. 
and that the allegations made in the Time story concerned his official 
conduct. 
Finally, in Ocala star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 
(1971), the newspaper published a false story that Damron had been charged 
with perjury in a federal court. Again the basis for applying the New York 
:!'~n.:,.es rule was not the public figure doctrine. At the time of the 
.. ' . 
- •• publication, Damron was the mayor of Crystal River, Florida, and a 
candidate for county tax assessor. As such he was plainly a public 
official. 
In short, I find n<thing in these four cases even arguably 
inconsistent with Part V of the draft opinion in Gertzzv. Welch. 
JJ 
ss 
- C H AM BERS O F 
.ju:prtmt (!}llltrl d t!f t ~th .jfaftg 
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JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
January 2, 1974 
Re: No. 72-617 - Gertz v. Welch 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely• I 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
- ~ttttt <!j:ttnrl of tlrt ~lt ~taftll .. aglp:nghm !fl. <!J. 2Llffe)l,.;l 
C H A M B ERS O F 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
January 3, 1974 
PERSONAL 
Re: 72-617 - Gertz v. Welch 
Dear Lewis: 
As of now I could not join you. Indeed, 
unless I misread you, I doubt that the con-
ference vote is really reflected in your 
o p1n1on. However, a closer study than 
I have been able to give it may still some 
of my concern. I write you now, without 




Mr. Justice Powell 
V 
- January 4, 19 7 4 
No. 72-617 Gertz v. Welch 
Dear Chief: 
Thank you for your note concerning Gertz v. Welch. I am 
disappointed that you were not initially taken with my circulation, as 
I had hoped and believed it was in accord with your general thinking as 
to how best to work the Court out of its present dilemma. I realize, 
however, that the complexity and importance of the task of reconciling 
the law of defamation to the First Amendment provide ample opportunities 
for disagreement. I particularly appreciate the wisdom of your sugges-
tion that reflection and discussion may yet lead to common grmmd. 
Your thought that my circulation does not follow the vote at 
Conference could be right although I attempted to identify and follow 
a consensus. I did find it difficult to reconcile all views and to judge 
how far a majority of the Court would be willing to go in reversing the 
strong tide toward near-total abrogation of the individual's opportunity 
to recover for libel in favor of the stringent demands of the -New York 
Times rule. 
My notes indicate that only Bill Douglas voted to affirm. You were 
clear that Gertz was not a public figure, and you expressed doubt whether 
his connection with any matter of public or general interest was close 
enough to be meaningful. Potter, Thurgocxl, and I agreed that Gertz was not 
a public figure, although I understoodihtlt Potter and Thurgocxl thought that 
the Rosenbloom plurality opinion could net be avoided on the ground of the 
remoteness of Gertz's connection with the controversy. Bill Rehnquist 
voted to reverse without fully articulating his reasons. Byron, while 
indicating that he thought Gertz might be a public figure, expressed his 
''total disagreement" with Rosenbloom and stated that he would reverse 
the holding below. Harry Blackmun expressed a tentative view that 
Rosenbloom was indistinguishable in principle. He joined Bill Brennan 
,. ,.. ,.. 
-
- 2 -
in thinking that the case should be reversed, but only because of the trial 
court's failure to give the jury an opportunity to find knowledge of falsity 
or reckless disregard of the truth. (After inspecting the record, I believe 
that there was no basis for such an instructioo, and I rather suspect that 
Bill Brennan will ultimately vote to affirm. ) 
If my notes and recollecticms are substantially accurate, the 
principal line of division at Conference turned on the Roseilbloom 
plurality's doctrine that the New York Times rule applies not merely 
to public officials and public figures but to anyone, even the most 
private citizen, who is involved in the discussion of a matter of public 
or general interest. I counted Potter, Thurgood, Bill Rehnquist, and 
myself as four reasonabltY sure votes in favor of disavowing the Rosenbloom 
extension of New York Times. I also counted you in our "camp," perhaps 
presumptuously, because of the difficulty of considering this case as 
outside the broad principle stated by the Rosenbloom plurality opinion 
and because so little would be accomplished by trying to distinguish 
Rosenbloom on its facts. The doctrine would remain intact and, in 
effect, would destroy entirely the law of libel, for anything a newspaper 
thinks important enough to print is arguably a matter of public or general 
interest. I also thought that Byron, who expressed his firm oppositicm 
to the Rosenbloom doctrine, could probably be counted as with us. 
I therefore addressed as the central issue in the case whether 
the Court should withdraw from the "issue of public or general interest" 
test of the Rosenbloom plurality. Answering this affirmatively, I then 
had to confrcmt the question of what constitutional limitations, if any, 
are applicable where a private citizen is libelled. On this issue, I 
had little guidance from the discussion at Conference. I adopted the 
familiar standard of negligence as a constitutional minimum (as 
suggested by Justice Harlan) rather than attempting to resuscitate 
the common law rule of strict liability, so emphatically condemned by 
a unanimous Court in New York Times and disapproved even by the 
dissenters in Rosenbloom. 
When I finally reached the damage question, I was confronted 
with the strongly held views of two of our colleagues ( Potter and Thurgood) 
that there should be no presumed or punitive damages where the standard 
for recovery is negligence - although my personal views have been 
generally to the ccmtrary. Accordingly, I again sought the middle ground 
and proposed a rule of "actual damages" but broadly defined them to 
.,. ,• ,,,. -,. 
-
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include "impairment of reputation and standing in the community, per-
sonal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering." (p. 24) 
As you will see from the foregoing, I approached the writing of 
the opinion with a view to what seemed possible in obtaining agreement 
among five Justices on a coherent theory of the law of libel and the 
First Amendment. In taking this approach I compromised somewhat 
my own views in the interest of obtaining a majority opinion rather than 
c ootinuing the fragmentation of the Court. In that respect we have a 
problem here somewhat analogous to the obscenity law situation prior 
to last Term. - . 
m I add one additional comment. Harry has volunteered the state-
ment that, if his vote were necessary to a majority position for the 
Court, he would seriOllSly consider joining my circulation in Gertz. 
He was careful to add, however, that he had not studied my circulation 
and was expressing a highly tentative view rather than anything like a 
firm intention. Consequently, I think it too speculative to count Harry 
as part of a majority for this case. 
~ ~ 
I shall be happy to discuss this futther at your convenience. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
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CHAM BERS O F 
JUSTICE B Y RON R . WHITE 
January 10, 1974 
Re: No. 72-617 - Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 
Dear Lewis: 
I agree with you that the plaintiff in this case 
should not be required to prove knowing falsehood or reck-
less disregard. But neither would I interpose a federal 
negligence standard that he must satisfy before he can 
recover under state libel law. Aside from situations 
involving public officials or public figures, I would leave 
libelous speech in its historic legal position--that is, 
unprotected by the First Amendment, along with obscenity, 
fighting words and other speech that is sufficiently 
violence prone. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. 250, 256-257 (1952); 
Chaplinsk~, 315 U.S. 568, 571-572 (1942); Cantwell, 310 U.S. 
296, 309- 10 (1940). As was the case in Metromedia, I am 
unaware of any satisfactory evidence or basis for further 
restricting state court power to protect private persons 
against reputation-damaging falsehoods published by the 
press or others. 
On the other hand, I would not care to suggest as a "? ~ 
general proposition that speech, negligently uttered and 
some way damaging to another, is unprotected. 
I thus will be in dissent from your remand for a new 
trial. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
fr 
Copies to Conference 
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Mr. John ._Teffries 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
DATE: January 18, 1974 
No. 72-617 Gertz v. Welch 
Bill Rehnquist informed me late yesterday that, on the basis of 
Bill also said that Byron thinks I did not follow the vote of the 
Conference, at which there was a majority vote - as he recorded it -
to reinstate the juflgment of the district court. 
It occurs to me that a letter along the lines of the attached draft 
might help to clear the atmosphere somewhat, I would like your views, 
and if we decide to go further I will perhaps wish to consult at least ~. 
one other colleague on the Court. 
~ ~ ._. 1..1 - UI 
I hope you will have the opportunity during the morning to 
pli!lsh up the letter, and have Sally or Gail run a second draft, double 
spaced with about three copies. 
' .. -·-
JCJJr/gg 1-18-74 
No. '72-617 Gertz v. Welch 
Dear Byr,oq: 
Thank you for ·.your letters stating your position in this 
troublesome case. In talking with Bill _Rehnquist late yesterday 
' 
I became aware u.at there may be some question as to what 
. . l 
prompted me to submit the opinion in its present form. Perhaps . . 
this l~tter will shed aome light. 
I hardly need siy that my notes from Conference, always 
. ' 
' 
incomplete and sometime ~ er~or, were especially unenlightening 
,, 
for this case. Indeed, I think the fact is that some of. the issues 
involved were not .specifically addressed in the Conference, ell:Cept 
perhaps tangentially by one or two Justices. . Against this background 
. . 
of a less than detailed' blueprint of a majority view, I proceeded 
substantially as follows: 
1. I assumed that we were addressing only First Amendment 
rights of the press. As I understand New York Times and its progeny, 
these decisions do not control the applic8:tion of the law of defamation 
\ 
to libellous statements made by non-media. speakers. 'lbe balancing . •·· . ~ 
, ~ f .. - .. 
2. 
of publtc and prlnte lnteresta may be different where tbe defeadant 
may not fairly be deemed a part of the media, especially where the 
non-media def•Ddant la not a public official or candidate for publtc 
oiftce·. 
2. We do not write upon a clean elate~ After nearly a 
' ' 
decade, and perbapa a dozen or in!,)re deetalona accepttag or applying 
. . 
it, I uaume that New York Time• la settled law wttb respect to 
media defamation of public off~lala and public figures. 
3. Tbe Rosenbloom pluraltty view would •~nd the New 
York Tlmea prtvtlep to media defama:tlon of private lndivt~la 
tnvomtd in matters of "general or public· interest." •It ts difficult 
to see any limits to what may be deemed a matter of "general or . ,, 
public interest", u tbe press Itself deter~tne• newaworthtneaa by 
' ,, 
the fact of publication. 1be one clear tmpresston from my nd es 
and memory ts that the Conference wlabed to disavow the extension 
•c• ' 
of New York·Tlmeaipropol!Ntd by ·tbe ·Roeenbloom plurality opinion. 
- ' ,-.~ , . ' .. 
• Tbls I have tried to do • 
• There· was· a comment or two u · to the poaslbllity of 
dtsttngutshtng Roaenbloom on its facts.. i cone luded tbta was not 
realistic and in any nenf. would not re10lye tile issue wbtcb prompted 
U8 to take this CRH• . 
' C • -
3. 
4. .Although the Conference decided not to follow the 
Rosenbloom plurality, it did not decide what coutttutional doctrine 
to anno1111Ce ln it• plaee. In the abaence of definitive guidance from 
the Conference and mindful of the -d to.fashion a majority view, I 
turned to tbe m11lttple and disparate oplntons by memera of the Court 
1n the cues followinl New York -Times. I wu convinced tbattbere 
• r 
wu ao ~rtty for a return to the common law rule of strict liabl~ity 
for defamation, at 1-t as applied to tbe press and broadcast media. 
' 
First, I peno•lly !llagree with tbat approach as a matter of poltcy · 
and 'thtnk it lncoulatent 'wtth the principles underlying New York Times. 
Second, 1bllJ'IOOd'• dtasenttng opinion in Rosenbloom made lt 
~ 
unmistakably c tear ta,t he and Potter would aot acquleeee 1n a return 
to strict Ua~tltty for defamation. Third, 1n view of tJle votes of the 
Chief Justice and Harry ln Rosenbloom-, . I thought tbat the. extreme 
position of the common law would be far less amenable to them tbaa 
• ... ,.: ..-j 
p •. , 
wou~d ~ mld41e grc,and ~,.ted,. 1n·t11e <1raft opinion. I thought 
•• • -i- • •' l • .;_ r .>' r "· ~ ' I 
Bill R~lllat'• primary concern wu to avoid the vaet extension of 
t r ~ · ., · · : ·, - , .·:, { 
New Yori: T~~ ••ed bl-ROMDbloom. Finally, your oplnlon 1n 
Roseabloom 184 me to. believe that .y~ bad DOt yet taken a position - . . 
on the broad• issues posed in that cue and in Gertz. • 
• I have not mentioned my Yery senior colleagues, Bill Douglas 
and. Bill _Brennan,. aa their views - aJtboagh not entirely in accord wttb 
eaeh other - are well known. 
t .. -
,. 
Altboagb_- thta e•rctae neceeaarlly hm>lved some readlnc of 
''tea leave•", and may lndeed have bNn a nd.areadtng, I concladed 
on the bula of the record that a majority of the Covt would favor, 
in a Gertz or RoNnblooDi type ettuatlon, allowtng -~ state• to ·~11 
auch rule of llab!ltt:, ~ they respectively deem appropriate, .•bort 
of maktJw the media ·guaraJU8· the truth of publications· often written 
or broadcast Wlder eztgent time preanre• and wttb ltttle or no 
; 
~. I , 
oipportuntty for careflll yertflcatton. ID &DJ event, I thought (and 
conttnue to bell•••> tbat this~ the only hope for a majority poattton. 
5. Tbta left the queetton of damage•. The district court ln 
tbta cue bu submitted the e~ to the Jury upon ~tructiona ~llowlDg 
''presumed" aa well u actual darn•pa. Thus, addresatng thle issue 
seemed ~•otdable. And again I bad very little _guidance either from 
my notes or recollection of what wu Aid at Conference. A• .P8rbapa 
you· recall, I personally -- on other occutons --,have expreaaed my 
own prete~nc•; for a broa~ darnage J-!ile _ in ltbel cues and woald be 
-~ ,· i , ,, 1 r , . .,. ~' . . i,. k • -· 
wtllillg. to· allow punitive darnages in accordance wttb the common law 
View:tbat tills would have ~_'propbylactlc ._effect OD the media. But again, 
~ . • t. t, 
although the. pldance from ~t opintoDS was by no meana u clear, 
• . I • • 
I kniew-from the dlaNnt in RONnbloom that Potter and Thurgood felt 
quite strongly that neither prea~ed nor pwdttve da!D9PS are 
allowable la private lttlptton of thla kind. As a practical matter, I 
t: .. , --
coDCluded tbat where actual darnapa are defined l9· lDClude -~. as 
they should i,,, '!'"• tnjury to reputation, standing ' tn the community, 
' , 
and personal bwntllatlon and embarrassment, juries'. have a way 
5. 
of cominl to a Jut reault in libel and slander cases wt~t too 
much regard to what the damaps are ~led~ On·tbe ,other aide .of 
' ' j s ~· • 
' ' 
tbe ledger, it ta trqe tbat an occaatQnal Jury will levy what ln effect 
' ' . 
ta.an outrapoas penalty or ~tne, when allowed to do so under tbe 
punltt,e-eta_~•• doctrine. This sort of poeaibility ~Y well ~ a 
burden on,tbe tan enrctae of media First Amen<!~•• rights. I 
' 
WU aceordlngly wtlltng to ·Rbordtnate my own personal preference 
to a viewpoint wblcb bas both substantive mer~t u well'aa strong support 
from ~ 'only members of tbe Co~ ~ .. bad announced a poaition 
on. t":his ta~ue. 
The foregotng ts, I am afrald, a far too ·•'long winded" 
u:poattion of bow I attempted to rationalize and harmonize vtewa . 
which •- wltli alt re~t_. •7· ,-omet~~ have seemed UDC tear to me. 
(. 1··· ii 1 l( 1 
r r· } ! 
No doubt we all a,ree tbat1i uiajortt)' poattton ls highly desirable 
' -::-. ,r.,: ~... ,....-:. r·•'',•. ,t. a ~- l 
U tbla·CaD -be ~becl'wltbout' sacrUlce of a prtnctpled view of a 
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Thank you for your letters stating your position in this 
troublesome case. In talking with Bill Rehnquist late yesterday 
I became aware that there may be some question as to what 
prompted me to submit the opinion in its present form. Perhaps 
this letter will shed some light. 
I hardly need say that my notes from Conference, always 
incomplete and sometime in error, were especially unenlightening 
for this case. Indeed, I think the fact is that some of the issues 
involved were not specifically addressed in the Conference, except 
perhaps tangentially by one or two Justices. Against this background 
of a less than detailed blueprint of a majority view, I proceeded 
substantially as follows: 
1. I assumed that we were addressing only First Amendment 
rights of the press. As I understand New York Times and its progeny, 
these decisions do not control the application of the law of defamation 
to libellous statements made by non-media speakers. The balancing 
2. 
of public and private interests may be different where the defendant 
may not fairly be deemed a part of the media, especially where the 
non-media defendant is not a public official or candidate for public 
office. 
2. We do not write upon a clean slate. After nearly a 
decade, and perhaps a dozen or more decisions accepting or applying 
it, I assume that New York Times is settled law with respect to 
media defamation of public officials and public figures. 
3. The Rosenbloom plurality view would extend the New 
York Times privilege to media defamation of private individuals 
involved in matters of "general or public interest." It is difficult 
to see any limits to what may be deemed a matter of "general or 
public interest", as the press itself determines newsworthiness by 
the fact of publication. The one clear impression from my nc:tes 
and memory is that the Conference wished to disavow the extension 
of New York Times proposed by the Rosenbloom plurality opinion. 
* This I have tried to do. 
* There was a comment or two as to the possibility of 
distinguishing Rosenbloom on its facts. I cone luded this was not 
realistic and in any event would not resolve the issue which prompted 
us to take this case. 
4. Although the Conference decided not to follow the 
Rosenbloom plurality, it did not decide what constitutional doctrine 
to announce in its place. In the absence of definitive guidance from 
3. 
the Conference and mindful of the need to fashion a majority view, I 
turned to the multiple and disparate opinions by meJ:ers of the Court 
in the cases following New York Times. I was convinced that there 
was no majority for a return to the common law rule of strict liability 
for defamation, at least as applied to the press and broadcast media. 
First , I personally disagree with that approach as a matter of policy 
and think it inconsistent with the principles underlying New York Times. 
Second , Thurgood's dissenting opinion in Rosenbloom made it 
unmistakably clear that he and Potter would not acquiesce in a return 
to strict liability for defamation. Third, in view of the votes of the 
Chief Justice and Harry in Rosenbloom, I thought that the extreme 
position of the common law would be far less amenable to them than 
would the middle ground reflected in the draft opinion. I thought 
Bill Rehnquist' s primary concern was to avoid the vast extension of 
New York Times suggested in Rosenbloom. Finally, your opinion in 
Rosenbloom led me to believe that you had not yet taken a position 
on the broad issues posed in that case and in Gertz. * 
* I have not mentioned my very senior colleagues, Bill Douglas 
and Bill Brennan, as their views - although not entirely in accord with 
each other - are well known. 
4. 
Although this exercise necessarily involved some reading of 
"tea leaves", and may indeed have been a misreading, I concluded 
on the basis of the record that a majority of the Court would favor, 
in a Gertz or Rosenbloom type situation, allowing the states to apply 
such rule of liability as they respectively deem appropriate, short 
of making the media guarantee the truth of publications often written 
or broadcast under exigent time pressures and with little or no 
opportunity for careful verification. In any event, I thought (and 
continue to believe) that this was the only hope for a majority position. 
5. This left the question of damages. The district court in 
this case has submitted the case to the jury upon instructions allowing 
"presumed" as well as actual damages. Thus, addressing this issue 
seemed unavoidable. And again I had very little guidance either from 
my notes or recollection of what was said at Conference. As perhaps 
you recall, I personally -- on other occasions -- have expressed my 
own preference for a broad damage rule in libel cases and would be 
willing to allow punitive damages in accordance with the common law 
view that this would have a prophylactic effect on the media. But again, 
although the guidance from past opinions was by no means •clear, 
I knew from the dissent in Rosenbloom that Potter and Thurgood felt 
quite strongly that neither presumed nor punitive damages are 
allowable in private litigation of this kind. As a practical matter, I 
concluded that where actual damages are defined to include -- as 
they should be -- injury to reputation, standing in the community, 
and personal humiliation and embarrassment, juries have a way 
5. 
of coming to a just result in libel and slander cases without too 
much regard to what the damages are labeled. On the other side of 
the ledger, it is true that an occasional jury will levy what in effect 
is an outrageous penalty or fine, when allowed to do so under the 
punitive damages doctrine. This sort of possibility may well be a 
burden on the full exercise of media First Amendment rights. I 
was accordingly willing to subordinate my own personal preference 
to a viewpoint which has both substantive merit as well as strong support 
from the only members of the Court who had announced a position 
on this issue. 
The foregoing is, I am afraid, a far too "long winded" 
exposition of how I attempted to rationalize and harmonize views 
which -- with all respect -- sometimes have seemed unclear to me. 
No doubt we all agree that a majority position is highly desirable 
if this can be reached without sacrifice of a principled view of a 
Justice. I wrote the circulated opinion with this goal in mind. 
.. ~. 
1 '), .,,,,1 
NOTE A 
Our caveat against strict liability is the principal 
point of departure for MR. JUSTICE WHITE'S dissent. Post , 
at 16-20 . He would hold that a publisher or broadcaster may 
be held liable for defamation of a private citizen even though 
the subject matter of the libel was an issue of public concern 
and even though _the publisher or broadcaster took every con-
ceivable precaution to ensure its accuracy. In his v iew, one 
who publishes a statement that later turns out to be i naccurate 
can never be "without fault" in any meaningful sense, f or 
"[i]t is he who circulated a falsehood .t hat he was not required 
to publish . " Post, at 19 (emphasis added). The problem with 
this view, as we see it, is that it accords no weight what -
ever to the First Amendment va lues i mpl i cated by a rule 
requiring the media to guarantee t he accuracy of all factual 
assertions and contradicts the essential premi se underlying 
New York Times and every subsequent decision of this Cour t . 
This fundamental precept is that the prospect of liability f or 
innocent error will induce a cautious and restrictive exer cise 
of the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of speech ,1and 
press: "Allowance of the defense of truth, with the bur den 
of proving it on the defendant, does not mean that only fal se 
speech will be deterred . " New York Times Co. v. Sul l i van , 
376 U. S . , at 279 . 
2. 
This core proposition - recognition that the unrestrained 
rigor of the corrnnon law of libel does touch First Amendment 
concerns - is well established in our precedents. In fact, 
until today no Member of the Court had suggested either in 
New York Times or in any of its numerous progeny, that due 
regard for the constitutional freedoms of speech and press 
could tolerate the imposition of strict liability for media 
publication of a defamatory falsehood, at least where an 
issue of public or general interest is involved. }1:R. JUSTICE 
WHITE would avoid the force of the unanimous authority on 
this point by a selective reading of prior decisions. He 
characterizes New York Times as purely and simply a case 
of seditious libel . Post, at 14. Aside from the fact that 
we do not read that decision so narrowly, the rationale of 
seditious libel is certainly inapplicable to Curtis Pub l ishing 
Co. v. Butts, supra . In that case five Members of the Court, 
including }1:R. JUSTICE WHITE, voted to extend the full protection 
of the knowing-or-reckless-falsity standard to media defamers 
of a class of persons having no connection with the govern-
ment. Although }1:R. JUSTICE WHITE suggests at one point that 
would continue to abide by the extension of the New York 
Times privilege to public figures, post, at 26, the full 
thrust of his dissent - as we read it - undercuts that 
suggestion. Significantly, we think, even the four Justices 
who dissented from the expansion of the knowing-or-reckless-
I • • 
3. 
falsity standard to public figures did not embrace the view 
now proposed by MR . JUSTICE WHITE . Instead, they concluded 
that media defamers of public persons could be held liable 
only on a showing of gross negligence . Finally in Rosenbloom 
v . Metromedia, Inc . , supra, MR. JUSTICE WHITE'S concurring 
opinion would have applied the New Y~rk Times privilege to 
media defamation of an individual who was neither a public 
official nor a public figure. His opinion states that the 
knowing-or- reckless-falsity standard should apply to media 
"corrnnent upon the official actions of public servants" 
including mere arrests by police - a conclusion that would 
significantly extend New York Times . Again there was not 
a single Justice who concluded that the imposition of money 
damages on the basis of strict liability was constitutionally 
permissible in that case. And although we granted this case 
to resolve the uncertainty created by the fractured Court 
in Rosenbloom, MR. JUSTICE WHITE'S dissent does not mention 
that decision . 
In sum, MR. JUSTICE WHITE'S opinion today ably presents 
a viewpoint that had wide support prior to New York Times. 
We think, however, that its basic rationale is directly 
contrary to the decade of precedents of this Court since 
1964. 
iii lfp/ss 
Memo to John Jeffries 
No. 72-617 Gertz v. Welch 
avc12-~/zdq 
~ .~~ _/2~-A\ 
As I read Justice White's dissent for the second time, 
I am dictating random thoughts as they occur to me. Most 
of these are within the ambit of the discussions you and 
I already have had about his opinion. I thought it might be 
helpful, however, if I record in a memorandum - in no order 
of priority or importance - what can be a rough checklist 
of points to consider for the changes to be made in our 
opinion. 
1. The first three paragraphs in the dissent containx 
a number of sweeping generalizations that are misleading: 
(i) the few exceptions to the settled law of libel since 
1964 "are limited to libels of public officials and public 
figures" (ignoring Rosenbloom); (ii) we have declared 
unconstitutional "the prevailing defamation law in all or 
most of the 50 statesir; (iii) this is true with respect to 
each and every defamation actionir - apparently without 
regard to whether the action is against the media or a 
defendant (e.g., a corporation, union or individual) unrelated 
to the media; that, "scuttling the libel laws of the states 
in such wholesale fashion", we have departed from "the 
2. 
settled ~XRKR«HXX precedents of this Court"; and that the 
Court's opinion "ill considered and an extravagant exercise 
of the power entrusted to this Court'r. 
Quite a mouthful for a page and a half! Yet, this 
pretty well sunnnarizes the thrust of the dissent, and puts 
us to the choice as to how much of this we should answer and 
in what detail. I still incline to the view, rather than 
a seriatim response, we should dispose of it in broad terms 
generally as follows: 
(a) The dissent focuses on the law of libel prior 
to New York Times. The "settled precedants" which the 
Court is now accused of scuttling are those which 
predated Hew York Times. The dissent ignores - quite 
literally almost entirely - the relevant decisions of 
this Court over the past ten years. Moreover, the tone 
of the dissent reflects (despite a disclaimer) a deep 
dissatisfaction with New York Times even thot:gh the 
author of that dissent joined in the decision. Even 
more remar~able, Justice White joined Chief Justice 
Warren in the opinion which extended New York Times 
to include public figures. Justice White's vote was 
3. 
decisive in Curtis Publishing/Walker, as four Justices 
did not think the First Amendment required that the 
media be protected by the New York Times standard with 
respect to defamation of public officials. In any event, 
and regardless of who voted for what, the present dissenting 
opinion in our case is predicated on pre-1964 law which 
it would now "sweep aside''. 
(b) Perhaps we should also reiterate in this 
rebuttal of the dissent's basic posture that the purpose 
of our taking this case was to resolve the uncertainty 
created - not by New York Times or even Curtis Publishing/ 
Walker but by Rosenbloom, where three Justices would RX][R 
R have extended New York Times to every case involving 
a matter of public interest (which means vitually ~ every 
case, as the mere publication itself creates presumptive 
implications of a public interest. We might eventti.ke 
note of the fact that White's contribution to Rosenbloom 
was that it was governed by New York Times because police 
("public officials") seized hxmd1:issmxxxksEkxx:aRa 
Rosenbloom's books and magazines. If the mere injection 
4. 
of police action is sufficient to trigger the New York 
Times standard (as White evidently believes), he has 
truly opened the door to perhaps the widest expansion of 
New York Times yet proposed. It could be argued in this 
case, since police were implicated in a wide variety of 
ways as well as other public officials such as the 
E coroner, White would be compelled by his rationale 
to impose the New York Times standard. 
*K~ (c) Apart from an effective advocacy job of 
making it appear that the Court has overthrown 200 
years of settled precedent, White's opinion stings us 
most on two rather specific issues: (i) our requirementxx 
of a showing of some XEX fault; and (ii) our position on 
damages. As to the first of these, it is Dlq§.EXXRX 
important for us to show that our position on fault 
reflects an evolution of the Court's thinking - HHX 
an evolution leading to a rational balancing of the 
interests that are implicated. There were four 
Justices (Harlan, Clark, Stewart and Fortas) who 
5. 
proposed an intermediate standard between New York Times and 
strict 
xxx±Ek liability in Harlan's Curtis Publishing Company 
opinion. As we have already noted in our opinion, 
Harlan, Marshall and Stewart proposed a negligence 
standard in Rosenbloom. We might also point out, as 
you suggest John, that quite apart from First Amendment 
considerations it is difficult to perceive the logic 
of accepting the historic, common law tort rule based 
on »R negligence and at the same time shedding crocodile 
tears over the helpless victim of a MRxmxx± defamation 
who is required to prove some fault before recovering 
damages. 
I find White's discussion of the standard of liability 
quite confusing at various places in the dissent. Take 
a look at page 17 where he puts, with horror, the 
following case: a defamation is published knowing that 
it will inflict injury, but believing that it was truthful. 
It turns out to have been false. White, without quite 
saying so, assumes that our opinion would relieve the 
publisher from liability without more. The answer, 
unless I misconceive my sp own opinion, is that if the 
6. 
publisher fails to exercise due care in veryifying the 
truth of what he published, he is of course liable. His 
good faith belief that it was truthful is irrelevant in 
the absence of taking due care with respect to kx what 
is clearly injurious. 
(c) The second focal point of attackby the dissent 
is on our damage position. Here, as we have discussed, 
we must make changes which we redefine our position with 
respect to presumed or general damages. We will hold 
firm as to punitive damages. 
Both with respect to what we may say in response 
on the standard of liability and the type and measure 
of damages, I suggest that you check the Restatement of 
forts - on which White relies x so fulsomely. First, 
be sure that you have the latest draft, and then take 
a look at the connnentary as well as the "black letter" 
provisions applicable to libel. I will be surprised 
if there is not some criticism of the strict liability 
rule, and perhaps of punitive damages. It may be, also, 
that you can find a moderate EX articulation of a rule 
with respect to presumed damages. I would be in a ' 
. . 
7. 
x stronger position with some of my Brothers if we have 
at least some authority for our ultimate formulation of 
a rationale rule with respect to damages that will not 
leave the plaintiff (especially the individual with no 
great reputation) with a nominal award where there has 
been a wrongful and serious defamation, widely circulated. 
Justice White construes our opinion to apply the 
New York Times standard of malice where the defamation 
of deliberately published with ill will and an attempt 
to injure. (Dissent, p. 7). I suppose that, framed in 
this way, the defamation would in fact meet the New York 
Times standard. But I recall our discussions of Old 
Dominion, where it was conceded that the purpose of the 
publication was to injure the ,r scabs" and the ill will 
was perfectly obvious. Assuming a defamation publication 
in these circumstances, what do you think the test should 
be with respect to a private individual - and how do you 
construe our opinion? 
-
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
$5u.pum:t {!Jllmi ttf tJrt ~u~ $5taug 
'Jfag4ingfan. ~- QJ. 2!lffe~~ 
January 22, 1974 
Re: No. 72-617 - Gertz v. Welch 
Dear Lewis: 
I will await further developments in this case 
before acting. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
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I ever so much appreciate your letter of February 20, and 
say without hesitation that the change which you suggest is entirely 
agreeable to me. ~ · : , ,t,•,•·· .,·;,,, -~' _ ,.r:; __ 
y ~ I -;~• -~ _,_:_, ';~\ ·:~~~~;-~ ~- ::rt~~:~-~-~: ~~ 
_,"?-· ...... -'i 
' ' . I will include it in ,the next circulation: of ·my opinion. ><'I· ' ' . ' •-t . 
(\:.,.,,.·-. 
" . .. • 
In an accidental conversation with Harry yesterchiyl 1fternoon, 
and in response to his inquiry as to where matters stood on Gertz, 
I advised Harry of your letter. ~He expressed satisf~ction and 
ne.mtrat'eJ:f his present intention to join the four ofus if necessary 
for a Court. But Harry is still troubled by the inconsistency with 
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April 2, 1974 
No. 72-617 Gertz v. Welch 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I intend to make some response, briefly I hope, to the 
dissenting opinion circulated today by Byron. 
I will try to give this some priority. 





Mr. John Jeffries 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
l'J / t/7 Gertz 
DATE: April 2, 1974 
Just off the "hot line" is a call received from Justice 
Stewart, who said he had spent the mmoo:mimgum reviewing Byron's 
opinion. 
He connnenced the conversation by saying, as you did, that 
the dissent is powerful. He added that there was a good deal 
of "merit" to it. However, in the course of a lengthy tele-
phone talk, Justice Stewart stated that he is staying with us 
100% on the standard of liability, but would like for us to 
relax our position as to damages. 
I will discuss this with you, but his position is that 
a valid distinction may be made between punitive damages 
("civil fines", as he calls them) and the presumption of injury 
to reputation resulting from per~ defamation. He would like 
us to acconnnodate this view, which I believe reflects Justice 
Stewart's personal opinion. He thinks this will be acceptable 
to Justice Marshall. 
Otherwise, he thinks our "Court" may be in real jeopardy. 
As you know, this is not fa·r from my own personal thinking. 
I have been seeking middle ground that will attract a court 
without compromising any principle that I consider fundamental. 







Mr. John Jeffries 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
'; 2- I, /7 
Gertz 
DATE: April 2, 1974 
Take a look at what at what is said in Linn v. Plant 
Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, at 65, with respect to the elements 
of damages recoverable in a libel suit. 
Although it is not entirely clear whether Jastice Clark 
was talking only about actions libelous per seat common law, 
his language is broad enough perhaps to encompass any actionable 
libel under our ne~ligence test. In tightening up our opinion 
Q.,,...~ • t.l'( 
in response to ~ tt:t;;:ett&llidit.~, we might add in a footnote 
keyed to our discussion of actual damages a couple of s~ntences 
in the second full paragraph of page 65 of Linn. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 
.:' .... 4/9/74 
I) 1, , t.11 
NOTE A 
~ :r 
Our caveat against strict liability is the principal 
point of departure for MR. JUSTICE WHITE'S dissent. Post, 
at 16-20 . He would hold that a publisher or broadcaster may 
be held liable for defamation of a private citizen even though 
the subject matter of the libel was an issue of public concern 
and even though the publisher or broadcaster took every con-
ceivable precaution to ensure its accuracy. In his view, one 
who publishes a statement that later turns out to be inaccurate 
can never be "without fault" in any meaningful sense, for 
"[i]t is he who circulated a falsehood .that he was not required 
to publish." Post, at 19 (emphasis added). The problem with 
this view, as we see it, is that it accords no weight what-
ever to the First Amendment values implicated by a rule 
requiring the media to guarantee the accuracy of all factual 
assertions and contradicts the essential premise underlying 
New York Times and every subsequent decision of this Court. 
This fundamental precept is that the prospect of liability for 
innocent error will induce a cautious and restrictive exercise 
of the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of speech ,iand 
press: "Allowance of the defense of truth, with the burden 
of proving it on the defendant, does not mean that only false 
speech will be deterred." New York Times Co. v . Sullivan, 
376 U.S., at 279. 
. , .... 
~ - ,If' ........ . 
2. 
This core proposition - recognition that the unrestrained 
rigor of the connnon law of libel does touch First Amendment 
concerns - is well established in our precedents. In fact, 
until today no Member of the Court had suggested either in 
New York Times or in any of its numerous progeny, that due 
regard for the constitutional freedoms of speech and press 
could tolerate the imposition of strict liability for media 
publication of a defamatory falsehood, at least where an 
issue of public or general interest is involved. MR. JUSTICE 
WHITE would avoid the force of the unanimous authority on 
this point by a selective reading of prior decisions. He 
characterizes New York Times as purely and simply a case 
of seditious libel. Post, at 14. Aside from the fact that 
we do not read that decision so narrowly, the rationale of 
seditious libel is certainly inapplicable to Curtis Publishing 
Co. v. Butts, supra. In that case five Members of the Court, 
including MR. JUSTICE WHITE, voted to extend the full protection 
of the knowing-or-reckless-falsity standard to media defamers 
of a class of persons having no connection with the govern-
ment. Although MR. JUSTICE WHITE suggests at one point that 
hewould continue to abide by the extension of the New York 
Times privilege to public figures, post, at 26, the full 
thrust of his dissent - as we read it - undercuts that 
suggestion. Significantly, we think, even the four Justices 
who dissented from the expansion of the knowing-or-reckless-
. ./ ' -
3. 
falsity standard to public figures did not embrace the view 
now proposed by MR. JUSTICE WHITE. Instead, they concluded 
that media defamers of public persons could be held liable 
only on a showing of gross negligence. Finally in Rosenbloom 
v. Metromedia, Inc., supra, MR. JUSTICE WHITE'S concurring 
opinion would have applied the New York Times privilege to 
media defamation of an individual who was neither a public 
official nor a public figure. His opinion states that the 
knowing-or-reckless-falsity standard should apply to media 
"corrnnent upon the official actions of public servants" 
including mere arrests by police - a conclusion that would 
significantly extend New York Times. Again there was not 
a single Justice who concluded that the imposition of money 
damages on the basis of strict liability was constitutionally 
permissible in that case. And although we granted this case 
to resolve the uncertainty created by the fractured Court 
in Rosenbloom, MR. JUSTICE WHITE'S dissent does not mention 
that decision. 
In sum, MR. JUSTICE WHITE'S opinion today ably presents 
a viewpoint that had wide support prior to New York Times. 
We think, however, that its basic rationale is directly 
contrary to the decade of precedents of this Court since 
1964. 
- CHAMBERS OF 
~ttttt <qomt '1f t1r.t ~a- ~m.ttg 
JhtsJtittghttt. ,. (q. 2.llffe~, 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
April 24, 1974 
Dear Lewis: 
Re: No. 72-617 - Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 
This is what I have in mind. I shall not circulate 
it until I have your reaction. 
Sincerely, 
;,,,,_ 
Mr. Justice Powell 
- C HAM BERS O F 
.:§uprttttt (!f ltltri ttf t4t ~th .:§taf.tg 
~as!r:ttg~ ~. (!f. 21lffe'1$ 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
April 25, 1974 
Re: No. 72-617 - Gertz v. Welch 
Dear Lewis: 
I have given some extended thought to the footnote 10 
in this opinion, which you added in your circulation of 
April 12th. I feel it reaffirms New York Times more emphatically 
than the body of the opinion does, and much more emphatically 
than I would be willing to do. I feel, therefore, that if it 
remains in the opinion, I cannot continue to be with you. 
Sincerely, 
. r¥V 
Mr. Justice Powell 
LFP/gg 4-26-74 Revised Footnote 10 
7 l · fr, J 1 ~ 
Our caveat against strict liability is the 
principal point of departure for MR. JUSTICE WHITE's 
dissent. Post, at 16-20. He would hold that a publiaher 
~ 
or braadcaster may be held liable for defamation of a 
private citizen even though the subject matter of the libel 
was an issue of public concern and even though the publisher 
or broadcaster took every conceivable precaution to ensure 
its accuracy. In his view, one who publishes a statement 
that later turns out to be inaccurate can never be "without 
faalt" in any meaningful sense, for "[i)t is he who 
circulated a falsehood that he was not required to publish." 
Post, at 19 (emphasis added). MR. JUSTICE WHITE characterizes 
New York Times as simply a case of seditious libel. Post, at 
14. But the rationale of seditious libel is certainly 
inapplicable to Curtis Publishing Co . v. Butts, supra. In 
that case five Members of the Court, including MR. JUSTICE 
WHITE, voted to extend the full protection of the knowing-
or-reckless falsity standard to media defamers of persons 
identified as public figures even though they have no 
connection with the Govermnent. Although MR. JUSTICE WHITE 
suggests at one point that he would continue to abide by 
the extension of the New York Times privilege to public 
figures, post, at 26, the full thrust of the dissent - as 
• 
- •• 
we read it - contradicts that suggestion. Finally in 
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc . , supra , MR. JUSTICE WHITE's 
concurring opinion would have applied the New York Times 
privilege to media defamation of an individual who was 
neither a public official nor a public figure . His opinion 
states that the knowing-or-reckless-falsity standard should 
apply to media "connnent upon the official actions of public 
servants," including mere arrests by police - a conclusion 
that would significantly extend New York Times . 
- ~u.p-rtutt (!f ttttrl of tlrt ~b ~taus ,.-asqin:ghtn. J. (!f. 21lffe'l, 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE June 5, 1974 
PERSONAL 
Re: 72-617 - Gertz v. Welch 
Dear Lewis: 
As you know, I have deferred action on your case until I had the 
Miami Herald problems sorted out, and that process is just about 
complete. 
Bill Brennan has sent me a personal memo indicating he will join 
my Miami Herald opinion provided I state that we do not reach nor 
decide the question of the validity or constitutionality of right-to-
reply laws generally. I am a little puzzled by his request since 
it seems to me that as it now stands the Miami Herald opinion 
(revised copy circulated t9day) does not leave much room for 
right-to-reply statutes w hich are mandatory. 
What I have had in mind is that Gertz, on its face at least, 
eliminates punitive damages whi.ch leaves some elbow room for 
a jury as to malice. I am not at all certain about the whole 
problem yet, but I would appreciate your giving some thought to 
the idea of saying -- if you agree with it - - that nothing in the 
holding impairs the right of the states to have statutes (such as 
Minnesota and the other states decided by Byron's opinion) 
allowing a newspaper to avoid all but compensatory damages by 
publishing a retraction. This may present some difficulties in 
light of your treatment of the punitive damage-compensatory 
damage standard. 
When you have had a chance to think about this, I would like to 
discuss it with you as Gertz should probably be coming down 
quite soon. 





June 6, 1974 
No. 72-617 Gertz v. Welch 
Dear Chief: 
Thank you for your note about a possible relationship 
between Miami Herald and Gertz on the point you mentioned. 
Gertz, as written, does not eliminate punitive damages 
in a libel action against a newspaper where malice is proved 
in conformity with the New York Times standard. But Gertz 
would not impair the validity of a state statute, such as 
you suggest, which allows a newspaper to avoid punitive 
damages by publishing a retraction. 
As you will recall, Gertz draws a distinction (and in 
this respect retreats from the prevailing understanding of 
Metromedia) between public officials and public figures, on 
the one hand, and all other persons who are defamed by the 
media. A mere showing that the defamation occurred in 
connection with a matter of public interest would no longer 
be sufficient to invoke the harsh New York Times rule. 
But as to public officials and public figures, the 
New York Times rule - consistently followed by the Court 
for the past decade - would remain in effect requiring a 
plaintiff to show publication of the defamation with knowledge 
of falsity or with reckless disregard of the truth. If this 
type of malice were shown, punitive damages could be ~ver~ru 
in the absence of s state statute to the contrary. 
In all other cases (not involving public officials or 
figures) Gertz would significantly relax the New York Times 
standard of liability by allowing each state to prescribe 
its own standard short of liability without fault. 
Returning to the question raised in your letter, it would 
seem to me appropriate to add a note to your opinion along the 
.. 
- - 2 -
lines you suggest, namely, that nothing in the holding impairs 
the right of the states to proscribe punitive damages where 
the newspaper publishes a retraction. As Gertz does not get 
into this area at all, it would be awkward and gratuitous -
it seems to me - to make a reference to retraction statutes 
in that case. 
I think your Miami Herald opinion is excellent and am 
sending you a join note. 
Sincerely, 






Porter v. Gaam Publications, Inc . , et al 
Berry v . Natl . Broadcasting Co . 
Weston v . Arkansas 
Cantrell; v. Forest City Publishing Co., et al 
These cases appear on Page 5 of the June 21st 
Conference List. They have been held for No. 72-617, 
Gertz v . Robt . Welch, Inc . 
No . 72-1509, Porter v . Guam Publications, Inc., et al. 
This is a fairly ordinary libel case involvinry 
respondents' newspaper article concerning petitioner?s 
arrest for auto theft. Petitioner asserts that the article 
misdescribed the offense as theft of a cash box and that it 
implied his guilt. The DC entered summary judgment for , 
respondents on the ground that the article was based on 
the public record and did not imply petitioner's guilt and 
that it was therefore privileged under Guam law. The CA 9 
affirmed on the ~round that petitioner ' s complaint failed 
to allege that any inaccuracy was published with knowledge 
of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth. 
Since the CA decided this case under the authority of the 
pluratity opinion in Rosenbloom v . Metromedia, Inc . , 403 
U.S. 29 (1971), I will vote to vacate and remand for 
reconsideration in light of Gertz . 
No. 73-467 1 Berry v. Natl. Broadcasting Co. 
This is a diversity action for "false light" 
invasion of privacy rather than for defamation. NBC 
broadcast a news documentary on the cultural problems 
of American Indians. The program dealt at length with 
the life of Thomas White Hawk, an Indian who had been 
convicted of murdering a white man and sentenced to 
death (later commuted). The final three minutes dealt 
with petitioner, a white man who shot and killed an 
Indian named Norman Little Brave in an unrelated incident 
some two years later. Petitioner was tried for murder 
and acquitted on a plea of self-defense. The NBC account 
of petitioner's trial and acquittal was "unsympathetic . " 
It was included in the broadcast to suggest that ''soroe 
people felt that there was a double standard of justice 
in South Dakata ." Although this message was con,eyed 
entirely by innuendo rather than by express staterrent , 
reasonable people could and did assume that petitioner 
had been a wrongful beneficiary of the alleged double 
standard. 
3 
Petitioner sued under the "false light" aspect of 
2. 
the cormnon law tort of invasion of privacy. The affirmative 
inaccuracies in the broadcast were trivial And certainly 
not defamatory to petitioner (incorrect statement that 
White Hawk ' s defense counsel had been out of law school 
only six months and misidentification of Little Brave's 
stepmother as his mother). Greater reliance WAS placen 
on the omissions that allegedly contributed to the " f~lse 
light." These included Little Brave's history of violent 
assault and two instances of dismissals of murder charges 
against Indians other than White Hawk. 
Petitioner won a verdict of $25,000 in the trial 
court, but the CA 8 reversed. It noted that NBC did not 
show all the evidence of Berry's innocence but that it 
had no obligation to do so. Relying generally on the 
precedents of this Court, the CA held that "the proof 
that persons did infer that [petitioner] was the wrongful 
beneficiary of a double standard, and the proof of 
irrelevant inaccuracies , together fall short of establishing 
the 'malice' needed to sustain a verdict agiinst a broad-
caster in light of the dictates of the First Amendment." 
Gertz does not control this case. The false 
statements of fact in the broadcast did not defame petitioner, 
and the case has not been tried as an action for libel. It 
3. 
is also not a privacy action in the traditional sense , 
for the broadcast was based entirely on r.ublicly- • 
available information. Rather, it is a 'false light" • 
case reminiscent of Time, Inc . v . Hill, 385 U. S. 374 · 
(19671. I will vote t o deny unless the Court decides to 
grant cert in No. 73-5520 , Cantrell v . Forest City 
Publishing Co . , et al, in which case I would also grant 
this case and set the two for argument together . 
No . 73-5520 1 Cantrell v . Forest City Publishing Co., et al 
This is another "false light" case. -, It involves · 
a human interest story on the Cantrell family. Mr. ,~ 
Cantrell was killed in the collapse of a bridge across 
the Ohio River at Point Pleasant, W. Va. His funeral was 
covered in the Cleveland Plain Dealer as a news feature. 
Some months later a reporter-photographer team returned 
to the Cantrell home to do a follow-up feature. Mrs. 
Cantrell was not at home, but the reporter talked to the 
children while the photographer took photographs of the 
home and family. It is not clear how the newsmen gained 
entry to the home, but apparently the children opened 
the door when they saw the men coming across a field. 
One child testified that they were neither invited in nor 
asked to le~ve. The resulting story upset ~rs. Cantrell. 
In a fairly melodramatic way the article emphasized the 
poverty o~
7
~he Cantrell family, and the accompanying 
photographs ~aepicted the home as run-down and the children 
as untidy. The article contained a number of ,inaccuracies, 
but they are nowhere specified . 
... ... 
Mrs. Cantrell brought suit for herself and her 
children, (all save one were later dismissed), claiming 
defamation, invasion of privacy by the intrusion of the 
newsmen into their home, and "false light'! portrayal -
of their con<lition to the public. As the 'litigation ~ 
developed, the first two claims wrapped out. The 
defamation claim was never submitted to the jury. The 
intrusion theory was apparently not relied on at trial, 
probably because of a failure of proof . It is not clear 
whether the newsmen were entitled to enter on the implied 
invitation and consent of the children . One may well 
doubt it. But Mrs . Cantrell claimed no injury from the 
intrusion itself; it was the 
publicity that upset her. Thus it seems 
down to a "false light" case. ; 
The CA reviewed the precedents of this Court 
from New York Times through Rosenbloom but relied 
principally on Time, Inc. v. Hill. Finding that case 
controlling the CA reversed ~judgment in favor of 
the Cantrelis because there was no evidence of knowledge 
of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth. 
Again Gertz does not control . For me, "false light" 
statutes raise difficult First Amendment problems . While 
I believe that we mus t address the issue at some point, 
I am inclined to wait until the dust has settled from 
Gertz and then to take a case, unlike this one, that does 
not involve any suggestion of intrusiva conduct that may 
be actionable as an invasion of privacy without regard 
to the First Amendment . 
"~~~ _,~n 
~1 
-This appeal involves the constitutionality of the 
Arkansas criminal libel statute . Appellant entered a 
demurrer to a charge of criminal libel, claiming that 
the statute is unconstitutionally vague. The trial court 
sustained the demurrer, but the state Sup Ct reversed 
and remanded. foret,-,. trial . Appellant claims that this is 
.a final judgment·· under Mills v . Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 
(1966), where the Court found that a state Sup Ct order 
remanding for trial was a final judgment because the 
defendant-appellant had no defense other than the 
constitutionalcllaim finally decided by the state courts. 
In my view, Mills is inapposite, for here appellant has 
defenses that he may raise at trial -- most notably, that 
because there is no compensatory interest in enforcing 
criminal ;l1bel law; Gertz is inapplicable, and the State 
must .p'rove ~,.knowl_edge of falsity or reckless disregard 
for the ~truth. Cf. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 
(1964). •r. Because such proof must await trial, I beliave 
that we are without jurisdiction to hear this appeal and 
will therefore vote to dismiss for want of a substantial 
federal question. ~ 
ttf' , ,.. - .. 
- '11lis case comes to us on writ of certiorari to the . ' United States Court if. Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 
It involves a diversity libel action by a reputable 
attorney against a magazine· that falsely labelled him a 
Leninist and a Coamuniat-fronter. 
The District Court, ·denying recovery, held that the 
subject of the magazine article was a matter of public 
, . 
interest, and therefore applied the strict standard of 
New York Times v. Sullivan, a case decided here in 1965. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed. 
In the .New York Times case, this :Court held for the 
first time that where a public official was the plaintiff 
in a libel case it -was necessary for .him to prove. 
knowledge of ·falsity or reckless disregard of trut~. 
The New York Times standard subsequently was extended to 
apply to public figures as well as public officials. 'nle 
rationale of this li~e of cases is grounded in First 
Amen<;hnent rights. 
We decline to extend :a. York Times to a case where 
neither a public official nor a public ~igure is the 
plaintiff, ·merely because the .publication is a matter of 
. . 
public interest. We recognize -that the State's interest 
... -
- in protecting tbe reputation of private individual• 111118t 
be bal.mced aga~•t tbe Firat ANndment intereata. 
Accordingly, w hold that tba State may all°" 
' 
2. 
C0111peDea.tory damage• for · defwtory falselx?od which causes 
inj~ to the reputation of private individuals without 
' 
proof· of knowledge of falsity or recklea• disregard of 
truth. But. we would not approve illlpoeition of liability 
without fault,•• w think thi• would unduly burden a 
free pre••. Thua • with reapec_t to· libel suits by private 
individuals, the. States would be free to. ~pply any standard 
'' 
.which doea not lapoae liability wlthoat fault, such •• a 
negligence standard. 
Accordingly, w reverse the Jud1,1118Dt of· the Court 
of .Appea~• ancl remand tbe can for a new trial. 
• 
7 ~rt• Va. *~l~h 
Thia caae come• to us on 'writ of certiorari to tbe 
United State• Court of Appeals for the Snenth Circuit. 
It iavolvea a dive~•ity libel action by a reputable 
attorney agaimt a Mgaslne that falsely labelled bi.a a 
J.aniniat and a Coaaunist-frmter. 
The ·01strict ·Court held that the aubject of the 
~ 
magasµw article vaa a -t~ of public iataraat and 
~ j ~ J 
therefore that the plaintiff could .not recover for libel 
unleaa he p~d that the aaguine published the defamatory 
statements with know~edge of their falsity or with reckless 
disregard for the truth. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed. We diaagree. We hold 
that the States. ·-y award compensatory d-a•• for defmtory 
falsehoods causing injury to the reputation of. a private 
individual on the. buis of whatever standard they choose, 
so long as they do not impose liability without fault. 






Mr. Justice Powell 
John Jeffries 
No. 72-617, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 
~1 t 
~ 
The judge gave the jury four instructions pertaining to 
the issue of damages. In the order in which they appear in the 
record, they are: 
In as sessing damages you may also award plaintiff 
such amount as will punish defendant for publishing the 
untrue defamatory statements concerning plaintiff. 
If you decide for the plaintiff on the question of 
liability, you must then fix the amount of money which will 
reasonably and fairly compensate him for any damages he 
has suffered that were directly and proximately caused by 
the articles complained of. When I use the expression 
"proximate cause" I mean that cause which, in natural or 
probable sequence, produced the injury complained of. 
In fixing the amount of damages you are to take into account 
the following elements: 
1. his prominence in the community where he lives. 
2. his professional standing. 
• his character. 
4. his good name. 
5. his reputation. 
6. the mental suffering and aguish occasioned by the 
publication. 
7. the extent of the circulation and republication of 
the libels. 
Where the publication complained of is libelous per se 
and the defendant has not proved the truth, the plaintiff is 
entitled to recover compensatory damages such as will 
fairly compensate him for the injury he has sustained, if 
any. Mental suffering and injury to reputation as the result 
of a libelous publication need not be proved but may be 
inferred from the nature of the injury. 
Since this .article and reprint pamphlet are libelous 
per se, plaintiff need not show that he has suffered any 
actual damage as a result of this article in order to en-
title him to a verdict in this matter. 
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
HASTINGS COLLEGE OF THE LAW 
198 MCALLISTER STREET 
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94102 
July 12, 1974. 
Professor John w. Wade 
Vanderbilt University School of Law 
Nashville, Tennessee 37240 
Dear John: 
Re: Revision of Restatement 2d, Torts, 
T. D. No. 20 (De f amation) 
We have discussed on the telephone your memoranda sent with 
your letter of Jul;• 3. I think we agree on the most important points 
and that Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., requires substantial changes 
in some of the sections approved for publication by the A.L.I. in 
May. I am writing this letter memorandum, as you requested me to do, 
to discuss some changes you are considering which I believe should 
not be made. 
First, this introductory i dea: The prestige of the Restatements 
and their enormous persuasive authority is due to the quality of the 
A.L.I. membership and the manner in which the Restatements have been 
promulgated. The fact that Tentative Drafts go out to every member 
of the Institute ahead of time and that the Institute's Restatement 
of a rule of substantive law is the rule which is finally approved 
by the membership at an annual meeting has had much to do with this 
prestige. The rule which appears in the published volumes is the 
rule promulgated, not by the Reporter and his Advisers or even by 
the Council, but promulgated by the members at an annual meeting. 
This is what gives them their authority and it is greater author-
ity than any text book, or article (or "Restatement") written by a 
Williston, a Scott, or a Prosser (to mention just three distinguished 
scholars and former Reporters) could ever have. I think it would 
hurt the persuasive authority of the contents of a finally published 
volume of the Restatement if it could be said that parts of it re-
flect substantive changes which are substantially different from 
what the membership approved for publication; substantial changes 
made thereafter by the Reporter, even with the approval of the 
Council. 
Having said this, I hasten to add that the Gertz case (coming 
down a month after the May meeting), confronts us with a unique sit-
uation and some substantive changes~ be made in a number of 
sections, e.g., Sections 581A and 581B. The need to get Volume III 
published justifies such changes being made without waiting to sub-
mit them to the 1975 Annual Meeting. Our justification is that 
Gertz compels these changes. But we should .!!,2!. change sections 
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already promulgated when Gertz does~ require it. In my opinion, Gertz 
does not compel some of the changes you are considering. 
1. Sections 566, 567 and§ 567A. These three sections, dealing with 
"opinion" and "ridicule" accurately state the common law. At the 1974 
meeting, a motion was made to delete them. I opposed the motion and it 
was defeated by an overwhelming voice vote. The June 25, 1974 decisions 
do not, I believe, compel a rejection or change in what the Institute has 
just approved. Mr. Justice Marshall's opinion in Old Dominion etc. v. 
Austin stresses that the case involves "federal labor laws" and a federal 
policy to give labor unions great latitude in using vituperative epi-
thets in labor disputes. (Note that Powell, J.;Burger, C.J. and Rehn-
quist, Jodissented) The Marshall opinion does not even obliquely point 
towards overruling the three Restatement sections. 
In Gertz, at the beginning of his "III," Mr. Justice Powell says: 
"We begin with the common ground. Under the First Amendment there is no 
such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we 
depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but 
on the competition of other ideas." He appends to this, his footnote 8, 
in which he quotes Thomas Jefferson's first inaugural address. Powell's 
third sentence is the only reference in his long opinion to "an opinion." 
These three sentences, to me, are stating an introductory philosophical 
idea, nothing more. Note that in White, J's seething dissent, in which 
he itemizes the various changes Powell's opinion is making in cormnon law 
rules, he does not mention any change in the common law rules concerning 
defamatory opinions or defamation by ridicule. (In 1965, we all agreed 
that a separate section 567A on "ridicule" was needed: 1965 Proceedings 
404-405. Just two months ago, after debate, the Institute retained it). 
I find nothing in Powell's opinion which requires the Reporter to reject 
what the Institute has so recently promulgated. 
2. Section 600, clause (b) of this section; as it appears in T.D. 
No. 20, is in the wording approved at the 1966 meeting. Prosser stated 
"the question simply is whether conditional privilege requires only honest 
belief in the truth ••• or whether there must be reasonable grounds for the 
belief" (1966 Proceedings, p. 509). You moved co strike clause (b) read-
ing "has no reasonable grounds for such belief." I opposed the motion 
(p.510) After debate the motion was voted down (p.513). My own notes 
read "lost by strong viva voce vote." 
You agree that the 1974 weight of authority supports clause (b) in 
T.D. No. 20, which the Institute approved again last May, but you suggest 
changing "reasonable" belief to "honest" belief. 
There is nothing in Gertz which compels this change; and it is flatly 
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3. On the last page of your memo headed "Gertz v. Welch" etc. you 
say: "If the present§ 600 (in T.D. 20) remains as it is, then§§ 593-610 
seem to serve no useful purpose (I think your "543" is an obvious typ-
ing error for "593") They may be needed, however, for the states which 
follow the 'honest-belief' view." 
Gertz does not compel the deletion of these 18 sections. If we 
were approaching them for the first time, in the light of present consti-
tutional law, we might approach them differently. Some of them may be 
redundant. But, again, we are not writing on a clean slate. The Institute 
has promulgated these sections for inclusion in Volume III. I see no harm 
in them. Indeed, I believe it is still useful to spell out the various 
conditionally privileged occasions and the several different ways in which · 
the occasion may be abused. 
As much of this letter involves 1nstitute policy, and I do not make 
policy, I am sending copies to Norris Darrell and Herb Wechsler. I leave 
it to you to make any other distribution you desire. 
With best regards. 
Sincerely yours, 
~~!dredge Laurence • 
LHE:df 
~&-r 
UNIVERSITY OF CALIF:ORNIA 
HASTINGS COLLEGE OF THE LAW 
188 MCALLISTER STR E ET 
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94102 
Professor John w. Wade 
Vanderbilt University Schoo~ of Law 
Nashville, Tennessee 37240 
Dear John: 
July 16, 1974. 
Re: Revision of Restatement 2d, Torts 
T. D. No. 20 (Defamation) 
Yesterday I received your July 11 memo and the several re-
vised sections. This letter supplements my letter of the 12th. 
Section 566. 
I strongly disagree with this section for the reasons 
stated on p.2 of my July 12 letter. 
Comment b. In my other letter I quoted Powell's language 
which you now take out of context and quote in this comment. You 
make it appear that the Supreme Court has definitely overruled 
the common law concerning defamatory opinions and defamatory 
ridicule. Powell never mentions "ridicule" and the word "opinion" 
appears once, rather casually, in only one sentence. 
I again emphasize that in White's dissent he gave an itemized 
bill of particulars of what changes in common law rules Powell was 
making. It is inconceivable to me that he would not have men-
tioned the law stated in §~ 566, 567 and 567A if Powell or anybody 
else thought his opinion "scuttled" it, to use White's word. 
Note also, that in the pretty carefully written syllabus for 
this case in Law Week (42 LW 5123) there is no mention of this 
point. 
I think your comment bis an erroneous statement of what Gertz 
decides, and a fantastic construction of Powell's opinion. (Forgive 
me for saying so). 
Comment c. 1st paragraph. I believe that Illustration 1, 
T. D. 20, p.42, is good law today. 
Comment d. 1st paragraph. 
in T. D. 20 p.10 and on p.46. 
The case law on "ridicule" is stated 
I find nothing in Powell's opinion 
61C 
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which indicates that he intended to overrule Learned Hand's opinion 
in the Burton case or the Supreme Court of Maine in the Powers case, 
in which an obscure private citizen ,was ridiculed in a column say-
ing that he was building his own coffin (the "Yankee Thrift" case). 
Comment f. Last paragraph, last sentence. 
To the extent that a person has a First Amendment right to speak 
about the plaintiff, the plaintiff cannot narrow that right by suing 
under 8 46 for mental suffering, for example, instead of suing for 
defamation. Your "may affect these torts, too" is too weak. 
Sections 580A and 580B. 
I think the black letter and comments are, in general, ac-
curate and :xcellently sta~ed. -tk.~ ,t~ ,, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ '-<f)'r ~.A.,. 
,. ('T,\).~\<t), ti,~: fu~c:..£ k /3H1~.hc,ftJ, 
~~ qql D ,,~ \))'\f- I have just a few comments and questions. Whycto'you say 
'3 ~~ ,~public "officer" when all the opinions from N. Y. Times to Powell's 




8 580A, comment a,, 2d paragraph, 2d and 3d sentences re "opinion." 
Objected to for reasons stated above. 
Comment b. 1st paragraph. 
You say the constitutional restriction "has thus been specifically 
held to apply, •• to a supervisor of a county recreational area." This 
is inaccurate. The case is Rosenblatt v. Baer (1966) 383 U.S. 75. 
Brennan, J., said at p.87 "The record here, however, leaves open the 
possibility that [the supervisor] could have adduced proof to bring his 
claim outside the N.Y. Times rule." And (p.88) "it is fer the trial 
judge in the first instance to determine whether the proofs show re-
spondent to be a 'public official'." 
Comment c, 2d paragraph, last sentence. I recoil from "embroil-
ment." Is not "involvement" preferable? I think there can be useful 
polishing of phrasing in a number of comments. 
Comment c. 3d paragraph, bottom of p.3. 
\(..e,tf This is a pure, speculative "blue sky" statement. There is nothing 
,n ~ in Gertz to support it. Why go out on a limb? Why not leave something 
~-~Q.,-t--:n ~l for the court to decide? Some institutions may be treated differently 
~ \rV''~ than others. This sentence would be fine in a law review article but 
{Ju-t.~,,v ~ I it has no place in a Restatement. I hope you strike it. 
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) ',-.,,..1,. ~\,,'I!)-~ 
~ .,..:- 1\..-L Gt-p~ N ~. 
Comment d. Last (3d) paragraph needs polis~g. Why not stress 
that "malice" is really Lord Herschell "scienter." 
Comment g. In last sentence you say the court "has been ready -
to lwld. •~ It ~quarely did hold in N. Y. Times. \/.,£,, 1 ~ ')-~ /X>-t_ 00-----
~ \  (V "'1\,, . - -
. Comment h. This is the T. D. 20, § 581A comment h. You must 
\lu\tJ'\~change the third sentence re "matters of public or general interest." 
Connnent i. I object to last two lines re "opinion." 
I 580~ comment c. 
f, -~ 1\ •• 1_ ~ ~---~-~~"~,~'I.A~~ J"~· r- ' In first paragraph can't you avoid "gross negligence?" We have 
always avoided it before. The last sentence, "on the other hand" 
.,.,..,...---etc., is pure speculation: Let the court decide, when the question 
L-._ J ~ ~t·~ ~ 
In the second paragraph, again, you go out on a limb in, your 
,.2. l, ~ last two sentences, and you do it in the face of Powell's explicit 
~ "\\J.MI\C. - . caveat: "Such a case is not before us, and we intimate no view as 






In last paragraph you enumerate "factors to be considered" in 
determining negligence. You do not mention the value of a person's 
good name, which, to me, is the primarily important factor; and which 
Powell stressed as a "concept at the root of any decent system of 
ordered liberty." 
Comment e. 
Your last sentence is slanted toward a possible future decision 
of proof c,f negligence by "convincing clarity." Why not slant it 
toward preponderance of credible evidence? In his dissent in Gertz, 
Brennan, J., said " ••• the burden of proof for reasonable care will 
doubtless be the preponderance of the evidence." (42 LW 5136, co.l. 2) 
I 600 -
I object to changing this section to state a rule quite different 
from what the A.L.I. has promulgated. I discussed this in my letter 
of July 12. 
, 
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This is a change which cannot be justified as compelled by 
Gertz. If 6 600 is published in the form you now submit, I respect-
fully suggest that it carry a: "Special Note: This is a Wade Restate-
ment rule which has never been considered by The American Law Insti-
tute." 
If it is considered next May, I fore see considerab_le debate about 
it and considerable opposition to it. 
These conditional privileges, and abuse of them, are still going 
to be important, particularly in an action for nominal damages to 
vindicate the plaintiff's good name. You say (§ 621, comment b, 
last paragraph) that the constitutional limitation "would apparently 
not apply to nominal damages." But common law conditional privileges 
will apply to, say, the private person's suit for nominal damages. 
If there is no abuse of the occasion there is no cause of action at 
all. There must be a verdict for the defendant. Yet the plaintiff 
has been hurt by a false defamatory statement. He should be able to 
get at least nominal damages unless the defendant had "reasonable 
grounds for believing the matter to be true." This was the rule of 
the First Restatement, it is the rule approved in 1966, after ex-
tensive debate, for the Second Restatement and it is still the weight 
of authority. 
You are not writing on a clean slate and I think it would be 
regrettable fo~ the Reporter to overrule what has been decided. 
I think you have better facilities than I have to make copies 
so I shall leave that to you, and the decision about distributioµ to 
the Advisers. For reasons stated in my letter of the 12th, I am 
sending copies to Norris Darrell and Herb Wechsler. 
I hope this doesn't bother you as much as it has me. I was 
awake much of last night worrying about it. 
With best regards. 
Sincerely yours, 
,(~ 






NASHVILLE , TENNESSEE 37240 ILIPHONI (615) 322 -7311 
July 19, 1974 
School of uw • Dirtct phont 322-2615 
To the Torts Advisers: 
_ Since my last memorandum I have carefully combed 
Tentative Draft No. 20 to locate all of the places where 
changes will have to be made as a result of Gertz, and have 
prepared tentative rewordings in each instance. They are 
far too numerous to reproduce and send to you and many of 
them of course depend upon whether all of my recommendations 
become final. 
I have rewritten the two Special Notes and enclose 
them herewith for your inspection and comments. I also 
enclose two single paragraph insertions which are signi ficant 
enough for you to contemplate. The revision of§ 617 was 
more extensive than most, and since it was retyped I am 
enclosing it, too. 
Finally, this morning I received a letter from Larry 
enclosing two memoranda which I am reproducing and enclosing 
herewith. As you can see, our important disagreements involve 
§§ 566 and 600, as they were submitted to you earlier. Larry's 
position is very forcefully put but I am not convinced; and I 
would like for each of you to evaluate the positions and let 
me have your measured conclusion. 
As to§ 566 I think it is quite possible that Mr. Justice 
Powell did not specifically have in mind a ruling that certain 
earlier common law decisions allowing recovery for expression 
of a derogatory opinion were unconstitutional; but I have no 
doubt in my mind as to what he and the majority of the Court 
would rule when the problem arises. I feel sure that the 
quotation will be applied literally, and that we are justified 
in treating it on this basis. The Court speaks consistently of 
a "defamatory falsehood." The established principle that the 
defendant cannot be held liable in any defamation action unless 
he was at least negligent regarding the falsity of his state-
ment, is simply incompatible with allowing recovery for expression 
of an opinion when truth or falsity cannot be at issue. Calling 
a person bad names raises a different type of problem. Allowing 
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but against intentional infliction of emotional dxress, and 
an entirely different balancing process is needed to deter-
mine constitutionality. 
I also continue to feel that my recommendation as to§ 600 
provides the best solution, for reasons set forth in the Note 
appended to my memo of July 11. It seems to me that Larry's 
position -- that we retain§ 600 as is and also§§ 593-610 --
involves a logical fallacy. Section 600 would say that when-
ever the defendant acted negligently regarding falsity ("had 
no reasonable grounds for believing the matter to be true"), 
the privilege was abused and is lost. Yet in order to bring 
an action at all, ~s a result of Gertz, the plaintiff must 
allege and prove negligence as to falsity. Thus, if he es-
tablishes a cause of action he automatically eliminates the 
availability of a conditional privilege. All of the sections 
on conditional privilege or abuse would be an exercise in 
futility. I see no point to be gained by referring to the 
nominal-damage cases. If it should be held that negligence 
is not required for them the same policies would apparently 
mean that the conditional privilege should not be applicable. 
And, of course, the possibility that a suit for nominal damages 
will be treated differently is a matter of speculation. - -
As to Larry's suggestions regarding language I have 
inserted some tentative reactions in the margin. 
Of course, I am not going to argue that the action of the 
Institute in May gives me the authority to make these changes 
on my own and promulgate them as the Restatement. They must 
go before the Council, and it will make the det:Ermination as to 
what parts, if any, should go before the Institute floor. 
Despite the desire to publish volume 3, I am inclined to be-
lieve that the decision will be to submit all of the sections 
which I have already sent you. 
Herb Wechsler has conferred with me over the phone 
since reading my second memo, and I have made some minor changes 
as a result. I have had helpful letters from Clarence, and also 
from Professo.rsAnderson (Texas) and Christie (Duke). 
i\fr. 2 1975 
ANTHONY LEWIS 
~lJe Newijork ~mu$ 
84 ST ATE STREET 
BOSTON . MASS. 02109 
My dear Mr. Justice: 
vi(, ,.I/.-'-""·'' 
f 
March 31, 1975 
For three months now, I have been teaching a 
weekly seminar on some of the constitutional decisions 
of the last dozen years related to the press. The exper-
ience--a new one for me--has been exhausting and ex-
citing. One conclusion that has gradually come over me 
is that your opinions in this area are something special. 
To write that to you must be awkward, but I want to do it. 
For example, the libel cases. In Gertz I 
thought you resolved the tensions in an intellectually 
most satisfying way. I happen to think it is the right 
way for the press, too: recognizing that there are other 
values in life. Your concurrence in Cox v. Cohn was 
pleasing in its succinct destruction of the notion that 
any room has been left in defamation for disallowing the 
defense of truth; and your footnote on Time v. Hill was 
more candid than others have been in· recognizing that the 
underpinnings of that decision are (happily, I would say) 
weakened. The dialogue with Justice White is expecially 
interesting, starting with Branzburg. Then I also ought 
to mention your dissent in Saxbe v. Post, which my 
students found a masterfu l example of the marshaling of 
particular facts to make an analytical point--make it, 
that is, in practical rather than ideological terms. 
Well , perhaps you will allow one carping 
comment--in a slightly different area. I was sorry that 
you joined the Chief Justice's opinions in the obscenity 
cases. They continue to strike me as political opinions: 
in the sense not of being partisan but of reaching their 
conclusions by force majeure rather than reason. I con-
tinue to hope that you can bring some reason to that 
unreasonable problem. I know that you would have improved 
the Court's le~than-inspiring performance in New York 
Times v. U.S. 
~~ 
-;y~ 
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SPECIAL NOTE ON REMEDIES FOR DEFAMATION OTHER THAN DAMAGES 
The tort law of libel and slander has been conceived of as 
serving three separate functions: (1) to compensate the plaintiff 
for the injury to his reputation, for his pecuniary losses and 
for his emotional distress, (2) to vindicate him and and aid in 
restoring his reputation, and (3) to punish the defendant and 
dissuade him and others from publishing defamatory statements. 
The traditional remedy has been an award of damages, whether 
compensatory, nominal or punitive. The award of damages has 
served all three purposes, to a greater or lesser degree. 
' But the damage remedy has proved to have many inadequacies, 
and it has become much less useful as a remedy for the injured 
party as a result of recent developments in the law of defamation. 
In the first place, there has always been a serious anomaly in 
trying to convert damage to reputation in t .he absence of proof 
of specific pecuniary loss, and injµry to feelings into exact 
monetary figures. 
Second, and more important, the damage remedy is frequently 
not available even though the communication is both false and 
defamatory and causes actual provable harm. The defendant is 
often found to be privileged. If he is absolutely privileged, 
there is certainly no point in bringing suit for damages. The 
common law of conditional privilege has been built up over the 
years as a careful balancing of the conflicting interests of the 
plaintiff and of the defendant, together with those of other 
people. But no matter how desirable it is to protect significant 
interests of other parties the fact remains that it is the 
plaintiff who has innocently suffered the damage. Now that strict 
liability for defamation is no longer constitutional, the 
plaintiff may lose because he was unable to .prove that the 
defendant published the statement with knowledge of its falsity 
or in reckless disregard of :its truth or falsity, or eveh · A:egli-
gently in this regard. If the plaintiff fails to win on any one 
of these bases, he not only fails to obtain damages, but the 
impression created among those who were aware of the suit is 
that the defamatory charge must have been true. As a result, 
the plaintiff's reputation is damaged all the more, and he \\Ould 
have been better off never to have brought the suit. 
Third, the damage remedy has sometimes proved to be unfair 
to the defendant. Defamation actions have not infrequently 
been brought -- or jury verdicts have been rendered, irrespactive 
of the plaintiff's motivation in bringing the action -- not to 
compensate for actual pecuniary loss or to vindicate the 
plaintiff, but instead to cudgel the defendant and to mulct 
him for. substantial damages which may be like a windfall to the 
plaintiff. It is cases of this sort which have helped to per-
suade the Supreme Court to intervene and set restrictions and 
standards which will protect the country's commitment to free 
speech and free press. 
These inadequacies make it very doubtful whether the 
damage remedy fully serves the purposes for which the law of 
defamation was established, especially the vindication of 
plaintiff's reputation. Consideration should therefore be 
given to alternative legal remedies which may more adequately 
serve one or more of the purposes enumerated. Several of these 
alternatives may be considered. 
(1) Declaratory relief. In a jurisdiction where declara-
tory relief is available as a general remedy and statutory pro-
visions do not preclude it, resort may be had to a suit for a 
declaratory judgment that the defamatory statement is untrue. 
This action would provide no compensation for injury but it could 
vindicate the plaintiff and aid in restoring his reputation. 
Libel or slander suits similar to this are those in which the 
plaintiff seeks only nominal damages or announces that he will 
donate to charity any award which he receives. 
There is presently no established practice for bringing 
suit to obtain a declaratory judgment that a defamatory statement 
about the plaintiff is false, and a number of questions will 
arise if the practice develops. Thus, since there is no request 
for award of damages, can an action for slander be maintained 
\ 
for a communication which was aot slanderous per se, even in • 
the absence of any proof of special damages? Again, now that 
the common law strict liability for defamation is no longer 
constitutional <see§§ 580A, 580B), would it still be necessary 
to prove fault on the part of the defen&nt in order to main-
tain an action solely for declaratory relief? Could the 
declaratory action be sustained even though the defendant was 
able to claim a privilege, on the basis that the purpose of 
the privilege is to protect the defendant from the burden of 
a monetary obligation? Should the affirmative defense of truth 
in a regular defamation action be converted into a specific 
element of the plaintiff's cause of action in a suit for 
declaratory relief, so that the burden of proof as to falsity 
is on the plaintiff? How should costs of suit be allocated? 
Would it be desirable to develop a technique for eliminating 
suits based on trivial defamation? Substantial policy issues 
abound in each of these problems. 
. If the remedy of · a formal action for a declaratory judgment 
is not available in a particular jurisdiction there remain two 
possible methods of using the ordinary action for defamation to 
obtain declaratory relief. The first is to bring the action 
expressly requesting only nominal damages, and stating that the 
suit is for the purpose of vindicating the plaintiff's reputation 
and not for tl:e purpose of recovering compensatory damages. It 
has been tacitly assumed that a suit of this nature would be 
subject to all of the defenses and restrictions of a suit for 
regular damages. But the issues involved are different, and the 
competing interests may produce a different balance. Decisions 
consciously treating tl:ese issues have not been rendered. A 
suit brought solely for nominal damages may well come to be 
· treated as one for declaratory relief, with different restrictions 
and defenses. 
The second possible method of obtaining declaratory relief 
in a regular defamation suit involves the utilization of a 
special verdict. Thus,if a fact issue is presented as to whether 
the defendant published a defamatory communication negligently 
(or recklessly or with knowledge of the falsity), and the case 
goes to the jury, the trial judge may call for a special verdict 
indicating (1) whether the communication was true or false and 
(2) whether the defendant acted negligently. In this way, even 
if the jury finds that the defendant was not negligent, so that 
he wins the suit, the plaintiff will have had an opportunity to 
obtain a formal declaration that the defamatory statement about 
him was false. 
(2) Retraction. There are numerous retraction statutes 
in the United States. They usually provide that if a newspaper 
receives a notification as to the falsity of a defamatory news 
item and complies with a request for retraction, its liability 
for damages will be reduced. At an earlier time the English 
manorial courts sometimes required an apology and the ecclesiastical 
courts required the defendant to acknowledge his false witness 
and beg the pardon of the injured party. The core of the idea 
might be utilized today as a supplement to the action for 
declaratory relief. A news medium for example, might be directed 
to publish a news item covering the judgment against it and thus 
aid in vindicating the plaintiff's reputation. As to the con-
stitutionality of a statute to this effect, see Miami Herald Pub. 
Co. v. Tornillo, (1974) ___ U.S., ___ , _____ (Brennan, J., 
concurring). 
(3) Injunctive relief. Equity courts have never been in-
clined to grant freely injunctive remedies against personal de-
famation, and ever since Near v. Minnesota, (1931) 283 U.S. 697, 
it has been recognized that prior restraint of a publication runs 
, 
afoul of the First Amendment. Neverth_eless, it remains possible 
that injunctive relief might become, on some occasions, a suitable 
supplement to declaratory relief. When it has been formally 
determined by a court that a statement is defamatory of the 
plaintiff and the defendant persists in continuing to publish 
it, a carefully worded injunction might meet the need and be 
available against further publication of the statement which has 
already been determined by the court to be false and defamatory. 
(4) Self-help. The Supreme Court has said~ "The first 
remedy of any victim of defamation is self-help--using available 
opportunities to contradict the lie or correct the error and 
thereby to minimize its adverse impact on reputation." This 
remedy, of course, does not require suit or court action. The 
law can nevertheless help. It gives a conditional privilege to 
a person who is seeking to protect his reputation by answering a 
defamatory charge. (See§ 594). But a statute requiring a news 
medium to publish a reply offered to a statement made by it 
would apparently be unconstitutional. The party seeking to vin-
dicate his reputation by self-help must find his own means of 
publication. If he finds the means, he may, at least in some 
situations, succeed in fully vindicating himself. 
But self-help may be resorted to, not on-¥tO reveal the 
falsity of the defamatory statement and to vindicate the re-
putation, but also to punish the defamer and retailiate against 
him. In earlier times, the principal method of this type of 
self-help was the clan or blood feud. They were supplanted 
for a time by the challenge to a duel and the horsewhip. ~ne 
of the primary reasons for developing the tort law of defamation 
was to induce the defamed person to resort to the courts for 
relief instead of wreaking his own vengeance. With the increasing 
unavailability of the damage remedy for defamation and the 
consequent heightened temptation to resort to extralegal methods 
like these which are presently regarded as uncivilized, the need 
grows for making available legal and civilized methods of 
pr~tecting the defamed person's reputation. Development of 
a declaratory remedy seems best calculated to do this. 
Further Reform of the Damage Remedy. The Supreme Court 
has on numerous occasions expressed concern regarding the rendering 
of verdicts for large sums of damages, and the effect of this in 
unconstitutionally impairing freedom of speech and freedom of the 




of these verdicts. The Court has now held in Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc., ___ u .s . __ , that the constitution limits re-
coverable damages to "compensation for actual injury ..• at least 
when liability is not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity 
or reckless disregard for the truth." But actual injury is "not 
limited to out-of-pocket loss" and may include"impairment of 
reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, 
and mental anguish and suffering." While this places much more 
restraint on discretion to determine the size of the damage award 
and gives more control over jury conduct to the courts, it still 
leaves a considerable amount of uncertainty regarding the ultimate 
figure. At the same time it leaves out one important element of 
pecuniary or out-of-pocket damages, for which the amount can be 
determined on an objective basis. This is for the cost of reasonable 
attorney's fees. 
,, 
The normal common law rule in America is not to award damages 
for attorney's fees in a tort action. At the same time it has 
been ~he traditional, though unexpressed~practice to treat the 
award for emotional distress as providing the funds for paying 
the plaintiff's counsel fees. The common law rule can be changed 
by a statute providing for recovery of the counsel fees. Since 
this might, however, · create constitutional problems because of 
the potential overall size of verdicts, a provision in the statute 
would be advisable, indicating that if counsel fees are sought, 
other damages will be limited to pecuniary loss. Perhaps the 
statute should leave the election as to whether to seek attorney's 
fees and forego recovery for mental suffering to the plaintiff; 
perhaps it should make the choice for him. 
' 
SPECIAL NOTE ON THE IMPACT OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT OF THE 
CONSTITUTION ON THE LAW OF DEFAMATION (Division Five, 
Chapters 24-27) 
Like other areas of the common law of torts, the law of 
defamation has continued since the time of publication of the 
First Restatement of Torts to grow and develop according to 
the common law wont, and a substantial number of changes from 
the Restatement (First) are reflected in Chapters 24-27 as a 
result of these developments. A different kind of change, so 
substantial as to be almost a transformatim, has also come 
about,, with the holding in New York Times co. v. Sullivan, (1964) 
376 U.S. 254, that the law of defamation comes under the control 
of the First Amendment to the Constitution and its prohibition 
against any law abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. 
Applied to judicial decisions under the common law as well as to 
legislative provisions and extended to state law through incor-
poration into the Fourteenth Amendment, this clause of the 
First Amendment is being used by the United States Supreme Court 
to rewrite many aspects bf the law of defamation. - Some changes 
have been expressly ruled (though fleshing out of the rules may 
still await further cases), others are impending and still others 
may be forecast. Perhaps more changes will come about that can-
not now be predicted. 
The Institute does not refrain from the process of restating 
an area of the law because of the circumstance that it is in the 
process of undergoing substantial change. Instead, it has sought 
to anticipate the further development of the ' decisions and to 
analyze the logical implications of the newly developed principle. 
In the situation here involved, however, there is a material 
difference. Here, one court, the Supreme Court of the United 
States, has the final word, and its decision is birrling on all of 
the state courts as a matter of constitutional law. A section 
of the Restatement which does not accord with an existing or 
later decision of the Supreme court is simply wrong, and no 
amount of authority from other courts can make it accurate. For 
this reason, the Institute has deferred as long as feasible the 
restatement of the chapters on defamation, in the hope that new 
decisions of the Supreme Court would settle uncertain issues. 
In the decade sin:e the New York Times case, the court was 
struggling to determine and set forth the evolving constitutional 
law on the subject. With the decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, 
Inc. (1974) ___ U.S. ____ , a good number of the uncertainties 
were clarified, and the process of restatement has been able to 
proceed with more assurance. When a particular constitutional 
question was not specifically covered by decisions 
the Court, resort has been had to extrapolation of 
stated in or deduced from the existing decisions. 
that this was not possible a caveat has been used. 
or language of 
the principles 
To the extent 
The following are the locations of the major change produced 
by the impact of the First Amendment. 
(1) Section 580A provides that in case of a defamatory 
communicatim published about a person in his capacity as a 
public officer or public figure, the plaintiff must prove, with 
convincing clarity, that the defendant published the matter 
with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of its 
truth or falsity; and that a finding of knowledge or reckless-
disregard involves the application of a constitutional standard 
which is subject to appellate review to determine whether the 
evidence is constitutionally adequate to sustaining the finding. 
(2) Section 580B provides that a private .person cannot 
prevail in an action for defamation unless he proves that the 
defendant was at least negligent regarding the falsity and 
defamatory character of the communication. 
(3) Section 621 provides that recoverable damages are · 
limited to "compensation for actual injury" and treats the 
meaning of actual injury. 
(4) Section 566 provides that there can be no reco~ery for 
a mere expression of opinion which does not carry by implication 
an expression of defamatory facts, and explaira that as_a result 
of this rule the privilege of fair comment has become obsolute. 
While these are the locations of major treatment of the 
impact of the Constitution, the implications of these changes 
are to be found scattered throughout§§ 558-623, and the language 
of the black letter or of the comments has been altered accordingly. 
No listing has been made in this Special Note of the changes 
corning about through the normal development of tie common law. 
Specific reference should be made, however, to the Special Note 
following§ 623, on remedies for defamation other than damages. 
[To be inserted as a new 3rd paragraph in§ 560A, Comment d] 
The Supreme Court cases to date have dealt only with factual 
situations in which the communication in question gave warning of 
its defamatory character and the problem was whether it was true 
or false. They have therefore not specifically adverted to the 
standard of fault which should be imposed regarding the defamatory 
character of the communication. The same standard of knowledge 
or reckless-disregard would seem to be required. Thus, if a 
statement is published regarding a public figure which is not 
defamatory on its face so that its defamatory character becomes 
appar~nt only to a person who has a knowledge of certain ex-
trinsic facts, then the defendant should be subject to liability 
only if he knew of those extrinsic facts or published the state-
ment in reckless disregard of their existence. (Cf. § 580B, 
Comments b, c). On the other hand, if the only question is whether 
the language is capable of bearing a particular meaning and whether 
that meaning is defamatory or not, that question is one of law 
which does not require the application of a standard of conduct. 
(See§ 614). 
[New Comment~ to be inserted in§ 612] 
Because of the purpose for which this privilege was 
established (see Comment a), it applies despite awareness 
on the part of the person providing the means of the pub-
lication that the communication is both false and defama-
tory. If the person seeking rreans of publication has an 
absolute privilege to publ~sh in the manner used, to hold 
that another person could not make available the means of 
publication without subjecting himself to potential liability 
would 'deprive him of that privilege . . In order for the 
privilege to be effective, it is necessary to hold that if it 
does actually exist, krowledge as to falsity or defamatory 
character on the part of the person supplying the means is 
irrelevant and neither party is subject to liability. This 
same position logically extends to the situation involving 
a conditional privilege. There. is a complicating circum-
stance, however. A conditional privilege is lost through 
abuse, and one form of abuse is to publish a communication 
when the publisher does not believe the matter to be true or acts 
in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity. (See§ 600). 
The person having the original privilege thus loses it if he 
knows or acts with reckless disregard as to the falsity. If 
the person supplying the means of publication knows of the 
falsity or has serious doubts as to the truth, he may well 
be under a duty to bring his knowledge or doubts to the 
attention of the holder of the original privilege and thus 
affect the continued existence of the original privilege. 
A failure to do this might be treated as an abuse of his own 
privilege. 
§ 617. PUBLICATION, TRUTH AND DEFENDANT'S FAULT 
SUBJECT TO THE CONTROL OF THE COURT WHENEVER THE 
ISSUE ARISES, THE JURY DETERMINES WHETHER THE DEFAMATORY 
MATTER WAS PUBLISHED OF AND CONCERNING THE PLAINTIFF, 
WHETHER THE MATTER WAS TRUE OR FALSE AND WHETHER THE DEFEN-
DANT WAS AT FAULT IN REGARD TO THE TRUTH OR FALSITY OF THE 
MATTER ANDITS DEFAMATORY CHARACTER. 
Comment: 
a. The respective functions of court and jury upon 
the issue of publication, the issue .of truth and the issue of 
defendant's fault are the same as upon ordinary issues of fact 
in other actions. The question of whether the defendant has 
published the defamatory communication to a third person (see 
§ 577) and whether it was of and concerning the plaintiff 
(see§ 564) are ordinarily for the jury or trier of fact to 
·determine. So too, the questi~n of whether the defamatory 
imputations are true (see§ 582) is ordinarily for the jury. 
Finally, the jury ordinarily determines whether the defendant 
was at fault regarding the truth or falsity of the communica-
tion and its defamatory character. ThB fault required is 
that of either knowledge or reckless disregard if the plain-
tiff is a public officer or a public figure (see§ 580A), and 
that of knowledge, reckless disregard or negligence if the 
plaintiff is a private person (See§ 580B). On all of these 
questions, however, if the evidence is so overwhelming that 
any other conclusion would be unreasonable, the court may 
direct the jury to make the proper funding. 
bo The phrase, subject to control of the court, 
refers to the normal controls possessed by a court under the 
common law or under state procedural statutes or rules of civil 
procedure. Some of the determinations listed in this Section, 
however, involve matters on which constitutional rights under 
the First Amendment stand or fall. The Supreme Court has ex-
pressly held that this is true of the determination of whether 
the communication was published of and concerning the plaintiff 
and whether a defamatory communication regarding a public 
officer or a public figure was made with knowledge or reck-
less disregard as to its truth or falsity. It would appear 
also to be true regarding the determination as to whether a 
defendant was negligent regarding falsity and defamatory 
character. These constitutional determinations are subject 
to close scrutiny by the trial court and by appellate courts 
on up to the United States Supreme Court, any one of which may 
decide that the evidence is constitutionally inadequate to 
sustain the jury determination. 
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MR. J USTICE POWELL delivered the opm10n of the 
Court. 
This Court has struggled for nearly a decade to define 
the proper accommodation between the law of defama-
tion and the freedoms of speech and press protected by 
the First Amendment. With this decision we return to 
that effort. We granted certiorari to reconsider the ex-
tent of a publisher's constitutional privilege against lia-
bility for defamation of a private citizen. - U. S. -
( 1973) . 
I 
In 1968 a Chicago policeman named Nuccio shot and 
killed a youth named Nelson . The state authorities prose-
cuted Nuccio for the homicide and ultimately obtained 
a conviction for murder in the second degree. The Nel-
son family retained petitioner Elmer Gertz. a reputable 
attorney, to represent them in civil litigation against 
Nuccio. 
Respondent publishes American Opinion, a monthly 
outlet for the views of the John Birch Society. Early in 
the 1960's the magazine began to warn of a nationwide 
conspiracy to discredit local law enforcement agencies 
and create in their stead a national police force capable 
of supporting a communist dictatorship. As part of the 
7~-Ul 1 - U 1' .l 1\ iU :', 
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continuing effort to alert the public to this assumed 
danger, the managing editor of American Opinion com-
missioned an article on the murder trial of officer ~ uccio. 
For this purpose he engaged a regular contributor to the 
magazine. In March of 1969 respondent published the 
resulting article u1Hler the title "FRAME-UP: Richard 
Nuccio And The War On Police." The article purports 
to demonstrate that the testimony against Nuccio at 
his criminal trial was false and that his prosecution was 
part of the communist campaign against the police. 
In his capacity as counsel for the :Nelson family in 
the civil litigation. petitioner attended the coroner's in-
quest into the boy's death and initiated actions for 
damages, but he neither discussed officer :Nuccio with the 
press nor played any part in the criminal proceeding. 
X otwithstanding petitioner's remote connection with the 
prosecution of Xuccio, respo11dent's magazine portrayed 
him as an architect of the "frame-up." According to 
the article, the police file on petitioner took "a big. Irish 
cop to lift. " The article stated that petitioner had been 
an official of the "Marxist League for Industrial Democ-
racy, originally known as the Intercollegiate Socialist 
Society. which has advocated the violent seizure of our 
government." It labelled Gertz a "Leninist" and a 
"Communist-fronter.'' It also stated that Gertz had 
been an officer of the Xational Lawyers Guild. described 
as a communist organization that "probably did more 
than any other outfit to plan the Communist attack on 
the Chicago policf' during the 1968 Democratic conven~ 
tion.' ' It is undisputed that these statements contained 
serious inaccuracies. The implication that petitioner had 
a criminal record was false. Petitioner had been a mem-
ber and officer of the -X ational Lawyers Guild some 15 
years earlier, but there was no evidence that he or that 
organization had taken any part in planning the 1968 
demonstrations in Chicago. There was also no basis for 
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the charge that petitioner was a "Leninist" or a "Com-
rnun ist-fronter." And he had never been a member of 
the "Marxist League for Industrial Democracy" or the 
"Intercollegiate Socialist Society." 
The managing editor of American Opinion made no 
effort to verify or substantiate the charges against peti-
tioner. Instead, he appended an editorial introduction 
stating that the author had "concluded extensive re-
search into the Richard Nuccio case." And he included 
i11 the article a photograph of petitioner and wrote the 
caption that appeared under it: "Elmer Gertz of the 
Red Guild harrasses Xuccio.'' Respondent placed the 
issue of American Opinion containing the article on sale 
at newsstands throughout the country and distributed 
reprints of the article on the streets of Chicago. 
Petitioner filed a diversity action for libel in the United 
States District Court for the N' orthern District of Illinois. 
He claimed that the falsehoods published by respondent 
injured his reputation as a lawyer and a citizen. Before 
filing an ans\\'er. respondent moved to dismiss the com-
plaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could 
be granted, apparently on the ground that petitioner 
failed to allege special damages. But the court ruled 
that statements contained in the article constituted libel 
per se under Illinois law and that consequently petitioner 
need not plead special damages. 366 F. Supp. 310 (ND 
111. 1969) . 
After answering the complaint, respondent filed a pre-
trial motion for summary j udgrnent, claiming a constitu-
tional privilege against liability for defamation. 1 It 
asserted that petitioner was a public official or a public 
figure and that the article concerned an issue of public 
'Pf'tit10nrr filed a ero:s::--motion for :-ummar~· judgment on ground:s 
not. ,qwrified in the record . The Court denif'd petitionf'r ':,; cross-
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interest and concerti. For these reasons, respondent 
argued. it was entitled to invoke the privilege enunciated 
in 1'.'ew York Times Co. Y. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964). 
Under this rule respondellt would escape liability unless 
petitioner could prove publication of defamatory false-
hood "with 'actual malice'-that is. in the knowledge that 
it was false or with reckless disregard for whether it was 
true or not." Id., at 279-280. Respondent claimed(!w'd 
submitted a supporting affidavit by the magazine's man-
aging editor. The editor denied any knowledge of the 
falsity of the statements concerning petitioner and stated 
that he had relied on the author's reputation and on his 
prior experience with the accuracy and authenticity of 
his contributions to American Opinion. 
The District Court denied respondent's motion for 
summary judgment in a memorandum opinion. - F .. 
Supp. - (:\"D Ill.. Sept. 16, 1970). The court did not 
dispute respondent's claim to the protection of the f./ew 
Yark Times standard. Rather, it concluded that peti-
tioner might overcome the constitutional privilege by 
making a factual showing sufficient to prove publication 
of defamatory falsehood in reckless disregard of the truth. 
During the course of the trial, however. it became clear 
that the trial court had not accepted all of respondent's 
asserted grounds for applying the A' ew Yark Times rule 
to this case. It thought that respondent's claim to the 
protection of the constitutional privilege depended on 
the contention that petitioner was either a public official 
under the Sew York Times decision or a public figure 
under Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 338 U. S. 130• 
(1967), apparently discounting the argument that a. 
privilege would arise from the presence of a public issue. 
After all the evidence had been presented but before 
submission of the case to the jury, the court ruled in 
-effect that petitioner was neither a public official nor a 
"J.- .J ,. J., -1,.1t1t-lt 
1Co t.; JJ ,v.f 1'1fa 1, ._ 
~ 11•'1. ~ S/,•wl"' 
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public figure. It added that, if he were, the resulting ap~ 
1Jlication of the 1\' ew Yark Tirnes standard would require 
a directed verdict for resp~ndent. Because some state= 
ments in the article constituted libel per se under Illii1b1s 
law. the court submitted the case to the jury under instruc-
tions that withdrew froni its consideration all issues save 
the measure of dama.ges. 'the jury awarded $50,000 to 
petitioner. 
Following the jury verdict an<l on further reflection) 
the District Court concluded that the 1Vew Yark Times 
standard should govern this case even though petitioner 
was not a public official or public figure. It accepted re; 
spondent's contention that that privilege protected dis~ 
cussion of any public issue without regard to the status 
of a person defamed therein. Accordingly, the court 
eutered judgment for respondent notwithstanding the 
jury's verdict. 2 This conclusion anticipated the reason-
2 - F. Supp. - C\"D Ill. , Dec. 8, 19i0). Petitioner a;;:;erts that 
the entr~· of judgment n. o. v. on the ba;;is of his fajJure to show 
knowledge of fol,-it~- or reckle,;~ disregard for the truth con:;tituted 
unfair surprise and deprived him of a full and fair opportunity to 
prove ·'actual malice" on the part of respoudents. Thi:; contention 
is not ,-upported by the record. It is clear that the trial court 
gave petitioner no reason to a:;sume that the New York Times 
privilege would not be available to re:;pondent. The cou rt 's memo-
randum opinion den~·ing re.-spondent 'i:i pretrial motion for summary 
judgment doe;; not :;tate that the Neu· York Times standard wa:; 
inapplicabl,, to thiR ca:;r. Tiather, it revea ls that the trial judge 
thought it po:;8ible for petitioner to make a. factual showing :;ufficient 
to overcome rc:;pondent ':; claim of constitutional privilege. It states 
in part: 
"When there i:; a factual dispute a::; to the existence of actual 
malice, summary judgment. is improper. 
'·In the in::;tant. r:1:;e a jur~· might infer from the evidence that 
.[respondent',;] failure to im·e:;tigate the truth of the a llegatiom;., 
·coupled with its rrceipt of communication,; challenging the factual 
accuracy of thi::; author in the pa,;t amounted to actual malice, that 
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ing of a plurality of this Court in Rosenbloom v. Metro ... 
media, 403 U. S. 29 (1971). 
Petitioner appealed to contest the applicability of the 
New York Tinies standard to this case. Although the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit doubted the 
correct11ess of the District Court's determination that 
petitioner was not a public figure, it did uot overturn 
that finding. " It agreed with the District Court that 
respondent could assert the constitutional privilege be-
cause the article concerned a matter of public interest, 
citing this Court's intervening decision in Rosenbloom v. 
Metrornedia, Inc., supra. The Court of Appeals read 
Rosenbloom to require application of the New York 
id, ' reckle,,;;.: di:::regard' of whether the allegation" were true or not. 
Neu· York Ti111es I Co.] \". Sullivan. supra. at 279-280." - F . 
Supp. -. - (ND Ill. , Sept. 16, 1970) . 
Thu::: . petitionf er knew or should liave known that the outcome of 
the trial might hinge 011 hi~ abilit~- to ,;how b~- clear and convincing 
evidence that re,,;pondent ncted witli rccklr;::,,; disregard for the truth . 
And tbi;.: 4uestio11 remained open throughout the trial. Although 
the court concluded that tlie applicabilit~- of New York Times 
rule dPpended on petitioner',- ~tatus as a public figure, the court 
did not deeide tlrnt petitioner was not n public figure until all 
the rvidenrr had Leeli prbented: Thu::: petitioner had every 
opportunit~-- indeed incentiYe. to prove ·'reckles,; disregard" if he 
eould. and he in fact /lttempted to do so . The record supports the 
ob:::ervation b~· the Court of Appeab that petitioner "did present 
evidence of m/llicf' (both the ·constitutional' and the 'ill-will' type) 
to support his cl/Image claim and no such evidence wa,,; excluded .... " 
-F.2d.at-. 
3 The court stated: 
'·f P etitioner's] con,,;ideraLIP :-tnture as a lawyer , author. lecturer, 
and participant in matt er~ of public import undermine the validity 
of the ns,;umption that he is Hot a ·pubiic figure ' as that term has 
been used by the progen_\· of Neu· York Times. Nevertheless, for 
purposes of decision we make tlwt as:,;umption and test the avail~ 
abilit~· of the claim of privilege by the :stfbject Jilittter of the article.'; 
- F . 2d, at -. 
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Times standard to any publication or broadcast about 
an issue of significant public interest, without regard 
to the position, fame. or ai1onymity of the person 
defa1ned , and it concluded that respondenes statements 
·concerned such an issue.4 After reviewing the record, 
4 In the Court of Appcab petitioner made an ingeniou,; but un• 
availing attempt to ,;how that re,;pondent 's defamatory charge against 
him concerned no i";-;ue of public or gC'nentl intere::;t. He as::;erted 
that t he subj eet matt er of the article wa,; the murder trial of Officer 
Xureio and tlrnt he did not participate in that procel:'di11g. There-
fore', he argued, e,·e11 if thr subj ect rnatt r r of the article generally 
were' protC'cted b~· the Neu· 1·ork Times privilege' . under the opinion 
of the Rosenbloom pluralit~·. the drf:imator~· ~tntements about him 
were not. Thr Court of Appeals rr jl:'cted thi" argument . It noted 
that the accu~ation,- aga in::;t petitioner pla~·ed an integra l pa rt in 
re"pondent 's general the"i" of a nationwide ron,;piracy to ha ra ::;s the 
poli ce : 
'·[\V]e ma~· abo m;sumc that the article''::; ba~ic the::;ii; is false. ~ever-
the]e,;,. under the rea,-011" of New York Times v. Sullivan. rven a 
fol::-e ;:;ta1ement made' in ~upport of a false the::;is is prokcted unless 
made with knowledge of it~ fabit~· or with reckless disregard of its 
truth or fabit~-. lt would undermine' tlw rule of that case to permit 
the actual falsity of a statement to determine whether or not its 
publi;,her i,; entitled to t he bC'nC'fit of the rnle. 
''If, tlwrefore, 1\'C' put to one side the false' character of the article 
:Hid trrat it a" 1 hough it~ content,; were entire]~· true, it cannot be 
denied tha t tlw rommenb about [ petitioner] we're integra l to its 
t he"i». The'~- mu;;t be' tC';,; tecl under the Neu· York Times ::;ta nda rcl." 
- F. 2d. at. - . 
We think that the Court of AppC'als correctly rejected petitioner 's 
argument. It~ acC'eptnnce might lead to arbitrary imposition of 
liability on the ba~i~ of an unwi,;e differentiation among kinds 
of factual mis,,ta t rme11t,;. The prec-ent casr illu,;trate,; thP point . 
Respondent false]~· portra.1·rd petitionC'r as an architect of the 
criminal pro:sC'cution against ~uccio . On its face this inaccuracy 
does not appea r defamatory. R e,;pondent also falsely labelled peti-
tioner a '· Leninst " and a ··Communi,;t-frontrr. " These accusations 
are genC'rall~· considered defamator~·. Under pC'titioner's interpreta-
tion of the .. publie or genrral intrrest" te:;t , rrspondent would have 
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the Court of Appeals endorsed the District Court 's con-
clusion that petitioner had failed to show by clear and 
convincing evidence that respondent had acted with 
"actual malice" as defined by Xew York Times. 'I'here 
was no evidence that the managing editor of American 
Opinion knew of the falsity of the accusations made in 
the article. In fact. he knew nothing about peti-
tioner except what he learned from the article. The 
court correctly noted that mere proof of failure to investi-
gate. without more, cannot establish reckless disregard for 
the truth. Rather, the publisher must act with a "high 
degree of awareness ... of probable falsity.'' St. Amant 
v. Thompson , 390 U. S. 727. 731 ( 1968). Accord : 
Beckley Xewspaper Corp. \". Hanks, 389 u. S. 81, 84-85 
(1967); Garrison"· Louisiana, 379 l:'. S. 67, 75-76 ( 1964) . 
The evidence in this case did not reveal that respondent 
had cause for such an awareness. The Court of Appeals 
therefore affirmed - F. 2d - (1972). For the reasons 
stated below, ,ve no,v reverse. 
II 
The principal issue in this case is whether a publisher 
of defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is 
neither a public official nor a public figure may claim a 
constitutional privilege against liability for the injury in-
flicted by those statements. The Court considered this 
question on the rather different set of facts presented in 
petitioner had in fact been a,.:,;ocia ted with thC' criminal prosecution . 
But thi,- would mean that the seeming!~· innocuous mistakC' of con-
fu,;ing pet itioner '::; rolr in thC' litigation again~t officer Nuccio would 
dr•::-tro~· tlw privilege othC'rwise available for calling petitionn a 
communist-frontn. Thus m;pondent':s privilege to publi8h ,;t ate-
mrnt::; who:se content should have alrrted it to tlw danger of in,iur~· 
to reputnt ion would hinge on the accurnc~· of statements that carried 
with thC'm no such warning. A:,;,;uming that none of the::-c statemPnt,; 
• r.'1 published wi1 h knowlPdge of fal>'it~· or with reckle~ disrC'gard 
for the truth, we seC' no rC'a::;on to di ::; fo1guish among thC' jnaccura ciP~. 
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Rosenbloom, ,r. Metromedia, /r,c., 403 U. S. 29 (1971). 
Rosenbloom. a distributor of nudist magazines, was 
arrested for selling allegedly obscene material while mak-
ing a delivery to a retail dealer. The police obtained a 
warrant and seized his entire inventory of 3,000 books and 
magazine. He sought and obtained an injunction pro-
hibiting further police interference with his business. He 
then sued a local radio station for failing to note in two 
of its newscasts that the 3,000 items seized were only 
"reportedly" or "allegedly" obscene and for broadcasting 
references to "the smut literature racket" and to "girlie-
book peddlers" in its coverage of the court proceeding 
for injunctive relief. He obtained a judgment against 
the radio station. but the Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit held the Xew York Times privilege applicable to 
the broadcast and reversed. 415 F. 2d 892 (1969). 
This Court affirmed the decision below. but no majority 
could agree on a controlling rationale. The eight Justices 5 
who participated in Rosenbloom announced their views 
in five separate opinions, none of which commanded more 
than three votes. The several statements not only re-
veal disagreement about the appropriate result in that 
case; they also reflect divergent traditions of thought 
about the general problem of reconciling the law of 
defamation with the First Amendment. One approach 
has been to extend the .\'ew York Times test to an ex-
panding variety of situations. Another has been to vary 
the level of constitutional privilege for defamatory false-
hood with the status of the person defamed. And a third 
view would grant to the press and broadcast media abso-
lute immunity from liability for defamation. To place 
our holding in the proper context. we preface our discus-
sion of this case with a review of the several Rosenbloom 
opinions and their antecedents . 
. ":\fa . .TrtsTJCE Doe<;LA::; did not p;1rtcipatc in the consideration o,: 
dc·ci,noi1 of this c::i:-e. 
10 
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In affirming the trial court's judgment in the instant 
case. the Court of Appeals relied on MR. JusTICE BREN-
NAN'S conclusion for the Rosenbloom plurality that "all 
discussion and communication involving matters of pub-
lic or general concern., warrant the protection from lia-
bility for defamation accorded by the rule originally enun-
ciated in iVew York Times Co.'"· Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964). There this Court defined a constitutional privi-
lege intended to free criticism of public officials from the 
restraints imposed by the common law of defamation. The 
Times ran a political advertisement endorsing civil rights 
demonstrations by black students in Alabama and im-
pliedly condemning the performance of local la,v enforce-
ment officials. A police commissioner established in state 
court that certain misstatements in the advertisement 
referred to him and that they constituted libel per se 
under Alabama law. This showing left the Times with 
the single defense of truth, for under Alabama law 
neither good faith nor reasonable care would protect the 
newspaper from liability. This Court concluded that a. 
"rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee 
the truth of all his factual assertions'" would deter pro-
tected speech, id., at 279, and announced the constitu-
tional privilege designed to counter that effect: · 
"The constitutional guarantees require, we think, 
a federal rule that prohibits a public official from 
recovery of damages for a defamatory falsehood re-
lating to his official conduct unless he proves that the 
statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, 
in the knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
disregard of whether it was true or not." Id., at 
279-280,6 
"New York T ime~ and later ca,;e,; explicnted the meaning of the 
11ew "'tandard . In Neu· York Times the Court held that under the 
72-6i7-0PIXION' 
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Three years after Xew York Times, a majority of the 
Court agreed to extend the constitutional privilege to 
defamatory critidsm of "public figures.'' This extensioii. 
rirC'um:--tanres tlw newspnper's failure to rherk the accuracy of the 
adverti,-emPnr 11gain,-t i1ew,.: :;torie:,; in 1t,- own tile:; did not e::;tablish 
rrcklrs:-- disregard for dw truth. Id .. at-. In St. Amant ,'. Tiwmp= 
son. :~go l'. S. 7'2i, 7:H ( 1968), the Court rquated reckle,-:,; tli:,;regard 
of the truth with :,,ubjective awai'rne:,;:,; of probablr fal8Jt~·: ·'There 
inu:,;t b<' sufhrient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defend-
an1 in fact cntcrtainrd ::;eriou:,; doubt,-: a" to the trnth of his publica-
ti011." In Beckle11 /\"eic~papers ('orp. v. Hanks. :{89 L'. S. 81 (1967) , 
tll(' Conrt emplrn:--izrd the distinrtion b(,tween the Anc York Times 
te::;t of knowledge· of fabit~· or recklr"" di,;regard of the truth and 
"actual malice" in thr trnditional 8en~e of ill-will. Garrison ,·. Loui-
siana. :179 l". S. o-1- (19fi4), madr pla111 th:11 tiir nrw ::;tandard appi.ieci 
(u criminal lib('! law,.: a::: well a:- to ci,·il action:- and that it go,·erned 
critiei,.:m dirrrtPd at ··an_dhing which might touch on an official '~ fit-
ne~:,; for officr." Id .. at Ti. Final!~·. in Ro~enblatt v. Baer. 38:1 ll . S. 
75, 85 (1966), the Court ::;tatc•d that ··thr ·public official' de,;ign<ttion 
applir,-; at the ,·er~· IP;1,,t to tho,-;e among tlw hPirarch~· of govPrnment 
emplo_we:,; who have. or appear to the public to have, ,;ubstantial 
re:;ponsibili1~· for or control OYer thr conduct of government affairs ." 
In Time. hie. v. Hill, 385 U.S. ;374 (19fl7). thr Court applied the 
New l"ork Times ,.:t,1ndard to action:- 11nd(0 r an unusual :-tate "tatutc. 
The statute clid not rrrate a cause of action for librl. Rather, it pro-
vided a remed~· for uuwmitPcl publirit~·- Although thr law allowed 
rcc·ovc'r~· of dnmagr" for harm eau,-;pd b)· Pxposure tu public attention 
rathrr than b~· fortual inaecuraciP~. it rrcognizrd truth a8 a complete 
drfen::;e. Thus, nondrfarnatorY factual error;: could render a publisher 
liable for somrthing akin to inva::-ion of prirncy. The Court rulPd that 
the drfrnd1111t in ,-11ch an aetion co11ld invoke thr Ne1c York Times 
pri,·ilegp rrgardlr,-,-; of tlw fame or anon~·mity of thr pbintiff. Speak-
ing for the Court. :.fH. Jl.',;'J'ICE BnENNAN declared that thi:; holding 
wa;; not an Pxtcn,;ion of New York Times but rather a parnllel line of 
re11:-;oning appl~·ing that "tandard to thi,-; discretr context : 
• ' '.Thi,~ i:'\. neither n libel action by .. a private individual nor a statu- , 
tor~- action b)· :\ public· official. Thrrefore, nlthough the First 
Amendmrnt priiwiplr8 announced in Seu· York Times guide our 
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was announced in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and its 
companion Associated Press Y. Walker, 388 U.S. 130. 162 
(1967). The first case involved the Saturday Evening 
Post ·s charge that C'oach vVally Butts of the University 
of Georgia had conspired with Coach Bear Bryant of the 
University of Alabama to fix a football game between 
their respective schools. fValker involved an erroneous 
Associated Press account of Brigadier General Edwirl 
Walker 's participatibt1 i11 a l"niversity of Mississippi 
campus riot. Brcause Butts was paid by a private alumni 
a~sociation and Walker had retired from the Army, neithE!!r 
could be classified as a "public official"' under l\~ ew York 
Times. Although Mr. Justice Harlan announced the 
result in both cases. a majority of the C'ourt agreed with 
Mr. Chief Justice \Varren's co11clusion that the 1\'ew York 
Times test should apply to criticism of "public figures '' as 
well as "public officials.''· The Court extended the con-
in thi:,: di~crt'te co11tex1. It thrreforr "en·r" no purpo~e to di~tingu1~h 
thr fact::: lwrr from tho"r in .VPu' 1·ork Times. 
r< wrre t!ll::' a libl"I ;\('11011. thf' (U;-[Ill('l!OD which ha::: been "ugge"ted 
brtween tlw rrlat ive opportunitie~ of thl' public official and the 
prirnte individunl io n'but defamator~· ch:1rgr" might be germane. 
And the additional ~t:itr intne"t in thc protrc1ion of thc individual. 
:igainst dnmagr" to hi" rrp111ation would be invoked. Cf. Rosenblatt 
\". Baer. :38:3 P. S. 75, 91 (S·1·EwAHT . .f.. cunrurring) .' ' Id ., at 390-:391. 
7 Profr",-ur K:tln•n onrc• introducrd :1 cli"cu,-,-io11 of the:;e ca:;e~ with 
the Hpt hrnding, "You Cnn't Trll thr Pla~·rr" Without a Scorr Card.'" 
H . Kah·rn. Thr Tfra:;onnble .\Ian and thr Fir:-t Amendnwnt, 19fl7 
Sup. Ct. Hr\'. :2fi7. :2,5 (19('j7). Onl~· threr other .Tu:;tice,; joined 
\fr. J11 Pt icr Hnrlan',; anal~·,-i:; of 1hr i:;:ouc,., involvrd. In hi:; con-
rurring opinion, \Ir. Chief .fu,-tice WarrPn "tilted the principle fur 
which the,;r r•H:;r" :;tand-tlrnt the Neu• York Times test reaclm; both 
public figurr" and public nffieiab. .\JH .. JL·:;TICE BHENNAN and .\In. 
.JF,;TrCE WHITE :1grrrd with the Chief J11:;ticc on that quc:-tion . 
:\Ir . .fu:;tice Black and .\fa .Ju::;TJ CE Dol'<:LA:,; reiterated their ,·iew 
tha1 pubfo,hrrP ~hould ha\'C' a11 nb~olutc immunit~· from liability for 
defamation , but the,· acquir:-rd in thr Chirf .Jrn;tice '~ reasoning in 
order to enable a rn:ijorit~· of the .Jqs'tic(':,; to :igrce on the que:;tion · 
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'st.ifutional privile~e announced in that case to proteot 
''defamatory criticism of nonpublic officials who "are never~ 
theless intimately involved in the resolution of important 
public questions, dr. by reason of their fame, shape event;; 
in areas of concern to society at large,' ' Id., at 164. 
In his opinion for the plurality in Rosenbloom x .. 
-J.l!Jetromedia, fnc., 403 F S. 29 (1971). MR. JUSTICE: 
BRENNAN took the-.\'ew York Times ·privilege one step 
further, He concluded that its protection should extend 
'to defamatory falsehoods relating to private persons if the 
' statements co11cernecl matters of general or public interest. 
He abjured the suggested distinction between public offi-
cials and public figures on the one hand and private indi-
viduals on the other, He focused instead on society's 
interest in learning about certain issues: "If a matter is a 
subject of public or general interest. it cannot suddenly 
· become less so merely because a private individual js 
involved or because in some sense the individual did npt 
'· choose to beconw involved.'' 403 U. S,. at ,43. '.fhu.~, 
;under the plurality opinion. a private citizen _involun-
tarily associated with a matter of general interest has'. 11P 
: recourse for injury to his reputation -unless he can satisfy 
, the demanding reguirements of the Aew York 1'imes ,te~t. 
Tv,:o members of ithe Court concurred in the result in 
,'tt,osenbloom but departed from the reasoning of the 
w-lurality. Mr. Justice Black restated his view, long 
· ·shared by MR. JusTICE DorGLAS, that the First Amend-
ment cloaks the news media with an absolute and in-
, · defeasible immunity from liability for· defamatio11. · Id., 
' at t>7. MR - JtrsTfCE- vVHITE concurred on a- narrower 
groui1d, Ibid. He concluded that "the First Amend-
ment gives the 1)ress and the broadcast media a privilege 
to report aiid conl'ment upon the official actions of public 
of the apprci'pri,lte c·on:::titutional j1ri,·iicgc for: defamation of 1)ublic 
figures. 
72-617-0PIXION 
14 GERTZ 1•. WELCH 
servants in full detail. with no requirement that the rep-
utation or privacy of an individual involved in or affected 
by the official action be spared from public view." Id., 
at 62. He therefore declined to reach the broader ques-
tions addressed by the other Justices. 
Mr. Justice Harlan dissented. Although he had joined 
the opinion of the Court in .Yew York Times, in Curtis 
Publishing Co. he had contested the extension of the 
privilege to public figures. There he had argued that 
a public figure who held no governmental office should 
be allowed to recover damages for defamation "on 
a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constitut-
ing an extreme departure from the standards of in-
vestigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by 
responsible publishers." 388 U. S .. at 155. In his Curtis 
Publishing Co. opinion Mr. Justice Harlan had distin-
guished .Yew York Times primarily on the ground that 
defamation actions by public officials "lay close to sedi-
tious libel. ... ·· Id., at 133. Recovery of damages by 
one \-\·ho held no public office. however. could not "be 
viewed as a vindication of governmental policy." Id., 
at 154. Additionally, he had intimated that, because 
most public officials enjoyed absolute immunity from 
liability for their own defamatory utterances under Barr 
'"· Ma.tteo, 360 V. S. 564 (195~)). they lacked a strong 
claim to the protection of the courts. 
In Rosenbloom ' Mr. Justice Harlan modified these 
views. He acquiesced in the application of the privilege 
to defamation of public figures but argued that a different 
rule should obtain where defamatory falsehood harmed 
a private individual. He noted that a private person 
has less likelihood "of securing access to the channels 
of communication sufficient to rebut falsehoods concern-
ing him'' than do public officials and public figures . id., 
at 70, and has not voluntarily placed himself in the public 
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Spotlight. Mr. Justice Harlan concluded that the States 
could constitutionally allow private individuals to re-
cover damages for defarnation on a showing of negligence. 
Mn. J"l'STICE lVIARSHALL dissented in Rosenbloom in an 
bpinion joined by Mn. Jus1'1CE STEWART. Id., at 78. He 
thought that the plurality's "public or general interest" 
test for determining the applicability of the Sew York 
Times privilege would involve the courts in the dangerous 
business of deciding "what information is relevant to self-
government." Id., at 79. He also contended that the 
plurality's position inadequately served "society's inter-
est in protecting private individuals from being thrust 
into the public eye by the distorting light of defamation." 
Ibid. MR. JusTICE MARSHALL therefore joined Mr. 
Justice Harlan in the conclusion that the States could 
allo,"'· private plaintiffs to recover damages for defamation 
on proving lack of reasonable care. The principal point 
of disagreement among the three dissenters concerned 
punitive damages. Whereas Mr . .Justice Harlan thought 
that the States could allow punitive damages in amounts 
bearing "a reasonable and purposeful relationship to the 
actual harm done ... ," id., at 75. MR . .JusTICE MARSHALL 
concluded that the size and unpredictability of jury 
awards of exemplary damages unnecessarily exacerbated 
the problems of media self-censorship and that such 
·damages should therefore be forbidden. 
III 
We begin with the common ground. Under the First 
Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. How-
ever pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its 
correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but 
on the competition of other ideas.' But there is no con-
8 As Thonrn~ Jefferson madr the point in his fir8t Inaugural 
Addrc,;s: "If tlwre bran~· a.mong 1,1:,: who wish to dissolve this union 
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stitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither 
the intentional lie nor the careless error materially ad-
vances society's interest in "uninhibited, robust. and 
wide-open'' debate on public issues. .Yew York T'imes 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 l'". S .. at 270. They belong to that 
category of utterances which "are 110 essential part of 
any exposition of ideas. and are of such slight social value 
as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived 
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest 
in order and morality.'' Chaplinsky \" . . \ ·ew Hampshire, 
315 U.S. 568, 572 ( 1~)42). 
Although the erroneous statement of fact is not worthy 
of constitutional protection, it is nevertheless inevitable in 
free debate. As .James Madison pointed out iii the Report 
on the Virginia Resolutions of 17n8. "Some degree of 
abuse is inseparable from the proper use of everything; 
and in no instance is this more true than that of the 
press.' ' 4 Elliot's Debates ( 1876). p. 571. And punish-
ment of error runs the risk of inducing a cautious and 
restrictive exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed 
freedoms of speech and press. Our decisions recognize 
that a rule of strict liability that compels a publisher 
or broadcaster to guarantee the accuracy of his factual 
assertions may lead to intolerable self-censorship. Al-
lowing the media to avoid liability only by proving the 
truth of all injurious statements does not accord adequate 
protection to First Amendment liberties. As the Court 
stated in .Yew York Times Co. \". Sullivan, supra, 376 
1.J". S .. at 279. "Allowance of the defense of truth, with 
the burden of proving it on the defendant. does not mean 
that only false speech will be deterred.'' The First 
Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in 
order to protect speech that matters. 
or elwnge its republican form of government , !rt them stand undis-
tnrbrd .as monument~ of the ;;afet~· with which error of opini011 may 
be tolerated whrre rea~on is k:ft free to combat it." 
72-617-0PINION 
GERTZ v. WELCH 17 
1rhe need to avoid self-ce11sorship by the news media is; 
however, not the on ly societal value at issue. If it were, 
this Court would have embraced long ago the view that 
publishers and broadcasters enjoy an unconditional and 
indefeasible immunity from liability for defamation. See 
1Yew York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254. 293 (1964) 
( opinion of Black. J.) ; Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64, 
80 (1964) ( opinion of Dou GLAS, J.); Curtis Publishing Co. 
v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130. 170 ( 1967) (opinion of Black. J.). 
Such a rule would indeed obviate the fear that the pros-
pect of civil liability for inJurious falsehood might dis-
suade a timorous press from the effective exercise of 
First Amendment freedoms. Yet absolute protection for 
the communications media requires a total sacrifice of 
the competing value served by the law of defamation. 
The legitimate state interest underlying the law of libel 
is the compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted 
on them by defamatory falsehoods. We would not lightly 
require the State to abandon this purpose. for. as MR. 
JusTICE STEWART has reminded us. the individual's right 
to the protection of his own good name 
"reflects no more than our basic concept of the essen-
tial dignity and worth of every human being-a 
concept at the root of any decent system of ordered 
liberty. The protection of private personality, like 
the protection of life itself. is left primarily to the 
individual states under the ~inth and Tenth Amend-
ments. But this does not mean that the right is 
entitled to any less recognition by this Court as a 
basic of our constitutional system.'' Rosenblatt v. 
Baer, 383 U. S. 75, 92-93 ( 1963) ( opinion of 
STEW AR'l', J. ) . 
Some tension necessarily exists between the need for 
a vigorous and uninhibited press and the legitimate in-
terest in redressing_ wrongful injury. As Mr. Justice 
1 
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Harlall stated. "some antithesis between freedom of 
speech and press and libel actions persists, for libel re-
mains premised on the content of speech and limits the 
freedom of the publisher to express certain sentiments, 
at least without guaranteeing legal proof of their sub-
stantial accuracy." Curtis Publishing Co. ,·. Butts, 388 
U. S .. at 152. In our conti11uing effort to define the 
proper accommodation between these competing con-
cerns, we have been especially anxious to assure to the 
freedoms of speech and press that "breathing space" 
essential to their fruitful exercise. .YAACP v. B1ttton, 
371 lJ. S. 415. 433 ( 1963). To that end this Court has 
extended a measure of strategic protection to defamatory 
falsehood. 
The .Yew Yark Times standard defines the level of 
co11stitutional protection appropriate to the context of 
defamation of a public person. Those "':ho. by reason 
of the notoriety of their achievements or the vigor 
and success with which they seek the public's attention, 
are properly classed as public figures and those who 
hold governmental office may recover for injury to rep-
utation only on clear and convincing proof that the 
defamatory falsehood was made with knowledge of its 
falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth. This 
standard administers an extremely powerful a~~ 
to the inducement to media self-censorship :7" n~:,1! ~ 
common law rule of strict liability for libel and 
slander. And it exacts a correspondingly high price 
from the victims of defamatory falsehood. Plainly 
many deserving plaintiffs. including some intentionally 
subjected to injury, will be unable to surmount 
the barrier of the .Yew York Times test. Despite this 
substantial abridgement of the state law right to com-
pensation for wrongful hurt to one's reputation, the 
Court has concluded that the protection of the 1Vew 
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York Times privilege should be available to publish-
ers aud broadcasters of defamtory falsehoods concern-
ing public -officials and public figures. !Yew York 
Times Co. ,·. Sullivan, 376 r. ~- 254 (1964); Curtis 
Publishing Co. "· Butts, 388 r. 1'. 130 (1967). We 
think that these decisions arP correct. but we do not 
find their holdi 11gs justified solely by reference to the 
interest of the press and broadcast media in immunity 
from liability. Rather. we believe that the .Yew 1·ork 
Times rule states an accommodation between this con-
cern and the limited state interest present in the context 
of libel actions brought by public persons. For the rea-
:sons stated below, we conclude that the state interest 
in compensating injury to the reputation of private 
individuals requires that a different rule should obtain 
with respect to them. 
Theoretically, of course. the balance between the needs 
of the press and the individual's claim to compensation 
for \\Tongful injury might be struck on a case-by-case 
basis. As Mr. Justice Harlan hypothesized, "it might 
seem, purely as an abstract matter, that the most utili-
tarian approach would be to scrutinize carefully every 
jury verdict in every libel case. in order to ascertain 
v.:hether the final judgmellt leaves fully protected what-
ever First Amendment values transcend the legitimate 
state interest in protecting the particular plaintiff who 
prevailed." Rosenbbom \'. M etro111edia, In c., 403 U. S. 
29. 63 ( H:171) ( footnote omitted). But this approach 
would lead to unpredictable results and uncertain expecta-
tions. and it could render our duty to supervisf' the lower 
courts unmanagable. Because an ad hoc resolution of 
the competing interests at stake in each particular case 
is not feasible. we must lay clown broad rules of general 
application . :-,uch rules necessarily treat alike various 
cases involving differences as well as similarities. Thus 
20 
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it is often true that not all of the considerations which 
justify adoption of a given rule will obtain in each par-
ticular case decided u11der its authority. 
With that caveat we have no difficulty i11 distinguishing 
among defamation plaintiffs. The first remedy of any 
victim of defamation is self-help-using available oppor-
tunities to contradict the lie or correct the error and 
thereby to minimize its adverse impact 011 reputation. 
Public officials and public figures usually enjoy signifi-
cantly greater access to the channels of effective commu-
nication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to 
counteract false statements than private individuals nor-
mally enjoy." Private individuals are therefore more 
vulnerable to injury, and the state interest in protecting 
them is correspondingly greater. 
More important than the likelihood that private indi-
viduals will lack effective opportunities for rebuttal, there 
is a corn pelli ng 11orrnative consideration underlying the 
distinction between public and private defamation plain-
tiffs. An individual who decides to seek governmental 
office must accept certain necessary consequences of that 
involvement in public affairs. He runs the risk of closer 
public scrutiny than n1ight otherwise be the case. And 
societ,y 's interest i11 the officers of governnwnt is not 
strictly limited to the formal discharge of official duties. 
As the Court pointed out in Garrison Y. Louisiana, 379 
U. S. 64. 77 ( 1964). the public's interest extends to "any-
thing that might touch 011 an official's fitness for office .... 
Few personal attributes are more germane to fitness for 
office than dishonesty, malfeasance. or improper motiva-
u Of course. :rn opportunit~· for rebuttal ;;eldom suffices to undo 
ha rm of clPfamator~· fal sehood . Indeed. the law of defamation is 
rooted in our experiPnce that the truth r11rely catches up with a lie. 
But the fact that the ;;elf-help remed~- of rebuttal. 1,:tanding alone. 
i:,; inadequat e to it;; task doe,; not mean that it i,-; irrelevant to our 
inquiry·. 
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.t.ion. even though these characteristics inay also aff'e~t 
the official's pr1vate character.',. 
.. Those classed as public figures stand in a simiiar posi-
tion. Hypothetically, it may be possible for someone to 
become a public figure through no purposeful action of 
his own. but the instances of truly involuntary public 
figures must be exceedingly rare. For the most part 
those who attain this status have assumed roles of especial 
prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy posi-
tions of such persuasive power an<l influence that they 
are deemed public figures for all purposes. More com-
monly, those classed as public figures have thrust them-
selves to the forefront of particular public controversies 
in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. 
1n either event, they invite attention and comment. 
Even if the foregoing generalities do not obtain in every 
instance, the communications media are entitled to act 
on the assumption that public officials and public figures 
have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk 
of injury from defamatory falsehoods concerning them. 
_,o such assumptiou is justified with respect to a private 
individual. He has relinquished no part of his interest 
in the protection of his own good name, and consequently 
he has a more compelling call on the courts for redress 
of injury inflicted by defamatory falsehood. Th us, pri-
vate individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury 
than public officials and public figures; they are also more 
deserving of recovery. 
:For these reasons we conclude that the States should 
retain substantial latitude in their efforts to enforce a 
legal remedy for defamatory falsehood injurious to the 
reputation of a private individual. The extension of the 
.\·ew J' ark Times test proposed by the Rosenbloom, plu-
rality would abridge this legitimate state interest to a 
degree that we find unacceptable. And it would occa-
sion the additional difficulty of forcing state and federal 
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judges to Jecide 011 an ad hoc basic which publicatio11s 
address issues of "general or publi~ interest'' a11d 
which do not-to determine. in the words of l\lIH. JutincE 
MAH81-IALL, " what i'11formation is relevant to self-govern-
111e11t.". Rose116loo111 Y: :lfetrv111edia, fnc., 403 C S., at 
7n. \Ye> doubt the wisdom of committing this task to the 
conscience of judges. Xor does the C'o11stitution require 
us to draw so thin a line between the drastic alternatives 
of the .\'e11 1 )'ark Times privilege a11cl the common law of 
strict liability for defamatory error. The "public or gen-
eral interest" test for cletermi11i11g the applicability of 
th e .\' e 11 1 rork 1'i111,es standard to private defamation 
actio11s inadequately serves both of the competing values 
at stake. On the one hand. a private individual whose 
r·<•pu tatio11 is inj un"'d by defamatory falsehood that does 
concern an issue of public m- general interest has no re-
course unless he can meet the rigorous requirements of 
.\'eu• 1' ork Times. This is true despite the factors 
that distinguish the state interest in compensating 
private individuals from the analogous interest involved 
in th e context of public persons. On the other 
hand. a publisher or broadcaster of a defamatory error 
which a court deern::; unrelated to an issue of public or 
general interest may be held liable in damages even if it 
took every reasonable precaution to ensure the accuracy 
of its assertions. And liabllity may far exceed compensa-
tion for any actual injury to the plaintiff. for the jury may 
be permitted to presume damages without proof of loss 
and even to award punitive damages. 
The familia1· concept of reaso11able care provides 
a more equitable boundary between the competing 
cu11cerns involved here. A negligence standard recog-
nizes the strength of the legitimate state interest in 
compensating private individuals for wrongful injury 
to reputation. yet shields the press and broadcast media 
7:2-617-0PINION 
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from the rigors of strict liabil ity for defamation. We 
hold that a publishflr or broadcaster of defamatory false~ 
hood injurious to the good natne of an individual who 
is neither a public official nor a public figure lrtay be held 
liable on a showing of negligence. At least this is so 
\\·here, as here. the substance of the defamatory statement 
"makes substantial danger to reputation apparent." '" 
This phrase places an important qualification on the 
conclusion we announce today. Our inquiry would in-
volve considerations somewhat different from those dis-
cussed above if a State purported to condition civil 
liability on a factual misstatement whose content did not 
carry warning of its defamatory potential. Cf. 1'frrte; 
Inc. \'. Hill, 385 l'". S. 374 ( 1967). Such a case is not 
110,Y before us. and ,ve intimate no view as to its proper 
resolution. 
IV 
Our accommodation of the competing values at stake 
in defamation suits by private individuals allows the 
States to impose liability 01i the publisher or broadcaster 
of defamatory falsehoods on a less demanding showing 
than that required by .Vew York Times. This conclusion 
is not based on a belief that the considerations which 
prompted the adoption of the X ew York Times privilege 
for defamation of public officials and its extension to 
public figures are wholly inapplicable to the context of 
private individuals. Rather, we endorse the standard of 
reasonable care in recognition of the strong and legitimate 
state interest in compensating private individuals for 
injury to reputation. But this countervailing state 
iHterest extends no further than compensation for actual 
injury. For the reasons stated below, we hold that the 
States may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive 
damages when liability is based on a finding of negligence. 
1° Curtis Pub/i;;hi11g Co . , . Butt;;, -188 ll. S. 130, 155 (1967). 
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The common law of defarnatiu11 is an oddity of tort 
la \\". for it a llows recovery of purportedly compensatory 
damages withoL1t evidencP of actual loss. rnder the 
trad itiu 111:Ll rules pertaining to actions for libel, th e exist-
e 11cc of injury is presunwd frolll th e fact of publication . 
Jurit:>s may award substantial sums as compensation for 
supposed damage to rep utation without any proof that 
such harm actually occu rred. The largely unco ntrolled 
discrPtion of juries to a ward darnages wh Pre there is no 
loss unnecessarily compounds th t• pote ntial of any sys-
t<~n1 of li ability for dt:>famatory falsehood to inhibit the 
vigorous exercis(• of First A111P11dment freedoms. Addi-
tionally. t lw doctrim• of pres umed damages invites juries 
to punish unpopular opinio11 rather than to compensate 
illdividuals for injury sustai ned by the publication of a 
false fact . More to the poi11t. the States have no sub-
stantia l interpst in secur ing for plaintiffs who prove only 
Hegligent defamation gratuitous awards of mon ey dam-
ages far in excess of any actual injury. 
\Ye would not. of cou rse . invalidate state law simply 
liecausC' wt' doubt its wisdom . but here we are attempting 
to reconci le state law with a competing interest grounded 
in the constitu t io11al command of the First A111endme1Jt. 
1t is therefon-· a ppropriate to req uire that state remedies 
for defamatory falsehood reach no farther than is 
llecessary to protect th e legitimate interest involved . 
I t is necessary to res trict defamation plaintiffs who 
recover 011 a shovving of neglige nce to compensation for 
actual injury. We need not define "actual injury," as 
trial cou rts have widt:> experie nce in frarni11g appropriate 
jury instructions i11 tort action. Suffice it to say that actual 
injury is not limited to out-of-pocket loss. Indeed, the 
m ore customary types of actual harm inflicted by defam-
atory falsehood include impainnent of reputation and 
stalld ing in the community. perso nal humiliation. and 
111ental anguish and suffering. Of course. juries must be · 
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Hmited by ai)propriate instructions, and iill awards must 
be supported by compett~nt evidenct'. 
We also fii1d i10 .iust:ification for allowing awards of 
j1unitivc damages ag•ainst publishers and broadcasters held 
liable for negligent defarnatio11. In most jurisdictions 
,iu ry discretion ov(1r the amounts awarded is limited only 
by the gentle rulf' that they 11ot be "excessive.'' 11 Con-
sequently, juries as::;ess punitiw damages in wholly unpre-
dictable amou11ts !waring 110 necessary relation to the 
actual harm caused. And tlwy remain free to use their 
discrC'tion selC'ctivPly to punish Pxpressions of unpopular 
Yif'\\'S. Like tlw dol'tri11e of presumed damages, jury dis-
crC'tio11 to a\\'arcl pu11itive damages un11ecessarily exacer-
bates thC' da11g;er of media self-ce11sorship. but. unlike the 
former rule. pu11itiv(0 damages art' wholly irrelevant to the 
statC' i11ten--s t that .i ustifies a negligence standard for pri-
,·atf' defamation actions. They arP not compensation for 
rn,1 u ry . 1 nsteacl. tlH•y are private fines levied by civil 
juriC's to punish repreheusible conduct and to deter its 
future occu1Tf'ncE1 • Because punitive damages perform 
much the same fu11ctions as criminal penalties. the in-
cidence of their imposition should be governed by our 
decision in Garriso n "· Louisiana, 379 P. S. 64 ( 1964). 
1 n short. the pri vak defamatio11 plaintiff wl10' establishes 
liability by proof of negligc11ce may recover only such 
da1nagPs as are sufficient to compensate him for actual 
m.1 ury. 
y 
Xot\\·ithstandi11g our refusal to extend the .Yew York 
Ti111 es privilege to defamation of private individuals, 
respondent conte11cls that ·we should affirm the judgment 
below on the ground that petitio,wr is either a public 
official or a public figure. There is little basis for the 
";o,e<' H . Ol<·<'k, Dama~('" to Per.-011" and Property, § 175, pp. 577-
5(:iO l 195.5) . 
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former assertioll.. Several years prior to the present in-
cident, petitioner had served briefly on housing commit-
tees appointed by the mayor of Chicago. but at the 
time of publication. he had never held any remunera-
tive governmental position. Respondent admits this 
but argues that petitioner's appearance at the coroner's 
inquest rendered him a "de facto public official." Our 
cases recognize no such concept. Respondent's sugges-
tion would s\veep all lawyers under the Xew York Times 
rule as officers of the court and distort the plain meaning 
of the "public official'' category beyond all recognition. 
We decline to follow it. 
Respondent's characterization of petitioner as a public 
figure raises a different question. That designation may 
rest on either of two alternative bases. In some in-
stances an individual may achieve such pervasive fame 
or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all pur-
poses and in all contexts. More commonly. an individual 
voluntary injects himself or is drawn into a particular 
public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure 
for a limited range of issues. In either case such persons 
assume special prominence in the resolution of public 
questions. 
Petitioner has long been active in community and 
professional affairs. He has served as an officer of local 
ci vi] groups and of various professional organizations, 
and he has published several books and articles on legal 
subjects. Although petitioner was consequently well-
known in some circles. he had achieved no general fame 
or notoriety in the commu11ity. ~one of the prospective 
.i urors called at the trial had ever heard of petitioner 
prior to this litigation. and respondent offered no proof 
that this response was atypical of the local population. 
We would not lightly assume that a citizen ·s participa-
tion in community and professional affairs rendered him 
a public figure for all purposes. Absent clear evidence 
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of general fame or notoriety in the community, and per-
vasive involvement in the affairs of society. an individual 
should not be deemed a public personality for all aspects 
of his life. It is preferable to reduce the public figure 
t}uestion to a more meaningful context by looking to the 
11ature and extent of an individual's participation in the 
particular controversy giving rise to the defamation. 
In this context it is plain that petitioner was not a 
public figure. He played a minimal role at the coroner's 
inquest . and his participation related solely to his repre-
sentation of a private client. He took no part in the 
criminal prosecution of officer ~uccio. Moreover, he 
never discussed either the criminal or civil litigation with 
the press and was never quoted as having done so. He 
plainly did not thrust himself into the vortex of this 
public issue, nor did he engage the public's attention in 
an attempt to influence its outcome. ,ve are persuaded 
that the trial court did not err in refusing to charactf'rize 
petitioner as a public figure for the purpose of this 
litigation. 
We therefore conclude that the .Yew York Tirnes stand-
ard is inapplicable to this case and that the trial court 
erred in entering j udgrnent for respondent. Because the 
jury was not required to find negligence as a condition 
of liability and was permitted to presume damages with-
out proof of injury. a new trial is necessary. We reverse 
and remand for further proceedings in accord with this 
opinion, 
It -is so ordered. 
~ 
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This Court has struggled for nearly a decade to define 
the proper accommodation between the law of defama-
tion and the freedoms of speech and press protected by 
the First Amendment. With this decision we return to 
that effort. We granted certiorari to reconsider the ex-
tent of a publisher's constitutional privilege against lia-
bility for defamation of a private citizen. - U. S. -
(1973). 
I 
In 1968 a Chicago policeman named Nuccio shot and 
killed a youth named Nelson . The state authorities prose-
cuted ~uccio for the homicide and ultimately obtained 
a conviction for murder in the !,econd degree. The Nel-
son family retained petitioner Elmer Gertz, a reputable 
attorney, to represent them in civil litigation against 
Nuccio. 
Respondent publishes American Opinion, a monthly 
outlet for the views of the John Birch Society. Early in 
the 1960's the magazine began to warn of a nationwide 
conspiracy to discredit local law enforcement agencies 
and create in their stead a national police force capable 
of supporting a communist dictatorship. As part of the 
~ 
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continuing effort to alert the public to this assumed 
danger, the managing editor of American Opinion com-
missioned an article on the murder trial of officer Nuccio. 
For this purpose he engaged a regular contributor to the 
magazine. In March of 1969 respondent published the 
resulting article under the title "FRAME-UP: Richard 
Nuccio And The War On Police." The article purports 
to demonstrate that the testimony against Nuccio at 
his criminal trial was false and that his prosecution was 
part of the communist campaign against the police. 
In his capacity as counsel for the Nelson family in 
the civil litigation, petitioner attended the coroner's in-
quest into the boy's death and initiated actions for 
damages, but he neither discussed officer Nuccio with the 
press nor played any part in the criminal proceeding. 
Notwithstanding petitioner's remote connection with the 
prosecution of Nuccio, respondent's magazine portrayed 
him as an architect of the "frame-up." According to 
the article, the police file on petitioner took "a big, Irish 
cop to lift." The article stated that petitioner had been 
an official of the "Marxist League for Industrial Democ-
racy, originally known as the Intercollegiate Socialist 
Society, which has advocated the violent seizure of our 
government.'' It labelled Gertz a "Leninist" and a 
"Communist-fronter." It also stated that Gertz had 
been an officer of the National Lawyers Guild, described 
as a communist organization that "probably did more 
than any other outfit to plan the Communist attack on 
the Chicago police during the 1968 Democratic conven-
tion." It is undisputed that these statements contained 
serious inaccuracies. The impliaction that petitioner had 
a criminal record was false. Petitioner had been a mem-
ber and officer of the National Lawyers Guild some 15 
years earlier, but there was no evidence that he or that 
organization had taken any part in planning the 1968 
demonstrations in Chicago, There was also no basis for 
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the charge that petitioner was a "Leninist" or a "Com-
munist-fronter." And he had never been a member of 
the "Marxist League for Industrial Democracy" or the 
"Intercollegiate Socialist Society.;; 
The managing editor of American Opinion made nd 
effort to verify or substantiate the charges against peti-
tioner. Instead, he appended an editorial introduction 
stating that the author had "concluded extensive re-
search into the Richard Nuccio case." And he included 
in the article a photograph of petitioner and wrote the 
caption that appeared under it: "Elmer Gertz of the 
Red Guild harrasses Nuccio." Respondent placed the 
issue of American Opinion containing the article on sale 
at newsstands throughout the country and distributed 
reprints of the article on the streets of Chicago. 
Petitioner filed a diversity action for libel in the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. 
He claimed that the falsehoods published by respondent 
injured his reputation as a lawyer and a citizen. Before 
filing an answer, respondent moved to dismiss the com-
plaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could 
be granted, apparently on the ground that petitioner 
failed to allege special damages. But the court ruled 
that statements contained in the article constituted libel 
per se under Illinois law and that consequently petitioner 
need not plead special damages. 366 F. Supp. 310 (ND 
Ill. 1969) . 
After answering the complaint, respondent filed a pre-
trial motion for summary judgment, claiming a constitu-
tional privilege against liability for defa.rnation.1 It 
asserted that petitioner was a public official or a public 
figure and that the article concerned an issue of public 
1 Petitioner filed a cros::;-motion for ::;ummary judgment on grounds 
not specified in the record. The Court denied petitioner's cross-
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interest and concern. For these reasons, respondent 
argued, it was entitled to invoke the privilege enunciated 
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964) . 
Under this rule respondent would escape liability unless 
petitioner could prove publication of defamatory false-
hood "with 'actual malice'-that is, in the knowledge that 
it was false or with reckless disregard for whether it was 
true or not. " Id. , at 279- 280. Respondent claimed and 
submitted a supporting affidavit by the magazine's man-
aging editor. The editor denied any knowledge of the 
falsity of the statements concerning petitioner and stated 
that he had relied on the author's reputati'on and on his 
prior experience with the accuracy and authenticity of 
his contributions to American Opinion. 
The District Court denied respondent's motion for 
summary judgment in a memorandum opinion. - F . 
Supp. - (ND Ill. , Sept. 16, 1970). The court did not 
dispute respondent 's claim to the protection of the New 
York Times standard. Rather, it concluded that peti-
tioner might overcome the constitutional privilege by 
making a factual showing sufficient to prove publication 
of defamatory falsehood in reckless disregard of the truth. 
During the course of the trial , however, it became clear 
that the trial court had not accepted all of respondent's 
asserted grounds for applying the New York Times rule 
to this case. It thought that respondent's claim to the 
protection of the constitutional privilege depended on 
the contention that petitioner was either a public official 
under the New York Times decision or a public figure 
under Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 338 U. S. 130 
(1967) , apparently discounting the argument that a 
privilege would arise from the presence of a public issue. 
After all the evidence had been presented but before 
submission of the case to the jury, the court ruled in ; 
effect that petitioner was neither a public official nor a 
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public figure. It added that, if he were, the resulting ap-
plication of the New Yark Times standard would require 
a directed verdict for respondent. Because some stat~,. 
ments in the article constituted libel per se under I11i11ois 
law, the court submitted the case to the jury under instruc~ 
tions that withdrew from its consideration all issues save 
the measure of damages. The jury awarded $50,000 to 
petitioner. 
Following the jury verdict and on further reflection, 
the District Court concluded that the New Yark Times 
standard should govern this case even if petitioner were 
not a public official or public figure. It accepted re~ 
spondent's contention that that privilege protected dis-
cussion of any public issue without regard to the status 
of a person defamed therein. Accordingly, the court 
entered judgment for respondent notwithstanding the 
jury's verdict! This conclusion anticipated the reason-
2 - F. Supp. - (ND Ill. , Dec. 8, 1970). Petitioner asserts that 
the entry of judgment n. o. v . on the basis of his failure to show 
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard fo r the truth constituted 
unfair surprise and deprived him of a full and fair opportunity to 
prove "actua l malice" on the part of respondents. This contention 
is not supported by the record. It is clear that the trial court 
gave petitioner no reason to assume that the New York Times 
privilege would not be available to respondent. The court's memo-
randum opinion denying respondent's pretrial motion for summary 
judgment does not state that the New York Times standard was 
inapplicable to this case. Rather, it reveals that the trial judge 
thought it possible for petitioner to make a factua l showing sufficient 
to overcome respondent 's claim of constitutional privilege. It states 
in part : 
"When there is it factual dispute as to the existence of actual 
malice, summary judgment is improper. 
"In the instant. c::ise a jury might infer from the evidence that 
[respondent 's] failure to investigate the truth of the allegations, 
coupled with its receipt of communications challenging the factual 
accuracy of this author in the past amounted to actual malice, that 
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ing of a plurality of this Court in Rosenbloom v. Metro-
media, 403 U. S. 29 (1971). 
Petitioner appealed to contest the applicability of the 
New York Times standard to this case. Although the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit doubted the 
correctness of the District Court's determination that 
petitioner was not a public figure, it did not overturn 
that finding. " It agreed with the District Court that 
respondent could assert the constitutional privilege be~ 
cause the article concerned a matter of public interest, 
citing this Court's intervening decision in Rosenbloom v. 
Metromedia, Inc., supra. The Court of Appeals read 
Rosenbloom, to require application of the New York 
is, 'reckleRs disregard' of whether the allegations were true or not. 
New York Times L Co.] v. Sullivan, supra, at 279-280." - F , 
Supp. - , - (ND Ill., Sept. 16 , 1970) . 
Thus, petitioneer knew or should have known that the outcome of 
the trial might hinge on his abilit)' to show by clear and convincing 
evidence that respondent acted with reckless disregard for the truth . 
And this question rema ined open throughout the trial. Although 
the court concluded that the applicability of New York Times 
rule depended on petitioner's status as a public figure , the court 
did not decide that petitioner was not a public figure until all 
the evidence had been presented. Thu~ petitioner had every 
opportunit)·, indeed incentive, to prove "reckless disregard" if he 
could, and he in fact attempted to do so. The record supports the 
observation by the Court of Appeals that petitioner "did present 
evidence of malice (both the 'constitutional' and the 'ill-will' type) 
to support his damage claim and no such evidence was excluded ... . " 
-F.2d,a.t-. 
3 The court sta ted : 
"[Petitioner's] considerable stature as a lawyer, author, lecturer, 
and participant in matters of public import undermine the validity 
of the assumption that he is not a 'public figure ' as that term has 
been used by the progeny of New York Times. Nevertheless, for 
purposes of decision we make that assumption and test the avail-
abilit)· of the claim of pri,·ilege by the s~1bject matter of the article." 
- F. 2d, at-' -. 
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Times standard to any publication or broadcast about 
an issue of signHicant public interest, without regard 
to the positloh, fame, or ailonymity of the perso11 
defamed, and it concluded that respondent's statements 
concerned such an isslle.4 After reviewing the record; 
·1 In the Court of Appeals petitioner made an ingenious but un• 
availing attempt to show that respondent 's defamatory charge against 
him concerned no is,ntc of public or general interest. He asserted 
that the subject matter of the article was the murder trial of Officer 
Nuccio and that he did not participate in that proceeding. There-
fore, he argued, even if the 8Ubject matter of the art icle generally 
were protected by the New York Times privilege, under the opinion 
of the Rosenbloom plurality, the defamatory statements about him 
were not. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument. It noted 
that the accusations against petitioner played an integral part in 
respondent's general the;;is of a nationwide con;;piracy to harass the 
police : 
' '[W]e may also assume that the article's basic thesis is false. Never• 
theless, under the rea;;ons of New York Times v. Sullivan, even a 
.false statement made in :,;upport of a false thesis is protected unless 
made with knowledge of its fabity or with reckless disregard of its 
truth or fabity. It would undermine the rule of that case to permit 
the actual falsity of a statement to determine whether or not its 
publisher i;; entitled to the benefit of the rule. 
"If. therefore, we put to one side the false character of the article 
and treat it as though it;; contents were enti rely true, it cannot be 
denied that the comment::; about [petitioner] were integral to its 
thesis. They must be tested under the New York Times standard." 
-F.2d, at -. 
We think that the Court of Appeals correctly rejected petitioner's 
argument . Its acceptance might lead to arbitrary imposition of 
liability on the basis of an unwise differentiation among kinds 
of factual misstatements. The present case illustrates the point. 
Respondent fa lsely portrayed petitioner as an architect of the 
criminal prosecution against Nuccio. On its face this inaccuracy 
does not appear defamatory. Respondent also falsely labelled peti-
tioner a " Leninst" and a ·'Communist-fronter." These accusations 
are plainly defamatory. Under petitioner's interpretation of the "pub-
; Jic or general interest" test, respondent would have enjoyed a constitlf-
tional privilege to publish defamatory fabehoods if petitioner had 
8 
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the Court of Appeals endorsed the District Court's con-
clusion that petitioner had failed to show by clear and 
convincing evidence that respondent had acted with 
"actual malice" as defined by New Yark Times. There 
was no evidence that the managing editor of American 
Opinion knew of the falsity of the accusations made in 
the article. In fact , he knew nothing about peti-
tioner except what he learned from the article. The 
court correctly noted that mere failure to investigate, 
standing alone, cannot establish reckless disregard for the 
truth. Rather, the publisher must act with a "high de-
gree of awareness ... of probable falsity. " St. Amant v. 
Thompson, 390 U. S. 727, 731 (1968). Accord: Beckley 
Newspaper Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U. S. 81, 84--85 (1967); 
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 67, 75-76 ( 1964). The 
evidence in this case did not reveal that respondent had 
such an awareness. The Court of Appeals therefore 
affirmed - F. 2d - ( 1972). For the reasons stated 
below, we now reverse. 
II 
The principal issue in this case is whether a publisher 
of defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is 
neither a public official nor a public figure may claim a 
,constitutional privilege against liability for the injury in-
flicted by those statements. The Court considered this 
question on the rather different set of facts presented in 
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U. S. 29 (1971). 
in fact been associated with the criminal pro,;ecution. But this would 
mean that the seemingly innocuou~ mistake of confusing petitioner's 
role in the litigation against officer Nuccio would destroy the privilege 
otherwise. available for calling petitioner a communist-fronter. 
Thus respondent 's privilege to publish statements whose content 
should have alerted it to the danger of injury to reputation would 
hinge on the accuracy of statement ,; that carried with them no such 
warning. Assuming that none of the~e sta tements were published 
with knowledge of falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth, we 
Sf'e no reason to distingui~h among t11e i11accuracies. 
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Rosenbloom, a distributor of nudist magazmes, was 
arrested for selling allegedly obscene material while mak-
ing a delivery to a retail dealer. The police obtained a 
warrant a11d seized his entire inventory of 3,000 books and 
magazine. He sought and obtained an ii1Junction pro-
hibiting further police interference with his business. He 
then sued a local radio station for failing to note in two 
of its newscasts that the 3,000 items seized were only 
"reportedly" or "allegedly" obscene and for broadcasting 
references to "the smut literature racket" and to "girlie-
book peddlers" in its coverage of the court proceeding 
for injunctive relief. He obtained a judgment against 
the radio station, but the Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit held the New York Times privilege applicable to 
the broadcast and reversed. 415 F. 2d 892 ( 1969). 
This Court affirmed the decision below, but no majority 
could agree on a controlling rationale. The eight Justices 5 
who participated in Rosenbloom announced their views 
in five separate opinions, none of which commanded more· 
than three votes. The several statements not only re-
veal disagreement about the appropriate result in that 
case; they also reflect divergent traditions of thought 
about the general problem of reconciling the law of 
defamation with the First Amendment. One approach 
has been to extend the J.:ew York Times test to an ex-
panding variety of situations. Another has been to vary 
the level of constitutional privilege for defamatory false-
hood with the status of the person defamed. And a third 
view would grant to the press and broadcast media abso-
lute immunity from liability for defamation. To place 
our holding in the proper context, we preface our discus-
sion of this case with a review of the several Rosenbloom 
opinions and their antecedents. 
5 MR. Ju,;TJCE DouGLAS did not partcipate jn the consideration or" 
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In affirming the trial court's judgment in the instant 
case, the Court of Appeals relied on MR. JusTICE BREN-
NAN'S conclusion for the Rosenbloom plurality that "all 
discussion and communication involving matters of pub-
lic or general concern'r warrant the protection from lia-
bility for defamation accorded by the rule originally enun-
ciated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964). There this Court defined a constitutional privi-
lege intended to free criticism of public officials from the 
restraints imposed by the common law of defamation. The 
Times ran a political advertisement endorsing civil rights 
demonstrations by black students in Alabama and im-
pliedly condemning the performance of local law enforce-
ment officials. A police commissioner established in state 
court that certain misstatements in the advertisement 
referred to him and that they constituted libel per se 
under Alabama law. This showing left the Times with 
the single defense of truth, for under Alabama law 
neither good faith nor reasonable care would protect the 
newspaper from liability. This Court concluded that a 
"rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee 
the truth of all his factual assertions" would deter pro-
tected speech, id., at 279, and announced the constitu-
tional privilege designed to counter that effect: 
"The constitutional guarantees require, we think, 
a federal rule that prohibits a public official from 
recovery of damages for a defamatory falsehood re-
lating to his official conduct unless he proves that the 
statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, 
in the knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
disregard of whether it was true or not." Id. , at 
279-280.6 
6 New Yark Times and later case~ explicated the meaning of the 
new standard . fo New York Times the Court held that under the 
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Three years after New York Times, a majority of the 
Court agreed to extend the constitutional privilege to 
defamatory criticism of "public figures. " This extension 
circumstances the new;;paper 's fai lure to check the accuracy of ti~e 
advertisement against news ;;tories in its own files did not establish 
reckless disregard for the truth. Id., at-. In St. Amant v. Thomp"-
son, 390 U. S. 727, 731 (1968), t he Court equated reckless disregard 
of the truth with subjective awareness of probable falsity: "There 
must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defend-
ant m fact entertained serious doubts as to the trut h of his publica-
tion." In Beckley Newspapers C'orp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. Si (1967)', 
1he Court emphasized the distinction between the New York Times 
test of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the trut h and 
"actual malice" in the traditional sense of ill-will. Garrison v. Loui~ 
siana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), made plain that the new standa rd applied 
to criminal libel laws as well as to civil actions and that it governed 
criticism directed at "anything which might touch on an officia l's fit-
ness for office." Id., at 77. Fina lly, in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 
75, 85 (1966), the Court stated that '·the 'public official' designation 
applies at the very least to those among the heirarchy of government 
employees who have. or appear to the publi c to have, substantial 
responsibility for or control over the conduct of government affai rs.'' 
In Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S. 374 (1967), the Court applied the 
New York Times standard to actions under an unusual state statute. 
The statute did not create a cause of action for libel. Rather, it pro-
vided a remedy for unwanted publicity. Although the law allowed 
recovery of damages for harm caused by expo,;ure to public attention 
rather than by factual inaccura cies, it recognized truth as a complete 
defense. Thus, nondefama tory factual errors could render a publisher 
liable for something akin to invasion of privacy. The Court ruled that 
the defendant in such an action could invoke the New York Times 
privilege regardless of the fame or anonymity of the plaintiff. Speak-
ing for t he Court, MR. ,Jus'!'ICE BRENNAN declared that this holding 
was not an extension of New York Times but rather a parallel line of 
reasoning applying that standard to this discrete context : 
"This is neither a libel action by a private individual nor a statu-
tory action by a public official. Therefore, although the First• 
Amendment principles announced in New York Times guide our 
conclusion, we reach that conclusion only by applying these principles 
12 
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was announced in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and its 
companion Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130, 162 
( 1967). The first case involved the Saturday Evening 
Post's charge that Coach Wally Butts of the University 
of Georgia had conspired with Coach Bear Bryant of the 
University of Alabama to fix a football game between 
their respective schools. Walker involved ah {lrroneolis'. 
Associated Press account of Brigadier General Edwirt 
Walker's participation in a University of Mississippi 
campus riot. Because Butts was paid by a private alumni 
association and Walker had retired from the Army, neither' 
could be classified as a "public official" under New York 
Times. Although Mr. Justice Harlan announced the 
r.esult in both cases, a majority of the Court agreed with 
Mr. Chief Justice Warren's conclusion that the New York 
Times test should apply to criticism of "public figures" as' 
well as "public officials." 1 The Court extended the con-
in this discrete context. It therefore serves no purpose to distinguish 
the facts here from those in New York Times . 
·'WerC' this a libel action, the distinction which has been suggested 
between the relative opportunities of the public official and the 
private individual to rebut defamatory charge:; might be germane. 
And the additional state interest in tlw protection of the individual 
against damages to his reputation would be involved. Cf. Rosenblatt 
v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 91 (STEWART, J ., concurring)." Id ., at 390-391. 
7 Professor Kalven once introduced a discussion of these cases with 
the apt heading, ' ·You Cnn't Tell the Phi~·ers Without a Score Card." 
H . Kalven , The Reasonnble :;\,fan nnd the First Amendment, 1967 
Sup. Ct. Rev. 267, 275 (1967). Only three other Justices joined 
Mr. Justice Harlan's analysis of the issues involved. In his con-
curring opinion, :V1r. Chief Justice Warren stated the principle for 
which these cnses stand-that the New York Times test reaches both 
public figures and public official~. l\lR. JusncE BRENNAN and Mn . 
.JUSTICE WH11'E agreed with the Chief Justice on that question. 
Mr. Ju,,tice Blnck and Mn JUSTICE DouGLAS reiterated their view 
that publishers should have an absolute immunity from liability for 
defamation, but they acquiesed in the Chief Just ice's reasoning in 
order to enable a majority of the Justices to agree on the question 
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stitutional privilege announced in that case to protect 
defamatory criticism of nonpublic officials who "are never-
theless intimately involved in the resolution of important 
public questions, or, by reason of their fame, shape events 
in ar~as of cc:2nce_n1 t<2 sc:2ci_e,ty at large." Id., at 164. 
In his opinion for the plurality in Rosenbloom v. 
~v(etromedia, Inc., 403 U. S. 29 (1971). MR. JusTICE 
B,RENNAN took the 1Vew York Times privilege one step 
further. He concluded that its protection should extend 
to defamatory falsehoods relating to private persons if the 
statements concerned matters of general or public interest. 
He abjured the suggested distinction between public offi-
cials and public figures on the one hand and private indi-
viduals on the other. He focused instead on society's 
interest in learning about certain issues: "If a matter is a 
subject of public or general interest , it cannot suddenly 
become less so merely because a private individual is 
involved or because in some sense the individual did not 
choose to become involved ." 403 U. S. , at 43. Thus, 
under the plurality opinion, a private citizen involun-
tarily associated with a matter of general interest has no 
recourse for injury to his reputation unless he can satisfy 
the demanding requirements of the Kew York Times test. 
Two members of the Court concurred in the result in 
Rosenbloom but departed from the reasoning of the 
plurality. Mr. Justice Black restated his view, long 
shared by MR. JusTICE DouGLAS, that the First Amend-
ment cloaks the news media with an absolute and in-
defeasible immunity from liability for defamation. Id., 
at 57. MR JusTICE WHITE concurred on a narrower 
ground. Ibid. He concluded that "the First Amend-
ment gives the press and the broadcast media a privilege 
to report and comment upon the official actions of public 
of the appropriate constitut ional privilege for defamation of public 
:figure::;. 
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servants in full detail , with no requirement that the rep-· 
utation or privacy of an individual involved in or affected 
by the official action be spared from public view." Id., 
at 62. He therefore declined to reach the broader ques~-
tions addressed by the other Justices. 
Mr. Justice Harlan dissented. Although he had joined 
the opinion of the Court in 1\' ew York Times, in Curtis 
Publishing Co. he had contested the extension of the 
privilege to public figures. There he had argued that 
a public figure who held no governmental office should 
be allowed to recover damages for defamation "on 
a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constitut-
ing an extreme departure from the standards of in-
vestigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by 
responsible publishers." 388 U. S .. at 155. In his Curtis 
Publishing Co. opinion Mr. Justice Harlan had distin-
guished X ew York Times primarily on the ground that 
defamation actions by public officials "lay close to sedi-
tious libel. ... '' Id ., at 133. Recovery of damages by 
one who held no public office, however, could not "be 
viewed as a vindication of governmental policy." la:, 
at 154. Additionally. he had intimated that, because 
most public officials enjoyed absolute immunity from 
liability for their own defamatory utterances under Barr 
v. Matteo , 360 U. S. 564 (1959), they lacked a strong 
claim to the protection of the courts: 
In Rosenbloom Mr. Justice Harlan modified these 
views. H e acquiesced in the application of the privilege' 
to defamation of public figures but argued that a different 
rule should obtain where defamatory falsehood harmed 
a private individual. He noted that a private person 
has less likelihood "of securing access to the channels· 
of communication sufficient to reb ut falsehoods concern:-
ing him" than do public officials and public figures . id., 
at 70, and has not voluntarily placed himself in the public 
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~ 11potlight. Mr. Justice Harlan concluded that the States 
~ould constitutionally allow private individuals to re• 
cover damages for defamation on a showing of negligence. 
MR. JusTicm MAffSHALL disEented in Rosenbloom in a11 
opinion joined by MR. JUSTICE STEWART. Id., at 78. He 
thought that the plurality's "public or general interest11 
test for determining the applicability of the 1Vew York 
Times privilege would involve the courts in the dangerous 
business of deciding "what information is relevant to self-
government." / d., at 79. He also contended that the 
plurality's position inadequately served "society's inter-
est in protecting private individuals from being thrust 
into the public eye by the distorting light of defamation." 
Ibid. MR. JusTICE MARSHALL therefore joined Mr. 
Justice Harlan in the conclusion that the States could 
allow private plaintiffs to recover damages for defamation 
on proving lack of reasonable care. The principal point 
of disagreement among the three dissenters concerned 
punitive damages. Whereas Mr. Justice Harlan thought 
that the States could allow punitive damages in amounts 
bearing "a reasonable and purposeful relationship to the· 
actual harm done ... ," id., at 75. MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL 
concluded that the size and unpredictability of jury 
awards of exemplary damages unnecessarily exacerbated 
the problems of media self-censorship and that such 
damages should therefore be forbidden. 
III 
We begin with the common ground. Under the First 
Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. How-
ever pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its 
correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but 
on the competition of other ideas.R But there is no con-
8 As Thomas Jefferson made the point in his first Inaugural · 
Address: '·If there be any among us who wish to dissolve this union · 
t6 
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stitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither 
the intentional lie nor the careless error materially ad-
vances society's interest in "uninhibited, robust. arid 
·wide-open"· cfebate on public issues. A·ew York Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S., at 270. They belong to that 
category of utterances which "are no essential part of 
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value 
as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived 
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest 
in order and morality. " Chaplinsky v . .\'ew Hampshire,, 
315 U. S. 568, 572 ( 1942). 
Although the erroneous statement of fact is not, worthy 
of constitutional protection, it is nevertheless inevitable in 
free debate. As James Madison pointed out in the Report 
on the Virginia Resolutions of 1708, "Some degree of 
abuse is inseparable from the proper use of everything; 
and in no instance is this more true than that of the 
press. " 4 Elliot's Debates ( 1876) , p. 571. And punish-
ment of error runs the risk of inducing a cautious and 
restrictive exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed 
freedoms of speech and press. Our decisions recognize 
that a rule of strict liability that compels a publisher 
or broadcaster to guarantee the accuracy of his factual 
assertions may lead to intolerable self-censorship. Al- -
lowing the media to avoid liability only by proving the 
truth of all injurious statements does not accord adequate 
protection to First Amendment liberties. As the Court 
stated in 1Yew York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, 376 
U. S. , at 279. "Allowance of the defense of truth, with 
the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not mean 
that only false speech will be deterred." The First 
Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in 
order to protect speech that matters. 
or chunge its republicun form of government , let them stund undis-
turbed as monuments of the sa fety with which error of opinion may 
be tolerated where rea:::on is left free to comhat 1t .'' 
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The need to avoid self-censorship by the news media is; 
however, not the only societal value at issue. If it were. 
this Court would have embraced long ago the view that 
publishers and broadcasters enjoy an unconditional and 
indefeasible immunity from liability for defamation. See 
A'ew York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254. 293 (1964) 
( opinion of Black. J.); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64, 
80 (1964) (opinion of DouGLAS, J.); Curtis Publishing Co. 
v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130. 170 ( 1967) ( opinion of Black, J.). 
Such a rule would indee<l obviate the fear that the pros-
pect of civil liability for injurious falsehood might dis-
suade a timorous press from the effective exercise of 
First Amendment freedoms. Yet absolute protection for 
the communications media requires a total sacrifice of 
the competing value serve<l by the law of defamation . 
The legitimate state interest underlying the law of libel 
is the compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted 
on them by defamatory falsehoods. We would not lightly 
require the State to abandon this purpose. for, as MR. 
JUSTICE STEWART has reminded us, the individual's right 
to the protection of his own good name 
"reflects no more than our basic concept of the essen-
tial dignity and worth of every human being-a 
concept at the root of any decent system of ordered 
liberty. The protection of private personality, like 
the protection of life itself. is left primarily to the' 
individual states under the Ninth and Tenth Amend-
ments. But this does not mean that the right is 
entitled to any less recognition by this Court as a 
basic of our constitutional system." Rosenblatt v. 
Baer, 383 U. S. 75, 92-93 ( 1963) (opinion of 
STEWART, J.). 
Some tension necessarily exists between the need for 
a vigorous and uninhibited press and the legitimate in-
terest in redressing wrongful injury. As Mr. Justice 
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Harlan stated, "some antithesis between freedom of 
speech and press and libel actions persists, for libel re-
mains premised on the content of speech and limits the 
freedom of the publisher to express certain sentiments, 
at least without guaranteeing legal proof of their sub-
stantial accuracy." Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 
U. S., at 152. In our continuing effort to define the 
proper accommodation between these competing con-
cerns, we have been especially anxious to assure to the 
freedoms of speech and press that "breathing space'1 
essential to their fruitful exercise. 1VAACP v. Button, 
371 U. S. 415, 433 (1963). To that end this Court has 
extended a measure of strategic protection to defamatory 
falsehood. 
The New Y 'Jrk Times standard defines the level of 
constitutional protection appropriate to the context of 
defamation of a public person. Those who, by reason 
of the notoriety of their achievements or the vigor with 
which they seek the public's attention, are properly 
classed as public figures and those :who hold governmental 
office may recover for injury to reputation only on clear 
and convincing proof that the defamatory falsehood was 
made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless dis-
regard for the truth. This standard administers an 
extremely powerful antidote to the inducement to media 
self-censorship by the common law rule of strict liability 
for libel and slander. Aud it exacts a correspondingly 
high price from the victims of defamatory falsehood. 
Plainly many deserving plaintiffs, including some inten-
tionally subjected to injury, will be unable to surmount 
the barrier of the 1Yew York Times test. Despite this 
substantial abridgement of the state law right to com-
pensation for wrongful hurt to one's reputation, the 
Court has concluded that the protection of the New 
York Times privilege should be available to publish-
ers and broadcasters of defamtory falsehoods concern-
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ing public officials and public figures. New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964); Curtis 
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130 (1967). We 
think that these decisions are correct, but we do not 
find their holdings justified solely by reference to the 
interest of the press and broadcast media in immunity 
, from liability. Rather, we believe that the Kew York 
Times rule states an accommodation between this con-
cern and the limited state interest present in the context 
of libel actions brought by public persons. For the rea-
sons stated below. we conclude that the state interest 
in compensating 111Jury to the reputation of private 
individuals requires that a different rule should obtain 
with respect to them. 
Theoretically, of course, the balance between the needs 
of the press and the individual's claim to compensation 
for wrongful injury might be struck on a case-by-case 
basis. As Mr. Justice Harlan hypothesized, "it might 
seem, purely as an abstract matter, that the most utili-
tarian approach would be to scrutinize carefully every 
jury verdict in every libel case , in order to ascertain 
whether the final judgment leaves fully protected what-
ever First Amendment values transcend the legitimate 
state interest in protecting the particular plaintiff who 
prevailed." Rosenbl-Jom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U. 8. 
29, 63 (1971) (footnote omitted). But this approach 
would lead to unpredictable results and uncertain expecta-
tions, and it would render our duty to supervise the lower 
courts unmanagable. Because an ad hoc resolution of 
the competing interests at stake in each particular case 
is unfeasible, we must lay down broad rules of general 
application. Such rules necessarily treat alike various 
cases involving differences as well as similarities. Thus 
it is often true that not all of the considerations which 
justify adoption of a given rule will obtain in each par-
ticular case decided under its authority. 
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With that caveat we have no difficulty in distinguishing 
among defamation plaintiffs. The first remedy of any 
victim of defamation is self-help-using available oppor-
tunities to contradict the lie or correct the error and 
thereby to minimize its adverse impact on reputation. 
Public officials and public figures usually enjoy signifi-
cantly greater access to the channels of effective commu-
nication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to 
counteract false statements than private individuals nor-
mally enjoy.u Private individuals are therefore more 
vuluerable to injury, and the state interest in protecting 
them is correspondingly greater. 
More important than the likelihood that private indi-
viduals will lack effective opportunities for rebuttal, there 
is a compelling normative consideration underlying the 
distinction between public and private defamation plain-
tiffs. An individual who decides to seek governmental 
office must .accept certain necessary consequences of that 
involvement in public affairs. He runs the risk of closer 
public scrutiny than might otherwise be the case. And 
society's interest in the officers of governmf'nt is not 
strictly limited to the formal discharge of official duties. 
As the Court pointed out in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 
U.S. 64. 77 (1964), the public's interest extends to "any-
thing that might touch on an official's fitness for office ... , 
Few personal attributes are more germane to fitness for 
office than dishonesty, malfeasance, or improper motiva-
tion, even though these characteristics may also affect 
the official's private character." 
9 Of coun;e. an opportunity for rebuttal ::seldom suffices to undo 
harm of defamatory fabehood. · Indeed, the law of defamation i~ 
noted in our experience that the truth rare!~· catche:; up with a lie•. 
But the fact that the self-help remedy of rebuttal, standing alone, 
is inadequate to its ta~k doe8 not mean tlwt it is irrelevant to ou.r 
U!CJ.UJry. 
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1.;hose classed as public figures stand in a similar posi-· 
fion. Hypothetically, it may be possible for someone to• 
become a public figure through no purposeful action of 
his own. but the instances of truly involuntary public-: 
figures must be exceedingly rare. For the most part 
t110se who attain this status have assumed roles of especial 
prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy posi-
tions of such persuasive power and influence that they· 
are deemed public figures for all purposes. More com-
monly, those classed as public figures have thrust them-
selves to the forefront of particular public controversies 
i'n order to influence the resolution of the issues involved·. 
f n either event. they invite attention and comment. 
Even if the foregoing generalities do not obtain in every 
fnstance, the communications media are entitled to act 
on the assumption that public officials and public figures 
f:iave voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk 
of injury from defamatory falsehoods concerning them .. 
No such assumption is justified with respect to a private 
individual. He has relinquished no part of his interest 
in the protection of his own good name, and consequently 
he has a more compelling call on the courts for redress 
of injury inflicted by defamatory falsehood. Th us, pri-
vate individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury 
than public officials and public figures; they are also more 
deserving of recovery. 
For these reasons we conclude that the States should 
retain substantial latitude in their efforts to enforce a 
legal remedy for defamatory falsehood injurious to the 
reputation of a private individual. The extension of the 
l\/ ew Yark Times test proposed by the Rosenbloom piu--
rality would abridge this legitimate state interest to a 
degree that we find unacceptable. And it would occa-
sion the additional difficulty of forcing state and federal 
j'udges to decide <m an ad hoe oasis which published. 
22 
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remarks address issues of "general or public interest" and 
which do not-to determine, in the words of MR. JusTICB 
MARSHALL, "what information is relevant to rnlf-govern-
ment." Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc ., 403 U. S., at 
79. We doubt the wisdom of committing this task to the 
conscience of judges, nor do we think it wise to draw so 
thin a line between the drastic alternatives of the New 
York Times privilege and the common law of strict 
liability for defamatory error. The "public or gen-
eral interest" test for determining the applicability of 
the New Yark Times standard to private defamation 
actions inadequately serves both the competing values at 
stake. On the one hand, a private individual whose 
reputation is injured by defamatory falsehood that does 
concern an issue of public or general interest has no re-;. 
course unless he can meet the rigorous requirements of 
the 1Vew York Times rule. And this is true despite the 
factors that distinguish the state interest in compen-
sating private individuals from the analogous interest 
involved in the context of public persons. On the other 
hand, a publisher or broadcaster of a defamatory error 
which a court deems unrelated to an issue of public or 
gneeral interest may be held liable in damages even if it 
took every reasonable precaution to ensure the accuracy 
of its assertions. And liability may far exceed compensa-
tion for any actual injury to the plaintiff, for the jury may 
be permitted to presume damages without proof of loss 
and even to award punitive damages. 
The familiar concept of reasonable care provides 
a more equitable boundary between the competing 
concerns involved here. A negligence standard recogc. 
nizes the strength of the legitimate state interest in 
compensating private individuals for wrongful injury 
to reputation, yet shields the press and broadcast media 
from the rigors of strict liability for defamation. We 
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hold that a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory false-
hood injurious to the good name of an individual who 
is neither a public official nor a private figure may be held 
liable on a showing of negligence. At least this is so 
where, as here, the substance of the defamatory statement 
"makes substantial danger to reputation apparent.' ; 10 
This phrase places an important qualification on the 
conclusion we announce today. Our inquiry would in-
volve considerations somewhat different from those dis-
cussed above if a State purported to condition civil 
liability on a factual misstatement whose content did not 
alert the publisher or broadcaster to its defamatory po-
tential. Cf. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S. 374 ( 1967). 
Such a case is not now before us, and we intimate no 
view as to its proper resolution. 
IV 
Our accommodation of the competing values at stake 
in defamation suits by private individuals allows the 
States to impose liability on the publisher or broadca:ster 
of defamatory falsehoods on a less demanding showing 
than that required by New York Times. This conclusion 
is not based on a belief that the considerations which 
prompted the adoption of the New York Times privilege 
for defamation of public officials and its extension to 
public figures are wholly inapplicable to the context of 
private individuals. Rather, we endorse the standard of 
reasonable care in recognition of the strong and legitimate 
state interest in compensating private individuals for 
injury to reputation. But this countervailing state 
interest extends no further than compensation for actual 
injury. For the reasons stated below, we hold that the 
States may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive 
'damages when liability is based on a finding of negligence, 
1° Curtis Publishing Co . v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130, 155 (1967). 
24 
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The common law of defamation is an oddity of tort 
law, for it allows recovery of purportedly compensatory 
damages without evidence of actual loss. Under the 
traditional rules pertaining to actions for libel, the exist-
~'nce of injury is presumed from the fact of publication. 
Juries may award substantial sums as compensation for 
supposed damage to reputation without any proof that 
such harm actually occurred. The largely uncontrolled 
discretion of juries to award damages where there is no 
loss unnecessarily compounds the potential of any sys:-
tem of liability for defamatory falsehood to inhibit the 
vigorous exercise of First Amendment freedoms. Addi-
tionally, the doctrine of presumed damages invites juries 
to punish unpopular opinion rather than to compensate 
individuals for injury sustained by the publication of a 
false fact. More to the point, the States have no sub-
stantial interest in securing for plaintiffs who prove only 
negligent defamation gratuitous awards of money dam-
ages far in excess of any actual injury. 
We would not, of course , invalidate state law simply 
because we doubt its wisdom, but here we are attempting 
to reconcile state law with a competing interest grounded 
in the constitutional command of the First Amendment. 
It is therefore appropriate to require that state remedies 
for defamatory falsehood reach no farther than is 
necessary to protect the legitimate interest involved. 
It is necessary to restrict defamation plaintiffs who 
recover on a showing of negligence to compensation for 
actual injury. We need not define "actual injury," as 
trial courts have wide experience in framing appropriate 
jury instructions in tort action. Suffice it to say that actual 
injury is not limited to out-of-pocket loss. Indeed, the 
more customary types of actual harm inflicted by defam-
atory falsehood include impairment of reputation and 
standing in the community, personal humiliation, and 
mental anguish and suffering. Of course, juries must be 
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limited by appropriate instructions, and all awards must 
be supported by competent evidence. 
We also find no justification for allowing awards of 
punitive damages against publishers and broadcasters held 
liable for negligent defamation. In most jurisdictions 
jury discretion over the amounts awarded is limited only 
by the gentle rule that they not be "excessive." 11 Con-
sequently, juries assess punitive damages in wholly unpre-
dictable amounts bearing no necessary relation to the 
actual harm caused. And they remain free to use their 
discretion selectively to punish expressions of unpopular 
views. Like the doctrine of presumed damages, jury dis-
cretion to award punitive damages unnecessarily exacer-
bates the danger of media self-censorship, but, unlike the 
former rule, punitive damages are wholly irrelevant to the 
state interest that justifies a negligence standard for pri-
vate defamation actions. They are not compensation for 
mJury. Instead, they are private fines levied by civil 
juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its 
future occurrence. Because punitive damages perform 
the same functions as criminal penalties, the incidence 
of their imposition should be governed by our decision 
in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64 ( 1964). In short, 
the private defamation plaintiff who establishes liability 
by proof of negligence may recover only such damages as 
are sufficient to compensate him for actual injury. 
V 
Notwithstanding our refusal to extend the New York 
Times privilege to defamation of private individuals, 
respondent contends that we should affirm the judgment 
below on the ground that petitioner is either a public 
official or a public figure. There is little basis for the 
11 See H. Oleck, Damages to Person~ and Property, § 175, pp. 577~ 
560 (1955) . 
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former assertion. Several years prior to the present in-
cident, petitioner had served briefly on housing commit-
tees appointed by the mayor of Chicago, but at the 
time of publication. he had never held any remunera-
tive governmental position. Respondent admits this 
but argues that petitioner's appearance at the coroner's 
inquest rendered him a "de facto public official." Our 
cases recognize no such concept. Respondent's sugges-
tion would sweep all lawyers under the New Yark Times 
rule as officers of the court and distort the plain meaning 
of the "public official" category beyond all recognition. 
We decline to follow it. 
Respondent's characterization of petitioner as a public 
figure raises a more substantial question. That desig-
nation may rest on either of two alternative bases. In 
some instances an individual may achieve such pervasive 
fame or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all 
purposes and in all contexts. More commonly, an indi-
vidual voluntarily thrusts himself into a particular public 
controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a 
limited range of issues. In either case such persons 
assume special prominence in the resolution of public 
questions. 
Petitioner has long been active in community and 
professional affairs. He has served as an officer of local 
civil groups and of various professional organizations, 
and he has published several books and articles on legal 
subjects. Although petitioner was consequently well-
known in some circles, he had achieved no general fame 
or notoriety in the community. None of the prospective 
jurors called at the trial had ever heard of petitioner 
prior to this litigation, and respondent offered no proof 
that this response was atypical of the local population. 
While this is a close question, we would not lightly as-
sume that a citizen's participation in community and 
,professional affairs rendered him a public figure for all 
~ ~ 
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purposes. Absent clear evidence of general fame or 
notoriety in the community, and pervasive involvement 
in the affairs of society, an individual should not be 
deemed a public personality for all aspects of his life. It 
is preferable to reduce the public figure question to a 
more meaiiingfui .context by looking to an individual's 
voluntary participation in the particular controversy giv-
ing rise to the defamation. 
In this context it is plain that petitioner was not a 
public figure, He played a minimal role at the coroner's 
inquest, and he took no part in the criminal prosecution 
of officer Nuccio. Moreover, he never- discussed either 
the criminal or civil litigation with the press and was 
never quoted as having done so. He plainly did not 
thrust himself into the vortex of this public 'issue, nor 
did he engage the public's attention in an attempt to 
influence its outcome. We are persuaded that the trial 
court did not err in refusing to characterize petitioner as 
a public figure for the purpose of this litigation. 
We therefore conclude that the New York Times stand-
ard is inapplicable to this case and that the trial court 
erred in entering judgment for respondent. Because the 
jury was not required to find negligence as a condition 
of liability and was permitted to presume damages with-
. out proof of injury, a new trial is necessary. We reverse 
and remand for further proceedings in accord with this· 
-opinio11. 
· It is so ordered. 
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This Court has struggled for nearly a decade to define 
the proper accommodation between the law of defama-
tion and the freedoms of speech and press protected by 
the First Amendment. With this decision we return to 
that effort. We granted certiorari to reconsider the ex-
tent of a publisher's constitutional privilege against lia-
bility for defamation of a private citizen. - U. S. -
(1973). 
I 
In 1968 a Chicago policeman named Nuccio shot and 
killed a youth named Nelson. · The state authorities prose-
cuted :\I" uccio for the homicide and ultimately obtained 
a conviction for murder in the second degree. The Nel-
son family retained petitioner Elmer Gertz, a reputable 
attorney, to represent them in civil litigation against 
Nuccio. 
Respondent publishes American Opinion, a monthly 
outlet for the views of the John Birch Society. Early in 
the 1960's the magazine began to warn of a nationwide 
conspiracy to discredit local law enforcement agencies 
and create in their stead a national police force capable 
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continuing effort to alert the public to this assumed 
danger, the managing editor of American Opinion com-
missioned an article on the murder trial of officer Nuccio, 
For this purpose he engaged a regular contributor to the 
magazine. In March of 1969 respondent published the 
resulting article under the title "FRAME-UP: Richard 
Nuccio And The War On Police." The article purports 
to demonstrate that the testimony against Nuccio at 
his criminal trial was false and that his prosecution was 
part of the communist campaign against the police. 
In his capacity as counsel for the Nelson family in 
the civil litigation, petitioner attended the coroner's in-
quest into the boy's death and initiated actions for 
damages, but he neither discussed officer Nuccio with the 
press nor played any part in the criminal proceeding. 
Notwithstanding petitioner's remote connection with the 
prosecution of Nuccio, respondent's magazine portrayed 
him as an architect of the "frame-up." According to 
the article, the police file on petitioner took "a big, Irish 
cop to lift. " The article stated that petitioner had been 
an official of the "Marxist League for Industrial Democ-
racy, originally known as the Intercollegiate Socialist 
Society, which has advocated the violent seizure of our 
governmel'1t." It labelled Gertz a "Leninist" and a 
"Communist-fronter." It also stated that Gertz had 
been an officer of the National Lawyers Guild, described 
as a communist organization that "probably did more 
than any other outfit to plan the Communist attack on 
the Chicago police during the 1968 Democratic conven-
tion." It is undisputed that these statements contained 
serious inaccuracies. The implication that petitioner had 
a criminal record was false. Petitioner had been a mem-
ber and officer of the National Lawyers Guild some 15 
years earlier, but there was no evidence that he or that 
organization had taken any part in planning the 1968 
demonstrations in Chicago. There was also no basis for 
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the charge that petitioner was a "Leninist" or a "Com-
munist-fronter." And he had never been a member of 
the "Marxist League for Industrial Democracy" or the 
"Intercollegiate Socialist Society." 
The managing editor of American Opinion made no 
effort to verify or substantiate the charges against peti-
tioner. Instead, he appended an editorial introduction 
stating that the author had "concluded extensive re-
search into the Richard Nuccio case." And he included 
in the article a photograph of petitioner and wrote the 
caption that appeared under it: "Elmer Gertz of the 
Red Guild harrasses Nuccio." Respondent placed the 
issue of American Opinion containing the article on sale 
at newsstands throughout the country and distributed 
reprints of the article on the streets of Chicago. 
Petitioner filed a diversity action for libel in the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. 
H e claimed that the falsehoods published by respondent 
injured his reputation as a lawyer and a citizen. Before 
filing an answer, respondent moved to dismiss the com-
plaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could 
be granted, apparently on the ground that petitioner 
failed to allege special damages. But the court ruled 
that statements contained in the article constituted libel 
per se under Illinois law and that consequently petitioner 
need not plead special damages. 366 F. Supp. 310 (ND 
Ill. 1969). 
After answering the complaint, respondent filed a pre-
trial motion for summary judgment, claiming a constitu-
tional privilege against liability for defamation.1 It 
asserted that petitioner was a public official or a public 
figure and that the article concerned an issue of public 
1 Petitioner filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on grounds 
not specified in the record. The Court denied petitioner's cross-
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interest and concern. For these reas0ns, respondent 
argued, it was entitled to invoke the privilege enunciated 
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 ( 1964). 
Under this rule respondent would escape liability unless 
petitioner could prove publication of defamatory false-
hood "with 'actual malice'-that is, in the knowledge that 
it was false or with reckless disregard · for whether it was 
ttue or not. " id., at 279-280. Respondent claimed· 
that petitioner could not make such. a showing and' 
~ubmitted a supporting .. affida~it by the !J1agazine's man-
aging editor. The editor denied !1-ny · knowledge of the" 
'falsity of the statements ·concerning petitioner and stated 
that he had relied on the author's reputation and on hi~ 
prior experience . with the accurl:l,cy an_d authenticity of 
-his contributions to American Opinion. 
The District Court denied respondent's motion for 
summary· judgment in a memorandum opiniori. - . F: 
~'Supp. - (ND Ill. , Sept. 16, 1970). The court did .not 
qispute respondent's claim to_ the p;otection of th~ Ne;,; 
York Times standard. ~ather, it'_ contluded that" peti~ 
tioner· might overcome the constitutidnal privilege by 
making a fact1;1al showing sufficient to prove publicatiol) 
of dHamatory falsehood fo reckless disregard of the truth. 
During the course of the tri~l, however, it _became cl~ar 
that the trial court had not accepted all of respondent;s 
. • ., J 
asserted grounds for applying the New York Times rule 
to this case. · It thought that respondent's claim to the 
protection of the constitutional privilege depended Qn 
the contention that petitioner wa~ either a 1;ublic officia,1 
under the New York Times decisioi1 or a public figure 
under Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 3f8U. S. 130 , ,.? 
(1967), apparently discounting the, argument that a 
p'rivilege would arise from the presence of a public' iss1.ie. ·· 
After all the evidence had beei1 presented but before , 
'Sµbmission of the case to the jury, the court ruled in 
€ff ect that P,:titioner was neltht:fr a publi~ official nor a., 
. ..._,.,,. 
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public figure . It added that, if he were, the resulting ap-
plication of the New Yark Times standard would require 
a directed verdict for respondent. Because some state-
ments in the article constituted libel per se under Illinois 
law, the court submitted the case to the jury under instruc-
tions that withdrew from its consideration all issues save 
the measure of damages. The jury awarded $50,000 to 
petitioner. 
Following the jury verdict and on further reflection, 
the District Court concluded that the New Yark Times 
standard should govern this case even though petitioner 
was not a public official or public figure. It accepted re-
spondent's contention that that privilege protected dis-
cussion of any public issue without regard to the status 
of a person defamed therein. Accordingly, the court 
entered judgment for respondent notwithstanding the 
jury's verdict.2 This conclusion anticipated the reason-
2 - F. Supp. - (ND Ill ., Dec. 8, 1970). Petitioner asserts that 
the entry of judgment n. o. v. on the basis of his failure to show 
knowledge of fa lsity or reckless disregard for the truth constituted 
unfair surprise and deprived him of a full and fair opportunity to 
prove "actual malice" on the part of respondents. This contention 
is not supported by the record . It is clear that the trial court 
gave petitioner no reason to assume that the New York Times 
privilege would not be available to respondent. The court 's memo-
randum opinion denying respondent's pretrial motion for summary 
judgment does not stat e that the New York Times standard was 
inapplicable to this case. Rather, it reveals that the trial judge 
thought it possible for petitioner to make a factual showing sufficient 
to overcome respondent's claim of constitutional privilege. It states 
in part : 
"When there is a factual dispute as to the existence of actual 
malice, summary judgment is improper. 
"In the instant c::1se a jury might infer from the evidence that 
[respondent 's] failure to investigate the truth of the allegations, 
cot1pled wit h its receipt of communications challenging the factual 
accuracy of this author in the past amounted to actual malice, that 
~ 
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ing of a plurality of this Court in Rosenbloom v. Metro~ 
media, 403 U. S. 29 ( 1971). 
Petitioner appealed to contest the applicability of the 
New York Times standard to this case. Although the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit doubted the 
correctness of the District Court's determination that 
petitioner was not a public figure, it did not overturn 
that finding ." It agreed with the District Court that 
respondent could assert the constitutional privilege be-
cause the article concerned a matter of public interest, 
citing this Court 's intervening decision in Rosenbloom v. 
M etromedia, Inc., supra. The Court of Appeals read 
Rosenbloom to require application of the New York 
is, ' reckless disregard ' of whether the allegations were true or not. 
New York Times [Co.] v. Sullivan, supra, at 279-280.'" - F . 
Supp. -, - (ND Ill., Sept . 16, 1970) . 
Thu~, pet it ioner knew or i:i hould have known that the out conw of 
t he trial might hinge on his ability to show by clear and convincing 
evidence thnt re,;pondent acted with reckless disregard for the truth , 
And t his quest ion remained open throughout the trial. Although 
the court concluded that the applicability of N ew York Timeg 
rule depended on petitioner's status as a public figure, the court 
did not decide that petitioner was not a public figure until all 
the en dencc had been presented. Thus petitioner had every 
opportuni ty, indeed incentive, to prove "reckless clisregard" if he 
could, and he in fact a ttempted to do so. The record supports the 
observation by the Court of Appea ls that petitioner "did present 
evidence of mali ce (both the ·con;:;titutional' and the 'ill-will ' type ) 
to support his damage claim and no such evidence was excluded .. .. " 
-F.2d,at-. 
3 The court sta ted : 
" [Petitioner's] con::;iderable sta ture as a lawyer, author, lecturer, 
and participant in matter,; of public import undermine the validity 
of the assumption that he is not a 'public figure' as that term has 
been used by the progeny of New Yark Times. Nevertheless, for 
purposes of decision v.re make that assumption and test the avail--
abili ty of t he claim of privilege by the subject matter of the article." 
- F .2d,at-. 
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Times standard to any publication or broadcast about 
an issue of significant public interest, without regard 
to the position, fame, or anonymity of the person 
defamed, and it concluded that respondent's statements 
concerned such an issue.4 After reviewing the record, 
4 In the Court of Appeals petitioner made an ingenious but un-
availing attempt to show that respondent's defamatory charge aga inst 
him concerned no issue of public or general interest. He asserted 
that the subject matter of the article was the murder trial of Officer 
Nuccio and that he did not participate in that proceeding. There-
fore, he argued, even if the subject matter of the article generally 
were protected by the New York Times privilege, under the opinion 
of the Rosenbloom plurality, the defamatory statements about him 
were not. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument. It noted 
that the accusations against petitioner played an integral part in 
respondent's general thesis of a nationwide conspiracy to harass the 
police : 
"[W]e may also assume that the article's basic thesis is false. Never-
theless, under the reasons of New York Times v. Sullivan, even a 
false statement made in support of a false thesis is protected unless 
made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of its 
truth or falsity. It would undermine the rule of that case to permit 
the actual falsity of a statement to determine whether or not its 
publisher is entitled to the benefit of the rule. 
" If, therefore, we put to one side the false character of the article 
and treat it as though its contents were entirely true, it cannot be 
denied that the comments about [petitioner] were integral to its 
thesis. They must be tested under the New York Times standard." 
-F.2d,at-. 
We think that the Court of Appeals correctly rejected petitioner's 
argument . Its acceptance might lead to arbitrary imposition of 
liability on the basis of an unwise differentiation among kinds 
of factual misstatements. The present case illustrates the point. 
Respondent falsely portrayed petitioner as an architect of the 
criminal prosecution against Nuccio. On its face this inaccuracy 
does not appear defamatory. Respondent also falsely labelled peti-
tioner a "Leninst" and a "Communist-fronter." These accusations 
are generally considered defamatory. Under petitioner's interpreta-
tion of the "public or general interest" test, respondent would have . 
enj·oyed a constitut ional privilege to publish defamatory falsehoods if 
8 
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the Court of Appeals endorsed the District Court's con-
clusion that petitioner had failed to show by clear and 
convincing evidence that respondent had acted with 
"actual malice" as defined by New York Times. There 
was no evidence that the managing editor of American 
Opinion knew of the falsity of the accusations made in 
the article. In fact, he knew nothing about peti-
tioner except what he learned from the article. The 
court correctly noted that mere proof of failure to investi-
gate, without more, cannot establish reckless disregard for 
the truth. Rather, the publisher must act with a "high 
degree of awareness ... of probable falsity." St. Amant 
v. Thompson, 390 U. S. 727, 731 (1968). Accord ~ 
Beckley Newspaper Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U. S. 81, 84-85 
(1967); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 67, 75-76 (1964) . 
The evidence in this case did not reveal that respondent 
had cause for such an awareness. The Court of Appeals 
therefore affirmed - F. 2d - ( 1972). For the reasons: 
stated below, we now reverse. 
II 
The principal issue in this case is whether a publisher 
of defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is 
neither a public official nor a public figure may claim a 
constitutional privilege against liability for the injury in-
flicted by those statements. The Court considered this 
question on the rather different set of facts presented in 
petitioner had in fact been associated with the criminal prosecution. 
But this would mean that the seemingly innocuous mistake of con-
fusing petitioner's role in the litigation against officer Nuccio would 
destroy the privilege otherwise available for calling petitioner a· 
communist-fronter. Thus respondent's privilege to publish state-
ments whose content should have alerted it to the danger of injury 
to reputation would hinge on the accuracy of statements that carried 
with them no such warning. Assuming that none of these statements 
was published with knowledge of falsity or with reckless disregard 
for the truth, we see no reason to distinguish among the inaccuracies .. 
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Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U. S. 29 (1971). 
Rosenbloom, a distributor of nudist magazines, was 
arrested for selling allegedly obscene material while mak-
ing a delivery to a retail dealer. The police obtained a 
warrant and seized his entire inventory of 3,000 books and 
magazine. He sought and obtained an injunction pro-
hibiting further police interference with his business. He 
then sued a local radio station for failing to note in two 
of its newscasts that the 3,000 items seized were only 
"reportedly" or "allegedly" obscene and for broadcasting 
references to "the smut literature racket" and to "girlie-
book peddlers" in its coverage of the court proceeding 
for injunctive relief. He obtained a judgment against 
the radio station, but the Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit held the New York Times privilege applicable to 
the broadcast and reversed. 415 F. 2d 892 (1969) . 
This Court affirmed the decision below, but no majority 
could agree on a controlling rationale. The eight Justices 5 
who participated in Rosenbloom announced their views 
in five separate opinions, none of which commanded more 
than three votes. The several statements not only re-
veal disagreement about the appropriate result in that 
case; they also reflect divergent traditions of thought 
about the general problem of reconciling the law of 
defamation with the First Amendment. One approach 
has been to extend the New York Times test to an ex-
panding variety of situations. Another has been to vary 
the level of constitutional privilege for defamatory false-
hood with the status of the person defamed. And a third 
view would grant to the press and broadcast media abso-
lute immunity from liability for defamation. To place 
our holding in the proper context, we preface our discus-
sion of this case with a review of the several Rosenbloom 
opinions and their antecedents. 
5 MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS did not partcipa.te in the consideration or' 
decision of this case. 
10 
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In affirming the trial court's judgment in the' instant 
case, the Court of Appeals relied on MR. JusTICE BREN-
NAN ' S conclusion for the Rosenbloom plurality that "all 
discussion and communication involving matters of pub-
lic or general concern" warrant the protection from lia-
bility for defamation accorded by the rule originally enun-
ciated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964) . There this Court defined a constitutional privi-
lege intended to free criticism of public officials from the 
restraints imposed by the common law of defamation. The 
Times ran a political advertisement endorsing civil rights 
demonstrations by black students in Alabama and im-
pliedly condemning the performance of local law enforce-
ment officials. A police commissioner established in state 
court that certain misstatements in the advertisement 
referred to him and that they constituted libel per se 
under Alabama law. This showing left the Times with 
the single defense of truth, for under Alabama law 
neither good faith nor reasonable care would protect the 
newspaper from liability. This Court concluded that a 
"rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee 
the truth of all his factual assertions" would deter pro-
tected speech, id., at 279, and announced the constitu-
tional privilege designed to counter that effect: 
''The constitutional guarantees require, we think. 
a federal rule that prohibits a public official from 
recovery of damages for a defamatory falsehood re-
lating to his official conduct unless he proves that the 
statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, 
in the knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
disregard of whether it was true. or not." Id., at 
279-280.6 
6 New York Times and later cases explicated the meaning of the 
new standard . In New York Times the Court held that under the 
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, 'Three years after New York Times, a majority of the 
'Court agreed to extend the constitutional privilege to 
defamatory criticism of "public figures. " This extension 
circumstances the newspaper's failure to check the accuracy of the 
advertisement against news stories in its own files did not establish 
reckless disregard for the truth. Id ., at-. In St. Amant v. Thomp~ 
son, 390 U. S. 727, 731 ( 1968) , the Court equated reckless disregard 
of the truth with subject ive awareness of probable falsity: "There 
must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defend 0 
ant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publica-
tion. " In Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967), 
the Court emphasized the distinction between the New Yark Times 
test of knowledge of fa lsity or reckless disregard of the truth and 
"actual malice" in the traditional sense of ill-will . Garrison v. Loui-
siana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), made plain that the new standard applied 
to criminal libel laws as well as to civil actions and that it governed 
criticism directed at "anything which might touch on an official's fit-
ness for office." Id ., at 77. Finally, in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 
75, 85 ( 1966), the Court stated that "the 'public official' designation 
applies at the very least to t hose among the heirarchy of government 
employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial 
responsibi li ty for or control over the conduct of government affairs." 
In Time, Inc. v. Hill , 385 U.S. 374 (1967), the Court applied the 
New York Times standard to actions under an unusual state statute. 
The statute did not create a cause of action for libel. Rather, it pro-
vided a remedy for unwanted publicity. Although the law allowed 
recovery of damages for harm caused by exposure to public attention 
rather than by factua l inaccuracies, it recognized truth as a complete 
defense. Thus, nondefamatory factual errors could render a publisher 
liable for something akin to invasion of privacy. The Court ruled that 
the defendant in such an action could invoke the New Yo rk Times 
privilege regardless of the fame or anonymity of the plaintiff. Speak-
ing for the Court , MR . J USTICE BRENNAN declared that this holding 
was not an extension of N ew York Times but rather a parallel line of 
reasoning applying that standard to this discrete context : 
"This is ne.ither a libel action by a private individual nor a statu-
tory action by a publi c official. Therefore, although the First 
Amendment principles announced in New York Times guide our 
'ccinclusion, we reach that conclusion only by applying these principles 
12 
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was announced in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and its 
companion Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U. S. 130, 162 
( 1967). The first case involved the Saturday Evening 
Post 's charge that Coach Wally Butts of the University 
of Georgia had conspired with Coach Bear Bryant of the 
University of Alabama to fix a football game between 
their respective schools. Walker involved an erroneous 
Associated Press account of Brigadier General Edwin 
Walker's participation in a University of Mississippi 
campus riot. Because Butts was paid by a private alumni 
association and Walker had retired from the Army, neither 
could be classified as a "public official" under New York 
Times. Although Mr. Justice Harlan announced the 
result in both cases, a majority of the Court agreed with 
Mr. Chief Justice Warren's conclusion that the New York 
Times test should apply to criticism of "public figures" as 
well as "public officials." 1 The Court extended the con-
in this discrete context. It therefore serves no purpose to distinO'p jsh _ 
the facts here from tho;;e in New Yark Times. de;e thi:s 0 
a libel action. the di;,tinction which has been ;;uggested be-
tween the rela tive opportunities of the public official and the 
private individual to rebut defamatory charges might be germane. 
And the additional state interest in the protection of the individual 
aga inst damages to hi;, reputation would be involved. Cf. Rosenblatt 
v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 91 (STEWART, J. , concurring)." Id ., at 390-391. 
7 Professor Kalven once introduced a discussion of these cases with 
the apt heading, "You Can't Tell the Players Without a Score Card." 
H . Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment, 1967 
Sup. Ct . Rev. 267, 275 (1967). Only three other Justices joined 
Mr. Justice Harlan's analysis of the issues involved. In his con-
curring opinion, Mr. Chief Justice Warren stated the principle for 
which these cases stand-that the N ew York Times test reaches both 
public figures and public officials. MR. JusTICE BRENNAN and MR. 
JUSTICE WHITE agreed with the Chief Justice on that question .. 
Mr. Just ice Black and l\.fo J USTICE DOUGLAS reiterated their view 
that publishers should have an absolute immunity from liability for 
defamation, but they acquiesed in the Chief Justice's reasoning in 
order: to enable a majority of the Justices to agree on the question 
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stitutional privilege announced in that case to protect 
defamatory criticism of nonpublic officials who "are never-
theless intimately involved in the resolution of important 
public questions, or, by reason of their fame, shape events 
in areas of concern to society at large." Id., at 164. 
In his opinion for the plurality in Rosenbloom v . 
.Metromedia, Inc., 403 U. S. 29 (1971), MR. JUSTICE 
BRENNAN took the New York Times privilege one step 
further. He concluded that its protection should extend 
to defamatory falsehoods relating to private persons if the 
statements concerned matters of general or public interest. 
H e abjured the suggested distinction between public offi-
cials and public figures on the one hand and private indi-
viduals on the other. He focused instead on society's 
interest in learning about certain issues: "If a matter is a 
subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly 
become less so merely because a private individual is 
involved or because in some sense the individual did not 
choose to become involved." 403 U. S., at 43. Thus, 
under the plurality opinion, a private citizen involun-
tarily associated with a matter of general interest has no 
recourse for injury to his reputation unless he can satisfy 
the demanding requirements of the New York Times test. 
Two members of the Court concurred in the result in 
Rosenbloom but departed from the reasoning of the 
plurality. Mr. Justice Black restated his view, long 
shared by MR. JusTICE DOUGLAS, that the First Amend-
ment cloaks the news media with an absolute and in-
defeasible immunity from liability for defamation. Id. , 
at 57. MR JUSTICE WHITE concurred on a narrower 
ground. Ibid. He concluded that "the First Amend-
ment gives the press and the broadcast media a privilege 
to report and comment upon the official actions of public 
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servants in full detail, with no requirement that the rep-
utation or privacy of an individual involved in or affected 
by the official action be spared from public view." Id. , 
at 62. He therefore declined to reach the broader ques-
tions addressed by the other Justices. 
Mr. Justice Harlan dissented. Although he had joined 
the opinion of the Court in New Yark Times, in Curt-is 
Publ-ishing Co. he had contested the extension of the 
privilege to public figures. There he had argued that 
a public figure who held no governmental office should 
be allowed to recover damages for defamation "on 
a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constitut-
ing an extreme departure from the standards of in-
vestigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by 
responsible publishers." 388 U. S., at 155. In his Ciirtis 
Publishing Co. opinion Mr. Justice Harlan had distin-
guished LYew Yark Times primarily on the ground that 
defamation actions by public officials "lay close to sedi-
tious libel. .. . " Id., at 133. Recovery of damages by 
one who held no public office, ho,vever, could not "be 
viewed as a vindication of governmental policy." Id., 
at 154. Additionally, he had intimated that, because 
most public officials enjoyed absolute immunity from 
liability for their own defamatory utterances under Barr 
v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564 (1959), they lacked a strong 
claim to the protection of the courts. 
In Rosenbloom Mr. Justice Harlan modified these 
views. He acquiesced in the application of the privilege 
to defamation of public figures but argued that a different 
rule should obtain where defamatory falsehood harmed 
a private individual. He noted that a private person 
has less likelihood "of securing access to the channels 
of communication sufficient to rebut falsehoods concern-
ing him" than do public officials and public figures , id., 
at 70, and has not voluntarily placed himself in the public 
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spotlight. Mr. Justice Harlan concluded that the States 
could constitutionally allow private individuals to re-
cover damages for defamation on the basis of any I 
standard of care except liability without fault. 
MR. JusTICE MARSHALL disrnnted in Rosenbloom in an 
opinion joined by MR. Jus'l'ICE STEWART. Id., at 78. He 
thought that the plurality's "public or general interest" 
test for determining the applicability of the New York 
Times privilege would involve the courts in the dangerous 
business of deciding "what information is relevant to self-
government." Id., at 79. He also contended that the 
plurality's position inadequately served "society's inter-
est in protecting private individuals from being thrust 
into the public eye by the distorting light of defamation." 
Ibid. MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL therefore reached the 
conclusion, joined by Mr. Justice Harlan, that the States 
should be "essentially free to continue the evaluation of 
the common law of defamation and to articulate what-
ever fault standards best suits the State's need," so long 
as the States did not impose liability without fault. Id., 
at 86. The principal point of disagreement among the 
three dissenters concerned punitive damages. Whereas 
Mr. Justice Harlan thought that the States could allow 
punitive damages in amounts bearing "a reasonable and 
purposeful relationship to the actual harm done .. . ," 
id., at 75, MR. JusTICE MARSHALL concluded that the 
size and unpredictability of jury awards of exemplary 
damages unnecessarily exacerbated the problems of 
media self-censorship and that such damages should 
therefore be forbidden . 
III 
We begin with the common ground. Under the First 
Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. How-
ever pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its 
correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but 
16 
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on the competition of other ideas.8 But there is no con-
stitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither 
the intentional lie nor the careless error materially ad-
vances society's interest in "uninhibited, robust, and 
wide-open" debate on public issues. New York Tirnes 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. , at 270. They belong to that 
category of utterances which "are no essential part of 
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value 
as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived 
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest 
in order and morality." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 
315 U. S. 568, 572 ( 1942). 
Although the erroneous statement of fact is not worthy 
of constitutional protection, it is nevertheless inevitable in 
free debate. As James Madison pointed out in the Report 
on the Virginia Resolutions of 1798, "Some degree of 
abuse is inseparable from the proper use of everything; 
and in no instance is this more true than that of the 
press." 4 Elliot's Debates ( 1876), p. 571. And punish-
ment of error runs the risk of inducing a cautious and 
restrictive exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed 
freedoms of speech and press. Our decisions recognize 
that a rule of strict liability that compels a publisher 
or broadcaster to guarantee the accuracy of his factual 
assertions may lead to intolerable self-censorship. Al-
lowing the media to avoid liability only by proving the 
truth of all injurious statements does not accord adequate 
protection to First Amendment liberties. As the Court 
stated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, 376 
U. S., at 279, "Allowance of the defense of truth, with 
the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not mean 
8 As Thomas Jefferson made the point in his first Inaugural 
Address : "If there be any among us who wish to dissolve this union 
or change its republican form of government, let them stand undis-
turbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may 
be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it ." 
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that only false speech will be deterred." The First 
Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in 
order to protect speech that matters. 
The need to avoid self-censorship by the news media is, 
however, not the only societal value at issue. If it were, 
this Court would have embraced long ago the view that 
publishers and broadcasters enjoy an unconditional and 
indefeasible immunity from liability for defamation. See 
New York Times Co. v.Sullivan,376 V. S. 254,293 (1964) 
(opinion of Black, J.); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 
80 (1964) (opinion of DOUGLAS, J.); Curtis Publishing Co. 
v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130, 170 ( 1967) ( opinion of Black, J.). 
Such a rule would indeed obviate the fear that the pros-
pect of civil liability for injurious falsehood might dis-
suade a timorous press from the effective exercise of 
First Amendment freedoms. Yet absolute protection for 
the communications media requires a total sacrifice of 
the competing value served by the law of defamation. 
The legitimate state interest underlying the law of libel 
is the compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted 
on them by defamatory fah:ehoods. We would not lightly 
require the State to abandon this purpose, for, as MR. 
JusTICE STEWART has reminded us, the individual 's right 
to the protection of his own good name 
" reflects no more than our basic concept of the essen-
tial dignity and worth of every human being-a 
concept at the root of any decent system of ordered 
liberty. The protection of private personality, like 
the protection of life itself, is left primarily to the 
individual states under the Ninth and Tenth Amend-
ments. But this does not mean that the right is 
entitled to any less recognition by this Court as a 
basic of our constitutional system." Rosenblatt v. 
Baer, 383 U. S. 75, 92-93 ( 1963) ( opinion of 
STEWAET, J .) . 
18 
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Some tension necessarily exists between the need for 
a vigorous and uninhibited press and the legitimate in-
terest in redressing wrongful injury. As Mr. Justice 
Harlan stated, "some antithesis between freedom of 
speech and press and libel actions persists, for libel re-
mains premised on the content of speech and limits the 
freedom of the publisher to express certain sentiments, 
at least without guaranteeing legal proof of their sub-
stantial accuracy." Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 
U. S. , at 152. In our continuing effort to define the 
proper accommodation between these competing con-
cerns, we have been especially anxious to assure to the 
freedoms of speech and press that "breathing space" 
essential to their fruitful exercise. NAACP v. B1ttton, 
371 U. S. 415, 433 ( 1963). To that end this Court has: 
extended a measure of strategic protection to defamatory 
falsehood . 
The New York Times standard defines the level of 
constitutional protection appropriate to the context of 
defamation of a public person. Those who, by reason 
of the notoriety of their achievements or the vigor 
and success with which they seek the public's attention, 
are properly classed as public figures and those who 
hold governmental office may recover for injury to rep-
utation only on clear and convincing proof that the 
defamatory falsehood was made with knowledge of its 
falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth. This 
standard administers an extremely powerful antidote 
to the inducement to media self-censorship of the 
common law rule of strict liability for libel and 
slander. And it exacts a correspondingly high price 
from the victims of defamatory falsehood. Plainly 
many deserving plaintiffs, including some intentionally 
subjected to injury, will be unable to surmount 
the barrier of the New Yark Times test. Despite this 
substantial abridg,ement of the state law right to com-
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-pensation for wrongful hurt to one's reputation, the 
Court has concluded that the protection of the New 
York Times privilege should be available to publish-
·ers and broadcasters of defamtory falsehoods concern-
ing public officials and public figures. New Yark 
'Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964); Curtis 
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130 (1967). We 
think that these decisions are correct, but we do not 
find their holdings justified solely by reference to the 
interest of the press and broadcast media in immunity 
from liability. Rather, we believe that the New York 
Times rule states an accommodation between this con-
cern and the limited state interest present in the context 
of libel actions brought by public persons. For the rea-
sons stated below, we conclude that the state interest 
in compensating injury to the reputation of private 
individuals requires that a different rule should obtain 
with respect to them. 
Theoretically, of course, the balance between the needs 
of the press and the individual's claim to compensation 
for wrongful injury might be struck on a case-by-case 
basis. As Mr. Justice Harlan hypothesized, "it might 
seem, purely as an abstract matter, that the most utili-
tarian approach would be to scrutinize carefully every 
jury verdict in every libel case, in order to ascertain 
whether the final judgment leaves fully protected what-
ever First Amendment values transcend the legitimate 
state interest in protecting the particular plaintiff who 
prevailed." Rosenbbom v. Metromedia, In c., 403 U. S. 
29, 63 ( 1971) ( footnote omitted). But this approach 
would lead to unpredictable results and uncertain expecta-
tions, and it could render our duty to supervise the lower 
courts unmanagable. Because an ad hoc resolution of 
the competing interests at stake in each particular case 
is not feasible , we must lay down broad rules of general 
· application. Such nJles necessarily treat alike various 
20 
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cases involving differences as well as similarities. Thus 
it is of ten true that not all of the considerations which 
justify adoption of a given rule will obtain in each par-
ticular case decided under its authority. 
With that caveat we have no difficulty in distinguishing 
among defamation plaintiffs. The first remedy of any 
victim of defamation is self-help-using available oppor-
tunities to contradict the lie or correct the error and 
thereby to minimize its adverse impact on reputation. 
Public officials and public figures usually enjoy signifi-
cantly greater access to the channels of effective commu-
nication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to 
counteract false statements than private individuals nor-
mally enjoy.u Private individuals are therefore more 
vulnerable to injury, and the state interest in protecting 
them is correspondingly greater. 
More important than the likelihood that private indi-
viduals will lack effective opportunities for rebuttal, there 
is a compelling normative consideration underlying the 
distinction between public and private defamation plain-
tiffs. An individual who decides to seek governmental 
office must accept certain necessary consequences of that 
involvement in public affairs. He runs the risk of closer 
public scrutiny than might otherwise be the case. And 
society's interest in the officers of governmf'nt is not 
strictly limited to the formal discharge of official duties. 
As the Court pointed out in Garrison v. Lou'i.siana, 379 
U.S. 64, 77 (1964), the public's interest extends to "any-
thing that might touch on an official 's fitness for office .. .. 
F ew personal attributes are more germane to fitness for 
0 Of course, an opportunity for rebuttal seldom suffices to undo 
harm of defamatory falsehood . Indeed, the law of defamation is 
rooted in our experience that the truth rarely catches up with a lie. 
But the fact that the self-help remedy of rebuttal, standing alone, 
is inadequate to its task does not mean that it is irrelevant to our 
inquir;v 
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office than dishonesty, malfeasance, or improper motiva-
tion, even though these characteristics may also affect 
the official's private character." 
Those classed as public figures stand in a similar posi-
tion. Hypothetically, it may be possible for someone to 
become a public figure through no purposeful action of 
his own, but the instances of truly involuntary public 
figures must be exceedingly rare. For the most part 
those who attain this status have assumed roles of especial 
prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy posi-
tions of such persuasive power and influence that they 
are deemed public figures for all purposes. More com-
monly, those classed as public figures have thrust them-
selves to the forefront of particular public controversies 
in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. 
In either event, they invite attention and comment. 
Even if the foregoing generalities do not obtain in every 
instance, the communications media are entitled to act 
on the assumption that public officials and public figures 
have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk 
of injury from defamatory falsehoods concerning them. 
No such assumption is justified with respect to a private 
individual. He has relinquished no part of his interest 
in the protection of his own good name, and consequently 
he has a more compelling call on the courts for redress 
of injury inflicted by defamatory falsehood. Thus, pri-
vate individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury 
than public officials and public figures; they are also more 
deserving of recovery. 
For these reasons we conclude that the States should 
retain substantial latitude in their efforts to enforce a 
legal remedy for defamatory falsehood injurious to the 
reputation of a private individual. The extension of the 
New Yark Times test proposed by the Rosenbloom plu-
rality would abridge this legitimate state interest to a 
degree that we find unacceptable. And it would occa-' 
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sion the additional difficulty of forcing state and federal 
judges to decide on an ad hoc basic which publications 
address issues of "general or public interest" and 
which do not-to determine, in the words of MR. JusTICE 
MARSHALL, "what information is relevant to self-govern-
ment. " Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U. S. , at 
79. We doubt the wisdom of committing this task to the 
conscience of judges. Nor does the Constitution require 
us to draw so thin a line between the drastic alternatives 
of the New Yark Times privilege and the common law of 
strict liability for defamatory error. The "public or gen-
eral interest" test for determining the applicability of 
the New Yark Times standard to private defamation 
actions inadequately serves both of the competing values 
at stake. On the one hand, a private individual whose 
reputation is injured by defamatory falsehood that does 
' concern an issue of public or general interest has no re-
course unless he can meet the rigorous requirements of 
New Yark Times. This is true despite the factors 
that distinguish the state interest in compensating 
private individuals from the analogous interest involved 
in the context of public persons. On the other 
hand, a publisher or broadcaster of a defamatory error 
which a court deems unrelated to an issue of public or 
general interest may be held liable in damages even if it 
took every reasonable precaution to ensure the accuracy 
of its assertions. And liability may far exceed compensa-
tion for any actual injury to the plaintiff, for the jury may 
be permitted to presume damages without proof of loss 
and even to award punitive damages. 
We hold that, so long as they do not impose liability 
without fault. the States may define for themselves the 
appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broad-1· 
caster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private 
individual. This approach provides a more equitable 
boundary between the competing concerns involved here 
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It recognizes the strength of the legitimate state interest 
in compensating private individuals for wrongful injury 
to reputation, yet shields the press and broadcast media 
from thf' rigors of strict liability for defamation. At 
least this cone] usion obtains where, as here, the sub-
sta11ce of the defamatory statement "makes substan-
tial danger to reputation apparent.'' 111 This phrase 
places an important qualification on the conclusion 
we announce today. Our inquiry would involve con-
siderations somewhat different from those discussed 
above if a State purported to · condition civil liability 
on a factual misstatement whose content did not 
carry warning of its defamatory potential. Cf. Time, 
Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S. 374 ( 1967). Such a case is not 
now before us, and we intimate no view as to its proper 
resolution. 
IV 
Our accommodation of the competing values at stake 
in defamation suits by private individuals allows the 
States to impose liability on the publisher or broadcaster 
of defamatory falsehoods on a less demanding showing 
than that required by New York Times. This conclusion 
is not based on a belief that the considerations which 
prompted the adoption of the New York Times privilege 
for defamation of public officials and its extension to 
public figures are wholly inapplicable to the context of 
private individuals. Rather, we endorse this approach( 
in recognition of the strong and legitimate state interest 
in compensating private individuals for injury to reputa-
tion. But this countervailing state interest extends no 
further than compensation for actual injury. For the 
reasons stated below, we hold that the States may not 
permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at/ 
1° Curtis Publishing Co . v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130, 155 (1967). 
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least when liability is not based on a showing of I 
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. 
The common law of defamation is an oddity of tort 
law, for it allows recovery of purportedly compensatory 
damages without evidence of actual loss. Under the 
traditional rules pertaining to actions for libel, the exist-
ence of injury is presumed from the fact of publication. 
Juries may award substantial sums as compensation for 
supposed damage to reputation without any proof that 
such harm actually occurred. The largely uncontrolled 
discretion of juries to award damages where there is no 
loss unnecessarily compounds the potential of any sys-
tem of liability for defamatory falsehood to inhibit the 
vigorous exercise of First Amendment freedoms. Addi-
tionally, the doctrine of presumed damages invites juries 
to punish unpopular opinion rather than to compensate 
individuals for injury sustained by the publication of a 
false fact. More to the point, the States have no sub-
stantial interest in securing for plaintiffs such as this) 
petitioner gratuitous awards of money damages far in 
excess of any actual injury. 
We would not, of course, invalidate state law simply 
because we doubt its wisdom, but here we are attempting 
to reconcile state law with a competing interest grounded 
in the constitutional command of the First Amendment. 
It is therefore appropriate to require that state remedies 
for defamatory falsehood reach no farther than is 
necessary to protect the legitimate interest involved. 
It is necessary to restrict defamatic,,1 plaintiffs who] 
do not prove knowledge of falsity or H'ckless disregard 
for the truth to compensation for actual injury. We 
need not define "actual injury," as trial courts have 
wide experience in framing appropriate jury instruc-
tions in tort action. Suffice it to say that actual 
injury is not limited to out-of-pocket loss. Indeed, the 
more customary types of actual harm inflicted by defam-
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atory falsehood include impairment of reputation and 
standing in the community, personal humiliation, and 
mental anguish and suffering. Of course, juries must be 
limited by appropriate instructions, and all awards must 
be supported by competent evidence. 
We also find no justification for allowing awards of 
punitive damages against publishers and broadcasters held 
liable under state-defined standards of liability for I 
defamation. In most jurisdictions jury discretion over 
the amounts awarded is limited only by the gentle 
rule that they not be excessive. Consequently, juries 
assess punitive damages in wholly unpredictable amounts 
bearing no necessary relation to the actual harm 
caused. And they remain free to use their discre-
tion selectively to punish expressions of unpopular 
views. Like the doctrine of presumed damages, jury dis-
cretion to award punitive damages unnecessarily exacer-
bates the danger of media self-censorship, but, unlike the 
former rule, punitive damages are wholly irrelevant to the 
state interest that justifies a negligence standard for pri-
vate defamation actions. They are not compensation for 
mJ ury. Instead, they are private fines levied by civil 
juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its 
future occurrence. In short, the private defamation/ ~ 
plaintiff who establishes liability under a less demanding 
standard than that stated by l\'ew York Times may 
recover only such damages as are sufficient to compensate 
him for actual injury. 
V 
Notwithstanding our refusal to extend the .New York 
Times privilege to defamation of private individuals, 
respondent contends that we should affirm the judgment 
below on the ground that petitioner is either a public 
official or a public figure. There is little basis for the 
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cident, petitioner had served briefly on housing commit-
tees appointed by the mayor of Chicago, but at the 
time of publication he had never held any remunera-
tive governmental position. Respondent admits this 
but argues that petitioner's appearance at the coroner's 
inquest rendered him a "de facto public official." Our 
cases recognize no such concept. Respondent's sugges-
tion would sweep all lawyers under the New York Times 
rule as officers of the court and distort the plain meaning 
of the "public official" category beyond all recognition. 
We decline to follow it. 
Respondent's characterization of petitioner as a public 
figure raises a different question. That designation may 
rest on either of two alternative bases. In some in-
stances an individual may achieve such pervasive fame 
or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all pur-
poses and in all contexts. More commonly, an individual 
voluntary injects himself or is drawn into a particular 
public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure 
for a limited range of issues. In either case such persons 
assume special prominence in the resolution of public 
questions. 
Petitioner has long been active in community and 
professional affairs. He has served as an officer of local 
civil groups and of various professional organizations, 
and he has published several books and articles on legal 
subjects. Although petitioner was consequently well-
known in some circles, he had achieved no general fame 
or notoriety in the community. None of the prospective 
jurors called at the trial had ever heard of petitioner 
prior to this litigation, and respondent offered no proof 
that this response was atypical of the local population. 
We would not lightly assume that a citizen's participa-
tion in community and professional affairs rendered him 
a public figure for all purposes. Absent clear evidence 
of general fam~ or notoriety in the community, and per-
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vasive involvement in the affairs of society, an individual 
'should not be deemed a public personality for all aspects 
of his life. It is preferable to reduce the public figure 
question to a more meaningful context by looking to the 
nature and extent of an individual's participation in the 
particular controversy giving rise to the defamation. 
In this context it is plain that petitioner was not a 
public figure. He played a minimal role at the coroner's 
inquest, and his participation related solely to his repre-
'sentation of a private client. He took no part in the 
criminal prosecution of officer Nuccio. Moreover, he 
never discussed either the criminal or civil litigation with 
the press and was never quoted as having done so. He 
plainly did not thrust himself into the vortex of this 
public issue, nor did he engage the public's attention in 
an attempt to influence its outcome. We are persuaded 
that the trial court did not err in refusing to characterize 
petitioner as a public figure for the purpose of this 
litigation. 
We therefore conclude that the N ew York Times stand-
ard is inapplicable to this case and that the trial court 
erred in entering judgment for respondent. Because the 
1 jury was allowed to impose liability without fault and was permitted to presume damages without proof of 
injury, a new trial is necessary. vVe reverse and remand 
for further proceedings in accord with this opinion. 
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This Court has struggled for nearly a decade to define 
the proper accommodation between the law of defama-
tion and the freedoms of speech and press protected by 
the First Amendment. With this decision we return to 
that effort. We granted certiorari to reconsider the ex-
tent of a publisher's constitutional privilege against lia-
bility for defamation of a private citizen. - U. S. -
(1973) . 
I 
In 1968 a Chicago policeman named Nuccio shot and 
killed a youth named Nelson. The state authorities prose-
cuted Nuccio for the homicide and ultimately obtained 
a conviction for murder in the second degree. The Nel-
son family retained petitioner Elmer Gertz, a reputable 
attorney, to represent them in civil litigation against 
Nuccio. 
Respondent publishes American Opinion, a monthly 
outlet for the views of the John Birch Society. Early in 
the 1960's the magazine began to warn of a nationwide 
conspiracy to discredit local law enforcement agencies 
and create in their stead a national police force capable 
of supporting a communist dictatorship. As part of the 
~ 
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continuing effort to alert the public to this assumed 
danger, the managing editor of American Opinion com-
missioned an article on the murder trial of officer Nuccio. 
For this purpose he engaged a regular contributor to the 
magazine. In March of 1969 respondent published the 
resulting article under the title "FRAME-UP: Richard 
Nuccio And The War On Police." The article purports 
to demonstrate that the testimony against Nuccio at 
his criminal trial was false and that his prosecution was 
part of the communist campaign against the police. 
In his capacity as counsel for the Nelson family in 
the civil litigation, petitioner attended the coroner's in 9 
quest into the boy1s death and initiated actions for 
damages, but he neither discussed officer Nuccio with the 
press nor played any part in the criminal proceeding, 
Notwithstanding petitioner's remote connection with the 
prosecution of Nuccio, respondent's magazine portrayed 
him as an architect of the '' frame-up. " According to 
the article, the police file on petitioner took "a big, Irish 
cop to lift." The article stated that petitioner had been 
an official of the "Marxist League for Industrial Democ-
racy, originally known as the Intercollegiate Socialist 
Society, which has advocated the violent seizure of our 
government." It labelled Gertz a "Leninist" and a 
''Communist-fronter. " It also stated that Gertz had 
been an officer of the National Lawyers Guild . described· 
as a communist organization that "probably did more 
than any other outfit to plan the Communist attack on 
the Chicago police during the 1968 Democratic conven-
tion." It is undisputed ·that these statements contained 
serious inaccuracies. The implication that petitioner had 
a criminal record was false. Petitioner had been a mem-
ber and officer of the National Lawyers Guild some 15 
years earlier, but there was no evidence that he or that 
organization had taken any part in planning the 1968 
demonstrations in Chicago. There was also no basis for 
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'the charge that petitioner was a "Leninist" or a "Com-
munist-fronter." And he had never been a member of 
the "Marxist League for Industrial Democracy" or the 
"Intercollegiate Socialist Society." 
The managing editor of American Opinion made no 
-effort to verify or substantiate the charges against peti-
tioner. Instead, he appended an editorial introduction 
stating that the author had "concluded extensive re-
search into the Richard Nuccio case." And he included 
in the article a photograph of petitioner and wrote the 
caption that appeared under it: "Elmer Gertz of the 
Red Guild harrasses Nuccio." Respondent placed the 
issue of American Opinion containing the article on sale 
at newsstands throughout the country and distributed 
reprints of the article on the streets of Chicago. 
Petitioner filed a diversity action for libel in the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. 
He claimed that the falsehoods published by respondent 
injured his reputation as a lawyer and a citizen. Before 
filing an answer, respondent moved to dismiss the com-
plaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could 
be granted, apparently on the ground that petitioner 
failed to allege special damages. But the court ruled 
that statements contained in the article constituted libel 
per se under Illinois law and that consequently petitioner 
need not plead special damages. 366 F . Supp. 310 (ND 
Ill. 1969) . 
After answering the complaint, respondent filed a pre-
trial motion for summary judgment, claiming a constitu-
tional privilege against liability for defamation.1 It 
asserted that petitioner was a public official or a public 
figure and that the article concerned an issue of public 
1 Petitioner filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on grounds 
not specified in the record. The Court denied petitioner's cross .. 
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interest and concern. For these reasons, respondent, 
argued, it was entitled to invoke the privilege enunciated 
111 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
Under this rule respondent would escape liability unless 
petitioner could prove publication of defamatory false-
hood "with 'actual malice'-that is, in the knowledge that 
it was false or with reckless disregard for whether it was 
true or not." Id., at 279-280. Respondent claimed 
that petitioner could not make such a showing and 
submitted a supporting affidavit by the magazine's man-
aging editor. The editor denied any knowledge of the 
falsity of the statements concerning petitioner and stated 
that he had relied on the author's reputation and on his 
prior experience with the accuracy and authenticity of 
his contributions to American Opinion. 
The District Court denied respondent's motion for 
summary judgment in a memorandum opinion. - F . 
Supp. - (ND Ill., Sept. 16, 1970) . The court did not 
dispute respondent's claim to the protection of the New 
York Times standard. Rather, it concluded that peti-
tioner might overcome the constitutional privilege by 
making a factual showing sufficient to prove publication 
of defamatory falsehood in reckless disregard of the truth. 
During the course of the trial, however, it became clear 
that the trial court had not accepted all of respondent's 
asserted grounds for applying the New York Times rule 
to this case. It thought that respondent's claim to the 
protection of the constitutional privilege depended on 
the contention that petitioner was either a public official 
under the New York Times decision or a public figure 
under Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130 
(1967), apparently discounting the argument that a 
privilege would arise from the presence of a public issue. 
After all the evidence had been presented but before 
submission of the case to the jury, the court ruled in 
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public figure. It added that, if he were, the resulting ap-
plication of the New York Times standard would require 
a directed verdict for respondent. Because some state-
ments in the article constituted libel per se under Illinois 
law, the court submitted the case to the jury under instruc-
tions that withdrew from its consideration all issues save 
the measure of damages. The jury awarded $50,000 to 
petitioner. 
Following the jury verdict and on further reflection, 
the District Court concluded that the New York Times 
standard should govern this case even though petitioner 
was not a public official or public figure. It accepted rew 
spondent's contention that that privilege protected dis• 
cussion of any public issue without regard to the status 
of a person defamed therein. Accordingly, the court 
entered judgment for respondent notwithstanding thl:l 
jury's verdict. 2 This conclusion anticipated the reason-
2 - F. Supp. - (ND Ill., Dec. 8, 1970) . Petitioner asserts that 
the entry of judgment n. o. v. on the basis of his failure to show 
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth constituted 
unfair surprise and deprived him of a full and fair opportunity to 
prove "actual malice" on the part of respondents. This contention 
is not supported by the record . It is clear that the trial court 
gave petitioner no reason to assume that the New Yark Times 
privilege would not be available to respondent . The court's memo-
randum opinion denying respondent's pretrial motion for summary 
judgment does not state that the New York Times standard was 
inapplicable to this case. Rather, it reveals that the trial judge 
thought it possible for petitioner to make a factual showing sufficient 
to overcome respondent's claim of constitutional privilege. It states 
in part: 
"When there is a factual dispute as to the existence of actual 
malice, summary judgment is improper. 
"In the instant c!lse a jury might infer from the evidence that 
[respondent's] failure to investigate the truth of the allegations, 
coupled with its receipt of communications challenging the factual 
accuracy of this author in the past amounted to actual malice, that 
6 
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ing of a plurality of this Court in Rosenbloom v. Metro• 
medw, 403 U. S. 29 (1971). 
Petitioner appealed to contest the applicability of the 
New York Times standard to this case. Although the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit doubted the 
correctness of the District Court's determination that 
petitioner was not a public figure, it did not overturn 
that finding. 3 It agreed with the District Court that 
respondent could assert the constitutional privilege be-
cause the article concerned a matter of public interest, 
citing this Court's intervening decision in Rosenbloom v. 
Metromedia, Inc., supra. The Court of Appeals read 
Rosenbloom to require application of the New York 
is, 'reckless disregard' of whether the allegations were true or not. 
New York Times [Co.] v. Sullivan, supra, at 279-280." - F, 
Supp. -, - (ND Ill., Sept. 16, 1970) . 
Thus, petitioner knew or should have known that the outcome of 
the trial might hinge on his ability to show by clear and convincing 
evidence that respondent acted with reckless disregard for the truth, 
And this question remained open throughout the trial. Although 
the court concluded that the applicability of New York Times 
rule depended on petitioner's status as a public figure , the court 
did not decide that petitioner was not a public figure until all 
the evidence had been presented. Thus petitioner had every 
opportunity, indeed incentive, to prove "reckless disregard" if he 
could, and he in fact attempted to do so. The record supports the 
observation by the Court of Appeals that petitioner "did present 
evidence of malice (both the 'constitutional' and the 'ill-will' type) 
to support his damage claim and no such evidence was excluded . .. .1' 
-F.2d,at-. 
3 The court stated : 
"[Petitioner's] considerable stature as a lawyer, author, lecturer, 
and participant in matters of public import undermine the validity 
of the assumption that he is not a 'public figure' as that term has 
been used by the progeny of New York Times . Nevertheless, for 
purposes of decision we make that assumption and test the avail-
ability of the claim of privilege by the subject matter of the article.'~ 
-F. 2d,at-. 
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·Times standard to any publication or broadcast about 
an issue of significant public interest, without regard 
to the position, fame, or anonymity of the person 
defamed, and it concluded that respondent's statements 
concerned such an issue.4 After reviewing the record, 
4 In the Court of Appeals petitioner made an ingenious but un-
availing attempt to show that respondent's defamatory charge against 
him concerned no issue of public or general interest. He asserted 
that the subject matter of the article was the murder trial of Officer 
Nuccio and that he did not participate in that proceeding. There• 
fore, he argued, even if the subject matter of the article generally 
were protected by the New York Times privilege, under the opinion 
of the Rosenbloom plurality, the defamatory statements about him 
were not. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument. It noted 
that the accusations against petitioner played an mtegral part in 
respondent's general thesis of a nationwide conspiracy to harass the 
police: 
"[W]e may a.Jso assume that the article's basic thesis is false. Never• 
theless, under the reasons of New York Times v. Sullivan, even a 
false statement made in support of a false thesis is protected unless 
made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of its 
truth or falsity. It would undermine the rule of that case to permit 
the actual falsity of a statement to determine whether or not its 
publisher is entitled to the benefit of the rule. 
"If, therefore, we put to one side the false character of the article 
and treat it as though its contents were entirely true, it cannot be 
denied that the comments about [petitioner] were integral to its 
thesis. They must be tested under the New York Times standard." 
-F.2d,at-. 
We think that the Court of Appeals correctly rejected petitioner's 
argument. Its acceptance might lead to arbitrary imposition of 
liability on the basis of an unwise d'ifterentiation among kinds 
of factual misstatements. The present case illustrates the point. 
Respondent falsely portrayed petitioner as an architect of the 
criminal prosecution against Nuccio. On its face this inaccuracy 
does not appear defamatory. Respondent also falsely labelled peti-
tioner a "Leninst" and a "Communist-fronter." These accusations 
are generally considered defamatory. Under petitioner's interpreta-
tion of the "public or general interest" test, respondent would have 
-epjoyed a constitutional privilege to publish defamatory falsehoods if 
8 
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the Court of Appeals endorsed the District Court's con-
clusion that petitioner had failed to show by clear and 
convincing evidence that respondent had acted with 
"actual malice" as defined by New York Times. There 
was no evidence that the managing editor of American 
Opinion knew of the falsity of the accusations made in 
the article. In fact, he knew nothing about peti-
tioner except what he learned from the article. The 
court correctly noted that mere proof of failure to investi-
gate, without more, cannot establish reckless disregard for 
the truth. Rather, the publisher must act with a "high 
degree of awareness ... of probable falsity." St. Amant 
v. Thompson, 390 U. S. 727, 731 ( 1968). Accord~ 
Beckley Newspaper Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U. S. 81, 84-85 
(1967); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 67, 75-76 (1964). 
The evidence in this case did not reveal that respondent 
had cause for such an awareness. The Court of Appeals 
therefore affirmed - F. 2d - ( 1972). For the reasons 
stated below, we now reverse. 
II 
The principal issue in this case is whether a publisher 
of defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is 
neither a public official nor a public figure may claim a 
constitutional privilege against liability for the injury in-
flicted by those statements. The Court considered this 
question on the rather different set of facts presented in 
petitioner had in fact been associated with the criminal prosecution .. 
But this would mean that the seemingly innocuous mistake of con-
fusing petitioner's role in the litigation against officer Nuccio would 
destroy the privilege otherwise available for calling petitioner a 
communist-fronter. Thus respondent's privilege to publish state-
ments whose content should have alerted it to the danger of injury 
to reputation would hinge on the accuracy of statements that carried 
with them no such warning. Assuming that none of these statements 
was published with knowledge of falsity or with reckless disregard' 
for the truth, we see no reason to distinguish among the inaccuracies_ 
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Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U. S. 29 (1971). 
Rosenbloom, a distributor of nudist magazines, was 
arrested for selling allegedly obscene material while mak-
ing a delivery to a retail dealer. The police obtained a 
warrant and seized his entire inventory of 3,000 books and 
magazine. He sought and obtained an injunction pro-
hibiting further police interference with his business. He 
then sued a local radio station for failing to note in two 
of its newscasts that the 3,000 items seized were only 
"reportedly" or "allegedly" obscene and for broadcasting 
references to "the smut literature racket" and to "girlie-
book peddlers" in its coverage of the court proceeding 
for injunctive relief. He obtained a judgment against 
the radio station, but the Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit held the New York Times privilege applicable to 
the broadcast and reversed. 415 F. 2d 892 (1969). 
This Court affirmed the decision below, but no majority 
could agree on a controlling rationale. The eight Justices 5 
who participated in Rosenbloom announced their views 
in five separate opinions, none of which commanded more 
than three votes. The several statements not only re-
veal disagreement about the appropriate result in that 
case; they also reflect divergent traditions of thought 
about the general problem of reconciling the law of 
defamation with the First Amendment. One approach 
has been to extend the New York Times test to an ex-
panding variety of situations. Another has been to vary 
the level of constitutional privilege for defamatory false-
hood with the status of the person defamed. And a third 
view would grant to the press and broadcast media abso-
lute immunity from liability for defamation. To place 
our holding in the proper context, we preface our discus-
sion of this case with a review of the several Rosenbloom 
opinions and their antecedents. 
5 Mn. JusTICE DouaLAS did not partcipate in the consideration or 
decision of this case. 
10 
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In affirming the trial court's judgment in the instant 
case, the Court of Appeals relied on MR. JUSTICE BREN .. 
NAN's conclusion for the Rosenbloom plurality that "all 
discussion and communication involving matters of pub-
lic or general concern" warrant the protection from lia-
bility for defamation accorded by the rule originally enun-
ciated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964). There this Court defined a constitutional privi-
lege intended to free criticism of public officials from the 
restraints imposed by the common law of defamation. The 
Times ran a political advertisement endorsing civil rights 
demonstrations by black students in Alabama and im-
pliedly condemning the performance of local law enforce·-
ment officials. A police commissioner established in stat~ 
court that certain misstatements in the advertisement 
referred to him and that they constituted libel per ·se 
under Alabama law. This showing left the Times with 
the single defense of truth, for under Alabama law 
neither good faith nor reasonable care would protect the 
newspaper from liability. This Court concluded that a 
''rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee 
the truth of all his factual assertions" would deter pro-
tected speech, id., at 279, and announced the constitu-
tional privilege designed to counter that effect : 
"The constitutional guarantees require, we think, 
a federal rule that prohibits a public official from 
recovery of damages for a defamatory falsehood re-
lating to his official conduct uriless he proves that the 
statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, 
in the knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
disregard of whether it was true or not." Id., at 
279-280.6 
6 New York Times and later cases explicated the meaning of the 
new standard. In New York Times the Court held that under the ' , 
'\ 
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Three years after New York Times, a majority of the 
'court agreed to extend the constitutional privilege to 
tlefamatory criticism of "public figures." This extension 
circumstances the newspaper 's failure to check the accuracy of the 
ii,dvertisement against news stories in its own files did not establish 
teckless disregard for the truth. Id., at-. In St. Amant v. Thomp-
son, 390 U. S. 727, 731 (1968), the Court equated reckless disregard 
of the truth with subjective awareness of probable falsity: "There 
must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defend_. 
ant in fact entertained serious doubts as to t}:ie truth of his publica-
tion." In Beckley Newspapers Cotp. v. Hanks, 389 U. S. 81 (1967), 
the Court emphasized the distinction between the New York Times 
test of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth and 
"actual malice" in the traditional sense of ill-will. Ganison v. Loui-
siana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), made plain that the new standard applied 
to criminal libel laws as well as to civil actions and that 1t governed 
criticism directed at "anything ·which might touch on an official's fit-
n~s for office." Id., at 77. Finally, in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 
75, 85 ( 1966), the Court stated that "the 'public official' designation 
applies at the very least to those _among the heirarchy of government 
employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial 
responsibility for or control over the, conduct of government affairs."· 
In Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S. 374 (1967), the Court applied the 
New York Times standard to actions .under an unusual state statute. 
The statute did not create a cat1se of action for libel. Rather, 1t pro-
vided a remedy for unwanted publicity .. Although the law allowed 
recovery of damages for harm caused by exposure to public attention 
rather than by factual inaccuracies, it recognized truth as a complete 
defense. Thus, nondefamatory factual errors could render a publisher· 
liable for something akin to invasion of pri~!lcy .. The Court ruled that 
the defendant in such an action could invoke the New York Times 
privilege regardless of the fame or anonymity of the plaintiff. Speak-
ihg for the Court , MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN declared that this holding· 
was not an extension of New York Times but rather a parallel line of 
reasoning applying that standard to this discrete context : 
"This is neither a libel action by a private individual nor a statu-
foi'y action by a public official. Therefore, although the First 
Amendment principles announced in New York Times guide our· 
qo_l}cltt~ion, Wt\•r.ea.ch that conclu$ion only by aP.nlying these:nrincigles:. 
12 
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was announced in Curt-is Publishing Co. v. Butts and its 
llompanion Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130, 162 
(1967). The first case involved the Saturday Evening 
Post's charge that Coach Wally Butts of the University 
of Georgia had conspired with Coach Bear Bryant of the 
University of Alabama to fix a football game between 
their respective schools. Walker involved an erroneous 
Associated Press account of Brigadier General Edwin 
Walker's participation in a University of Mississippi 
campus riot. Because Butts was paid by a private alumni 
association and Walker had retired from the Army, neither 
could be classified as a "public official" under New York 
Times. Although Mr. Justice Harlan announced the 
result in both cases, a majority of the Court agreed with 
Mr. Chief Justice Warren's conclusion that the New York 
Times test should apply to criticism of "public figures" as 
well as "public officials." 1 The Court extended the con-
in this discrete context. It therefore serves no purpose to distinguish 
the facts here from those in New York Times . Were this 
a libel action, the distinction which has been suggested be-
tween the relative opportunities of the public official and the 
private individual to rebut defamatory charges might be germane. 
And the additional state interest in the protection of the individual 
against damages to his reputation would be involved. Cf. Rosenblatt 
v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 91 (STEWART, J ., concurring) ." Id., at 390-391. 
7 Professor Kalven once introduced a discussion of these cases with 
the apt heading, "You Can't Tell the Players Without a Score Card." 
H. Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment, 1967 
Sup. Ct. Rev. 267, 275 (1967). Only three other Justices joineq 
Mr. Justice Harlan's analysis of the issues involved. In his con-
curring opinion, Mr. Chief Justice Warren stated the principle for 
which these cases stand-that the New York Times test reaches both 
public figures and public officials. MR. JusTICE BRENNAN and MR. 
JUSTICE WHITE agreed with the Chief Justice on that question. 
Mr. Justice Black and MR JUSTICE DOUGLAS reiterated their view 
that publishers should have an absolute immunity from liability for 
defamation, but they acquiesed in the Chief Justice's reasoning in 
,order to enable a majority of the Justices to agree on the questio.l} 
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stitutional privilege announced in that case to protect 
defamatory criticism of nonpublic officials who "are never-
theless intimately involved in the resolution of important 
public questions, or, by reason of their fame, shape events 
in areas of concern to society at large." Id., at 164. 
In his opinion for the plurality in Rosenbloom v. 
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U. S. 29 (1971), MR. JUSTICE 
BRENNAN took the New York Times privilege one step 
further. He concluded that its protection should extend 
to defamatory falsehoods relating to private persons if the 
statements concerned matters of general or public interest. 
He abjured the suggested distinction between public offi-
cials and public figures on the one hand and private indi-
viduals on the other. He focused instead on society's 
interest in learning about certain issues : "If a matter is a 
subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly 
become less so merely because a private individual is 
involved or because in some sense the individual did not 
choose to become involved." 403 U. S., at 43. Thus, 
under the plurality opinion, a private citizen involun-
tarily associated with a matter of general interest has no 
recourse for injury to his reputation unless he can satisfy 
the demanding requirements of the New York Times test. 
Two members of the Court concurred in the result in 
Rosenbloom but departed from the reasoning of the 
plurality. Mr. Justice Black restated his view, long 
shared by MR. JusTICE DOUGLAS, that the First Amend-
ment cloaks the news media with an absolute and in-
defeasible immunity from liability for defamation. Id., 
at 57. MR JUSTICE WHITE concurred on a narrower 
ground. Ibid. He concluded that "the First Amend-
ment gives the press and the broadcast media a privilege 
to report and comment upon the official actions of public 




GERTZ v. WELCH 
servants in full detail, with no requirement that the repJ 
utation or privacy of an individual involved in or affected 
by the official action be spared from public view." Id:, 
at 62. He therefore declined to reach the broader ques-
tions addressed by the other Justices. 
Mr. Justice Harlan dissented. Although he had joined 
the opinion of the Court in New York Times, in Curtis 
Publishing Co. he had conteEted the extension of the 
privilege to public figures. There he had argued that 
a public figure who. held no governmental office should 
be allowed to recover damages for defamation "on 
a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constitut-
ing an extreme departure from the standards of in-
vestigation and . reporting ordinarily adhered to by 
responsible publishers." 388 U. S., at 155, In his Curtis 
Publishing Co. opinion Mr. Justice Harlan had distin-
guished New York Times primarily on the ground that 
defamation actions by public officials "lay close to sedi-
tious libel. , 
1 
• " Id., at 133. Recovery of damages by 
one who held . no public office, however, could not "be 
viewed as a vindication of governmental policy." Id., 
at 154. Additionally, he had intimated that, bec.ause 
most public officials enjoyed absolute immunity from 
liability for their own defamatory utterances under Barr 
v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564 (1959), they lacked a strong 
claim to the protection of the courts, 
In Rosenbloom Mr. Justice Harlan modified these 
views. He acquiesced in the application of. the privilege 
to defamation of public figures but argued that a different 
rule should obtain where defamatory falsehood harmed 
a private ' individual. He noted that a private person 
has less likelihood "of securing access to the channels 
of communication sufficient to rebut falsehoods concern-
ing him" th,an do public officials and public figures, id., 
at 70, and has not voluntarily placed himself in the public 
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spotlight. Mr. Justice Harlan concluded that the States 
could constitutionally allow private individuals to re-
cover damages for defamation on the basis of any 
standard of care except liability without fault. 
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL disrnnted in Rosenbloom in an 
opinion joined by MR. JusTICE STEWART. Id., at 78. He 
thought that the plurality's "public or general interest" 
test for determining the applicability of the New Yark 
Times privilege would involve the courts in the dangerous 
business of deciding "what information is relevant to self-
government." Id., at 79. He also contended that the 
plurality's position inadequately served "society's inter-
est in protecting private individuals from being thrust 
into the public eye by the distorting light of defamation." 
Ibid. MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL therefore reached the 
conclusion, joined by Mr. Justice Harlan, that the States 
should be "essentially free to continue the evaluation of 
the common law of defamation and to articulate what-
ever fault standards best suits the State's need, " so long 
as the States did not impose liability without fault. Id., 
at 86. The principal point of disagreement among the 
three dissenters concerned punitive damages. Whereas 
Mr. Justice Harlan thought that the States could allow 
punitive damages in amounts bearing "a reasonable and 
purposeful relationship to the actual harm done ... ," 
id., at 75, MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL concluded that the 
size and unpredictability of jury awards of exemplary 
damages unnecessarily exacerbated the problems of 
media self-censorship and that such damages should 
therefore be forbidden .. 
III 
We begin with the common ground. Under the First 
Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. How-
ever pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its 
eorrection not on the conscience of judges and juries but, 
16 
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cm the competition of other ideas.8 But there is no con-
stitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither 
the intentional lie nor the careless error materially ad-
vances society's interest in "uninhibited, robust. and 
wide-open" debate on public issues. New Yark Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. , at 270. They belong to that 
category of utterances which "are ;1~ essential part of 
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value 
as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived 
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest 
in order and morality.'' Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 
315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) . . 
Although the erroneous statement of fact 1s not worthy 
of constitutional protection, it is nevertheless inevitable in 
free debate. As James Madison pointed out in the Report 
on the Virginia Resolutions of 1798, "Some degree of 
abuse is inseparable from the proper use of everything; 
and in no instance is this more true than that of the 
press." 4 Elliot's Debates ( 1876), p. 571. And punish-
ment of error runs the risk of inducing a cautious and 
restrictive exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed 
_freedoms of speech and press. Our decisions recognize 
that a rule of strict liability that compels a publisher 
or broadcaster to guarantee the accuracy of his factual 
assertions may lead to intolerable self-censorship. Al-
lowing the media to avoid liability only by proving the 
truth of all injurious statements does not accord adequate 
protection to First Amendment liberties. As the Court 
stated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, 376 
U. S., at 279, "Allowance of the defense of truth, with 
the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not mean 
8 As Thomas Jefferson made the point m his first Inaugural 
Address: "If there be any among us who wish to dissolve this union 
or change its republican form of government , let them stand undis-
turbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may,· 
._ be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it," 
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that only false speech will be deterred." The First 
Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in 
order to protect speech that matters. 
The need to avoid self-censorship by the news media is, 
however, not the only societal value at issue. If it were, 
this Court would have embraced long ago the view that 
publishers and broadcasters enjoy an unconditional and 
indefeasible immunity from liability for defamation. See 
New York Times Co. v.Sullivan,376 U.S. 254,293 (1964) 
(opinion of Black, J.); Garrison v. Lou-isiana, 379 U.S. 64, 
80 (1964) (opinion of DOUGLAS, J.); Curt-is Publ-ishing Co. 
v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130, 170 (1967) (opinion of Black, J.). 
Such a rule would indeed obviate the fear that the pros-
pect of civil liability for injurious falsehood might dis-
suade a timorous press from the effective exercise of 
First Amendment freedoms. Yet absolute protection for 
the communications media requires a total sacrifice of 
the competing value served by the law of defamation. 
The legitimate state interest underlying the law of libel 
is the compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted 
on them by defamatory falsehoods. We would not lightly 
require the State to abandon this purpose, for, as MR. 
JusTICE STEWART has reminded us, the individual's right 
to the protection of his own good name 
"reflects no more than our basic concept of the essen-
tial dignity and worth of every human being-a 
_concept at the root of any decent system of ordered 
liberty. The protection of private personality, like 
the protection of life itself, is left primarily to the 
individual states under the Ninth and Tenth Amend-
ments. But this does not mean that the right is 
entitled to any less recognition by this Court as a 
basic of our constitutional system." Rosenblatt v. 
Baer, 383 U. S. 75, 92-93 (1963) (opinion of 
STEWART, J .) . 
18 
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Some tension necessarily exists between the need for 
a vigorous and uninhibited press and the legitimate in~ 
terest in redressing wrongful injury. As Mr. Justice 
Harlan stated, "some antithesis between freedom of 
speech and press and libel actions persists, for libel re-
mains premised on the content of speech and limits the 
freedom of the publisher to express certain sentiments, 
at least without guaranteeing legal proof of their sub-
stantial accuracy." Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 
U. S., at 152. In our continuing effort to define the 
proper accommodation between these competing con .. 
cerns, we have been especially anxious to assure to the 
freedoms of speech and press that "breathing space" 
essential to their fruitful exercise. NAACP v. Button, 
371 U. S. 415, 433 (1963). To that end this Court has 
extended a :measure of strategic protection to defamatory 
falsehood. 
The New York Times standard defines the level of 
constitutional protection appropriate to the context of 
defamation of a public person. Those who, by reason 
of the notoriety of their achievements or the vigor 
and success with which they seek the public's attention, 
are properly classed as public figures and those who 
hold governmental office may recover for injury to rep~ 
utation only on clear and convincing proof that the 
defamatory falsehood was made with knowledge of its 
falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth. This 
standard administers an extremely powerful antidote 
to the inducement to media self-censorship of the 
common law rule of strict liability for libel and 
slander. And it exacts a correspondingly high price 
from the victims of defamatory falsehood. Plainly 
many deserving plaintiffs, including some intentionally 
subjected to injury, will be unable to surmount 
the barrier of the New York Times test. Despite this 
substantial abridgement of the state law right to com~ 
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pensation for wrongful hurt to one's reputation, the 
Court has concluded that the protection of the New 
York Times privilege should be available to publish-
ers and broadcasters of defamtory falsehoods concern-
ing public officials and public figures. New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964); Curtis 
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130 (1967). We 
think that these decisions are correct, but we do not 
find their holdings justified solely by reference to the 
interest of the press and broadcast media in immunity 
from liability. Rather, we believe that the New York 
Times rule states an accommodation between this con-
cern and the limited state interest present in the context 
of libel actions brought by public persons. For the rea-
sons stated below, we conclude that the state interest 
in compensating injury to the reputation of private 
individuals requires that a different rule should obtain 
with respect to them. 
Theoretically, of course, the balance between the needs 
of the press and the individual's claim to compensation 
for wrongful injury might be struck on a case-by-case 
basis. As Mr. Justice Harlan hypothesized, "it might 
seem, purely as an abstract matter, that the most utili-
tarian approach would be to scrutinize carefully every 
jury verdict in every libel case, in order to ascertain 
whether the final judgment leaves fully protected what-
ever First Amendment values transcend the legitimate 
state interest in protecting the particular plaintiff who 
prevailed." Rosenbl-Jom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U. S. 
29, 63 (1971) (footnote omitted). But this approach 
. would lead to unpredictable results and uncertain expecta-
tions, and it could render our duty to supervise the lower 
courts unmanagable. Because an ad hoc resolution of 
the competing interests at stake in each particular case 
is not feasible , we must lay down broad rules of general 
Jlpplication. Such rules necessarily treat alike various 
20 
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cases involving differences as well as similarities. Thus 
it is of ten true that not all of the considerations which 
justify adoption of a given rule will obtain in each par-
ticular case decided under its authority. 
With that caveat we have no difficulty in distinguishing 
among defamation plaintiffs. 'The first remedy of any 
victim of defamation is self-help-using available oppor-
tunities to contradict the lie or correct the error and 
thereby to minimize its adverse impact on reputation. 
Public officials and public figures usually enjoy signifi-
cantly greater access to the channels of effective commu-
nication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to 
counteract false statements than private individuals nor-
mally enjoy.9 Private individua1s are therefore more 
vulnerable tci injury, and the state interest in protecting 
them is correspondingly greater. 
More important than the likelihood that private indi-
viduals will lack effective opportunities for rebuttal, there 
is a compelling normative consideration underlying the 
distinction between public and private defamation plain-
tiffs. An individual who decides to seek governmental 
office must accept certain necessary consequences of that 
involvement in public affairs. He runs the risk of closer 
public scrutiny than might otherwise be the case. And 
society's interest in the officers of government is not 
strictly limited to the formal discharge of official duties. 
As the Court pointed out in 'Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 
U. S. 64, 77 (1964) , the public's interest extends to "any-
thing that might touch on an official's fitness for office ... ,. 
Few personal attributes are more germane to fitness for 
9 Of course, an opportunity for rebuttal seldom suffices to undo 
harm of defamatory falsehood. Indeed, the law of defamation js 
rooted in our experience that the truth rarely catches up with a lie. 
But the fact that the self-help remedy of rebuttal, standing alone, 
is inadequate to its task does not mean that it is irrelevant to our-
inquiry. 
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office than dishonesty, malfeasance, or improper motiva-
tion, even though these characteristics may also affect 
the official's private character." 
Those classed as public figures stand in a similar posi-
'tion. Hypothetically, it may be possible for someone to 
become a public figure through no purposeful action of 
_his own, but the instances of truly involuntary public 
figures must be exceedingly rare. For the most part 
those who attain this status have assumed roles of especial 
prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy posi-
tions of such persuasive power and influence that they 
are deemed public figures for all purposes. More com-
monly, those classed as public figures have thrust them-
selves to the forefront of particular public controversies 
in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. 
In either event, they invite attention and comment. 
Even if the foregoing generalities do not obtain in every 
instance, the communications media are entitled to act 
on the assumption that public officials and public :figures 
have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk 
of injury from defamatory falsehoods concerning them. 
No such assumption is justified with respect to a private 
individual. He has relinquished no part of his interest 
in the protection of his own good name, and consequently 
he has a more compelling call on the courts for redress 
of injury inflicted by defamatory falsehood. Thus, pri-
vate individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury 
than public officials and public figures; they are also more 
deserving of recovery. 
For these reasons we conclude that the States should 
retain substantial latitude in their efforts to enforce a 
legal remedy for defamatory falsehood injurious to the 
reputation of a private individual. The extension of the 
New Yark Times test proposed by the Rosenbloom plu-
rality would abridge this legitimate state interest to a 
degree that we find unacceptable. And it would occa~ 
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sion the additional difficulty of forcing state and federal 
judges to decide on an ad hoc basic which publications 
address issues of "general or public interest" and 
which do not--to determine, in the words of MR. JusTICE 
MARSHALL, "what information is relevant to self-govern-
ment." Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U. S., at 
79. We doubt the wisdom of committing this task to the 
conscience of judges. Nor does the Constitution require 
us to draw so thin a line between the drastic alternatives 
of the New Yark Times privilege and the common law of 
strict liability for defamatory error. The "public or gen-
eral interest" test for determining the applicability of 
the New York Times standard to private defamation 
actions inadequately serves both of the competing values 
at stake. On the one hand, a private individual whose 
reputation is injured by defamatory falsehood that does 
concern an issue of public or general interest has no re-
course unless he can meet the rigorous requirements of 
New York Times. This is true despite the factors 
that distinguish the state interest in compensating 
private individuals from the analogous interest involved 
in the context of public persons. On the other 
hand, a publisher or broadcaster of a defamatory error 
which a court deems unrelated to an issue of public or 
general interest may be held liable in damages even if it 
took every reasonable precaution to ensure the accuracy 
·of its assertions. And liability may far exceed compensa. 
tion for any actual injury to the plaintiff, for the jury may 
be permitted to presume damages without proof of loss 
and even to award punitive damages. 
We hold that, so long as they do not impose liability 
without fault, the States may define for themselves the 
appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broad-
caster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private 
individual. This approach provides a more equitable 
· boundary between the competing concerns involved here. 
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it recognizes the strength of the legitimate state interest 
in compensating private individuals for wrongful injury 
to reputation, yet shields the press and broadcast media 
from the rigors of strict liability for defamation. At 
least this conclusion obtains where, as here, the sub-
stance of the defamatory statement "makes substan-
tial danger to reputation apparent." 10 This phrase 
places an important qualification on the conclusion 
we announce today. Our inquiry would involve con-
siderations somewhat different from those discussed 
above if a State purported to condition civil liability 
on a factual misstatement whose content did not 
carry warning of its defamatory potential. Cf. Time, 
Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S. 37 4 ( 1967) . Such a case is not 
now before us, and we intimate no view as to its proper 
resolution. 
IV 
Our accommodation of the competing values at stake 
in defamation suits by private individuals allows the 
States to impose liability on the publisher or broadcaster 
of defamatory falsehoods on a less demanding showing 
than that required by New York Times. This conclusion 
is not based on a belief that the considerations which 
prompted the adoption of the New York Times privilege 
for defamation of public officials and its extension to 
public figures are wholly inapplicable to the context of 
private individuals. Rather, we endorse . this approach · 
i_n recognition of the strong and legitimate state interest 
in compensating private individuals for injury to reputa-
tion. But this countervailing state interest extends no 
further than compensation for actual injury. For the 
reasons stated below, we hold that the States may not 
permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at · 
!° Curtis Publi,shing Co . v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130, 155 (1967)'. 
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least when liability is not based on a showing of 
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth . 
The common law of defamation is an oddity of tort 
law, for it allows recovery. of purportedly compensatory 
damages without evidence of actual loss. Under the 
traditional rules pertaining to actions for libel, the exist-
ence of injury is presumed from the fact of publication. 
Juries may award substantial sums as compensation for 
supposed damage to reputation without any proof that 
such harm actually qccurrect. The largely uncontrolled 
discretion of juries to award damages where there is no 
loss unnecessarily compounds the potential of any sys-
tem of liability for defamatory falsehood to inhibit the 
vigorous exercise of First Amendment freedoms. Addi-
tionally, the doctrine of presumed damages invites juries· 
to punish unpopular opinion rather than to compensate 
individuals for injury sustained by the publication of a 
false fact . More to the point, the States have no sub-
~tantial - interest in securing for plaintiffs such as this 
petitioner gratuitous awards of money damages far in 
e.~cess of any actual· injury. 
We would not, of course, invalidate state law simply 
because we doubt its wisdom, but here we are attempting 
to reconcile state law with a competing interest grounded 
in the constitutional command of the First Amendment. 
It is therefore appropriate to require that state remedies 
for defamatory falsehood reach no farther than is 
necessary to protect the legitimate interest involved. 
It is necessary to restrict defamation plaintiffs who 
do not prove kno,vledge of falsity or reckless disregard 
for the truth to compensation for actual injury. We 
need • not define "actual injury,"· as trial courts have 
wide experience in framing appropriate jury instruc-
tions in tort action. Suffice it to say that actual 
injury is not limited to out-of-pocket loss. Indeed, the 
more customary types of actual harm inflicted by defam- . 
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f;l,tory falsehood include impairment of reputation and 
standing in the community, personal humiliation, and 
mental anguish and suffering. Of course, juries must be 
limited by appropriate instructions, and all awards must 
be supported by competent evidence concerning the in-1 
jury, although there need be no evidence which assigns 
an actual dollar value to the injury. 
We also find no justification for allowing awards of 
punitive damages against publishers and broadcasters held 
liable under state-defined standards of liability for 
defamation. In most jurisdictions jury discretion over 
the amounts awarded is limited only by the gentle 
rule that they not be excessive. Consequently, juries 
assess punitive damages in wholly unpredictable amounts 
bearing no necessary relation to the actual harm 
caused. And they remain free to use their discre-
tion selectively to punish expressions of unpopular 
views. Like the doctrine of presumed damages, jury dis-
pretion to award punitive damages unnecessarily exacer-
bates the danger of media self-censorship, but, unlike the 
former rule, punitive damages are wholly irrelevant to the 
state interest that justifies a negligence standard for pri-
vate defamation actions. They are not compensation for 
rnJury. Instead, they are private fines levied by civil 
juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its 
future occurrence. In short, the private defamation 
plaintiff who establishes liability under a less demanding 
standard than that stated by New York Times may 
recover only such damages as are sufficient to compensate 
him for actual injury. 
V 
Notwithstanding our refusal to extend the New York 
Times privilege to defamation of private individuals, 
respondent contends that we should affirm the judgment 
below on the ground that petitioner is either a public 
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official or a public figure. There is little basis for the 
former assertion. . Several years prior to the present in-
cident, petitioner had served briefly on housing commit-
tees appointed by the mayor of Chicago, but at the 
time of publication he had never held any remunera-
tive governmental position. Respondent admits this 
but argues that petitioner's appearance at the coroner's 
inquest rendered him a "de facto public official." Our 
cases recognize no such concept. Respondent's sugges-
tion would sweep all lawyers under the New York Times 
rule as officers of the court and distort the plain meaning 
of the "public official" category beyond all recognition. 
We decline to follow it. 
Respondent's characterization of petitioner as a public 
figure raises a different question. That designation may 
rest on either of two alternative bases. In some in-
stances an individual may achieve such pervasive fame 
or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all pur-
poses and in all contexts. More commonly, an individual 
voluntary injects himself or is drawn into a particular 
public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure 
for a limited range of issues. In either case such persons 
assume special prominence in the resolution of public 
questions. 
Petitioner has long been active in community and 
professional affairs. He has served as an officer of local 
civil groups and of various professional organizations, 
and he has published several books and articles on legal 
subjects. Although petitioner was consequently well-
known in some circles, he had achieved no general fame 
or notoriety in the community. None of the prospective 
jurors called at the trial had ever heard of petitioner 
prior to this litigation, and respondent offered no proof 
that this response was atypical of the local population. 
We would not lightly assume that a citizen's participa-
tion in community and professional affairs rendered him 
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a public figure for all purposes. Absent clear evidence 
of general fame or notoriety in the community, and per-
vasive involvement in the affairs of society, an individual 
should not be deemed a public personality for all aspects 
of his life. It is preferable to reduce the public figure 
question to a more meaningful context by looking to the 
nature and extent of an individual's participation in the 
particular controversy giving rise to the defamation. 
In this context it is plain that petitioner was not a 
public figure. He played a minimal role at the coroner's 
inquest, and his participation related solely to his repre-
sentation of a private client. He took no part in the 
criminal prosecution of officer Nuccio. Moreover, he 
never discussed either the criminal or civil litigation with 
the press and was never quoted as having done so. He 
plainly did not thrust himself into the vortex of this 
public issue, nor did he engage the public's attention in 
an attempt to influence its outcome. We are persuaded 
that the trial court did not err in refusing to characterize 
petitioner as a public figure for the purpose of this 
litigation. 
We therefore conclude that the New York Times stand-
ard is inapplicable to this case and that the trial court 
erred in entering judgment for respondent. Because the 
jury was allowed to impose liability without fault and 
was permitted to presume damages without proof of 
injury, a new trial is necessary. We reverse and remand 
for further proceedings in accord with this opinion. 
It i,s so ordered.. 
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Elmer Gertz, Petitioner,] On ,vrit of Certiorari to the 
v. United States Court of 
Robert Welch Inc Appeals for the Seventh 
' · Circuit. 
[January - , 1974] 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
This Court has struggled for nearly a decade to define 
the proper accommodation between the law of defama-
tion and the freedoms of speech and press protected by 
the First Amendment. With this decision we return to 
that effort. We granted certiorari to reconsider the ex-
tent of a publisher's constitutional privilege against lia-
bility for defamation of a private citizen. - U. S. -
(1973). 
I 
In 1968 a Chicago policeman named Nuccio shot and 
killed a youth named Nelson. The state authorities prose-
cuted Nuccio for the homicide and ultimately obtained 
a conviction for murder in the second degree. The N el-
son family retained petitioner Elmer Gertz, a reputable 
attorney, to represent them in civil litigation against 
Nuccio. 
Respondent publishes American Opinion, a monthly 
outlet for the views of the John Birch Society. Early in 
the 1960's the magazine began to warn of a nationwide 
conspiracy to discredit local law enforcement agencies 
and create in their stead a national police force capable 
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continuing effort to alert the public to this assumed 
danger, the managing editor of American Opinion com-
missioned an article on the murder trial of officer Nuccio. 
For this purpose he engaged a regular contributor to the 
magazine. In March of 1969 respondent published the 
resulting article under the title "FRAME-UP: Richard 
Nuccio And The War On Police." The article purports 
to demonstrate that the testimony against Nuccio at 
his criminal trial was false and that his prosecution was 
part of the communist campaign against the police. 
In his capacity as counsel for the Nelson family in 
the civil litigation, petitioner attended the coroner's ins 
quest into the boy1s death and initiated actions for 
damages, but he neither discussed officer Nuccio with the 
press nor played any part in the criminal proceeding. 
Notwithstanding petitioner's remote connection with the 
prosecution of Nuccio, respondent's magazine portrayed 
him as an architect of the ''frame-up." According to 
the article, the police file on petitioner took "a big, Irish 
cop to lift." The article stated that petitioner had been 
an official of the 1'Marxist League for Ind·ustrial Democ-
racy, originally known as the Intercollegiate Socialist 
Society, which has advocated the violent seizure of our 
government."· It labelled Gertz a "Leninist" and a 
"Communist-fronter. '' It also stated· that Gertz had 
been an officer of the National Lawyers Guild. described· 
as a communist organization that "probably did more 
than any other outfit to plan the Communist attack on 
the Chicago police during the 1968 Democratic conven-
tion." It is undisputed ·that these statements contained 
serious inaccuracies. The implication that petitioner had 
a criminal record was false. Petitioner had been a mem-
ber and officer of the National Lawyers Guild some 15 
years earlier, but there was no evidence that he or that 
organization had taken any part in planning the 1968 
demonstrations in Chicago. There was also no basis for 
.. 
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the charge that petitioner was a "Leninist" or a "Com-
munist-fronter." And he had never been a member of 
the "Marxist League for Industrial Democracy" or the 
"Intercollegiate Socialist Society." 
The managing editor of American Opinion made no 
··effort to verify or substantiate the charges against peti-
tioner. Instead, he appended an editorial introduction 
stating that the author had "concluded extensive re-
search into the Richard Nuccio case." And he included 
in the article a photograph of petitioner and wrote the 
caption that appeared under it: "Elmer Gertz of the 
Red Guild harrasses Nuccio." Respondent placed the 
issue of American Opinion containing the article on sale 
at newsstands throughout the country and distributed 
reprints of the article on the streets of Chicago. 
Petitioner filed a diversity action for libel in the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. 
He claimed that the falsehoods published by respondent 
injured his reputation as a lawyer and a citizen. Before 
filing an answer, respondent moved to dismiss the com-
plaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could 
be granted, apparently on the ground that petitioner 
failed to allege special damages. But the court ruled 
that statements contained in the article constituted libel 
per se under Illinois law and that consequently petitioner 
need not plead special damages. 366 F. Supp. 310 (ND 
Ill. 1969). 
After answering the complaint, respondent filed a pre-
trial motion for summary judgment, claiming a constitu-
tional privilege against liability for defamation.1 It 
asserted that petitioner was a public official or a public 
figure and that the article concerned an issue of public 
1 Petitioner filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on grounds 
not specified in the record. The Court. denied petitioner 's cross~ 
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interest and concern. For these reasons, respondent. 
argued, it was entitled to invoke the privilege enunciated· 
fo New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
Under this rule respondent would escape liability unless 
petitioner could prove publication of defamatory false-
hood "with 'actual malice'-that is, in the knowledge that 
it was false or with reckless disregard for whether it was 
true or not." Id., at 279-280. Respondent claimed 
that petitioner could not make such a showing and 
submitted a supporting affidavit by the magazine's man-
aging editor. The editor denied any knowledge of the 
falsity of the statements concerning petitioner and stated 
that he had relied on the author's reputation and on his 
prior experience with the accuracy and authenticity of 
his contributions to American Opinion. 
The District Court denied respondent's motion for 
summary judgment in a memorandum opinion. - F . 
Supp. - (ND Ill. , Sept. 16, 1970) . The court did not 
dispute respondent's claim to the protection of the New 
York Times standard. Rather, it concluded that peti-
tioner might overcome the constitutional privilege by 
making a factual showing sufficient to prove publication 
of defamatory falsehood in reckless disregard of the truth. 
During the course of the trial, however, it became clear 
that the trial court had not accepted all of respondent's 
asserted grounds for applying the New York Times rule 
to this case. It thought that respondent's claim to the 
protection of the constitutional privilege depended on 
the contention that petitioner was either a public official 
under the New York Times decision or a public figure 
under Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130 
( 1967), apparently discounting the argument that a 
privilege would arise from the presence of a public issue. 
After all the evidence had been presented but before 
submission of the case to the jury, the court ruled in 
effect that petitioner was neither a public official nor a 
' . l 
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public figure. It added that, if he were, the resulting ap-
plication of the New York Times standard would require 
a directed verdict for respondent. Because some state-
ments in the article constituted libel per se under Illinois 
law, the court submitted the case to the jury under instruc-
tions that withdrew from its consideration all issues save 
the measure of damages. The jury awarded $50,000 to 
petitioner. 
Following the jury verdict and on further reflection, 
the District Court concluded that the New York Times 
standard should govern this case even though petitioner 
was not a public official or public figure. It accepted re-
spondent's contention that that privilege protected dis~ 
cussion of any public issue without regard to the status 
· of a person defamed therein. Accordingly, the court 
entered judgment for respondent notwithstanding the 
jury's verdict.2 This conclusion anticipated the reason-
2 - F. Supp. - (ND Ill. , Dec. 8, 1970) . Petitioner asserts that 
the entry of judgment n. o. v. on the basis of his failure to show 
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth constituted 
unfair surprise and deprived him of a full and fair opportunity to 
prove "actual malice" on the part of respondents . This contention 
is not supported by the record . It is clear that the trial court 
gave petitioner no reason to assume that the New York Tirnes 
privilege would not be available to respondent. The court's memo-
randum opinion denying respondent 's pretrial motion for summary 
judgment does not state that the New York Times standard was 
inapplicable to this case. Rather, it reveals that the trial judge 
thought it possible for petitioner to make a factual showing sufficient 
to overcome respondent 's claim of constitutional privilege. It states 
in part : 
"When there is a factual dispute as to the existence of actual 
malice, summary judgment is improper. 
"In the instant case a jury might infer from the evidence that 
[respondent's] failure to investigate the truth of the allegations, 
coupled with its receipt of communications challenging the factual 
accuracy of this author in the past amounted to actual malice, that 
6 
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ing of a plurality of this Court in Rosenbloom v. Metro-
media, 403 U. S. 29 (1971). 
Petitioner appealed to contest the applicability of the 
New York Times standard to this case. Although the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit doubted the 
correctness of the District Court's determination that 
petitioner was not a public figure, it did not overturn 
that finding. 3 It agreed with the District Court that 
respondent could assert the constitutional privilege be-
cause the article concerned a matter of public interest, 
citing this Court's intervening decision in Rosenbloom v. 
Metromedia, Inc., supra. The Court of Appeals read 
Rosenbloom to require application of the New York 
is, 'reckless disregard' of whether the allegations were true or not. 
New York Times [Co .] v. Sullivan, supra, at 279-280." - F . 
Supp. -, - (ND Ill., Sept. 16, 1970). 
Thus, petitioner knew or ~hould have known that the outcome of 
the trial might hinge on his ability to show by clear and convincing 
evidence that respondent acted with reckless disregard for the truth, 
And this question remained open throughout the trial. Although 
the court concluded that the applicability of New York Times 
rule depended on petitioner's status as a public figure, the court 
did not decide that petitioner was not a public figure until all 
the evidence had been presented. Thus petitioner had every 
opportunity, indeed incentive, to prove "reckless disregard" if he 
could, and he in fact attempted to do so. The record supports the 
observation by the Court of Appeals that petitioner "did present 
evidence of malice (both the 'constitutional' and the 'ill-will' type) 
to support his damage claim and no such evidence was excluded .... " 
-F.2d,at-. 
3 The court stated : 
"[Petitioner's] considerable stature as a lawyer, author, lecturer, 
and participant in matters of public import undermine the validity 
of the assumption that he is not a 'public figure' as that term has 
been used by the progeny of New York Times. Nevertheless, for 
purposes of decision we make that assumption and test the avail-
ability of the claim of privilege by the subject matter of the article!~ 
-F. 2d,at-. 
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·Times standard to any publication or broadcast about 
an issue of significant public interest, without regard 
to the position, fame, or anonymity of the person 
defamed, and it concluded that respondent's statements 
concerned such an issue.4 After reviewing the record, 
4 In the Court of Appeals petitioner made an ingenious but un-
availing attempt to show that respondent's defamatory charge against 
him concerned no issue of public or general interest. He asserted 
that the subject matter of the article was the murder trial of Officer 
Nuccio and that he did not participate in that proceeding. There-
fore, he argued, even if the subject matter of the article generally 
were protected by the New York Times privilege, under the opinion 
of the Rosenbloom plurality, the defamatory statements about him 
were not. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument. It noted 
that the accusations against petitioner played an integral part in 
respondent's general thesis of a nationwide conspiracy to harass the 
police : 
"[W]e may also assume that the article's basic thesis i., false. Never-
theless, under the reasons of New York Times v. Sullivan, even a 
false statement made in support of a false thesis is protected unless 
made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of its 
truth or falsity. It would undermine the rule of that case to permit 
the actual falsity of a statement to determine whether or not its 
publisher is entitled to the benefit of the rule. 
"If, therefore, we put to one side the false character of the article 
and treat it as though its contents were entirely true, it cannot be 
denied that the comments about [petitioner] were integral to its 
thesis. They must be tested under the New York Times standard." 
- F.2d, at-. 
We think that the Court of Appeals correctly rejected petitioner's 
argument. Its acceptance might lead to arbitrary imposition of 
liability on the basis of an unwise d.iif erentiation among kinds 
of factual misstatements. The present case illustrates the point. 
Respondent falsely portrayed petitioner as an architect of the 
criminal prosecution against Nuccio. On its face this inaccuracy 
does not appear defamatory. Respondent also falsely labelled peti-
tioner a "Leninst" and a "Communist-fronter." These accusations 
are generally considered defamatory. Under petitioner's interpreta-
tion of the "public or general interest" test, respondent would have 
-€pjoyed a constitutional privilege to publish defamatory falsehoods if 
8 
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the Court of Appeals endorsed the District Court's con-
clusion that petitioner had failed to show by clear and 
convincing evidence that respondent had acted with 
"actual malice" as defined by New York Times. There 
was no evidence that the managing editor of American 
Opinion knew of the falsity of the accusations made in 
the article. In fact, he knew nothing about peti-
tioner except what he learned from the article. The 
court correctly noted that mere proof of failure to investi-
gate, without more, cannot establish reckless disregard for 
the truth. Rather, the publisher must act with a "high 
degree of awareness .. . of probable falsity." St. Amant 
v. Thompson, 390 U. S. 727, 731 (1968). Accord : 
Beckley Newspaper Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U. S. 81, 84-85 
(1967); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 67, 75--76 (1964) . 
The evidence in this case did not reveal that respondent 
had cause for such an awareness. The Court of Appeals 
therefore affirmed - F. 2d - (1972) . For the reasons. 
stated below, we now reverse. 
II 
The principal issue in this case is whether a publisher 
of defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is 
neither a public official nor a public figure may claim a 
constitutional privilege against liability for the injury in-
flicted by those statements. The Court considered this 
question on the rather different set of facts presented in 
petitioner had in fact been associated with the criminal prosecution .. 
But this would mean that the seemingly innocuous mistake of con-
fusing petitioner's role in the litigation against officer Nuccio would 
destroy the privilege otherwise available for calling petitioner a 
communist-fronter. Thus respondent's privilege to publish state-
ments whose content should have alerted it to the danger of injury 
to reputation would hinge on the accuracy of statements that carried 
with them no such warning. Assuming that none of these statements 
was published with knowledge of falsity or with reckless disregard 
for the truth, we see no reason to distingmsh among the inaccuracies_ 
72-617-0PINION 
GERTZ v. WELCH 9 
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U. S. 29 (1971). 
Rosenbloom, a distributor of nudist magazines, was 
arrested for selling allegedly obscene material while mak-
ing a delivery to a retail dealer. The police obtained a 
warrant and seized his entire inventory of 3,000 books and 
magazine. He sought and obtained an injunction pro-
hibiting further police interference with his business. He 
then sued a local radio station for failing to note in two 
of its newscasts that the 3,000 items seized were only 
"reportedly" or "allegedly" obscene and for broadcasting 
references to "the smut literature racket" and to "girlie-
book peddlers" in its coverage of the court proceeding 
for injunctive relief. He obtained a judgment against 
the radio station, but the Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit held the New York Times privilege applicable to 
the broadcast and reversed. 415 F. 2d 892 (1969) . 
This Court affirmed the decision below, but no majority 
could agree on a controlling rationale. The eight Justices ~ 
who participated in Rosenbloom announced their views 
in five separate opinions, none of which commanded more 
than three votes. The several statements not only re-
veal disagreement about the appropriate result in that 
case; they also reflect divergent traditions of thought 
about the general problem of reconciling the law of 
defamation with the First Amendment. One approach 
has been to extend the New York Times test to an ex-
panding variety of situations. Another has been to vary 
the level of constitutional privilege for defamatory false-
hood with the status of the person defamed. And a third 
view would grant to the press and broadcast media abso-
lute immunity from liability for defamation. To place 
our holding in the proper context, we preface our discus-
sion of this case with a review of the several Rosenbloom 
opinions and their antecedents. 
5 MR. JUSTICE DouGLAS did not partcipate in the consideration or 
decision of this case. 
10 
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In affirming the trial court's judgment in the instant 
case, the Court of Appeals relied on MR. JusTICE BREN.., 
NAN's conclusion for the Rosenbloom plurality that "all 
discussion and communication involving matters of pub-
lic or general concern" warrant the protection from lia-
bility for defamation accorded by the rule originally enun-
ciated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964). There this Court defined a constitutional privi-
lege intended to free criticism of public officials from the 
restraints imposed by the common law of defamation. The 
Times ran a political advertisement endorsing civil rights 
demonstrations by black students in Alabama and im-
pliedly condemning the performance of local law enforce'.. 
ment officials. A police commissioner established in stat~ 
court that certain misstatements ih the advertisement 
referred to him and that they constituted libel per ·se 
under Alabama law. This showing left the Times with 
the single defense of truth, for under Alabama law 
neither good faith nor reasonable care would protect the 
newspaper from liability. This Court concluded that a 
''rule compelling th~ critic of official conduct to guarantee 
the truth of all his factual assertions" would deter pro-
tected speech, id., at 279, and announced the constitu-
tional privilege designed to counter that effect : 
"The constitutional guarantees require, we think, 
a federal rule that prohibits a public official from 
recovery of damages for a defamatory falsehood re-
lating to his official conduct uriless he proves that the 
statement was ri:1ade with 'actual malice'-that is, 
in the knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
disregard of whether it was true or not." Id., at 
279-280.6 
6 New York Times and later cases explicated the meaning of the 
new standard. In N ew York Times · the Court held that under the ., . 
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Three years after New York Times, a majority of the 
Court agreed to extend the constitutional privilege to 
tlefamatory criticism of "public figures. " This extension 
circumstances the newspaper's failure to check the accuracy of the 
ii,dvertisement against news stories in its own files did not establish 
feckless disregard for the truth. Id., at-. In St. Amant v. Thomp~ 
son, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968), the Court equated reckless disregard 
of the truth with subjective awareness of probable falsity: "There 
must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defend-
ant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publica-
tion." In Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U. S. 81 (1967), 
the Court emphasized the distinction between the New York Times 
test of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth anci 
"actual malice" in the traditional sense of ill-will. Garrison v. Loui-
siana, 379 U. S. 64 (1964), made plain that the new standard applied 
to criminal libel laws as well as to civil actions and that it governed 
criticism directed at "anything ·which might touch on an official's fit-
ness for office." Id., at 77. Finally, in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 
75, 85 ( 1966), the Court stated that "the 'public official' designation 
applies at the very least to those _among the heirarchy of government 
employees who ha.ve, or appear to the public to have, substantial" 
responsibility for or control over the conduct of government affairs."· 
In Time, Inc . v. Hill, 381\ U. S. 374 (1967), the Court applied the 
New York Times standard to a~tions.under an unusual state statute. 
The statute did not create a cause of action for libel. Rather, it pro .. 
vided a remedy for unwanted publicity .. Although the law allowed 
recovery of damages for harm caused by exposure to public attention 
rather than by factual inaccuracies, it recognized truth as a complete 
defense. Thus, nondefamatory factual errors could r.ender a. publisher· 
liable for something akin to invasion of pri;~cy. , The Court ruled that 
t he defendant in such an action could invoke the New York Times · 
privilege regardless of the fame or anonymity of the plaintiff. Speak-
ihg for the Court , MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN declared that this holding· 
was not an extension of New York Times but rather a parallel line of 
reasoning applying that standard to this discrete context : 
"This is neither a libel action by a private individual nor a statu-
t~i'y action by a public official. Therefore, although the First 
Amendment principles announced in New York Times guide OU:!!' 
(lQ!lcli.t~ion, we.- r.each that conclusion only by ap12lying these:princiyles,, 
12 
72--617-0PINION 
GERTZ v. WELCH 
was announced in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and its 
llompanion Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130, 162 
(1967). The first case involved the Saturday Evening 
Post's charge that Coach Wally Butts of the University 
of Georgia had conspired with Coach Bear Bryant of the 
University of Alabama to fix a football game betweert 
their respective schools. Walker involved an erroneous 
Associated Press account of Brigadier General Edwin 
Walker's participation in a University of Mississippi 
campus riot. Because Butts was paid by a private alumni 
association and Walker had retired from the Army, neither 
could be classified as a "public official" under New York 
Times. Although Mr. Justice Harlan announced the 
result in both cases, a majority of the Court agreed with 
Mr. Chief Justice Warren's conclusion that the New York 
Times test should apply to criticism of "public figures" as 
well as "public officials." 7 The Court extended the con-
in this discrete context. It therefore serves no purpose to distinguish 
the fact s here from those in New York Times. Were this 
a libel action , the distinction which has been suggested be-
tween the relative opportunities of the public official and the 
private individual to rebut defamatory charges might be germane. 
And the additional state interest in the protection of the individual 
against damages to his reputation would be involved. Cf. Rosenblatt 
v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 91 (STEWART, J ., concurring)." Id ., at 390-391. 
7 Professor Kalven once introduced a discussion of these cases with 
the apt heading, "You Can't Tell the Players Without a Score Card." 
H. Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment, 1967 
Sup. Ct. Rev. 267, 275 (1967) . Only three other Justices joineq. 
Mr. Justice Harlan's analysis of the issues involved. In his con-
curring opinion, Mr. Chief Justice Warren stated the principle for 
which these cases stand-that the New York Times test reaches both 
public figures and public officials. MR. JusTrcE BRENNAN and MR. 
JusTrcE WHITE agreed with the Chief Justice on that question. 
Mr. Justice Black and MR JusTrcE DOUGLAS reiterated their view 
that publishers should have an absolute immunity from liability for 
defamation, but they acquiesed in the Chief Justice's reasoning in 
,order to ena:ble a majority of the Justices to agree on the questioJ:l 
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stitutional privilege announced in that case to protect 
defamatory criticism of nonpublic officials who "are never-
theless intimately involved in the resolution of important 
public questions, or, by reason of their fame, shape events 
in areas of concern to society at large." Id., at 164. 
In his opinion for the plurality in Rosenbloom v. 
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U. S. 29 (1971), MR. JusTICE 
BRENN AN took the New York Times privilege one step 
further. He concluded that its protection should extend 
to defamatory falsehoods relating to priva.te persons if the 
statements concerned matters of general or public interest. 
He abjured the suggested distinction between public offi-
cials and public figures on the one hand and private indi-
viduals on the other. He focused instead on society's 
interest in learning about certain issues: "If a matter is a 
subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly 
become less so merely because a private individual is 
involved or because in some sense the individual did not 
choose to become involved." 403 U. S., at 43. Thus, 
under the plurality opinion, a private citizen involun-
tarily associated with a matter of general interest has no 
recourse for injury to his reputation unless he can satisfy 
the demanding requirements of the New York Times test. 
Two members of the Court concurred in the result in 
Rosenbloom but departed from the reasoning of the 
plurality. Mr. Justice Black restated his view, long 
shared by MR. JusTICE DouGLAS, that the First Amend-
ment cloaks the news media with an absolute and in-
defeasible immunity from liability for defamation. Id., 
at 57. MR JUSTICE WHITE concurred on a narrower· 
ground. Ibid. He concluded that "the First Amend-
ment gives the press and the broadcast media a privilege 
to report and comment upon the official actions of public 
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servants in full detail, with no requirement that the repJ 
utation or privacy of an individual involved in or affected 
by the official action be spared from public view." Id'., 
at 62. He therefore declined to reach the broader ques-
tions addressed by the other Justices. 
Mr. Justice Harlan dissented. Although he had joined 
the opinion of the Court in New York Times, in Curt-is 
Publishing Co. he had contes:ted the extension of the 
privilege to public figures. There he had argued that 
a public figure who. held no governmental office should 
be allowed to recover damages for defamation "on 
a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constitut-
ing an extreme departure from the standards of in-
vestigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by 
responsible publishers." 388 U. S., at 155. In his Curtis 
Publishing Co. opinion · Mr. Justice Harlan had distin-
guished New Yark Times primarily on the ground that 
defamation actions by public officials "lay close to sedi" 
tious libel. , 1 • " Id. , at 133. Recovery of damages by 
one who held . no public office, however, could not "be 
viewed as a vindication of governmental policy." Id. , 
at 154. Additionally, he had intimated that, because 
most public officials enjoyed absolute immunity from 
liability for their own defamatory utterances under Barr 
v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564 (1959), they lacked a strong 
claim to the protection of the courts. 
In Rosenbloom Mr. Justice Harlan modified these 
views. He acquiesced in the application of, the ,privilege 
to defamation of public figures but argued that a different 
rule should obtain where defamatory falsehood harmed 
a private ' individual. He noted that a priv:ate person 
has less likelihood "of securing access to the channels 
of communication sufficient to rebut falsehoods concern-
ing him" th,an do public officials and public figures , id., 
-at 70, and has not voluntarily placed himself in the p ublic 
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spotlight. Mr. Justice Harlan concluded that the States 
-could constitutionally allow private individuals to re-
cover damages for defamation on the basis of any 
standard of care except liability without fault. 
MR. JusrICE MARSHALL dissented in Rosenbloom in an 
opinion joined by MR. JusTICE STEWART. Id., at 78. He 
thought that the plurality's "public or general interest" 
test for determining the applicability of the New York 
Times privllege would involve the courts in the dangerous 
business of deciding "what information is relevant to self-
government." Id., at 79. He also contended that the 
plurality's position inadequately served "society's inter-
est in protecting private individuals from being thrust 
into the public eye by the distorting light of defamation." 
Ibid. MR. JusTICE MARSHALL therefore reached the 
conclusion, joined by Mr. Justice Harlan, that the States 
should be "essentially free to continue the evaluation of 
the common law of defamation and to articulate what-
ever fault standards best suits the State's need," so long 
as the States did not impose liability without fault. Id., 
at 86. The principal point of disagreement among the 
three dissenters concerned punitive damages. Whereas 
Mr. Justice Harlan thought that the States could allow 
punitive damages in amounts bearing "a reasonable and 
purposeful relationship to the actual harm done .. . ," 
id., at 75, MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL concluded that the 
size and unpredictability of jury awards of exemplary 
damages unnecessarily exacerbated· the problems of 
media self-censorship and that such damages should 
therefore- be forbidden .. 
III 
We begin with the common ground. Under the First 
Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. How-
ever pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its 
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cm the competition of other ideas.8 But there is no con-
stitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither 
the intentional lie nor the careless error materially ad-
vances society's interest in "uninhibited, robust. and 
wide-open" debate on puplic issues. New Yark Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S., at 270. They belong to that 
category of utterances which "are ~~ essential part of 
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value 
as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived 
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest 
in order and morality.' ' Chaplinsky v. ,Vew Hampshire, 
315 U.S. 568,572 (1942) . . 
Although the erroneous statement of fact 1s not worthy 
of constitutional protection, it is nevertheless inevitable in 
free debate. As lames Madison pointed out in the Report 
on the Virginia Resolutions of 1798, "Some degree of 
abuse is inseparable from the proper use of everything ; 
and in no instance is this more true than that of the 
press." 4 Elliot's Debates ( 1876) ,· p. 571. And punish-
ment of error runs the risk of inducing a cautious and 
restrictive exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed 
.freedoms of speech and press. Our decisions recognize 
that a rule of strict liability that compels a publisher 
or broadcaster to guarantee the accuracy of his factual 
assertions may lead to intolerable self-censorship. Al-
lowing the media to avoid liability only by proving the 
truth of all injurious statements does not accord adequate 
protection to First Amendment liberties. As the Court 
stated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, 376 
U. S., at 279, "Allowance of the defense of truth, with 
the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not mean 
8 As Thomas Jefferson made the point in his first Inaugural 
Address: "If there be any among us who wish to dissolve this union 
or change its republican form of government, let them stand undis-
turbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may,· 
; be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it !' 
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that only false speech will be deterred." The First 
Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in 
order to protect speech that matters. 
The need to avoid self-censorship by the news media is, 
however, not the only societal value at issue. If it were, 
this Court would have embraced long ago the view that 
. publishers and broadcasters enjoy an unconditional and 
indefeasible immunity from liability for defamation. See 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,293 (1964) 
(opinion of Black, J.); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 
80 (1964) (opinion of DouGLAS, J.); Curtis Publishing Co. 
v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 170 (1967) (opinion of Black, J.) . 
Such a rule would indeed obviate the fear that the pros-
pect of civil liability for injurious falsehood might dis-
suade a timorous press from the effective exercise of 
First Amendment freedoms. Yet absolute protection for 
the communications media requires a total sacrifice of 
the competing value served by the law of defamation. 
The legitimate state interest underlying the law of libel 
is the compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted 
on them by defamatory falsehoods. We would not lightly 
require the State to abandon this purpose, for, as MR. 
JusTICE STEWART has reminded us, the individual's right 
to the protection of his own good name 
"reflects no more than our basic concept of the essen-
tial dignity and worth of every human being-a 
_concept at the root of any decent system of ordered 
liberty. The protection of private personality, like 
the protection of life itself, is left primarily to the 
individual states under the Ninth and Tenth Amend-
ments. But this does not mean that the right is 
entitled to any less recognition by this Court as a 
basic of our constitutional system." Rosenblatt v. 
Baer, 383 U. S. 75, 92- 93 (1963) (opinion of 
STEWART, J .) . 
18 
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Some tension necessarily exists between the need for 
a vigorous and uninhibited press and the legitimate in~ 
terest in redressing wrongful injury. As Mr. Justice 
Harlan stated, "some antithesis between freedom of 
speech and press and libel actions persists, for libel re-
mains premised on the content of speech and limits the 
freedom of the publisher to express certain sentiments, 
at least without guaranteeing legal proof of their sub-
stantial accuracy." Curt-is Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 
U. S., at 152. In our continuing effort to define the 
proper accommodation between these competing con .. 
cerns, we have been especially anxious to assure to the 
freedoms of speech and press that "breathing space" 
essential to their fruitful exercise. NAACP v. Button, 
·371 U. S. 415, 433 (1963). To that end this Court has 
extended a measure of strategic protection to defamatory 
falsehood. 
The New Y [)rk Times standard defines the level of 
constitutional protection appropriate to the context of 
defamation of a public person. Those who, by reason 
of the notoriety of their achievements or the vigor 
and success with which they seek the public's attention, 
are properly classed as public figures and those who 
hold governmental office may recover for injury to rep~ 
utation only on clear and convincing proof that the 
defamatory falsehood was made with knowledge of its 
falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth. This 
standard administers an extremely powerful antidote 
to the inducement to media self-censorship of the 
common law rule of strict liability for libel and 
slander. And it exacts a correspondingly high price 
from the victims of defamatory falsehood. Plainly 
many deserving plaintiffs, including some intentionally 
subjected to injury, will be unable to surmount 
the barrier of the New York Times test. Despite this 
substantial abridgement of the state law right to com-
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pensation for wrongful hurt to one's reputation, the 
Court has concluded that the protection of the New 
York Times privilege should be available to publish-
ers and broadcasters of defamtory falsehoods concern-
ing public officials and public figures. New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964); Curt-is 
Publ-ishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130 (1967). We 
think that these decisions are correct, but we do not 
find their holdings justified solely by reference to the 
interest of the press and broadcast media in immunity 
from liability. Rather, we believe that the New York 
Times rule states an accommodation between this con-
cern and the limited state interest present in the context 
of libel actions brought by public persons. For the rea-
sons stated below, we conclude that the state interest 
in compensating injury to the reputation of private 
individuals requires that a different rule should obtain 
with respect to them. 
Theoretically, of course, the balance between the needs 
of the press and the individual's claim to compensation 
for wrongful injury might be struck on a case-by-case 
basis. As Mr. Justice Harlan hypothesized, "it might 
seem, purely as an abstract matter, that the most utili-
tarian approach would be to scrutinize carefully every 
jury verdict in every libel case, in order to ascertain 
whether the final judgment leaves fully protected what-
ever First Amendment values transcend the legitimate 
state interest in protecting the particular plaintiff who 
prevailed." Rosenbbom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U. S. 
29, 63 (1971) (footnote omitted) . But this approach 
would lead to unpredictable results and uncertain expecta-
tions, and it could render our duty to supervise the lower 
courts unmanagable. Because an ad hoc resolution of 
the competing interests at stake in each particular case 
is not feasible, we must lay down broad rules of general 
J:\pplicatio11. Such rules necessarily treat alike various 
20 
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·cases involving differences as well as similarities. Thus 
it is of ten true that not all of the considerations which 
justify adoption of a given rule will obtain in each par-
ticular case decided under its authority. 
With that caveat we have no difficulty in distinguishing 
among defamation plaintiffs. 'The first remedy of any 
victim of defamation is self-help-using available .oppor-
tunities to contradict the lie or correct the error and 
thereby to minimize its adverse impact on reputation. 
Public officials and public figures usually enjoy signifi-
cantly greater access to the channels of effective commu-
nication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to 
counteract false statements than private individuals nor-
mally enjoy.0 Private individua1s are therefore more 
vulnerable to injury, and the state interest in protecting 
them is correspondingly greater. 
More important than the likelihood that private indi-
viduals will lack effective opportunities for rebuttal, there 
is a compelling normative consideration underlying the 
distinction between public and private defamation plain-
tiffs. An individual who decides to seek governmental 
office must accept certain necessary consequences of that 
involvement in public affairs. He runs the risk of closer 
public scrutiny than might otherwise be the case. And 
society's interest in the officers of government is not 
strictly limited to the formal discharge of official duties. 
As the Court pointed out in Garrison v. Lou1,SW,na, 379 
U.S. 64, ·77 (1964) , the public'sfoterest extends to "any-
thing that might touch on an official's fitness for office .. , , 
Few personal attributes are more germane to fitness for 
9 Of course, an opportunity for rebuttal seldom suffices to undo 
harm of defamatory falsehood. Indeed, the law of defamation is 
rooted in our experience that the truth rarely catches up with a lie. 
But the fact that the self-help remedy of rebuttal, standing alone, 
is inadequate to its task does not mean that it is irrelevant to our· 
inquiry. 
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office than dishonesty, malfeasance, or improper motiva~ 
tion, even though these characteristics may also affect 
the official's private character." 
Those classed as public figures stand in a similar posi-
'tion. Hypothetically, it may be possible for someone to 
become a public figure through no purposeful action of 
his own, but the instances of truly involuntary public 
figures must be exceedingly rare. For the most part 
those who attain this status have assumed roles of especial 
prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy posi-
'tions of such persuasive power and influence that they 
are deemed public figures for all purposes. More com-
monly, those classed as public figures have thrust them-
selves to the forefront of particular public controversies 
in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. 
In either event, they invite attention and comment. 
Even if the foregoing generalities do not obtain in every 
instance, the communications media are entitled to act 
on the assumption that public officials and public figures 
have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk 
of injury from defamatory falsehoods concerning them. 
No such assumption is justified with respect to a private 
individual. He has relinquished no part of his interest 
in the protection of his own good name, and consequently 
he has a more compelling call on the courts for redress 
of injury inflicted by defamatory falsehood. Thus, pri-
vate individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury 
than public officials and public figures ; they are also more 
deserving of recovery. 
For these reasons we conclude that the States should 
retain substantial latitude in their efforts to enforce a 
legal remedy for defamatory falsehood injurious to the 
reputation of a private individual. The extension of the 
New Yark Times test proposed by the Rosenbloom plu-
rality would abridge this legitimate state interest to a 
degree that we find unacceptable. And it would occa .. 
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sion the additional difficulty of forcing state and federal 
judges to decide on an ad hoc basic which publications 
address issues of "general or public interest" and 
which do not--to determine, in the words of MR. JusTICEl 
MARSHALL, "what information is relevant to self-govern-
ment." Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U. S., at 
79. We doubt the wisdom of committing this task to the 
conscience of judges. Nor does the Constitution require 
us to draw so thin a line between the drastic alternatives 
of the New York Times privilege and the common law of 
strict liability for defamatory error. The "public or gen-
eral interest" test for determining the applicability of 
the New York Times standard to private defamation 
actions inadequately serves both of the competing values 
at stake. On the one hand, a private individual whose 
reputation is injured by defamatory falsehood that does 
concern an issue of public or general interest has no re-
course unless he can meet the rigorous requirements of 
New York Times. This is true despite the factors 
that distinguish the state interest in compensating 
private individuals from the analogous interest involved 
in the context of public persons. On the other 
hand, a publisher or broadcaster of a defamatory error 
which a court deems unrelated to an issue of public or 
-general interest may be held liable in damages even if it 
took every reasonable precaution to ensure the accuracy 
-of its assertions. And liability may far exceed compensa. 
tion for any actual injury to the plaintiff, for the jury may 
be permitted to presume damages without proof of loss 
and even to award punitive damages. 
We hold that, so long as they do not impose liability 
without fault, the States may define for themselves the 
appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broad-
caster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private 
individual.~ This approach provides a more equitable 
· boundary between the competing concerns involved here. 
7 N~e- II 
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it recognizes the strength of the legitimate state interest 
in compensating private individuals for wrongful injury 
to reputation, yet shields the press and broadcast media 
from the rigors of. strict liability for defamation. At 
least this conclusion obtains where, as here, the sub-
stance of the defamatory statement "makes substan-
tial danger to reputation apparent." 10 This phrase 
places an important qualification on the conclusion 
we announce today. Our inquiry would involve con-
siderations somewhat different from those discussed 
above if a State purported to condition civil liability 
on a factual misstatement whose content did not 
carry warning of its defamatory potential. Cf. Time, 
Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S. 374 (1967). Such a case is not 
now before us, and we intimate no view as to its proper 
resolution. 
IV .5ee _l V (7?eu ;~~J.) 
Our accommodation of the competing values at stake 
in defamation suits by private individuals allows the 
States to impose liability on the publisher or broadcaster 
of defamatory falsehoods on a less demanding showing 
than that required by New York Times, This conclusion 
is not based on a belief that the considerations which 
prompted the adoption of the New York Times privilege 
for defamation of public officials and its extension to 
public figures are wholly h1applicable to the context of 
private individuals. Rather, we endorse , this approach · 
i_n recognition of the strong and legitimate state interest 
in compensating private individuals for injury to reputa-
tion. But this countervailing state interest extends no ' 
further than compensation for actual injury. For the 
reasons stated below, we hold that the States may not · 
permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at ' 
. ' 
!° Curtis Publishing Co. v Butts, 388 U S. 130, 155 (19671, 
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least when liability is not based on a showing of 
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. 
The common law of defamation is an oddity of tort 
law, for it allows recovery- of purportedly compensatory 
damages without evidence of _actual loss. Under the 
traditional rules pertaining to actions for libel, the exist-
~nce of injury is presumed- from the fact of publication. 
Juries may award substantial sums as compensation for 
supposed damage to reputation without any proof that 
such harm actually qccurrect. The largely uncontrolled 
<;liscretion of juries to award damages where there is no 
loss unnecessarily compounds the potential of any sys-
tem of liability for defamatory falsehood to inhibit the 
vigorous exercise of First Amendment. freedoms. Addi-
tionally, the doctrine of presumed damages invites juries-
to punish unpopular opinion rather than to compensate 
individuals for injury sustained by the publication of a 
false fact . More to the point, the States have no sub-
~tantial -interest in securing for plaintiffs such as this· 
petitioner gratuitous awards of money damages far in 
e.~cess of any actual- injury. 
.l[. ("P,vis.,cl) 
We would not, of course, invalidate state law simply 
because we doubt its wisdom, but here we are attempting 
to reconcile state law with a competing interest grounded 
in the constitutional command of the First Amendment. 
It is therefore appropriate to require that state remedies 
for defamatory falsehood reach no farther than is 
necessary to protect the legitimate interest involved. 
It is necessary to restrict defamation plaintiffs who 
do not prove knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard 
for the truth to compensation for actual injury. We 
need -not define "actual injury,"· as trial courts have 
wide experience in framing appropriate jury instruc-
tions in tort action. Suffice it to say that actual · 
injury is not limited to out-of-pocket loss. Indeed, the 
more custornary types of actual harm inflicted by defam- . 
72-617-0PINI0N 
GERTZ v. WELCH 25 
1v {T? .. ~viseJ) 
f;ttory falsehood include impairment of reputation and 
standing in the community, personal humiliation, and 
mental anguish and suffering. Of course, juries must be 
limited by appropriate instructions, and all awards must 
be supported by competent evidence concerning the in-1 
jury, although there need be no evidence which assigns 
an actual dollar value to the injury. 
We also find no justification for allowing awards of 
punitive damages against publishers and broadcasters held 
liable under state-defined standards of liability for 
defamation. In most jurisdictions jury discretion over 
the amounts awarded is limited only by the gentle 
rule that they not be excessive. Consequently, juries 
assess punitive damages in wholly unpredictable amounts 
bearing no necessary relation to the actual harm 
caused. And they remain free to use their discre-
tion selectively to punish expressions of unpopular 
views. Like the doctrine of presumed damages, jury dis-
cretion to award punitive damages unnecessarily exacer-
bates the danger of media self-censorship, but, unlike the 
former rule, punitive damages are wholly irrelevant to the 
state interest that justifies a negligence standard for pri-
vate defamation actions. They are not compensation for 
injury. Instead, they are private fines levied by civil 
juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its 
future occurrence. In short, the private defamation 
plaintiff who establishes liability under a less demanding 
standard than that stated by New Yark Times may 
recover only such damages as are sufficient to compensate 
him for actual injury. 
V 
Notwithstanding our refusal to extend the New York 
Times privilege to defamation of private individuals, 
respondent contends that we should affirm the judgment 
below on the ground that petitioner is either a public 
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official or a public figure. There is little basis for the 
former assertion . . Several years prior to the present in-
cident, petitioner had served briefly on housing commit-
tees appointed by the mayor of Chicago, but at the 
time of publication he had never held any remunera-
tive governmental position. Respondent admits this 
but argues that petitioner's appearance at the coroner's 
inquest rendered him a "de facto public official." Our 
cases recognize no such concept. Respondent's sugges-
tion would sweep all lawyers under the New York Times 
rule as officers of the court and distort the plain meaning 
of the "public official" category beyond all recognition. 
We decline to follow it. 
Respondent's characterization of petitioner as a public 
figure raises a different question. That designation may 
rest on either of two alternative bases. In some in-
stances an individual may achieve such pervasive fame 
or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all pur-
poses and in all contexts. More commonly, an individual 
voluntary injects himself or is drawn into a particular 
public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure 
for a limited range of issues. In either case such persons 
assume special prominence in the resolution of public 
questions. 
Petitioner has long been active in community and 
professional affairs. He has served as an officer of local 
civil groups and of various professional organizations, 
and he has published several books and articles on legal 
subjects. Although petitioner was consequently well-
known in some circles, he had achieved no general fame 
or notoriety in the community. None of the prospective 
jurors called at the trial had ever heard of petitioner 
prior to this litigation, and respondent offered no proof 
that this response was atypical of the local population. 
We would not lightly assume that a citizen's participa-
tion in community and professional affairs rendered him 
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a public figure for all purposes. Absent clear evidence 
of general fame or notoriety in the community, and per-
vasive involvement in the affairs of society, an individual 
should not be deemed a public personality for all aspects 
of his life. It is preferable to reduce the public figure 
question to a more meaningful context by looking to the 
nature and extent of an individual's participation in the 
particular controversy giving rise to the defamation. 
In this context it is plain that petitioner was not a 
public figure. He played a minimal role at the coroner's 
inquest, and his participation related solely to his repre-
sentation of a private client. He took no part in the 
criminal prosecution of officer Nuccio. Moreover, he 
never discussed either the criminal or civil litigation with 
the press and was never quoted as having done so. He 
plainly did not thrust himself into the vortex of this 
public issue, nor did he engage the public's attention in 
an attempt to influence its outcome. We are persuaded 
that the trial court did not err in refusing to characterize 
petitioner as a public figure for the purpose of this 
litigation. 
We therefore conclude that the New Yark Times stand-
ard is inapplicable to this case and that the trial court 
erred in entering judgment for respondent. Because the 
jury was allowed to impose liability without fault and 
was permitted to presume damages without proof of 
injury, a new trial is necessary. ·we reverse and remand 
for further proceedings in accord with this opinion. 
It is so ordered.. 
1 
ff ~ I~ :LI, JJ- :J.J" 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
This Court has struggled for nearly a decade to define 
the proper accommodation between the law of defama-
tion and the freedoms of speech and press protected by 
the First Amendment. With this decision we return to 
that effort. We granted certiorari to reconsider the ex-
tent of a publisher's constitutional privilege against lia-
bility for defamation of a private citizen. - U. S, -
(1973). 
I 
In 1968 a Chicago policeman named Nuccio shot and 
killed a youth named Nelson. The state authorities prose-
cuted Nuccio for the homicide and ultimately obtained 
a conviction for murder in the second degree. The Nel-
son family retained petitioner Elmer Gertz, a reputable 
attorney, to represent them in civil litigation against 
Nuccio. 
Respondent publishes American Opinion, a monthly 
outlet for the views of the John Birch Society. Early in 
the 19_60's the magazine began to warn of a nationwide 
conspiracy to discredit local law enforcement agencies 
~nd create in their stead a 1-iat·iohal police force capable 
of supporting a communist dictatorshiP', As part of the 
~ 
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continuing effort to alert the public to this assumed 
danger, the managing editor of American Opinion com-
missioned an article on the murder trial of officer Nuccio. 
For this purpose he engaged a regular contributor to the 
magazine. In March of 1969 respondent published the 
resulting article under the title "FRAME-UP: Richard 
Nuccio And The ·war On Police." The article purports 
to demonstrate that the testimony agi;iinst Nuccio at 
his criminal trial was false and that his prosecution was 
part of the communist campaign against the police. 
In his capacity as counsel for the Nelson family in 
the civil litigation, petitioner attended the coroner's in-
quest into the boy's death and initiated actions for 
damages, but he neither discussed officer Nuccio with the 
press nor played any part in the criminal proceeding. 
Notwithstanding petitioner's remote connection with the 
prosecution of Nuccio, respondent 's magazine portrayed 
him as an architect of the "frame-up." According to 
the article, the police file on petitioner took "a big, Irish 
cop to lift." The article stated that petitioner had been 
an official of the "Marxist League for I ndustrial Democ-
racy, originally known as the Intercollegiate Socialist 
Society, which has advocated the violent seizure of our 
government." It labelled Gertz a "Leninist" and a 
"Communist-fronter." It also stated that Gertz had 
been an officer of the National Lawyers Guild, described 
as a communist organization that "probably did more 
than any other outfit to plan the Communist attack on 
the Chicago police during the 1968 Democratic conven-
tion." It is undisputed that these statements contained 
serious inaccuracies. The implication that petitioner had 
a criminal record was false. Petitioner had been a mem-
ber and officer of the National Lawyers Guild some 15 
years earlier, but there was no evidence that he or that 
organization had taken any part in planning the 1968 
demonstrations in Chicago. There wa.s 11,lso no basis for 
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the charge that petitioner was a "Leni,nist" or a i'Com-
munist-fronter." And he had never been a member of 
the "Marxist League for Industrial Democracy" or the 
"Intercollegiate Socialist Society." 
The managing editor of American Opinion made no 
effort to verify or substantiate the charges against peti-
tioner. Instead, he appended an editorial introduction 
stating that the author had "concluded extensive re• 
search into the Richard Nuccio case." And he included 
in the article a photograph of petitioner and wrote the 
caption that appeared under it: "Elmer Gertz of the 
Red Guild harrasses Nuccio." Respondent placed the 
issue of American Opinion containing the article on sale 
at newsstands throughout the country 'and distributed 
reprints of the article on the streets of Chicago. 
Petitioner filed a diversity action for libel in the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. 
He claimed that the falsehoods published by respondent 
injured his reputation as a lawyer and a citizen. Before 
filing an answer, respondent moved to dismiss the com-
plaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could 
be granted, apparently on the ground that petitioner 
failed to a.Ilege special damages. But the court ruled 
that statements contained in the article constituted libel 
per se under Illinois law and that consequently petitioner 
need not plead special damages. 306 Ji' . Supp. 310 (ND 
Ill. 1969). 
After answering the complaint, respondent filed a pre-
trial motion for summary judgment, claiming a constitu-
tional privilege against liability for defamation.1 It 
asserted that petitioner was a public official or a public 
figure and that the article concerned an issue of public 
1 Petitioner filed a cro~s-motion for summary Judgment on grounds 
not specified in the record. The Court denied petitioner's cross:,, 
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interest and concern. For these reasons, respondent 
argued, it was entitled to invoke the privilege enunciated 
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) . 
Under this rule respondent would escape liability unless 
petitioner could prove publication of defamatory false-
hood "with 'actual malice'-that is, in the knowledge that 
it was false or with reckless disregard for whether it was 
true or not." Id. , at 279-280. Respondent claimed 
that petitioner could not make such a showing and 
submitted a supporting affidavit by the magazine's man-
aging editor. The editor denied any knowledge of the 
falsity of the statements concerning petitioner and stated 
that he had relied on the author's reputation and on his 
prior experience with the accuracy and authenticity of 
his contributions to American Opinion. 
The District Court denied respondent's motion for 
summary judgment in a memorandum opinion. - F. 
Supp. - (ND Ill. , Sept. 16, 1970). The court did not 
dispute respondent's claim to the protection of the New 
York Times standard. Rather, it concluded that peti-
tioner might overcome the constitutional privilege by 
making a factual showing sufficient to prove publication 
of defamatory falsehood in reckless disregard of the truth. 
During the course of the trial, however, it became clear 
that the trial court had not accepted all of respondent's 
asserted grounds for applying the New York Times rule 
to this case. It thought that respondent 's claim to the 
protection of the constitutional privilege depended on 
the contention that petitioner was either a public official 
under the New York Times decision or a public figure 
under Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130 
( 1967) , apparently discounting the argument that a 
privilege would arise from the presence of a public issue. 
After all the evidence had been presented but before 
submission of the case to the jury, the court ruled in 
effect that petitioner was neither a public official nor a 
72--617-0PiNION 
GE:flTZ v. WELCH 5 
public figure. It added that, if he were, the resulting ap-
plication of the New York Times standard would require 
a directed verdict for respondent. Because some state-
ments in the article constituted libel per se unµ~r Illinois 
law, the court submitted the case to the jury under instrutl-
tions that withdrew from its consideration all issues save 
the measure of damages. The jury awarded $50,000 to 
petitioner. 
Following the jury verdict and on further reflection, 
the District Court concluded that the New York Times 
standard should govern this case even though peti~ioner 
was not a public official or public figure. It accepted re-
spondent's contention that that privilege protected dis-
cussion of any public issue without regard to the status 
of a person defamed therein. Accordingly, the court 
entered judgment for respondent notwithstanding the 
jury's verdict.2 This conclusion anticipated tµe reason-
2 - F. Supp. - (ND Ill., Dec. 8, 1970) . Petitioner asserts that 
the entry of judgment n. o. v. on the basis of his failure to show 
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard (or the truth constituted 
unfair surprise and deprived him of a full and fair opportunity to 
prove "actual malice" on the part of respondents. This contention 
is not supported by the record. It is clear that the trial court 
gave petitioner no reason to assume that the New York Times 
privilege would not be available to respondent. The court's memo-
randum opinion denying respondent 's pretrial motion for summary 
judgment does not state that the New York Times standard was 
inapplicable to this case. Rather, it reveals that the trial judge 
thought it possible for petitioner to make a factual showing sufficient 
to overcome respondent 's claim of constitutional privilege. It states 
in part : 
"When there is a factual dispute as to the existence of actual 
malice, summary judgment is improper. 
"In the instant case a jury might infer from the evidence that 
[respondent's] failure ,to investigate the truth of the allegations, 
coupled with its receipt of communications chall<mging the factual 
·i\ccuracy of this author in the past -amounteq to actual malice, that 
.6 
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ing of a plurality of this Court in Rosenbloom v. Metro-
medi,a, 403 U. S. 29 (1971) . 
Petitioner appealed to contest the applicability of the 
New York Times standard to this case. Although the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit doubted the 
correctness of the District Court's determination that 
petitioner was not a public figure, it did not overturn 
that finding. 3 It agreed with the District Court that 
respondent could assert the constitutional privilege be-
cause the article concerned a matter of public interest, 
citing this Court's intervening decision in Rosenbloom v. 
Metromedia, Inc., supra. The Court of Appeals read 
Rosenbloom to require application of the New York 
is, ' reckless disregard' of whether the allegation:; were true or not. 
New York Times [Co.] v. Sullivan, s'upra, at 279-280 .'' -- F . 
Supp. -, - (ND Ill., Sept. 16, 1970) . 
Thus, petitioner knew or 8hould have known that the outcome of 
the trial might hinge on his ability to ~how by clear and convincing 
evidence that respondent acted with reckless disregard for the truth. 
And this question remained open throughout the trial. Although 
the court conrluded that the applicability of New York Times 
rule depended 011 petitioner's status as a public figUre , the court 
did not decide that petitioner was not a public figure until all 
the evidence had been presented . Thus petit10ner had every 
opportunity, indeed incentive, to prove "reckless disregard" if he 
could, and he in fact attempted to do so. The record supports the 
observation by the Court of Appeals that petitioner "did present 
evidence of malice (both the 'constitutional' and the 'ill-will' type) 
to support his damage claim and no such evidence was excluded . .. .'' 
- F.2d, at-. 
3 The court stated : 
"[Petitioner's] considerable sta ture as a lawyer, author, lecturer, 
and participant in matters of public import undermine the validity 
of the assumption that he i~ not a 'public figure ' as that term has 
been used by the progeny of New York Times. Nevertheless, for 
purposes of decision we make that ;1ssumption and test the avail-
ability of the claim of privilege by the subject matter of the article/' 
......... F . 2d,at -, 
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Times standard to any publication or broadcast about 
an issue of significant public interest, without reg~rd 
to the position, fame, or anonymity of the person 
defamed, and it concluded that respondent's statements 
concerned such an issue. 4 After reviewing the record, 
4 In the Court of Appeals petitioner made an ingenious but un• 
availing attempt to show that respondent's defamatory charge against 
him concerned no issue of public or general interest. He asserted 
that the subject matter of the article was the murder trial of Officer 
Nuccio and that he did not participate in that proceeding. There-
fore, he argued, even if the subject matter of the article generally 
were protected by the New York Times privilege, under the opinion 
of the Rosenbloom plurality, the defamatory statements about him 
were not. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument. It noted 
that the accusations against petitioner played an integral part in 
respondent's general thesis of a natiomvide conspiracy to harass the 
police : 
" [W]e may also assume that the article's basic thesis is false. Never-
theless, under the reasons of New York Times v. Sullivan, even a 
false statement made in support of a. false thesis is protected unless 
made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of its 
truth or falsity. It would undermine the rule of that case to permit 
t he actual falsity of a statement to determme whether or not its 
publisher is entitled to the benefit of the rule. 
"If, therefore, we put to one side the fal8e characte~· of the article 
and treat it as though its contents were entirely true, it cannot be 
denied that the comments about [petitioner] were integral to its 
thesis. They must be tested under the New York Times standard." 
-F.2d,at-. 
We think that the Court of Appeals correctly rejected petitioner's 
argument. Its acceptance might lead to arbitrary imposition of 
liability on the basis of an unwise differentiation among kinds 
of factual misstatements. The present case illustrates the point . 
Respondent falsely portrayed petitioner as an architect of the 
criminal prosecution against Nuccio. Ou its face this inaccuracy 
does not appear defamatory. Respondent also falsely labelled peti-
tioner a "Leninst" and a "Communist-fronter." These accusations 
are generally cousidered defamatory. Under petitioner's interpreta-
tion of the "public or general interest" test , respondent would have . 
erljoyed a constjtutional privilege to publish defamatory falsehoods if 
·s 
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the Court of Appeals endorsed the District Court's con• 
clusion that petitioner had failed to show by clear and 
convincing evidence that respondent h~d acted with 
"actual malice" as defined by New York Times. There 
was no evidence that the managing editor of American 
Opinion knew of the falsity of the accusations made in 
the article. In fact, he knew nothing about peti-
tioner except what he learned from the article. The 
court correctly noted that mere proof of f l:1-ilure to investi-
gate, without more, cannot establish reckless disregard for 
the truth. Rather, the publisher must act with a "high 
degree of awareness ... of probable falsity." St. Amant 
v. Thompson, 390 U. S. 727, 731 (1968). Accord : 
Beckley Newspaper Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U. S. 81, 84-85 
(1967); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 67, 75-76 (1964) . 
The evidence in this case did not reveal that respondent 
had cause for such an awareness. The Court of Appeals 
therefore affirmed - F. 2d - (1972) . For the reasons 
stated below, we now reverse. 
II 
__. + he ,.J~rincipal issue in this case 1s whether a news- / 
broadcaster that publishes defamatory false-
about an individual who is neither a public 
official nor a public :figure may claim a constitu-
tional privilege against liability for the injury in-
petitioner had in fact been associated with the criminal prosecution. 
But this would mean that the seemingly innocuous mistake of con-
fusing petitioner's role in the litigation against officer Nuccio would 
destroy the privilege otherwise available for calling petitioner a 
communist-fronter. Thus respondent's privilege to publish state-
ments whose content should have alerted it to the danger of injury 
to reputation would hinge on the accuracy of statements that carried 
with them no such warning. Assuming that none of these statements 
was published with knowledge of falsity or with reckless disregard 
for the truth, we see no reason to distinguish among the inaccuracie(l. 
::' 
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flicted by those statements. The Court considered this 
question on the rather different set of facts presented in 
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U. S. 29 (1971). 
Rosenbloom, a distributor of nudist magazines, was 
arrested for selling allegedly obscene material while mak-
ing a delivery to a retail dealer. The police obtained a 
warrant and seized his entire inventory of 3,000 books and 
magazine. He sought and obtained an injunction pro-
hibiting further police interference with his business. He 
then sued a local radio station for failing to note in two 
, of its newscasts that the 3,000 items seized were only 
"reportedly" or "allegedly" obscene and for broadcasting 
references to "the smut literature racket" and to "girlie-
book peddlers" in its coverage of the court proceeding 
for injunctive relief. He obtained a judgment against 
the radio station, but the Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit held the New York Times privilege applicable to 
, the broadcast and reversed. 415 F. 2d 892 (1969). 
This Court affirmed the decision below, but no majority 
could agree on a controlling rationale. The eight Justices 5 
who participated in Rosenbloom announced their views 
in five separate opinions, none of which commanded more 
than three votes. The several statements not only re-
veal disagreement about the appropriate result in that 
case; they also reflect divergent traditions of thought 
about the general problem of reconciling the law of 
defamation with the First Amendment. One approach 
has been to extend the New York Times test to an ex-
panding variety of situations. Another has been to vary 
the level of constitutional privilege for defamatory false-
hood with the status of the person defamed. And a third 
view would grant to the press and broadcast media abso-
lute immunity from liability for defamation. To place 
our holding in the proper context, we preface our discus-
5 l\fo. JusTICE DOUGLAS did not partcipate in the consideration of 
decision of this case. 
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sion of this case with a review of the several Rosenbloom 
opinions and their antecedents. 
In affirming the trial court's judgment in the instant 
case, the Court of Appeals relied on MR. JusTICE BREN· 
NAN's conclusion for the Rosenbloom plurality that "all 
discussion and communication involving matters of pub• 
lie or general concern" warrant the protection from lia-
bility for defamation accorded by the rule originally enun-
ciated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964). There this Court defined a constitutional privi-
lege intended to free criticism of public officials from the 
restraints imposed by the common law of defamation. The 
Times ran a political advertisement endorsing civil rights 
demonstrations by black students in Alabama and im-
pliedly condemning the performance of local law enforce-
ment officials. A police commissioner established in state 
court that certain misstatements in the advertisement 
referred to him and that they constituted libel per se 
under Alabama law. This showing left the Times with 
the single defense of truth, for under Alabama law 
neither good faith nor reasonable care would protect the 
newspaper from liability. This Court concluded that a 
"rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee 
the truth of all his factual assertions" would deter pro-
tected speech, id., at 279, and announced the constitu-
tional privilege designed to counter that effect : 
"The constitutional guarantees require, we think, 
a federal rule that prohibits a public official from 
recovery of damages for a defamatory falsehood re-
, lating to his official conduct unless he proves that the 
statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, 
- in the knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
disregard of whether it was true or not." Id., at 
279-280.6 
fl New York Times and later cases explicated the meaning of the 
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Three years after New York Times, a majority of the 
Court agreed to extend the constitutional privilege to 
defamatory criticism of "public figures." This extension 
new standard. In New York Times the Court held that under the 
circumstances the newspaper's failure to check the accuracy of the 
advertisement against news stories in its own files did not establish 
reckless disregard for the truth. Id., at-. In St. Amant v. Thomp-
s011,, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968), the Court equated reckless disregard 
of the t ruth with subjective awareness of probable falsity: "There 
must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defend-
ant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publica.a 
tion." In Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U. S. 81 (1967), 
the Court emphasized the distinction between the New York Times 
test of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth and 
"actual malice" in the traditional sense of ill-will. Garris011, v. Loui.a 
siana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), made plain that the new standard applied 
to criminal libel laws as well as to civil actions and that it governed 
criticism directed at "anything which might touch on an official's fit~ 
ness for office." Id., at 77. Finally, in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 
75, 85 (1966), the Court stated that "the 'public official' designatiort 
applies at the very least to those among the heirarchy of government 
employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substaBtial 
responsibility for or control over the conduct of gover.t;1ment affairs." 
In Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), the Court applied the 
New York Times standard to actions under an unusual state statute. 
The statute did not create a cause of action for libel. Rather, it pro-
vided a remedy for unwanted publicity. Although the law allowed 
recovery of damages for harm caused by exposure to public attention 
rather than by factual inaccuracies, it recognized truth as a complete 
defense. Thus, nondefamatory factual errors could render a publisher 
liable for something akin to invasion of privacy. The Court ruled that 
the defendant in such an action could invoke the New York Times 
privilege regardless of the fame or anonymity of the plaintiff. Speak-
ing for the Court , Mn. JUSTICE BRENNAN declared that this holding 
was not an extension of New York Times but rather a parallel line of 
reasoning applying that standard to this discrete context : 
"This is neither a libel action by a private individual nor a statu-
tory action by a public official. Therefore, although the First. 
Amendment principles announced in New York Times guide our 
conclusion, we reach that conclusion only by applying these principles 
1~ 
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was announced in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and its 
companion Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U. S. 130, 162 
(1967). The first case involved the Saturday Evening 
Post's charge that Coach Wally Butts of the University 
of Georgia had conspired with Coach Bear Brya.nt 6f the 
University of Alabama to fix a football game between 
their respective schools. Walker involved an erroneous 
Associated Press account of Brigadier General Edwin 
Walker's participation in a University of Mississippi 
campus riot. Because Butts was paid by a private alumni 
association and Walker had retired from the Army, neither 
could be classified as a "public official" under New York 
Times. Although Mr. Justice Harlan announced the 
result in both cases, a majority of the Court agreed with 
Mr. Chief Justice Warren's conclusion that the New York 
Times test should apply to criticism of "public figures" as 
well as "public officials." 7 The Court extended the con-
in this discrete context . It therefore serve~ no purpose to distinguish 
the fact s here from those m New Yotk Times . Were this 
a libel action, the distinction which ha ;,, been suggested be-
twem the relative opportunities of the public official and the 
private individual to rebut defamatory charges might be germane. 
And the additional state interest in the protection of the individual 
against damages to his reputation would be involved. Cf. Rosenblatt 
V. Baer, 383 U. S. 75, 91 (STEWART, J., concurring) ." Id ., at 390-391. 
7 Professor Kalven once introduced a discussion of these cases with 
the apt heading, "You Can't Tell the Players Without a Score Card." 
H . Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment, 1967 
Sup. Ct. Rev. 267, 275 (1967) . Only three other Justices joined 
Mr. Justice Harlan's analysi1:, of the issues involved. In his con-
curring opinion, Mr. Chief .Justice Warren stated the principle for 
which these cases stand-that the New Y orlc Times test reaches both 
public figures and public officials. MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN and MR. 
JUSTICE WHITE agreed with the Chief Justice on that question. 
Mr. Justice Black and MR JusTICE DouGLAS reiterated their view 
that publishers should have an absolute immunity from liability for 
defamation) but they acquiesed in the Chief Justice's reasoning in 
J),:der to enflble a majority of the Justices to agree on the questiol} 
72-617--0PINION 
GERTZ v. WELCH 13 
· stitutional privilege announced in that case to protect 
defamatory criticism of nonpublic officials who "are never-
theless intimately involved in the resolution of important 
public questions, or, by reason of their fame, shape events 
in areas of concern to society at large." Id., at 164. 
In his opinion for the plurality in Rosenbloom v. 
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U. S. 29 (1971), MR. JusTrCE 
BRENN AN took the New York Times privilege one step 
further. He concluded that its protection should extend 
to defamatory falsehoods relating to private persons if the 
statements concerned matters of general or public interest. 
He abjured the suggested distinction between public offi-
cials and public figures on the one hand and private indi-
viduals on the other. He foc1.1sed instead on society's 
interest in learning about certain issues : "If a matter is a 
subject of public or general interest. it cannot suddenly 
become less so merely because a private individual is 
involved or because in some sense the individual did not 
choose to become involved." 403 U. S., at 43. Thus, 
under the plurality opinion, a private citizen involun-
tarily associated with a matter of general interest has no 
recourse for injury to his reputation unless he can satisfy 
the demanding requirements of the New York Times test. 
Two members of the Court concurred in the result in 
Rosenbloom but departed from the reasoning of the 
plurality. Mr. Justice Black restated his view, long 
shared by MR. JusTICE DOUGLAS, that the First Amend.:. 
ment cloaks the news media with an absolute and in-
defeasible immunity from liability for defamation. ld., 
at 57. MR JusTICE WHITE concurred on a narrower 
ground. Ibid. He concluded that "the First Amend-
ment gives the press and the broadcast media a privilege 
to report and comment upon the official actions of public 
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servants in full detail, with no requirement that the rep~ 
utation or privacy of an individual involved in or affected 
by the official action be spared from public view." Id., 
at 62. He therefore declined to reach th.e broader ques-
tions addressed by the other Justices. 
Mr. Justice Harlan dissented. Although he had joined 
the opinion of the Court in New York Times, in Curtis 
Publishing Co: he had contested the extension of the 
privilege to public figures. There he had argued that 
a public figure who held no governmental office should 
be allowed to recover damages for defamation "on 
a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constitut-
ing an extreme departure from the standards of in-
vestigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by 
responsible publishers." 388 U. S .. at 155. In his Curtis 
Publishing Co. opinion Mr. Justice Harlan had distin-
guished New Yark Times primarily on the ground that 
defamation actions by public officials "lay close to sedi-
tious libel. ... " / d., at 133. Recovery of damages by 
one who held no public office, however, could not "be 
viewed as a vindication of governmental policy." Id., 
at 154. Additionally, he had intimated that, because 
most public officials enjoyed absolute immunity from 
liability for their own defamatory utterances under Barr 
v. Matteo , 360 U. S. 564 (1959), they lacked a strong 
. claim to the protection of the courts. 
In Rosenbloom Mr. Justice Harlan modified these 
views. He acquiesced in the application of the privilege 
to defamation of public figures but argued that a different 
rule should obtain where defamatory falsehood harmed 
. a private individual. He noted that a private person 
has less likelihood "of securing access to the channels 
of communication sufficient to rebut falsehoods concern-
ing him" than do public officials and public figures, ·id., 
-At 70, and has not voluntarily placed himself in the public 
72--617-0PINION 
GERTZ v. WELCH 15 
spotlight. Mr. Justice Harlan concluded that the States 
··could constitutionally allow private individuals to re-
cover damages for defamation on the ha.sis of any 
standard of care except liability without fault. 
MR. JusncE MARSHALL disrnnted in Rosenbloom in an 
opinion joined by MR. JusTICE STEWART. Id., at 78. He 
thought that the plurality's "public or general interest; ' 
test for determining the applicability of the New York 
Times privilege would involve the courts in the dl:l,ngerous 
business of deciding "what information is relev;:i.nt to self-
government." Id., at 79. He also contended that the 
plurality's position inadequately served "society's inter-
est in protecting private individuals from being thrust 
into the public eye by the distorting light of defamation." 
Ibid. MR. JusTICE MARSHALL therefore reached the con-
clusion , also reached by Mr. Justice Harlan, that the I 
States should be "essentially free to continue the evalua-
tion of the common law of defamation and to articulate 
whatever fault standards best suits the State's need," so 
long as the States did not impose liability without fault. 
Id., at 86. The principal point of disagreement among 
the three dissenters concerned punitive charges. Whereas 
Mr. Justice Harlan thought that the States could allow 
punitive damages in amounts bearing "a reasonable and 
purposeful relationship to the actual harm done . . . ," 
id., at 75, MR. JusTICE MARSHALL concluded that the 
size and unpredictability of jury awards of exemplary 
damages unnecessarily exacerbated the problems of 
media self-censorship and that such damages should 
therefore be forbidden. 
III 
We begin with the common ground. Under the First 
Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. How-
e:ver pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its 
correction not on the conscience of judg~s and juries but 
16 
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on the competition of other ideas.8 But there is no con-
stitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither 
the intentional lie nor the careless error materially ad-
vances society's interest in "uninhibited, robust, and 
wide-open" debate on public issues. New Yark Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S., at 270. They belong to that 
eategory of utterances which "are no essential part of 
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value 
as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived 
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest 
· in order and morality.'' Chaplinsky "· Sew Hnmpshfre,. 
315 U.S. 568,572 (1942) . 
Although the erroneous stateme11t of fact 1s not worthy 
of constitutional protectio11. it is nevertheless inevitable iu 
free debate. As James Madison pointed out in the Report 
on the Virginia Resolutions of 1798, "Some degree of 
abuse is inseparable from the proper use of everything , 
and in no instance is this more true than that of the 
press." 4 Elliot's Debates ( 1876) . p. 571. And punish-
ment of error runs the risk of inducing a cautious and 
restrictive exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed 
' freedoms of speech and press. Our decisions recognize 
that a rule of strict liability that compels a publisher 
or broadcaster to guarantee the accuracy of his factual 
assertions may lead to intolerable self-censorship. Al-
lowing the media to avoid liability only by proving the 
truth of a11 injurious statements does not accord adequate 
protection to First Amendment liberties. As the Court 
stated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, 376 
U. S., at 279, "Allowance of the defense of truth , with 
the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not mean 
8 As Thomas Jefferson made the point in his first Inaugural 
Address: "If there be any among us who wish to dissolve this union 
or change its republican form of government, let them stand undis-
turbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may 
be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it..'' 
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that only false speech will be deterred." The First 
Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in 
order to protect speech that matters. 
The need to avoid self-censorship by the news media is; 
however, not the only societal value at issue. If it were, 
this Court would have embraced long ago the view that 
publishers and broadcasters enjoy an unconditional and 
indefeasible immunity from liability for defamation. See 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293 (1964) 
(opinion of Black, J .); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 
80 (1964) (opinion of DOUGLAS, J.); Curtis Publishing Co. 
v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 170 (1967) (opinion of Black, J.) . 
Such a rule would indeed obviate the fear that the pros-
pect of civil liability for injurious falsehood might dis-
suade a timorous press from the effective exercise of 
First Amendment freedoms. Yet absolute protection for 
the communications media requires a total sacrifice of 
the competing value served by the law of defamation. 
The legitimate state interest underlying the law of libel 
is the compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted 
on them by defamatory falsehoods. We would not lightly 
require the State to abandon this purpose, fpr , as MR. 
JusTICE STEWART has reminded us, the individual's right 
to the protection of his own good name 
"reflects no more than our basic concept of the essen-
tial dignity and worth of every human being-a 
concept at the root of any decent system of ordered 
liberty. The protection of private personality, like 
the protection of life itself, is left primarily to the 
individual states under the Ninth and Tenth Amend-
ments. But this does not mean that the right is 
entitled to any less recognition by this Court as a 
basic of our constitutional system." Rosenblatt v. 
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Some tension necessarily exists between the need for 
a vigorous and uninhibited press and the legitimate in-
terest in redressing wrongful injury. As Mr. Justice 
Harlan stated, "some antithesis between freedom of 
speech and press and libel actions persists, for libel re-
mains premised on the content of speech and limits the 
freedom of the publisher to express certain sentiments, 
at least without guaranteeing legal proof of their sub-
stantial accuracy." Curt-is Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 
U. S., at 152. In our continuing effort to define the 
proper accommodation between these competing con-
cerns, we have been especially anxious to assure to the 
freedoms of speech and press that "breathing space" 
essential to their fruitful exercise. NAACP v. Button, 
·371 U. S. 415, 433 (1963). To that end this Court has 
extended a measure of strategic protection to defamatory 
falsehood . 
The N eW Yark Times standard defines the level of 
'constitutional protection appropriate to the context of 
defamation of a public person. Those who, by reason 
'of the notoriety of their achievements or the vigor 
and success with which they seek the public's attention, 
:are properly classed as public figures and those who 
hold governmental office may recover for injury to rep-
utation only on clear and convincing proof that the 
,defamatory falsehood was made with knowledge of its 
falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth. This 
standard administers an extremely powerful antidote 
to the inducement to media self-censorship of the 
common law rule of strict liability for libel and 
slander. And it exacts a correspondingly high price 
from the victims of defamatory falsehood. Plainly 
many deserving plaintiffs, including some intentionally 
subjected to injury, will be unable to surmount 
the barrier of the New Yark Times test. Despite this 
substantial abridgement of the state law right to com• 
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pensation for wrongful hurt to one's reputation, the 
Court has concluded that the protection of the New 
York Times privilege should be available to publish-
ers and broadcasters of defamtory falsehoods concern-
ing public officials and public figures. New I York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 ( 1964)-; Curtu; 
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130 (1967): We 
think that these decisions are correct, but we do not 
find their holdings justified solely by reference to the 
interest of the press and broadcast media in immunity 
from liability. Rather, we believe that the New York 
Times rule states an accommodation between this con-
cern and the limited state interest present in the context 
of libel actions brought by public persons. For the rea-
sons stated below, we conclude that the state interest 
in compensating injury to the reputation of private 
individuals requires that a different rule should obtain 
with respect to them. 
Theoretically, of course, the balance between the needs 
of the press and the individual 's claim to compensation 
for wrongful injury might be struck on a case-by-case 
basis. As Mr. Justice Harlan hypothesized, . " it might 
seem, purely as an abstract matter, that the most utili-
tarian approach would be to scrutinize carefully every 
· jury verdict in every libel case, in order to ascertain 
whether the final judgment leaves fully protected what-
ever First Amendment values transcend the legitimate 
state interest in protecting the particular plaintiff who 
prevailed." Rosenbl-Jom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U. S. 
29, 63 (1971) (footnote omitted). But this approach 
would lead to unpredictable results and uncertain expecta-
~ions, and it could render our duty to supervise the lower 
courts unmanagable. Because an ad hoc resolution of 
the competing interests at stake in each particular case 
is not feasible, we must lay down broad rules of gener,al 
~pplicatfo11. Such rules necessarily treat alike various 
20 
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cases involving differences as well as similarities. Thus 
it is often true that not all of the considerations which 
justify adoption of a given rule will obtain in each par-
ticular case decided under its authority. 
With that caveat we have no difficulty in distinguishing 
among defamation plaintiffs. The first remedy of any 
victim of defamation is self-help-using available oppor-
tunities to contradict the lie or correct the error and 
thereby to minimize its adverse impact on reputation. 
Public officials and public figures usually enjoy signifi-
cantly greater access to the channels of effective commu-
nication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to 
counteract false statements than private individuals nor-
mally enjoy.9 Private individuals are therefore more 
vulnerable to injury, and the state interest in protecting 
them is correspondingly greater. 
More important than the likelihood that private indi-
viduals will lack effective opportunities for rebuttal , there 
is a compelling normative consideration underlying the 
distinction between public and private defamation plain-
tiffs. An individual who decides to seek governmental 
office must accept certain necessary consequences of that 
involvement in public affairs. He runs the risk of closer 
public scrutiny than might otherwise be the case. And 
society's interest in the officers of government is not 
strictly limited to the formal discharge of official duties. 
As the Court pointed out iu Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 
U.S. 64, 77 (1964), the public's interest extends to "any-
thing that might touch on an official's fitness for office .. .. 
Few personal attributes are more germane to fitness for 
9 Of course, an opportunity for rebuttal seldom suffices to undo 
harm of defamatory falsehood. Indeed, the law of defamation is 
rooted in our experience that the truth rarely catches up with a lie. 
But the fact that · the self-help remedy of rebuttal, standing alone, 
is inadequate to its task does not mean that it is irrelevant to our . 
mquiry. 
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bffice than dishonesty, malfeasance, or improper motiva-
tion, even though these characteristics may also affect 
the officiafs private character." 
Those classed as public figures stand in _a simila, posi• 
tion. Hypothetically, it may be possible fdr someone to 
become a public figure through no purposeful action of 
his own, but the instances of truly involuntary publi<I 
figures · must be exceedingly rare. For the most part 
those who attain this status have assumed roles of especial 
prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy posi-
tions of such persuasive power and influence that they 
are deemed public figures for all purposes. More com-
monly, those classed as public figures have thrust them-
selves to the forefront of particular public controversies 
in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. 
In either event, they invite attention and comment. 
Even if the foregoing generalities do not obtain in every 
instance, the communications media are entitled to act 
on the assumption that public officials and public figures 
have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk 
of injury from defamatory falsehoods concerning them. 
No such assumption is justified with respect to a private 
individual. He has not accepted public office nor as- 1 
sumed an "influential role in ordering society. '' Curtis 
Publishing Co. v. Butts, supra, 388 U.S., at 164 (opinion 
of Warren, C. J.). He has relinquished no part of his 
interest in the protection of his own good name, and 
consequently he has a more compelling call on the 
courts for redress of injury inflicted by defamatory false-
hood. Thus, private individuals are not only more vul-
nerable to injury than public officials and public figures ; 
they are also more deserving of recovery. 
For these reasons we conclude that the States should 
retain substantial latitude in their efforts to enforce a 
legal remedy for defamatory falsehood injurious to the 
reputation of a private individual. The extension of the 
22 
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New Yark Times test proposed by the Rosenbloom plu-
rality would abridge this legitimate state interest to a 
degree that we find unacceptable. And it would occa-
sion the additional difficulty of forcing state and federal 
judges to decide on an ad hoc basic whfoh publications 
address issues of "general or public interest" and 
which do not-to determine, in the words of MR. JUSTICE 
MARSHALL, "what information is relevant to self-govern-
ment." Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U. S., at 
79. We doubt the wisdom of committing this task to the 
conscience of judges. Nor does the Constitution require 
us to draw so thin a line between the drastic alternatives 
of the New Yark Times privilege and the common law of 
strict liability for defamatory error. The "public or gen-
eral interest" test for determining the applicability of 
. the New Yark Times standard to private defamation 
actions inadequately serves both of the competing values 
at stake. On the one hand , a private individual whose 
reputation is injured by defamatory falsehood that does 
concern an issue of public or general interest has no re-
course unless he can meet the rigorous requirements of 
New Yark Times. This is true despite the factors 
that distinguish the state interest in compensating 
. private individuals from the analogous interest involved 
in the context of public persons. On the other 
hand, a publisher or broadcaster of a defamatory error 
which a court deems unrelated to an issue of public or 
general interest may be held liable in damages even if it 
took every reasonable precaution to ensure the accuracy 
of its assertions. And liability may far exceed compensa-
tion for any actual injury to the plaintiff, for the jury may 
be permitted to presume damages without proof of loss 
and even to award punitive damages. 
We hold that. so long as they do not impose liability 
without fault, the States may define for themselves the 
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appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broad-
caster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private 
individual.1° This approach provides a more equitable 
10 Our caveat against strict liability is the principal point of 
departure for MR. JusTICE WHITE'S dissent. Post, at 16--20. He 
would hold that a publisher or broadcaster may be held liable for 
defamation of a private citizen even though the subject matter 
of the libel wa.s an issue of public concern and even though the 
publisher or broadcaster took every conceivable precaution to ensure 
its accuracy. In his view, one who publishes a statement that 
later turns out to be inaccurate can nevn by "without fault" in any 
meaningful sense, for "[i]t is he who circulated a fabehood that 
he was not required to publish." Post, at 19 ( emphasis added) 
The problem with this view, as we see it, is that it accords no weight 
whatever to the First Amendment valu~ implicated by a rule 
requiring the media to guarantee the accuracy of all factual assC'r-
tions and contradicts the essential premise underlying N ew York 
Times and ever~- subsequent decision of this Court . This funda -
mental precept is that the prospect of liability for innocent errot 
will induce a cautious and restrictive exercise of the com,titu-
tionally guaranteed freedoms of speech and press: •· Allowance of 
the defense of truth , with thf burden of proving it on the defendant, 
does not mean that only false speech will be deterred." New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U. S., at 279 . . 
This core proposition-recognition that the unrestrained rigor of 
the common law of libel does touch First Amendment concerns-i;, 
well established in our precedents. In fact, until today no l\Iember 
of the Court had suggested either in New York Times or m any of 
its numerous progen~·, that due regard for the constitutional frE>edom~ 
of speech and press could tolerate the imposition of strict liability 
for media publication of a defamatory falsehood, at least where an 
issue of public or gerteral interest is involved. MR. JusTICE WHITE 
would avoid the force of the unanimous authority on this point 
by a selective reading of prior decisions. He characterizes New 
York Times as simply a case of seditious libel. Post, at 14. Aside 
from the fact that we do not read that decision so narrowly, the 
rationale of seditious libel is cntainly mapplicable to Curtis Pub-
lishing Co . v. Butts, supra. In that case five Members of thf Court , 
including MR . .JusTICE WHITE, voted to extend the full protection 
of the b10wing-or-recklfss-falsity standard to media defamers of a 
24 
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boundary between the competing concerns involved here. 
It recognizes the strength of the legitimate state interest 
in compensating private individuals for wrongful injury 
to reputation, yet shields the press and broadcast media 
from the rigors of strict liability for defamation. At 
least this conclusion obtains where, as here, the sub-
stance of the defamatory statement "makes substan-
tial danger to reputation apparent." 11 This phrase places 
in perspective the conclusion we announce today. Our 
inquiry would involve considerations somewhat different 
from those discussed above if a 8tate purported to condi-
tion civil liability on a factual misstatement whose 
class of persons having no connrct1on with the Government. Al-
though MR. JusTICE WHITE ,mgge,;ts at one point that he would 
continue to abide by the extension of the New York Times privilege 
to public figures, post, at 26, the ful l thrust of his dissent-as we 
read it-contradicts that suggestion. Significantly, we think, even. 
t he four Justices who dissented from the expansion of the knowing-
or-reckless-falsity standard to public figures did not embrace the 
view now proposed by MR. JusncE WHtTB. Instead, they con-
cluded that media defamers of public persons could be held liable 
only on a showing of gross negligence. Fmally in Rosenbloom v. 
Metromedia. Inc ., supra, MR. JusTICE WHITE 's concurring opmion 
would have applied the New York Times privilege to media defama-
tion of an indiv idual who was nei ther a public official nor a public 
figure. His opinion states that the knowing-or-reckless-falsity :;tand-
ard should apply to media "comment upon the official actions of 
public servants," including mere a rrests by police-a conclusion 
that would significantly extend New York Times . Again there was 
not a single Justice who concl uded that the imposition of monPy 
damages on the basis of strict liability was constitutio1u1lly per-
missible in that casr. And although we granted this case to resOlvP 
the uncertainty created by the fractured Court in Rosenbloom, MR. 
JUSTICE WHITE'S dissent does not mention that decision . In sum, MR. 
J usn cE WHrrE ably presrnts a viewpoint t hat had wide support 
prior to :New York :Times . We think, however, that his basic 
rationale is directly contrary to the deMde of precedents of tl11s: 
Court since 1964. 
11 Curtis Publishing Co . v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130, 155 (1967). 
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content did not warn a reasonably prudent editor or l 
broadcaster of its defamatory potential. Cf. Time, Inc . 
v. Hill, 385 U. S. 374 (1967) . Such a case is not now 
before us, and we intimate no view as to its proper 
resolution. 
IV 
Our accommodation of the competing values at stake 
in defamation suits by private individuals allows the 
States to impose liability on the publisher or broadcaster 
of defamatory falsehoods on a less demanding showing 
than that required by 1\' ew York Times . This conclusion 
is not based on a belief that the considerations which 
prompted the adoption of the 1Yew York Times privilege 
for defamation of public officials and its extension to 
public figures are wholly inapplicable to the context of 
private individuals. Rather, we endorse this approach 
in recognition of the strong and legitimate state interest 
in compensating private individuals for injury to reputa-
tion. But this countervailing state interest extends no 
further than compensation for actual injury. For the 
reasons stated below, we hold that the States may not 
permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at 
least when liability is not based on a showing of 
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth . 
The common law of defamation is an oddity of tort 
law, for it allows recovery of purportedly compensatory 
damages without evidence of actual loss. Under the 
traditional rules pertaining to actions for libel, the exist-
ence of injury is presumed from the fact of publication. 
Juries may award substantial sums as compensation for 
supposed damage to reputation without any proof that 
such harm actually occurred. The largely uncontr-olled 
discretion of juries to award damages where there is no 
loss unnecessarily compounds the potential of any sys-
tem of liability for defamatory falsehood to inhibit the 
26 
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vigorous exercise of First Amendment freedoms. Addi-
tionally, the doctrine of presumed damages invites juries 
to punish unpopular opinion rather than to compensate 
individuals for injury sustained by the publication of a 
false fact . More to the point, the States have no sub-
stantial interest in securing for plaintiffs such as this 
petitioner gratuitous awards of money damages far in 
excess of any actual injury. 
We would not, of course, invalidate state law simply 
because we doubt its wisdom, but here we are attempting 
to reconcile state law with a competing interest grounded 
in the constitutional command of the First Amendment. 
It is therefore appropriate to require that state remedies 
for defamatory falsehood reach no farther than is 
necessary to protect the legitimate interest involved. 
It is necessary to restrict defamation plaintiffs who 
do not prove knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard 
for the truth to compensation for actual injury. We 
need not define "actual injury," as trial courts have 
wide experience in framing appropriate jury instruc-
tions in tort action. Suffice it to say that actual 
injury is not limited to out-of-pocket loss. Indeed, the 
more customary types of actual harm inflicted by defam-
atory falsehood include impairment of reputation and 
standing in the community, personal humiliation, and 
mental anguish and suffering. Of course, juries must be 
limited by appropriate instructions, and all awards nrnst 
be supported by competent evidence concerning the in-
jury, although there need be no evidence which assigns 
an actual dollar value to the injury. 
We also find no justification for allowing awards of 
punitive damages against publishers and broadcasters held 
liable under state-defined standards of liability for 
defamation. In' most jurisdictions jury diwretion over 
the amounts awarded is limited only by the gentle 
rule that they not be excessive. Consequently, juries 
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assess punitive damages in wholly unpredictable amounts 
bearing no necessary relation to the actual harm 
caused. And they remain free to use their discre-
tion selectively to punish expressions of unpopular 
views. Like the doctrine of presumed damage~, jury dis-
cretion to award punitive damages unnecessarily exacer-
bates the danger of media self-censorship, but, unlike the 
former rule, punitive damages are wholly irrelevant to the 
state interest that justifies ~ negligence standard for pri-
vate defamation actions. They are not compensation for 
mJury. Instead, they are private fines levied by civil 
juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its 
future occurrence. In short, the private defamation 
plaintiff who establishes liability under a less demanding 
standard than that stated by New York Times may 
recover only sue~ damages as are sufficient to compensate 
him for actual injury. 
V 
Notwithstanding our refusal to extend the New York 
Times privilege to defamation of private individuals, 
respondent contends that we should affirm the judgment 
below on the ground that petitioner is either a public 
official or a public figure. There is little basis for the 
former assertion. Several years prior to the present in-
cident, petitioner had served briefly on housing commit-
tees appointed by the mayor of Chicago, but at the 
time of publication he had never held any remunera-
tive governmental position. Respondent admits this 
but argues that petitioner's appearance at the coroner's 
inquest rendered him a "de facto public official." Our 
cases recognize no such concept. Respondent's sugges-
tion would sweep all lawyers under the New Yark Times 
rule as officers of the court and distort the plain meaning 
of the "public official" category beyond all recognition. 
We decline to follow it. 
28 
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Respondent's characterization of petitioner as a public 
figure raises a different question. That designation may 
rest on either of two. alternative bases. In some in-
stances an individual may achieve such pervasive fame 
or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all pur-
poses and in all contexts. More commonly, an individual 
voluntary injects himself or is drawn into a particular 
public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure 
for a limited range of issues. In either case such persons 
assume special prominence in the resolution of public 
questions. 
Petitioner has long been active in community and 
professional affairs. He has served as an officer of local 
civil groups and of various professional organizations, 
and he has published several books and articles on legal 
subjects. Although petitioner was consequently well-
,known in some circles, he had achieved no general fame 
or notoriety in the community. None of the prospective 
jurors called at the trial had ever heard of petitioner 
prior to this litigation, and respondent offered no proof 
that this response was atypical of the local population. 
We would not lightly assume that a citizen's participa-
tion in community and professional affairs rendered him 
a public figure for all purposes. Absent clear evidence 
of general fame or notoriety in the community, and per-
vasive involvement in the affairs of society, an individual 
should not be deemed a public personality for all aspects 
of his life. It is preferable to reduce the public figure 
question to a more meaningful context by looking to the 
nature and extent of an individual's participation in the 
particular controversy giving rise to the defamation. 
In this context it is plain that petitioner was not a 
public figure. He played a minimal role at the coroner's 
-inquest, and his participation related solely to his repre-
sentation of a private client. He took no part in the 
.criminal prosecution of 9ffl.cer Nuccio, Moreover, he 
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never discussed either the criminal or civil litigation with 
the press and was never quoted as having done so. He 
plainly did not thrust himself into the vortex of this 
public issue, nor did he engage the public 's attention in 
an attempt to influence its outcome. We are persuaded 
that the trial court did not err in refusing to characterize 
petitioner as a public figure for the purpose of this 
litigation. 
We therefore conclude that the New York Times stand-
ard is inapplicable to this case and that the trial court 
erred in entering judgment for respondent. Because the 
Jury was allowed to impose liability without fault and 
was permitted to presume damages without proof of 
injury, a new trial is necessary. vVe reverse and remand 
for further proceedings in accord with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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This Court has struggled for nearly a decade to define 
the proper accommodation between the law of defama-
tion and the freedoms of speech and press protected by 
the First Amendment. With this decision we return to 
that effort. We granted certiorari to reconsider the ex-
tent of a publisher's constitutional privilege against lia-
bility for defamation of a private citizen. - U. S. -
(1973) . 
I 
In 1968 a Chicago policeman named Nuccio shot and 
killed a youth named Nelson. The state authorities prose-
cuted Nuccio for the homicide and ultimately obtained 
a conviction for murder in the second degree. The Nel-
son family retained petitioner Elmer Gertz, a reputable 
attorney, to represent them in civil litigation against 
Nuccio. 
Respondent publishes American Opinion, a monthly 
outlet for the views· of the John Birch Society. Early in 
the 1960's the magazine began to warn of a nationwide 
conspiracy to discredit local law enforcement agencies 
and create in their stead a national police force capable 
of supporting a communist dictatorship. As part of the 
1@ 
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continuing effort to alert the public to this assumed 
danger, the managing editor of American Opinion com-
missioned an article on the murder trial of officer Nuccio. 
For this purpose he engaged a regular contributor to the 
magazine. In March of 1969 respondent published the 
resulting article under the title "FRAME-UP: Richard 
Nuccio And The War On Police." The article purports 
to demonstrate that the testimony against Nuccio at 
his criminal trial was false and that his prosecution was 
part of the communist campaign against the police. 
In his capacity as counsel for the ~els011 family in 
the civil litigation. petitioner attended the coroner's in-
quest into the boy's death and imtiated actions for 
damages, but he neither discussed officer Nuccio with the 
press nor played any part in the criminal proceeding. 
fotwithstanding petitioner's remote connection with the 
prosecution of Nuccio, respondent's magazine portrayed 
him as an architect of the "frame-up." According to 
the article, the police file on petitioner took "a big, Irish 
cop to lift." The article stated that petitioner had been 
an official of the "Marxist League for Industrial Democ-
racy. originally known as the Intercollegiate Socialist 
Society, which has advocated the violent seizure of our 
government." It labelled Gertz a "Leninist" and a 
"Communist-fronter." It also stated that Gertz had 
been an officer of the ~ational Lawyers Guild, described 
as a communist organization that " probably did more 
than any other outfit to plan the Communist attack on 
the Chicago police during the 1968 Democratic conven-
tion." It is undisputed that these statements contained 
serious inaccuracies. The implication that petitioner had 
a criminal record wa.s false. Pet itioner had been a mem-
ber and officer of the National Lawyers Guild some 15 
years earlier, but then' was no evidence that he or that 
organization had taken any part in planning the 1968 
demonstrations in Chicago. There was also no basis for 
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the charge that petitioner was a "Leninist" or a "Com-
munist-fronter." And he had never been a member of 
the "Marxist League for Industrial Democracy" or the 
"Intercollegiate Socialist Society." 
The managing editor of American Opinion made no 
effort to verify or substantiate the charges against peti-
tioner. Instead, he appended an editorial introduction 
stating that the author had "concluded extensive re-
search into the Richard Nuccio case." And he included 
in the article a photograph of petitioner and wrote the 
caption that appeared under it : "Elmer Gertz of the 
·Red Guild harrasses Nuccio." Respondent placed the 
issue of American Opinion containing the article on sale 
at newsstands throughout the country and distributed 
reprints of the article on the streets of Chicago. 
Petitioner filed a diversity action for libel in the United 
States District Court for the Northern. District of Illinois. 
He claimed that the falsehoods published by respondent 
injured his reputation as a lawyer _and a citizen. Before 
filing an answer, respondent moved to dismiss the com-
plaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could 
be granted, apparently on the ground that petitioner 
failed to allege special damages. But the court ruled 
that statements contained in the article constituted libel 
per se under Illinois law and that consequently petition~r 
need not plead special damages. 306 F . Supp. 310 (ND 
Ill. 1969), 
After answering the complaint, respondent filed a pre-
trial motion for summary judgment, claiming a constitu-
tional privilege against liability for -defamation.1 It 
asserted that petitioner was a public official or a public 
figure and that the article concerned an issue of public 
1 J>etitioner filed a cross-motion for ::mmmar~· judgment on grounds 
not specified in the record . The Court denied petitioner's cross-
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interest and concern. For these reasons, respondent 
argued, it was entitled to invoke the privilege enunciated 
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
Under this rule respondent would escape liability unless 
petitioner could prove publication of defamatory false-
hood "with 'actual malice'-that is, in the knq:wledge that 
it was false or with reckless disregard for whether it was 
true or not." Id., at 279-280. Respondent claimed 
that petitioner could not make such a showing and 
submitted a supporting affidavit by the magazine's man-
aging editor. The editor denied any knowledge of the 
falsity of the statements concerning petjtioner and stated 
that he had relied on the author's reputation and on his 
prior experience with the accuracy and authenticity of 
his contributions to American Opinion. 
The District Court denied respondent's motion for 
summary judgment in a memorandum opinion. - F . 
Supp. - (ND Ill., Sept. 16, 1970). The court did not 
dispute respondent's claim to the protection of the New 
York Times standard. Rather, it concluded that peti-
tioner might overcome the constitutional privilege by 
making a factual showing sufficient to prove publication 
of defamatory falsehood in reckless disregard of the truth. 
During the course of the trial, however, it became clear 
that the trial court had not accepted all of respondent's:' 
asserted grounds for applying the New York Times rule 
to this case. It thought that respondent's claim to the 
protection of the constitutional privilege depended on 
the contention that petitioner was either a public official 
under the New York Times decision or a public figure 
under Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130' 
(1967), apparently discounting the argument that a 
privilege would arise from the presence of a public issue. 
After all the evidence had been presented but before 
submission of the case to the jury, the court ruled in 
effect that petitioner was neither a public official nor a. 
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public figure. It added that, if he were, the resulting ap-
plication of the New York Times standard would require 
a directed verdict for respondent. Because some state" 
ments in the article constituted libel per se under Illinois 
law, the court submitted the case to the jury under instruc-
tions that withdrew from its consideration all issues save 
the measure of damages. The jury awarded $50,000 to 
petitioner. 
Following the jury verdict and on further reflection; 
the District Court concluded that the New York Times 
standard should govern this case even though petitioner 
was not a public official or public figure. It accepted re-
spondent's contention that that privilege protected dis-
cussion of any public issue without regard to the status 
of a person defamed therein. Accordingly, the court 
entered judgment for respondent notwithstanding the 
jury's verdict.2 This conclusion anticipated the reason~ 
2 - F . Supp. - (ND Ill., Dec. 8, 1970). Petitioner asserts that 
the entry of judgment n. o. v. on the basis of his failure to show 
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for , the truth constituted 
unfair surprise and deprived him of a full and fair opportunity to 
prove "actual malice" on the part of respondents. This contention 
is not supported by the record. It is clear that the trial court 
gave petitioner no reason to assume that the New York Times 
privilege would not be available to respondent. The court's memo-
randum opinion denying respondent 's pretrial motion for summary 
judgment does not state that the New York Times standard was 
inapplicable to this case. Rather, it reveals that the trial judge 
thought it possible for petitioner to make a factual showing sufficient 
to overcome respondent's claim of constitutional privilege. It states 
in part: 
"When there is a factual dispute as to the existence of a<Jtual 
malice, summary judgment is improper. . . . 
"In the instant case a jury might infer from the evidence that 
[respondent's] failure to investigate the truth of the allegations, 
coupled with its receipt of communications challenging the factual 
accuracy of this author in the past amounted to actual malice, th~t 
6 
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ing of a plurality of this Court in Rosenbloom v. Metro,. 
media, 403 U. S. 29 (1971 ) . 
Petitioner a1:'>pealed to contest the applicability of the 
New Yark Times standard to this case. Although the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit doubted the 
correctness of the District Court's determination that 
petitioner was not a public figure, it did not overturn 
that finding.3 It agreed with the District Court that 
respondent could assert the constitutional privilege be-
cause the article concerned a matter of public interest, 
citing this Court's intervening decision ill Rosenbloom v. 
Metromedia, Inc., supra. The Court of Appeals read 
Rosenbloom to require application of the New York 
is, ' reckless disregard' of whether the allegations were true or not. 
New York Times [Co.] v. Sullivan. supra, at 279-280." - F . 
Supp. - , - (ND Ill., Sept. 16, Hl70) 
Thus, petitioner knew or should have known that the outcome of 
the trial might hinge on his ability to show by clear and convincing 
evidence that respondent acted with reckless disregard for the truth. 
And this question remained open throughout the trial. Although 
the court concluded that the applicability of New York Time/! 
rule depended on petitioner's status as a public figure , the court 
did not decide t hat petitioner was not a public figure until all 
the evidence had been presented. Thus petitioner had every 
opportunity, indeed incentive, to prove '' reckless disregard" if he 
could, and he in fact a-ttempted to do so. The record supports the 
observation by the Court of Appeals that petitioner "did present 
evidence of malice (both the 'constitutional' and the 'ill-will ' type) 
to support his damage claim and no such evidence was excluded .. .. " 
- F . 2d,at - . 
3 The court stated : 
" [Petitioner's] considerable stature as a lawyer, author, lecturer, 
and participant in matters of public import undermine the validity 
of the assumption that he is not a 'public figure ' as that term has 
been used by the progeny of New York Times. Nevertheless, for 
purposes of decision we make that assumption and test the avail-
ability of the claim of privilege by the subject matter of the article;.''' 
- F . 2d, at - . 
72-617-0PINION 
GERTZ v. WELCH 1 
Times standard to any publication or broadcast about 
an issue of significant public interest, without regard 
to the position, fame, or anonymity of the person 
defamed, and it concluded that respondent's statements 
concerned such an issue.4 After reviewing the record, 
4 In the Court of Appeals petitioner made an ingenious but un-
availing attempt to show that respondent's defamatory charge against 
him concerned no issue of public or general interest. H-e asserted 
that the subject matter of the article was the murder trial of Officer 
Nuccio and that he did not participate in that proceeding. There-
fore, he argued, even if the subject matter of the article generally 
were protected by the New York Times privilege, under the opinion 
of 'the Rosenbloom plurality, the defamatory statements about him 
were not . The Court of Appeals rejected this argument. It noted 
that the accusations against petitioner played an integral part in 
respondent 's general thesis of a nationwide conspiracy to harass the 
police : 
" [W]e may also assume that the article's basic thesis is false. Never-
theless, under the reasons of New York Times v. Sullivan, even a 
false statement made in support of a false thesis is protected unless 
made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of its 
truth or falsity. It would undermine the rule of that case to permit 
the actual falsity of a statement to determine whether or not its 
publisher is entitled to the benefit of the rule. 
" If, therefore, we put to one side the false character of the article 
and treat it as though its contents were entirely true, it cannot be 
d~nied that the comments about [petitioner] were integral to its 
thesis. They must be tested under the New York Times standard." 
-F. 2d,at-" 
We think that the Cou.rt of Appeals correctly rejected petitioner's 
argument. Its acceptance might lead to arbitrary imposition of 
liability on the basis of an unwise differentiation among kinds 
of factual misstatements. The present case illustrates the point. 
Respondent falsely portrayed petitioner as atl architect of the 
criminal prosecution against Nuccio. On its face this inaccuracy 
does not appear defamatory. Respondent also falsely labelled peti-
tioner a "Leninst" and a "Communist-fronter." These accusations 
are generally considered defamatory. Under petitioner's interpreta-
t ion of the "public or general interest" test, respondent would have 
enjoyed a constitutional privilege to publish defamatory falsehoods if 
8 
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the Court of Appeals endorsed the District Court's con• 
clusion that petitioner had failed to show by clear and 
convincing evidence that respondent had acted with 
"actual malice" as defined by New York Times. There 
was no evidence that the managing editor of American 
Opinion knew of the falsity of the accusations made in 
the article. In fact, he knew nothing about peti-
tioner except what he learned from the article. The 
court correctly noted that mere proof of failure to investi-
gate, without more, cannot establish reckless disregard for 
the truth. Rather, the publisher must act with a "high 
degree of awareness ... of probable falsity." St. Amant 
v. Thompson, 390 U. S. 727, 731 (1968). Accord : 
Beckley Newspaper Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U. S. 81, 84-85 
(1967); Garrison v. Louiswna, 379 U.S. 67, 75-76 (1964). 
The evidence in this case did not reveal that respondent 
had cause for such an awareness. The Court of Appeals 
therefore affirmed - F. 2d - (1972) . For the reasons 
stated below, we now reverse. 
II 
The principal issue in this case is whether a news-
paper or broadcaster that publishes defamatory false-
hoods about an individual who is neither a public 
official nor a public figure may claim a constitu~ 
tional privilege against liability for the injury in-
petitioner had in fact been associated with the criminal prosecution. 
But this would mean that the seemingly innocuous mistake of con-
fusing petitioner's role in the litigation against officer Nuccio would 
destroy the privilege otherwise available for calling petitioner a 
communist-fronter. Thus respondent's privilege to publish state-
ments whose content should have alerted it to the danger of injury 
to reputation would hinge on the accuracy of statements that carried 
with them no such warning. Assuming that none of these statements 
was published with knowledge of falsity or with reckless disregard 
for the truth, we see no reason to distinguish among the inaccuracies. 
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flicted by those statements. The Court considered this 
question on the rather different set of facts presented in 
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U. S. 29 (1971). 
Rosenbloom, a distributor of nudist magazines, was 
arrested for selling allegedly obscene material while mak-
ing a delivery to a retail dealer. The police obtained a 
warrant and seized his entire inventory of 3,000 books and 
magazine. He sought and obtained an injunction pro-
hibiting further police interference with his business. He 
then sued a local radio station for failing to note in two 
of its newscasts that the 3,000 items seized were only 
"reportedly" or "allegedly" obscene and for broadcasting 
references to "the smut literature racket" and to "girlie-
book peddlers" in its coverage of the court proceeding 
for injunctive relief. He obtained a judgment against 
the radio station, but the Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit held the New York Times privilege applicable to 
the broadcast and reversed. 415 F. 2d 892 (1969). 
This Court affirmed the decision below, but no majority 
could agree on a controlling rationale. The eight Justices 5 
who participated in Rosenbloom announced their views 
in five separate opinions, none of which commanded more 
than three votes. The several statements not only re-
veal disagreement about the appropriate result in that 
case; they also reflect divergent traditions of thought 
about the general problem of reconciling the law of 
defamation with the First Amendment. One approach 
has been to extend the New York Times test to an ex-
panding variety of situations. Another has been to vary 
the level of constitutional privilege for defamatory false-
hood with the status of the person defamed. And a third 
view would grant to the press and broadcast media abso-
lute immunity from liability for defamation. To place 
our holding in the proper context, we preface our discus-
5 MR. JusTICE DouGLAS did not partcipate in the consideration or 
decision of this case. 
10 
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sion of this case with a review of the several Rosenbloom 
opinions and their antecedents. 
In affirming the trial court's judgment in the instant 
case, the Court of Appeals relied on MR. JusTICE BREN-
NAN'S conclusion for the Rosenbloom plurality that "all 
discussion and communication involving matters of pub-
lic or general concern" warrant the protection from lia-
bility for defamation accorded by the rule originally enun-
ciated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964). There this Court defined a constitutional privi-
lege intended to free criticism of public officials from the 
restraints imposed by the common law of defamation. The 
Times ran a political advertisement endorsing civil rights 
demonstrations by black students in Alabama and im-
pliedly condemning the performance of local law enforce-
ment officials. A police commissioner established in state 
court that certain misstatements in the advertisement 
referred to him and that they constituted libel per se 
under Alabama law. This showing left the Times with 
the single defense of truth, for under Alabama law 
neither good faith nor reasonable care would protect the-
newspaper from liability. This Court concluded that a 
"rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee• 
the truth of all his factual assertions" would deter pro-
tected speech, id., at 279, and announced the constitu-
tional privilege designed to counter that effect : 
"The constitutional guarantees require, we think, 
a federal rule that prohibits a public official from 
recovery of damages for a defamatory falsehood re-
lating to his official conduct unless he proves that the 
statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, 
in the knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
disregard of whether it was true or not." Id., at 
279-280.6 
6 New York Times and later cases explicated the meaning of the: 
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Three years after New York Times, a majority of the 
Court agreed to extend the constitutional privilege to 
defamatory criticism of "public figures." This extension 
hew standard. In New York Times the Court held that under the 
circumstances the newspaper's failure to check the accuracy of the 
advertisement against news stories in its own files did not establish 
reckless disregard for the truth. Id., at-. In St. Amant v. Thomp-
son, 390 U. S. 727, 731 (1968), the Court equated reckless disregard 
of the truth with subjective awareness of probable falsity: "There 
must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defend~ 
ant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publica.--
tion." In Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U. S. 81 ( i967) , 
the Court emphasized the distinction between the New York Times 
· test of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth and 
. "actual malice" in the traditional sense of ill-will. Garrison v. Loui-
siana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), made plain that the new standard applied 
,to criminal libel laws as well as to civH actions and that it governed 
criticism directed at "anything which might touch on an official's fit~ 
ness for office." Id., at 77. Finally, in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 
75, 85 ( 1966), the Court stated that "the 'public official' designation 
~pplies at the very least to those among the heirarchy of governme.llt 
employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial 
responsibility for or control over the conduct of government affairs.''. 
In Time, Inc . v. Hill, 385 U. S. 374 (1967), the Court applied the 
New York Times standard to actions under an unusual state statute. 
The statute did not create a cause of action for libel. Rather, it pro .. 
vided a remedy for unwanted publicity. Although the law allowed 
recovery of damages for harm caused by exposure to public attention 
rather than by factual inaccuracies, it recognized truth as a complete 
defense. Thus, nondefamatory factual errors could render a publisher 
liable for something akin to invasion of privacy. The Court ruled that 
the defendant in such an action could invoke the New York Times 
privilege regardless of the fame or anonymity of the plaintiff. Speak-
ing for the Court, MR. JusTICE BRENNAN decla red that this holding 
was not an extension of New York Times but rather a parallel line of 
reasoning applying that standard to this discrete context: 
. "This is neither a libel action by a private individual nor a statu-
tory action by a public official. Therefore, although the First 
Amendment principles announced in New York Times guide our 
cofrnhision, we reach that conclusion only by applying these principles 
12 
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was announced in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and iM 
companion Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130, 162 
(1967). The first case involved the Saturday Evening 
Post's charge that Coach Wally Butts of the University 
of Georgia had conspired with Coach Bea.r Bryant of the 
University of Alabama to fix a football game between 
their respective schools. Walker involved an erroneous 
Associated Press account of Brigadier General Edwin 
Walker's participation in a University of Mississippi 
campus riot. Because Butts was paid by a private alumni 
association and Walker had retired from the Army, neither 
could be classified as a "public official" under New Yark 
Times. Although Mr. Justice Harlan announced the 
result in both cases, a majority of the Court agreed with 
Mr. Chief Justice Warren's conclusion that the New York 
Times test should apply to criticism of "public figures" as 
well as "public officials." 1 The Court extended the con-
in this discrete context. It therefore serves no purpose to distinguish 
the facts here from those in New York Times. Were this 
a libel action, the distinction which has been suggested be-
tween the relative opportunities of the public official and the 
private individual to rebut defamatory charges might be germane. 
And the additional state interest in the protection of the individual 
against damages to his reputation would be i-nvolved. Cf. Rosenblatt 
V. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 91 (STEWART, J., concurring) ." Id., at 390-391. 
7 Professor Kalven once introduced a discussion of these cases with 
the apt heading, "You Can't Tell the Players Without a Score Card." 
H . Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment, 1967 
Sup. Ct. Rev. 267, 275 (1967). Only three other Justices joined 
Mr. Justice Harlan's analysis of the issues involved. In his con-
curring opinion, Mr. Chief Justice Warren stated the principle for 
which these cases stand-that the New York Times test reaches both 
public figures and public officials. MR. Jus'l'ICE BRENNAN and MR. 
JUSTICE WHITE agreed with the Chief Justice on that question. 
Mr. Justice Black and MR JUSTICE DouGLAS reiterated their view 
that pliblishers should have an absolute immunity from liability for 
.defamation, but they acquiesed in the Chief Justice's reasoning in 
.order w enable a majority of the Justices to agree on the questio,n 
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stitutional privilege announced in that case to protect 
defamatory criticism of nonpublic officials who "are never-
theless intimately involved in the resolution of important 
public questions, or, by reason of their fame, shape events 
in areas of concern to society at large." Id., at 164. 
In his opinion for the plurality in Rosenbloom v. 
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U. S. 29 (1971), MR. JusTICE 
BRENNAN took the New York Times privilege one step 
further. He concluded that its protection should extend 
to defamatory falsehoods relating to private persons if the 
statements concerned matters of general or public interest. 
He abjured the suggested distinction between public offi-
cials and public figures on the one hand and private indi-
viduals on the other. He focused instead on society's 
interest in learning about certain issues: "If a matter is a 
subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly 
become less so merely because a private individual is 
involved or because in some sense the individual did not 
choose to become involved." 403 U. S., at 43. Thus, 
under the plurality opinion, a private citizen involun-
tarily associated with a matter of general interest has no 
recourse for injury to his reputation unless he can satisfy 
the demanding requirements of the New York Times test. 
Two members of the Court concurred in the result in 
Rosenbloom but departed from the reasoning of the 
plurality. Mr. Justice Black restated his view, long 
shared by MR. JusTICE DOUGLAS, that the First Amend-
ment cloaks the news media with an absolute and in-
defeasible immunity from liability for defamation. Id., 
at 57. MR JusTICE WHITE concurred on a narrower 
ground. Ibid. He concluded that "the First Amend-
ment gives the press and the broadcast media a privilege 
to report and comment upon the official actions of public 
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servants in full detail, with no requirement that the rep .. 
utation or privacy of an individual involved in or affected 
by the official action be spared from public view." Id., 
at 62. He therefore declined to reach the broader ques-
tions addressed by the other Justices. 
Mr. Justice Harlan dissented. Although he had joined 
the opinion of the Court in New York Times, in Curtis 
Publishing Co. he had contested the extension of the 
privilege to public figures. There he had argued that 
a public figure who held no governmental office should 
be allowed to recover damages for defamation "on 
a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constitut-
ing an extreme departure from the standards of in-
vestigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by 
responsible publishers." 388 U. S .. at 155. In his Curtis 
Publishing Co. opinion Mr. Justice Harlan had distin-
guished New Yark Times primarily on the ground that 
defamation actions by public officials "lay close to sedi-
tious libel. ... " Id., at 133. Recovery of damages by 
one who held no public office, however, could not "be 
viewed as a vindication of governmental policy." Id., 
at 154. Additionally, he had intimated that, because 
most public officials enjoyed absolute immunity from 
liability for their own defamatory utterances under Barr 
v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564 (1959) , they lacked a strong 
claim to the protection of the courts. 
In Rosenbloom Mr. Justice Harlan modified these 
views. He acquiesced in the application of the privilege 
to defamation of public figures but argued that a different 
rule should obtain where defamatory falsehood harmed 
a private individual. He noted that a private person 
has less likelihood "of securing access to the channels 
of communication sufficient to rebut falsehoods concern-
ing him" than do public officials and public figures, id., 
.at 70, and has not voluntarily placed himself in the public 
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spotlight. Mr. Justice Harlan concluded that the States 
could constitutionally allow private individuals to re-
cover damages for defamation on the basis of any 
standard of care except liability without fault. 
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL dissented in Rosenbloom in an 
opinion joined by Mn. JuSTICE STEWART. Id., at 78. He 
thought that the plurality's "public or general interest" 
test for determining the applicability of the New Yark 
Times privllege would involve the courts in the dangerous 
business of deciding "what information is relevant to self-
government." Id ., at 79. He also contended that the 
plurality's position inadequately served "society's inter-
est in protecting private individuals from being thrust 
into the public eye by the distorting light of defamation." 
Ibid. MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL therefore reached the con-
clusion, also reached by Mr. Justice Harlan , that the 
States should be "essentially free to continue the evalua-
tion of the common law of defamation and to articulate 
whatever fault standards best suits the State's need," so 
long as the States did not impose liability without fault. 
Id., at 86. The principal point of disagreement among 
the three dissenters concerned punitive charges. Whereas 
Mr. Justice Harlan thought that the States could allow 
punitive damages in amounts bearing "a reasonable and 
purposeful relationship to the actual harm done .. . ," 
id., at 75, MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL concluded that the 
size and unpredictability of jury awards of exemplary 
damages unnecessarily exacerbated the problems of 
media self-censorship and that such damages should 
therefore be forbidden . 
III 
We begin with the common ground. Under the First 
Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. How-
ever pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its 
correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but 
16 
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on the competition of other ideas.8 But there is no coh-
stitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither 
the intentional lie nor the careless error materially ad-
vances society's interest in "uninhibited, robust, and 
wide-open" debate on public issues. New Yark Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S., at 270. They belong to that 
category of utterances which "are no essential part of 
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value 
as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived 
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest 
in order and morality." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 
315 u. s. 568,572 (1942). 
Although the erroneous statement of fact is not worthy 
of constitutional protection , it is nevertheless inevitable in 
free debate. As James Madison pointed out in the Report 
on the Virginia Resolutions of 1798, "Some degree of 
abuse is inseparable from the proper use of everything; 
and in no instance is this more true than that , of the 
press." 4 Elliot's Debates ( 1876), p. 57 L And punish-
ment of error runs the risk of inducing a cautious and 
restrictive exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed 
freedoms of speech and press. Our decisions recognize 
that a rule of strict liability that compels a publisher 
or broadcaster to guarantee the accuracy of his factual 
assertions may lead to intolerable self-censorship. Al-
lowing the media to avoid liability only by proving the· 
truth of all injurious statements does not accord adequate 
protection to First Amendment liberties. As the Court 
stated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, 376 
U. S., at 279, "Allowance of the defense of truth, with 
the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not mean 
8 As Thomas Jefferson made the point in his first Inaugural 
Address: "If there be any among us who wish to dissolve this union 
or change its republican form of government, let them stand undis-
turbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may 
he tolerated where _reasoi:i _is left free to com);>at it." 
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that only false speech will be deterred." The First 
Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in 
order to protect speech that matters. 
The need to avoid self-censorship by the news media is, 
however, not the only societal value at issue. If it were, 
this Court would have embraoed long ago the view that 
publishers and broadcasters enjoy an uncondition;:i,l and 
indefeasible immunity from liability for defamation. See 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,293 (1964) 
(opinion of Black, J.); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 
80 (1964) (opinion of DouGLAS, J.); Curtis Publishing Co. 
v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 170 (1967) (opinion of Black, J.) . 
Such a rule would indeed obviate the fear that the pros-
pect of civil liability for injurious falsehood might dis-
suade a timorous press from the effective exercise of 
First Amendment freedoms. Yet absolute protection for 
the communications media requires a total sacrifice of 
the competing value served by the law of defamation. 
The legitimate state interest underlying the law of libel 
is the compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted 
on them by defamatory falsehoods. We would not lightly 
require the State to abandon this purpose, for, as MR. 
JUSTICE STEWART has reminded us, the individual's right 
to the protection of his own good name 
"reflects no more than our basic concept of the essen-
tial dignity and worth of every human being-a 
concept at the root of any decent system of ordered 
liberty. The protection of private personality, like 
the protection of life itself, is left primarily to the 
individual states under the Ninth and Tenth Amend-
ments. But this does not mean that the right is 
entitled to any less recognition by this Court as a 
basic of our constitutional system." Rosenblatt v. 
Baer, 383 U. S. 75, 92- 93 (1963) (opinion of 
STEWART, J.) . 
18 
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Some tension necessarily exists between the need i or 
a vigorous and uninhibited press and the legitimate in-
terest in redressing wrongful injury. As Mr. Justice 
Harlan stated, "some antithesis between freedom of 
speech and press and libel actions persists, for libel re-
mains premised on the content of speech and limits the 
freedom of the publisher to express certain sentiments, 
at least without guaranteeing legal proof of their sub-
stantial accuracy." Curt-is Publ-ishing Co. v. Butts, 388 
U. S., at 152. In our continuing effort to define the 
proper accommodation between these competing con-
cerns, we have been especially anxious to assure to the 
freedoms of speech and press that "breathing space" 
essential to their fruitful exercise. NAACP v. Button, 
371 U. S. 415, 433 ( 1963). To that end this Court has 
extended a measure of strategic protection to defamatory 
falsehood. 
The New York Times standard defines the level of 
constitutional protection appropriate to the context of 
defamation of a public person. Those who, by reason 
of the notoriety of their achievements or the vigor 
and success with which they seek the public's attention, 
are properly classed as public figures and those who 
hold governmental office may recover for injury to rep-
utation only on clear and convincing proof that the 
defamatory falsehood was made with knowledge of its 
falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth. This 
standard administers an extremely powerful antidote 
to the inducement to media self-censorship of the 
common law rule of strict liability for libel and 
slander. And it exacts a correspondingly high price 
from the victims of defamatory falsehood. Plainly 
many deserving plaintiffs, including some intentionally 
subjected to injury, will be unable to surmount 
the barrier of the New Yark Times test. Despite this 
&ubstantial abridgement of the state law right to com. 
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pensation for wrongful hurt to one's reputation, the 
Court has concluded that the protection of the New 
York Times privilege should be available to publish-
ers and broadcasters of defamtory falsehoods concern-
ing public officials and public figures. New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 ( 1964); Curtis 
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130 (1967). We 
think that these decisions are correct, but we do not 
find their holdings justified solely by reference to the 
interest of the press and broadcast media in immunity 
from liability. Rather, we believe that the New York 
Times rule states an accommodation between this con-
.cern and the limited state interest present in the context 
of libel actions brought by public persons. For the rea-
.sons stated below, we conclude that the state interest 
in compensating injury to the reputation of private 
individuals requires that a different rule should obtain 
with respect to them. 
Theoretically, of course. the balance between the needs 
of the press and the individual's claim to compensation 
for wrongful injury might be struck on a case-by-case 
basis. As Mr. Justice Harlan hypothesized, "it might 
seem, purely as an abstract matter, that the most utili-
tarian approach would be to scrutinize carefully every 
jury verdict in every libel case, in order to ascertain 
whether the final judgment leaves fully protected what-
,ever First Amendment values transcend the legitimate 
state interest in protecting the particular plaintiff who 
prevailed." Rosenbloom v. M etrornedia, I11c., 403 U. S. 
29, 63 (1971) (footnote omitted) . But this approach 
would lead to unpredictable results and uncertain expecta-
tions, and it could render our duty to supervise the lower 
,courts unmanagable. Because an ad hoc resolution of 
the competing interests at stake in each particular case 
is not feasible, we must lay down broad rules of general 
_application. Such rules necessarily treat alike various 
201 
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cases involving differences as well as similarities. Thus 
it is often true that not all of the considerations which 
justify adoption of a given rule will obtain in each par-
ticular case decided under its authority, 
With that caveat we have no difficulty in distinguishing 
among defamation plaintiffs. The first remedy of any 
victim of defamation is self-help-using available oppor-
tunities to contradict the lie or correct the error and 
thereby to minimize its adverse impact on reputation. 
Public officials and public figures usually enjoy signifi-
cantly greater access to ·the channels of effective commu-
nication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to 
counteract false statements than private individuals nor-
mally enjoy.0 Private individuals are therefore more 
vulnerable to injury, and the state interest in protecting 
them is correspondingly greater. 
More important than the likelihood that private indi-
viduals will lack effective opportunities for rebuttal, there 
is a compelling normative consideration underlying the 
distinction between public and private defamation plain-
tiffs. An individual who decides to seek governmental 
office must accept certain necessary consequences of that 
involvement in public affairs. He runs the risk of closer 
public scrutiny than might otherwise be the case. And 
society's interest in the officers of government is not 
strictly limited to the formal discharge of official duties. 
"As the Court pointed out in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 
U.S. 64, 77 (1964), the public's interest extends to "any-
thing that might touch on an official's fitness for office ... . 
Few personal attributes are more germane to fitness for 
·0 Of course, an opportunity for rebuttal seldom suffices to undo 
harm of defamatory falsehood. Indeed, the law of defamation is 
rooted in our experience that the truth rarely catches up with a lie. 
But the fact that the self-help remedy of rebuttal, standing alone, 
is inadequate to its task does not mean that it is irrelevant to ou_r 
inquiry. 
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·office than dishonesty, malfeasance, or improper motiva-
tion, even though these characteristics may also affect 
the official's private character." 
Those classed as public figures stand in a similar posi-
tion. Hypothetically, it may be possible for someone to 
become a public figure through no purposeful action of 
his own, but the instances of truly involuntary public 
figures must be exceedingly rare. For the most part 
those who attain this status have assumed roles of especial 
prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy posi .. 
tions of such persuasive power and influence that they 
are deemed public figures for all purposes. More com-
monly, those classed as public figures have thrust them-
selves to the forefront of particular public controversies 
in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. 
In either event, they invite attention and comment. 
Even if the foregoing generalities do not obtain in every 
instance, the communications media are entitled to act 
on the assumption that public officials and public figures 
have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk 
of injury from defamatory falsehoods concerning them. 
No such assumption is justified with respect to a private 
individual. He has not accepted public office nor as-
sumed an "influential role in ordering society." Curtis 
Publishing Co. v. Butts, supra, 388 U.S., at 164 (opinion 
of Warren, C. J.). He has relinquished no part of his 
interest in the protection of his own good name, and 
consequently he has a more compelling call on the 
courts for redress of injury inflicted by defamatory false-
hood. Thus, private individuals are not only more vul-
nerable to injury than public officials and public figures ; 
they ar.e also more deserving of recovery. 
For these reasons we conclude that the States should 
retain substantial latitude in their efforts to enforce a 
legal remedy for defamatory falsehood injurious to the 
reputation of a private individual. The extension of the 
22 
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New York Times test proposed by the Rosenbloom plu-
rality would abridge this legitimate state interest to a 
degree that we find unacceptable. And it would occa-
sion the additional difficulty of forcing state and federal 
judges to decide on an ad hoc basic which publications 
address issues of "general or public interest" and 
which do not-to determine, in the words of MR. JUSTICE 
MARSHALL, "what information is relevant to self-govern-
ment." Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U. s:, at 
79. We doubt the wisdom of committing this task to the 
conscience of judges. Nor does the Constitution require 
us to draw so thin . a line between the drastic alternatives 
of the New York Times privilege and the common law of 
strict liability for defamatory error. The "public or gen-
eral interest" test for determining the applicability of 
the New York Times standard to private defamation 
actions inadequately serves both of the competing values 
at stake. On the one hand, a private individual whose 
reputation is injured by defamatory falsehood that does 
concern an issue of public or general interest has no re-
course unless he can meet the rigorous requirements of 
New York Times. This is true despite the factors 
that distinguish the state interest in compensating 
private individuals from the analogous interest involved 
in the context of public persons. On the other 
hand, a publisher or broadcaster of a defamatory error 
which a court deems unrelated to an issue of public or 
general interest may be held liable in damages even if it 
took every reasonable precaution to ensure the accuracy 
of its assertions. And liability may far exceed compensa-
tion for any actual injury to the plaintiff, for the jury may 
be permitted to presume damages without proof of loss 
and even to award punitive damages. 
We hold that, so long as they do not impose liability 
without fault, the States may define for themselves the 
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appropriate standard of liability. for a publisher or broad-
caster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private 
individual.10 This approach provides a more equitable 
'IO Our caveat against strict liability is the principal point of 
tleparture for MR. JusTICE WHITE'S dissent. Post, at 16-20. He 
would hold that a publisher or broadcaster may be held liable for 
defamation of a private citizen even though the subject matter 
of the libel was an issue of public concern and even though the 
publisher or broadcaster took every conceivable precaution to ensure 
its accuracy. In his view, one who publishes a statement that 
later turns out to be inaccurate can never by ·•without fault" in any 
meaningful sense, for " [i] t is he who circulated a falsehood that 
he was not required to publish." Post, at 19 ( emphasis added). 
The problem with this view, as we see it, is that it accords no weight 
whatever to the Fir::;t Amendment values implicated by a rule 
requiring the media to guarantee the accuracy of all factual asser-
tions and contradicts the essential premise underlying New York 
Times and every subsequent decision of this Court. This funda-
mental precept is that the prospect of liability for innocent errol: 
will induce a cautious and restrictive exercise of the constitu-
tionally guaranteed freedoms of speech and press: "Allowance of 
t}1e defense of truth, with the burden of proving it on the defendant, 
does not mean that only false speech will be deterred." New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U.S., at 279. 
This core proposition-recognition that the unrestrained rigor of 
the common law of libel does touch First Amendment. concerns-is 
well established in our precedents. In fact , until today no Member 
of the Court had suggested either in New Y or!-.: Times or in any of 
its numerous progeny, that due regard for the constitutional freedoms 
of speech and press could tolerate the imposition of st rict liability 
for media publication of a defamatory falsehood, at least where an 
issue of public or general interest is involved. MR. JUSTICE WHITE 
would avoid the force of the unanimous authority on this point 
by a selective reading of prior decisions. He characterizes New 
York Times as simply a case of seditious libel. Post, at 14. Aside 
from the fact that we do not read that decision so narrowly, the 
rationale of seditious libel is certainly inapplicable to Curtis Pub-
lishing Co. v. Butts, supra. In that case five Members of the Court, 
including MR. JusTICE WHITE, voted to extend the full protection 
9f the knowing-or-reckless-falsity standard to media defamers of ;t 
~4 
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boundary between the competing concerns involved here. 
,It recognizes the strength of the legitimate state interest 
in compensating private individuals for wrongful injury 
to reputation, yet shields the press and broadcast media 
from the rigors of strict liability for defamation. At 
least this conclusion obtai'ns where, as here, the sub-
stance of the defamatory statement "makes substan-
tial danger to reputation apparent." 11 This phrase places 
in perspective the conclusion we announce today. Our 
inquiry would involve considerations somewhat different 
from those discussed above if a State purported to condi-
tion civil liability on a factual misstatement whose 
content did not warn a reasonably prudent editor or 
broadcaster of its defamatory potential. Cf. Time, Inc. 
class of persons having no connecfion with the Government. Al-
though MR. JusTJCE WHITE suggests at one point that he would 
continue to abide by the extension of the New York Times privilege 
to public figures, post, at 26, the full thrust of his dissent-as we 
read it-contradicts that suggestion. Significantly, we think, even 
the four Justices who dissented from the expansion of the knowing-
or-reckless-falsity standard to public figures did not embrace the 
view now proposed by MR . .Tu8TICE WHITE. Instead, they con-
cluded that media defamers of public pen;ons could be held liable 
only on a showing of gross negligence. Final!~· in Rosenbloom v, 
Metromedia, Inc., supra, MR. Jm;ncE WHI1'E 's concurring opinion 
would have applied the New York Times privilege to media defama-
tion of an individual who wa;; neither a public official nor a public 
figure. His opinion states that the knowing-or-reckless-falsity stand-
ard should apply to media "comment upon the official actions of 
public servants," including mere arrests by police-a conclusion 
that would significantly extend New York Times. Again there was 
not a single Justice who concluded that the imposition of money 
damages on the basis of strict liability was com,titutionally pe!::_. ~ 
missible in that case. In sum, Ma. Jus-rICE WHITE ably presents a 
viewpoint that had widr ,;upport prior to New York Times. We 
think, however, that his basic rationalr is directly contrary to the 
decade of precedents of this Court since 1964. 
11 C1,1,rtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130, 155 (1967), 
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v. Hill, 385 U. S. 374 (1967). Such a case is not now 
before us, and we intimate no view as to its proper 
resolution. 
IV 
Our accommodation of the competing values at stake 
in defamation suits by private individuals allows the 
States to impose liability on the publisher or broadcaster 
of defamatory falsehoods on a less demanding showing 
than that required by New York Times. This conclusion 
is not based on a belief that the considerations which 
prompted the adoption of the A' ew York Times privilege 
for defamation of public officials and its extension to 
public figures are wholly inapplicable to the context of 
private individuals. Rather, we endorse this approach 
in recognition of the strong and legitimate state interest 
in compensating private individuals for injury to reputa-
tion. But this countervailing state interest extends no 
further than compensation for actual injury. For the 
reasons stated below, we hold that the States may not 
permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at 
least when liability is not based on a showing of 
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. 
The common law of defamation is an oddity of tort 
law, for it allows recovery of purportedly compensatory 
damages without evidence of actual loss. Under the 
traditional rules pertaining to actions for libel, the exist-
ence of injury is presumed from the fact of publication. 
Juries may award substantial sums as compensation for 
supposed damage to reputation without any proof that 
such harm actually occurred. The largely uncontrolled 
discretion of juries to award damages where there is no 
loss unnecessarily compounds the potential of any sys-
tem of liability for defamatory falsehood to inhibit the 
vigorous exercise of First Amendment freedoms. Addi-
tionally, the doctrine of presumed damages invites juries 
26 
72-617-0PINtON 
GERTZ v. WELCH 
to punish unpopular opinion rather than to compensate 
individuals for injury sustained by the publication of a 
false fact. More to the point, the States have no sub• 
stantial interest in securing for plaintiffs such as this 
petitioner gratuitous awards of money damages far in 
excess of any actual injury. 
We would not, of course, invalidate state law simply 
because we doubt its wisdom, but here we are attempting 
to reconcile state law with a competing interest grounded 
in the constitutional command of the First Amendment. 
It is therefore appropriate to require that state remedies 
for defamatory falsehood reach no farther than is 
necessary to protect the legitimate interest involved. 
It is necessary to restrict defamation plaintiffs who 
do not prove knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard 
for the truth to compensation for actual injury. We 
need not define "actual injury," as trial courts have 
wide experience in framing appropriate jury instruc-
tions in tort action. Suffice it to say that actual 
injury is 11ot limited to out-of-pocket loss. Indeed, the 
more customary types of actual harm inflicted by defam~ 
atory falsehood include impairment of reputation and 
standing in the community, personal humiliation, and 
mental anguish and suffering. Of course, juries must be 
limited by appropriate instructions, and all awards must 
be supported by competent evidence concern111g the in-
jury, although there need be no evidence which assigns 
an actual dollar value to the injury. 
We also find no justification for allowing awards of 
punitive damages against publishers and broadcasters held 
liable under state-defined standards of liability for 
defamation. In most jurisdictions jury diwretion over 
the amounts awarded is limited only by the gentle 
rule that they not be excessive. Consequently, juries 
_assess punitive damages in wholly unpredictable amounts - -
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bearing no necessary relation to the actual harm 
caused. And they remain free to use their discre-
tion selectively to punish expressions of unpopular 
views. Like the doctrine of presumed damages, jury dis-
cretion to award punitive damages unnecessarily exacer~ 
bates the danger of media self-censorship, but, unlike the 
former rule, punitive damages are wholly irrelevant to the 
state interest that justifies a negligence standard for pri-
vate defamation actions. They are not compensation for 
mJury. Instead, they are private fines levied by civil 
juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its 
future occurrence. In short, the private defamatioh 
plaintiff who establishes liability under a less demanding 
standard tha.n that stated by New York Times may 
recover only such damages as are sufficient to compensate 
him for actual injury. 
V 
Notwithstanding our refusal to extend the New York 
Times privilege to defamation of private individuals, 
respondent contends that we should affirm the judgment, 
below on the ground that petitioner is either a public 
o~cial or a public figure. There is little basis for the' 
former assertion. Several years prior to the present in-
cident, petitioner had served briefly on housing commit-
tees appointed by the mayor of Chicago, but at the 
time of publication he had never held any remunera-
tive governmental position. Respondent admits this 
but argues that petitioner's appearance at the coroner's 
inquest rendered him a "de facto public official." Our 
cases recognize no such concept. Respondent's sugges-
tion would sweep all lawyers under the New York Times 
rule as officers of the court and distort the plain meaning 
of the "public official" category beyond all recognition~ 
We decline to follow it. 
28 
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Respondent's characterization of petitioner as a public\ 
figure raises a different question. That designation may 
rest on either of two alternative bases. In some in-
stances an individual may achieve such pervasive fame 
or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all pur-
poses and in all contexts. More commonly, an individual 
voluntary injects himself or is drawn into a particular 
public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure 
for a limited range of issues. In either case such persons 
assume special prominence in the resolution of public 
questions. 
Petitioner has long been active in community and 
professional affairs. He has served as an officer of local 
civil groups and of various professional organizations, 
and he has published several books and articles on legal 
subjects. Although petitioner was consequently well-
known in some circles, he had achieved no general fame 
or notoriety in the community. None of the prospective 
jurors called at the trial had ever heard of petitioner 
prior to this litigation, and respondent offered no proof 
that this response was atypical of the local population. 
We would not lightly assume that a citizen's participa~ 
tion in community and professional affairs rendered him 
a public figure for all purposes. Absent clear evidence 
of general fame or notoriety in the community, and per-
vasive involvement in the affairs of society, an individual 
should not be deemed a public personality for all aspects 
of his life. It is preferable to reduce the public figure 
question to a more meaningful context by looking to the 
nature and extent of an individual's participation in the 
particular controversy giving rise to the defamation. 
In this context it is plain that petitioner was not a 
public figure. He played a minimal role at the coroner's 
inquest, and his participation related solely to his repre-
sentation of a private client. He took no part in the 
criminal prosecution of officer Nuccio. Moreover, he 
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never discussed either the criminal or civil litigation with 
the press and was never quoted as having done so. He 
plainly did not thrust himself into the vortex of this 
public issue, nor did he engage the public's attention in 
an attempt to influence its outcome. We are persuaded 
that the trial court did not err in refusing to characterize 
petitioner as a public figure for the purpose of this 
litigation. 
We therefore conclude that the New York Times stand-
ard is inapplicable to this case and that the trial court 
erred in entering judgment for respondent. Because the 
jury was allowed to impose liability without fault and 
was permitted to presume damages without proof of 
injury, a new trial is necessary. We reverse and remand 
for further proceedings in accord with this opinion. 
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Court. 
This Court has struggled for nearly a decade to define 
the proper accommodation between the law of defama-
tion and the freedoms of speech and press protected by 
the First Amendment. With this decision we return to 
that effort: We granted certiorari to reconsider the ex-
tent of a publisher's constitutional privilege against lia-
bility for defamation of a private citizen. - U. S. -
(1973) . 
I 
In 1968 a Chicago policeman named Nuccio shot and 
killed a youth named Nelson. The state authorities prose-
·cuted Nuccio for the homicide and ultimately obtained 
a conviction for murder in the second degree. The N el-
son family retained petitioner Elmer Gertz, a reputable 
attorney, to represent them in civil litigation against 
Nuccio. 
Respondent publishes American Opinion, a monthly 
outlet for the views of the John Birch Society. Early in 
the 1960's the magazine began to warn of a nationwide 
conspiracy to discredit local law enforcement agencies 
$d create in their stead a national police force capable 
o1f supporting a communist dictatorship. As part of the· 
~ 
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continuing effort to alert the public to this assumed 
danger, the managing editor of American Opinion com-
missioned an article on the murder trial of officer Nuccio. 
For this purpose he engaged a regular contributor to the 
magazine. In March of 1969 respondent published the 
resulting article under the title "FRAME-UP: Richard 
Nuccio And The War On Police." The article purports 
to demonstrate that the testimony against Nuccio at 
his criminal trial was false and that his prosecution was 
part of the communist campaign against the police. 
In his capacity as counsel for the Nelson family in 
the civil litigation, petitioner attended the coroner's in-
quest into the boy's death and initiated actions for 
damages, but he neither discussed officer Nuccio with the 
press nor played any part in the criminal proceeding. 
Notwithstanding petitioner's remote connection with the 
prosecution of Nuccio, respondent's magazine portrayed 
him as an architect of the "frame-up.'J According to 
the article, the police file on petitioner took "a big, Irish 
cop to lift." The article stated that petitioner had been 
an official of the "Marxist League for Industrial Democ-
racy, originally known as the Intercollegiate Socialist 
Society, which has advocated the violent seizure of our 
government." It labelled Gertz a "Leninist" and a 
"Communist-fronter." It also stated that Gertz had 
been an officer of the National Lawyers Guild, described 
as a communist organization that "probably did more 
than any other outfit to plan the Communist attack on 
the Chicago police during the 1968 Democratic conven-
tion." It is undisputed that these statements contained 
serious inaccuracies. The implication that petitioner had 
a criminal record was false. Petitioner had been a mem-
ber and officer of the National Lawyers Guild some 15 
years earlier, but there was no evidence that he or that 
organization had taken any part in planning the 1968 
,demonstrations in Chicago. ';['here was also no basis for 
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the charge that petitioner was a "Leninist" or a "Com-
munist-fronter." And he had never been a member of 
the "Marxist League for Industrial Democracy" or the 
"Intercollegiate Socialist Society." 
The managing editor of American Opinion made no 
effort to verify or substantiate the charges against peti-
tioner. Instead, he appended an editorial introduction 
stating that the author had "concluded extensive re-
search into the Richard Nuccio case." And he included 
in the article a photograph of petitioner and wrote the 
caption that appeared under it: "Elmer Gertz of the 
Red Guild harrasses Nuccio." Respondent placed the 
issue of American Opinion containing the article on sale 
at newsstands throughout the country and distributed 
reprints of the article on the streets of Chicago. 
Petitioner filed a diversity action for libel in the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. 
He claimed that the falsehoods published by respondent 
injured his reputation as a lawyer and a citizen. Before 
filing an answer, respondent moved to dismiss the com-
plaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could 
be granted, apparently on the ground that petitioner 
failed to allege special damages. But the court ruled 
that statements contained in the article constituted libel 
per se under Illinois law and that consequent~y petitioner 
need not plead special damages. 306 F . Supp. 310 (ND 
Ill. 1969). 
After answering the complaint, respondent filed a pre-
trial motion for summary judgment, claiming a constitu-
tional privilege against liability for defamation.1 It 
asserted that petitioner was a public official or a public 
figure and that the article concerned an issue of public 
1 Petitioner filed a cross-motion for summar:v judgment on grounds 
not specified m the record . The Court denied petitioner's cross~ 
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interest and concern. For these reasons, respondent 
argued, it was entitled to invoke the privilege enunciated 
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
Under this rule respondent would escape liability unless 
petitioner could prove publication of defamatory false-
hood "with 'actual malice'-that is, in the knowledge that 
it was false or with reckless disregard for whether it was 
true or not." ld., at 279-280. Respondent claimed 
that petitioner could not make such a showing and 
submitted a supporting affidavit by the magazine's man-
aging editor. The editor denied any knowledge of the 
falsity of the statements concerning petitioner and stated 
that he had relied on the author's reputation and on his 
prior experience with the accuracy and authenticity of 
his contributions to American Opinion. 
The District Court denied respondent's motion for 
summary judgment in a memorandum opinion. - F. 
Supp. - (ND Ill., Sept. 16, 1970). The court did not 
dispute respondent's claim to the protection of the New 
York Times standard. Rather, it concluded that peti-
t ioner might overcome the constitutional privilege by 
making a factual showing sufficient to prove publication 
of defamatory falsehood in reckless disregard of the truth. 
During the course of the trial, however, it became clear 
that the trial court had not accepted all of respondent's 
asserted grounds for applying the New York Times rule 
to this case. It thought that respondent's claim to the 
protection of the constitutional privilege depended on 
the contention that petitioner was either a public official 
under the New York Times decision or a public figure 
under Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130 
(1967), apparently discounting the argument that a 
privilege would arise from the presence of a public issue. 
After all the evidence had been presented but before 
submission of the case to the jury, the court ruled in 
effect that petitioner was neither a public official nor a 
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public figure. It added that, if he were, the resulting ap-
plication of the New York Times standard would require 
a directed verdict for respondent. Because some state-
ments in the article constituted libel per se under Illinois 
law, the court submitted the case to the jury under instruc-
tions that withdrew from its consideration all issues save 
the measure of damages. The jury awarded $50,000 to 
petitioner. 
Following the jury verdict and on further r~flectioni 
the District Court concluded that the N eW York Times 
standard should govern this case even though petitioner 
was not a public official or public figure. It accepted re• 
spondent's contention that that privilege protected dis• 
cussion of any public issue without regard to the status 
of a person defamed therein. Accordingly, the court 
entered judgment for respondent notwithstanding the 
jury's verdict.2 This conclusion anticipated the reason-
2 - F. Supp. - (ND Ill., Dec. 8, 1970) . Petitioner asserts that 
the entry of judgment n. o. v. on the basis of his foilur!-' to show 
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard ior the truth const1tutPd 
unfair surprise and deprived him of a full and fair opportumty to 
prove "actual malice" on the part of respondents . This contention 
is not supported by the record. It is clear that t he trial court 
gave petitioner no reason to assume that the New York Times 
privilege would not be available to respondent. The court's memo-
randum opinion denying respondent 's pretrial motion for summary 
judgment does not state that the New York Times standard was 
inapplicable to t his case. Rather, it reveals that the trial judge 
thought it possible for petitioner to make a factual showing sufficient 
to overcome respondent's claim of constitutional privilege. It states 
in part : 
"When there is a factual dispute as to the existence of actual 
malice, summary judgment is improper. . . 
"In the instant case a jury might infer from the evidence that 
[respondent 's] failure to mvestigate t he truth of the allegations, 
coupled with its receipt of communications challenging the factual 
i:i,ccuracy of this author in the p11st jlmounteq tq ll,ctual maljce, that 
6 
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ing of a plurality of this Court in Rosenbloom v. Metro-
media, 403 U. S. 29 (1971 ). 
Petitioner appealed to contest the applicability of the 
N ew York Times standard to this case. Although the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit doubted the 
'Correctness of the District Court 's determination that 
pet itioner was not a public figure, it did not overturn 
that finding.3 It agreed with the District Court that 
respondent could assert the constitutional privilege be-
cause the article concerned a matter of public interest, 
citing this Court's intervening decision in Rosenbloom v. 
Metromedia, Inc., supra. The Court of Appeals read 
Rosenbloom to require application of the New York 
is, 'reckless disregard' of whether the allegations were true or not. 
New York Times [Co.] v. Sullivan. supra, at 279-280." - F 
Supp.-, - (ND Ill., Sept. 16, 1970) . 
Thus, petitioner knew or should have known that the outcome of 
the t rial might binge on his ability to .;;how by clear and convincing 
evidence that respondent acted with recklc~" d1.;;regard for the tmth. 
And this question remained open throughout the trial. Although 
the court concluded that the applicability of New York Times 
·rule depended on petitioner's status as a public figure, the court 
did not decide that petitioner wa,; not a public figure until all 
the evidence had been pre8ented. Thus petit10ner had every 
opportunity, indeed incentive, to prove ''reckless disregard" if he 
could, and he in fact attempted to do 80. The record .;;upports the 
·observation by the Court of Appeals t hat petitioner "did present 
evidence of malice (both the 'constitu tional' and the 'ill-will' type) 
to support his damage claim and no such evidence wa8 excluded. '' 
-F.2d, at -. 
3 The court stated : 
"[Petitioner's] considerable stature as a lawyer, author, lecturer, 
and participant in matters of public import undermine the validity 
of the assumption that he is not a 'public figure ' as that term has 
been used by the progeny of New Y or!,: Times. Nevertheless, for 
purposes of decision we make that assumption and test the avail-
ability of the claim of privilege by the snbJect matter of the article,"' 
-F.2d,at-. 
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Times standard to any publication or broadcast about 
an issue of significant public interest, without regard 
to the position, fame, or anonymity of the person 
defamed, and it concluded that respondent's statements 
concerned such an issue: After reviewing the record, 
4 In the Court of Appeals petitioner made an ingenious but un-
availing attempt to show that respondent's defamatory charge against 
him concerned no issue of public or general interest. He asserted 
that the subject matter of the article was the murder trial of Officer 
Nuccio and that he did not participate in that proceeding, There• 
fore, he argued, even if the subject matter of the article generally 
were protected by the New York Times prmlege, under the opinion 
of the Rosenbloom plurality, the defamatory "tatements about him 
were not. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument . It noted 
that the accusations against petitioner played an integral part in 
respondent's general thesis of a nationwide conspiracy to harass the 
police: 
" [W]e may also assume that the article's basic thesis is false. Never-
theless, under the reasons of New York Times v. Sullivan, even a 
false statement made in support of a false thesis is protected unless 
made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckle,;s disregard of its 
truth or falsity. It would undermine the rule of that case to permit 
the actual falsity of a statement. to determme whether or not its 
publisher is entitled to the benefit of the rule. 
"If, therefore, we put to one side tlw false character of the article 
and treat it as though its content8 were entirely true, 1t cannot be 
denied that the comments about Lpetitioner] were integral to its 
thesis. They must be tested under the New York Times standard." 
-F. 2d,at-. 
We think that the Court of Appeals correctly rejected petitioner's 
argument. Its acceptance might lead to arbitrary imposition of 
liability on the basis of an unwise differentiation among kind 
of factual misstatement;.. The pre::!ent case illu~trates the point. 
Respondent falsely portrayed petitioner as an architect of the 
criminal prosecution against N ucc10 On its face this inaccura.cy 
does not appear defamatory. Respondent also fal8ely labelled peti-
tioner a "Leninst" and a "Communist-fronter." These accusations 
are generally considered defamatory. Under petitioner's interpreta-
tion of the "public or general interest'' test, respondent would have 
epjoyeq a co,nstitutional privilege to 41ublish defamatory falsehoods if 
8 
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the Court of Appeals endorsed the District Court's con-
clusion that petitioner had failed to show by clear and 
convincing evidence that respondent had acted with 
"actual malice" as defined by New York Times. There 
was no evidence that the managing editor of American 
Opinion knew of the falsity of the accusations made in 
the article. In fact , he knew nothing about peti-
tioner except what he learned from the article. The 
court correctly noted that mere proof of failure to investi-
gate, without more, cannot establish reckless disregard for 
the truth. Rather, the publisher must act with a "high 
degree of awareness ... of probable falsity." St. Amant 
v. Thompson, 390 U. S. 727, 731 (1968). Accord : 
Beckley Newspaper Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U. S. 81, 84-85 
(1967); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 67, 75-76 (1964). 
The evidence in this case did not reveal that respondent 
had cause for such an awareness. The Court of Appeals 
therefore affirmed - F. 2d - (1972). For the reasons 
stated below, we now reverse. 
II 
The principal issue in this case is whether a news-
paper or broadcaster that publishes defamatory false-
hoods about an individual who is neither a public 
official nor a public figure may claim a constitu-
t ional privilege against liability for the injury in-
petitioner had in fact been associated with the criminal prosecution. 
But this would mean that the seemingly innocuous mistake of con-
fusing petitioner 's role in the litigation against officer Nuccio would 
destroy the privilege otherwise available for calling petitioner a 
communist-fronter. Thus respondent's privilege to publish state-
ments whose content should have alerted it to the danger of injury 
to reputation would hinge on the accuracy of statements that carried 
with them no such warning. Assuming that none of these statements 
was published with knowledge of falsity or with reckless disregard 
for the truth, we see no reason to distinguish among the inaccuracies. 
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flicted by those statements. The Court considered this 
question on the rather different set of facts presented in 
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U. S. 29 (1971). 
Rosenbloom, a distributor of nudist magazines, was 
arrested for selling allegedly obscene material while mak-
ing a delivery to a retail dealer. The police obtained a 
warrant and seized his entire inventory of 3,000 books and 
magazine. He sought and obtained an injunction pro-
hibiting further police interference with his business. He 
then sued a local radio station for failing to note in two 
of its newscasts that the 3,000 items seized were only 
"reportedly" or "allegedly" obscene and for broadcasting 
references to "the smut literature racket" and to "girlie-
book peddlers" in its coverage of the court proceeding 
for injunctive relief. He obtained a judgment against 
the radio station, but the Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit held the New York Times privilege applicable to 
the broadcast and reversed. 415 F. 2d 892 (1969). 
This Court affirmed the decision below, but no majority 
could agree on a controlling rationale. The eight Justices 5 
who participated in Rosenbloom announced their views 
in five separate opinions, none of which commanded more 
than three votes. The several statements not only re-
veal disagreement about the appropriate result in that 
case; they also reflect divergent traditions of thought 
about the general problem of reconciling the law of 
defamation with the First Amendment. One approach 
has been to extend the New York Times test to an ex-
panding variety of situations. Another has been to vary 
the level of constitutional privilege for defamatory false-
hood with the status of the person defamed. And a third 
view would grant to the press and broadcast media abso-
lute immunity from liability for defamation. To place 
our holding in the proper context, we preface our discus-
5 MR. JusTICE DOUGLAS did not partcipate in the consideration or 
decision of this case, 
·10 
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sion of this case with a review of the several Rosenbloom 
opinions and their antecedents. 
In affirming the trial court's judgment in the instant 
case, the Court of Appeals relied on MR. JusTICE BREN-
NAN'S conclusion for the Rosenbloom plurality that "all 
discussion and communication involving matters of pub-
· lic or general concern" warrant £he protection from lia-
bility for defamation accorded by the rule originally enun-
, ciated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964). There this Court defined a constitutional privi-
·lege intended to free criticism of public officials from the 
restraints imposed by the common law of defamation. The 
·Times ran a political advertisement endorsing civil rights 
demonstrations by black students in Alabama and im-
pliedly condemning the performance of local law enforce-
ment officials. A police commissioner estabiished in state 
court that certain misstatements in the advertisement 
referred to him and that they constituted libel per se 
under Alabama law. This showing left the Times with 
,the single defense of truth, for under Alabama law 
neither good faith nor reasonable care would protect the 
newspaper from liability. This Court concluded that a 
"rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee 
the truth of all his factual assertions" would deter pro-
-tected speech, id., at 279, and announced the constitu-
:Pional privilege designed to counter that effect: 
"The constitutional guarantees require, we think, 
a federal rule that prohibits a public official from 
recovery of damages for a defamatory falsehood re-
lating to his official conduct unless he proves that the 
statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, 
in the knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
disregard of whether it was true or not." Id., at 
279-280.11 
G..lfew York Tirnes and later cases explicated the meaning of the 
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Three years after New York Times, a majority of the 
Court agreed to extend the constitutional privilege to 
defamatory criticism of "public figures." This extension 
new standard. In New York Times the Court held that under the 
circumstances t he newspaper's failure to check the accuracy of the 
advertisement against news stories in its own files did not establish 
reckless disregard for the truth. Id., at-. In St. Amant v. Thomp-
son, 390 U. S. 727, 731 (1968), the Court equated reckless disregard 
of the truth with subjective awareness of probable falsity: "There 
must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defend-' 
ant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publica-' 
tion." In Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. Si (1967); 
the Court emphasized the distinction between the New York Times 
test of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth and 
"actual malice" in the traditional sense of ill-will. Garrison v. Loui-
siana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), made plain that the new standard applied 
to criminal libel laws as well as to civil actiorts and that it govern!ld 
criticism directed at "anything which might touch on an official's fit-
ness for office." Id., at 77. Finally, in Rosenblatt v. Ba.er, 383 U.S. 
75, 85 ( 1966), the Court stated that "the 'public official' designation 
applies at the very least to those among the heirarchy of government 
'employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial 
responsibility for or control over the conduct of government affairs.'' 
In Time, Jnc . v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), the Court applied the 
New York Times standard to actions under an unusual state statute. 
The statute did not create a cause of action for libel. Rather, it pro-
vided a remedy for unwanted publicity. Although the law allowed 
recovery of damages for harm caused by exposure to public attention 
rather than by factual inaccuracies, it recognized truth as a complete 
defense. Thur:i, nondefamatory factual errors could render a publisher 
liable for something akin to invasion of privacy. The Court ruled that 
the defendant in such an action could invoke the New York Times 
privilege regardless of the fame or anonymity of the plaintiff. Speak-
ing for the Court, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN declared that this holding 
was not an extension of New York Times but rather a parallel line of 
reasoning applying that standard to this discrete context: 
"This is neither a libel action by a private individual nor a statu-
tory action by a public officiaL Therefore, although the First 
Amendment principles announced in New York Times guide our 
cop.ch}siop, we reach that conclllsion only by applying these principles 
!2 
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was announced in Curt-is Publ-ishing Co. v. Butts and its 
companion Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130, 162 
(1967). The first case involved the Saturday Evening 
Post's charge that Coach Wally Butts of the University 
of Georgia had conspired with Coach Bear Bryant of the 
University of Alabama to fix a football game between 
their respective schools. Walker involved an erroneous 
Associated Press account of Brigadier General Edwin 
Walker's pa.rticipation in a University of Mississippi 
Qampus riot. Because Butts was paid by a private alumni 
association and Walker had retired from the Army. neither 
could be classified as a "public official" under New York 
Times. Although Mr. Justice Harlan announced the 
result in both cases, a majority of the Court agreed with 
Mr. Chief Justice Warren's conclusion that the New York 
Times test should apply to criticism of "public figures" as 
well as "public officials." 7 The Court extended the con-
in thi" di6crete context It therefore "ern~ no pmpo~e to distinguish 
the facts here from those m New York Times Were this 
a libel action, the distinction which has been suggested be-
tween the relative opportunities of the public official and the 
private individual to rebut defamatory charges might be germane. 
And the additional state interest in the protection of the individual 
against damages to his reputation would be involved. Cf. Rosenblatt 
v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 91 (STEWART, .T., concurring)." Id ., at 390-391. 
7 Professor Kalven once introduced a discussion of these ca~es with 
the apt heading, "You Can't Tell the Players Without a Score Card." 
H. Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment, 1967 
Sup. Ct. Rev. 267, 275 (1967) . Only three other Justices joined 
Mr. Justice Harlan's analysis of the issues involved. In his con-
curring opinion, Mr. Chief Ju~tice Warren stated the principle for 
which these cases stand-that the New York Times test reaches both 
public figures and public officials. MR. JusncE BRENNAN and MR. 
JusTICE WHITE agreed with the Chief Justice on that question. 
Mr. Justice Black and MR JUSTICE DouGLAS reiterated their view 
that publishers should have an absolute immunity from liability for 
defamation, but they acquiesed in the Chief Justice's reasoning in 
prder to enable a majority of the Justices to agree on the question 
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stitutional privilege announced in that case to protect 
defamatory criticism of nonpublic officials who "are never-
theless intimately involved in the resolution of important 
public questions, or, by reason of their fame, shape events 
in areas of concern to society at large." Id., at 164. 
In his opinion for the plurality in Rosenbloom v. 
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U. S. 29 (1971), MR. JUSTICE 
BRENNAN took the New York Times privilege one step 
further. He concluded that its protection should extend 
to defamatory falsehoods relating to private persons if the 
statements concerned matters of general or public interest. 
He abjured the suggested distinction between public offi-
cials and public figures on the one hand and private indi-
viduals on the other. He focused instead on society's 
interest in learning about certain issues: "If a matter is a 
subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly 
become less so merely because a private individual is 
involved or because in some sense the individual did not 
choose to become involved." 403 U. S., at 43. Thus, 
under the plurality opinion, a private citizen involun-
tarily associated with a matter of general interest has no 
recourse for injury to his reputation unless he can satisfy 
the demanding requirements of the New York Times test. 
Two members of the Court concurred in the result in 
Rosenbloom but departed from the reasoning of the 
plurality. Mr. Justice Black restated his view, long 
shared by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, that the First Amend-
ment cloaks the news media with an absolute and in-
defeasible immunity from liability for defamation. Id., 
at 57. MR JUSTICE WHITE concurred on a narrower 
ground. Ibid. He concluded that "the First Amend-
ment gives the press and the broadcast media a privilege 
to report and comment upon the official actions of public 
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servants in full detail, with no requirement that the rep-
utation or privacy of an individual involved in or affected 
by the official action be spared from public view." Id., 
at 62. He therefore declined to reach the broader ques-
tions addressed by the other Justices. 
Mr. Justice Harlan dissented. Although he had joined 
the opinion of the Court in New York Times, in Curtis 
Publishing Co. he had contested the extension of the 
privilege to public figures. There he had argued that 
a public figure who held no governmental office should 
be allowed to recover damages for defamation "on 
a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constitut-
ing an extreme departure from the standards of in-
vestigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by 
responsible publishers." 388 U.S., at 155. In his Curtis 
Publishing Co. opinion Mr. Justice Harlan had distin-
guished New York Times primarily on the ground that 
defamation actions by public officials "lay close to sedi-
tious libel. ... " Id., at 133. Recovery of damages by 
one who held no public office, however, could not "be 
viewed as a vindication of governmental policy." Id., 
at 154. Additionally, he had intimated that, because 
most public officials enjoyed absolute immunity from 
liability for their own defamatory utterances under Barr 
v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564 (1959 ), they lacked a strong 
claim to the protection of the courts. 
In Rosenbloom Mr. Justice Harlan modified these 
views. He acquiesced in the application of the privilege 
to defamation of public figures but argued that a different 
rule should obtain where defamatory falsehood harmed 
a private individual. He noted that a private person 
has less likelihood "of securing access to the channels 
of communication sufficient to rebut falsehoods concern-
ing him" than do public officials and public figures, id., 
at 70, and h,a,s not voluntarily placed himself in the public 
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spotlight. Mr. Justice Harlan concluded that the States 
could constitutionally allow private individuals to re-
cover damages for defamation on the basis of any 
standard of care except liability without fault. 
MR. JusrrcE MARSHALL dissented in Rosenbloom in an 
opinion joined by MR. JUSTICE STEWART. Id., at 78. He 
thought that the plurality's "public or general interest" 
test for determining the applicability of the New York 
Times priv1lege would involve the courts in the dangerous 
business of deciding "what information is relevant to self-
government." Id., at 79. He also contended that the 
plurality's position inadequately served "society's inter-
est in protecting private individuals from being thrust 
into the public eye by the distorting light of defamation." 
Ibid. MR. JusTICE MARSHALL therefore reached the con-
clusion, also reached by Mr. Justice Harlan, that the 
States should be "essentially free to continue the evalua-
tion of the common law of defamation and to articulate 
whatever fault standards best suits the State's need," so 
long as the States did not impose liability without fault. 
Id., at 86. The principal point of disagreement among 
the three dissenters concerned punitive charges. Whereas 
Mr. Justice Harlan thought that the States could allow 
punitive damages in amounts bearing "a reasonable and 
purposeful relationship to the actual harm done ... ," 
id., at 75, MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL concluded that the 
size and unpredictability of jury awards of exemplary 
damages unnecessarily exacerbated the problems of 
media self-censorship and that such damages should 
therefore be forbidden 
III 
We begin with the common ground. Under the First 
Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. How-
ever pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its 
correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but 
16 
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on the competition of other ideas.8 But there is no con-
stitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither 
the intentional lie nor the careless error materially ad-
vances society's interest in "uninhibited, robust. and 
wide-open" debate on public issues. New Yark Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S., at 270. They belong to that 
category of utterances which "are no essential part of 
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value 
as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived 
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest 
in order and morality." Chaplwsky \,. l\'ew Hampshire, 
315 u. s. 568,572 (1942) . 
Although the erroneous statement of fact is not worthy 
of constitutional protection, it is nevertheless inevitable in 
free debate. As James Madison pointed out .in the Report 
on the Virginia Resolutions of 1798. "Some degree of 
abuse is inseparable from the proper use of everything; 
and in no instance is this more true than that of the 
press." 4 Elliot's Debates (1876), p. 571. And punish-
ment of error runs the risk of inducing a cautious and 
restrictive exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed 
freedoms of speech and press. Our decisions recognize 
that a rule of strict liability that compels a publisher 
or broadcaster to guarantee the accuracy of his factual 
assertions may lead to intolerable self-censorship. Al-
lowing the media to avoid liability only by proving the 
truth of all injurious statements does not accord adequate 
,protection to First Amendment liberties. As the Court 
stated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, 376 
U. S., at 279, "Allowance of the defense of truth, with 
the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not mean 
8 As Thomas Jefferson made the point in his first Inaugural 
Address: "If there be any among us who wish to dissolve this union 
or change its republican form of government , let them stand undis-
turbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may 
be tolerated where reasop is left free to combat 1t," 
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that only false speech will be deterred." The First 
Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in 
order to protect speech that matters. 
The need to avoid self-censorship by the news media is, 
however, not the only societal value at issue. If it were, 
this Court would have embraced long ago the view that 
publishers and broadcasters enjoy an unconditional and 
indefeasible immunity from liability for defamation. See 
New York Times Co. v.Sullivan,376 U.S. 254,293 (1964) 
(opinion of Black, J.); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 
80 ( 1964) ( opinion of DouGLAS, J.) ; Curtis Publishing Co . 
v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 170 (1967) (opinion of Black., J. ). 
Such a rule would indeed obviate the fear that the pros-
pect of civil liability for injurious falsehood might dis-
suade a timorous press from the effective exercise of 
First Amendment freedoms. Yet absolute protection for 
the communications media requires a total sacrifice of 
the competing value served by the law of defamation. 
The legitimate state interest underlying the law of libel 
is the compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted 
on them by defamatory falsehoods. We would not lightly 
require the State to abandon this purpose, for, as MR. 
JusTICE STEWART has reminded us , the individual's right 
to the protection of his own good name 
"reflects no more than our basic concept of the essen-
tial dignity and worth of every human being-a 
concept at the root of any decent system of ordered 
liberty. The protection of private personality, like 
the protection of life itself, is left primarily to the 
individual states under the Ninth and Tenth Amend-
ments. But this does not mean that the right is 
entitled to any less recognition by this Court as a 
basic of our constitutional system." Rosenblatt v. 
Baer, 383 U. S. 75, 92-93 ( 1963) ( opinion of 
STEWART, J o) o 
18 
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Some tension necessarily exists between the need for 
a vigorous and uninhibited press and the legitimate in-
terest in redressing wrongful injury. As Mr. Justice 
Harlan stated, "some antithesis between freedom of 
speech and press and libel actions persists, for libel re-
mains premised on the content of speech and limits the 
freedom of the publisher to express certain sentiments, 
at least without guaranteeing legal proof of their sub-
stantial accuracy." Curt-is Publ-ishing Co. v. Butts, 388 
U. S., at 152. In our continuing effort to define the 
proper accommodation between these competing con-
cerns, we have been especially anxious to assure to the 
freedoms of speech and press that "breathing space'' 
essential to their fruitful exercise. NAACP v. Button, 
371 U. S. 415, 433 ( 1963) . To that end this Court has 
extended a measure of strategic protection to defamatory 
falsehood. 
The New Yark Times standard defines the level of 
constitutional protection appropriate to the context of 
defamation of a public person. Those who, by reason 
of the notoriety of their achievements or the vigor 
and success with which they seek the public's attention, 
are properly classed as public figures and those who 
hold governmental office may recover for injury to rep-
utation only on clear and convincing proof that the 
defamatory falsehood was made with knowledge of its 
falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth. This 
standard administers an extremely powerful antidote 
to the inducement to media self-censorship of the 
common law rule of strict liability for libel and 
slander. And it exacts a correspondingly high price 
from the victims of defamatory falsehood. Plainly 
many deserving plaintiffs, including some intentionally 
subjected to injury, will be unable to surmount 
the barrier of the New York Times test. Despite this 
substantial abridgement of the state law right to com-
72---617-0l>INlON 
GERTZ v. WELCH 19 
pensation for wrongful hurt to one's reputation, the 
Court has concluded that the protection of the New 
York Times privilege should be available to publish-
·ers and broadcasters of defamtory falsehoods concern-
ing public officials and public figures. New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 ( 1964); Curt-is 
Publi.shing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130 (1967). We 
think that these decisions are correct, but we do not 
find their holdings justified solely by reference to the 
interest of the press and broadcast media in immunity 
from liability. Rather, we believe that the New York 
Times rule states an accommodation between this con-
·cern and the limited state interest present in the context 
'of libel actions brought by public persons. For the rea-
sons stated below, we conclude that the state interest 
in compensating injury to the reputation of private 
1ndividuals requires that a different rule should obtain 
·with respect to them. 
Theoretically, of course. the balance between the nrecls 
-0f the press and the individual's claim to compensation 
for wrongful injury might be struck on a case-by-case 
basis. As Mr. Justice Harlan hypothesized, "it might 
seem, purely as an abstract matter, that the most utili-
tarian approach would be to scrutinize carefully every 
jury verdict in every libel case, in order to ascertain 
whether the final judgment leaves fully protected what-
·ever First Amendment values transcend the legitimate 
state interest in protecting the particular plaintiff \\'ho 
prevailed." Rosenbloom Y. Metromedia, l11c., 403 U. S, 
29, 63 (1971) (footnote omitted). But this approach 
would lead to unpredictable results and uncertam expecta-
tions, and it could render our duty to supervise the lower 
courts unmanagable. Because an ad hoc resolution of 
the competing interests at stake in each particular case 
is not feasible, we must lay down broad rules of general 
/application. Such rules nec,essarily treat alike vanous 
20l 
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cases involving differences as well as similarities. Thus 
it is of ten true that not all of the considerations which 
justify adoption of a given rule will obtain in each par-
ticular case decided under its authority. 
With that caveat we have no difficulty in distinguishing 
among defamation plaintiffs. The first remedy of any 
victim of defamation is self-help-using available oppor-
tunities to contradict the lie or correct the error and 
thereby to minimize its adverse impact on reputation_. 
Public officials and public figures usually enjoy signin-
cantly greater access to the channels of effective commu-
nication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to 
counteract false statements than private individuals nor-
mally enjoy.9 Private individuals are therefore more 
vulnerable to "injury, and the state interest in protecting 
them is correspondingly greater. 
More important than the likelihood that private indi-
viduals will lack effective opportunities for rebuttal, there 
is a compelling normative consideration underlying the 
distinction between public and private defamation plain-
tiffs. An individual who decides to seek governmental 
office must accept certain necessary consequences of that 
involvement in public affairs. He runs the risk of closer 
public scrutiny than might otherv. ise be the case. And 
society's interest in the officers of government is not 
strictly limited to the formal discharge of official duties. 
As the Court pointed out in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 
U.S. 64, 77 (1964), the public's interest extends to "any-
thing that might touch on an official's fitness for office .... 
Few personal attributes are more germane to fitness for 
0 Of course, an opportunity for rebuttal :,;eldom suffices to undo 
harm of defamatory falsehood. Indeed, the law of defamation is 
rooted in our experience that the truth rarely catches up with a lie. 
But the fact that the self-help remedy of rebuttal, standing alone, 
is inadequate to its task does not mean that it is irrelevant to O\lf 
inquiry. 
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office than dishonesty, malfeasance, or improper motiva-
tion, even though these characteristics may also affect 
the official's private character." 
Those classed as public figures stand in a similar posi-
tion. Hypothetically, it may be possible for someone to 
become a public figure through no purposeful action of 
his own, but the instances of truly involuntary public 
figures must be exceedingly rare. For the most part 
those who attain this status have assumed roles of especial 
prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy posi-
tions of such persuasive power and influence that they 
are deemed public figures for all purposes. More com-
monly, those classed as public figures have thrust them-
selves to the forefront of particular public controversies 
in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. 
In either event, they invite attention and comment. 
Even if the foregoing generalities do not obtain in every 
instance, the communications media are entitled to act 
on the assumption that public officials and public figures 
have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk 
of injury from defamatory falsehoods concerning them. 
No such assumption is justified with respect to a private 
mdividual. He has not accepted public office nor as-
sumed an "influential role in ordering society." Curti,s 
Publishing Co. v. Butts, supra, 388 U. S .. at 164 ( opinion 
of Warren, C. J.). He has relinquished no part of his 
interest in the protection of his own good name, and 
consequently he has a more compelling call on the 
courts for redress of injury infhcted by defamatory false-
hood. Thus, private individuals arc not only more vul-
nerable to injury than public officials and public figures ; 
they are also more deserving of recovery. 
For these reasons we conclude that the States should 
retain substantial latitude in their efforts to enforce a 
legal remedy for defamatory falsehood injurious to the 
reputation of a private individual. The extension of the 
22 
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New York Times test proposed by the Rosenbloom plu-
rality would abridge this legitimate state interest to a 
degree that we find unacceptable. And it would occa-
sion the additional difficulty of forcing state and federal 
judges to decide on an ad hoc basic which publications 
address issues of "general or public interest" and 
which do not-to determine, in the words of MR. JUSTICE 
MARSHALL, "what information is relevant to self-govern-
ment." Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U. S., at 
79. We doubt the wisdom of committing this task to the 
conscience of judges. Nor does the Constitution require 
us to draw so thin a line between the drastic alternatives 
of the New York Times privilege and the common law of 
strict liability for defamatory error. The "public or gen-
eral interest" test for determining the applicability of 
the New York Times standard to private defamation 
actions inadequately serves both of the competing values 
at stake. On the one hand, a private individual whose 
reputation is injured by defamatory falsehood that does 
concern an issue of public or general interest has no re-
course unless he can meet the rigorous requirements of 
New York Times. This is true despite the factors 
that distinguish the state interest in compensating 
private individuals from the analogous interest involved 
in the context of public persons. On the other 
hand, a publisher or broadcaster of a defamatory error 
which a court deems unrelated to an issue of public or 
general interest may be held liable in damages even if it 
took every reasonable precaution to ensure the accuracy 
of its assertions. And liability may far exceed compensa-
tion for any actual injury to the plaintiff, for the jury may 
be permitted to presume damages without proof of loss 
and even to award punitive damages. 
We hold that, so long as they <lo not impose liability 
w~thout fault, the States may define for themselves the 
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appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broad-
caster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private 
individual.10 This approach provides a more equitable 
boundary between the competing concerns involved here. 
It recognizes the strength of the legitimate state interest 
in compensating private individuals for wrongful injury 
to reputation, yet shields the press and broadcast media 
from the rigors of strict liability for defamation. At 
least this conclusion obtains where, as here, the sub-
stance of the defamatory statement "makes substan-
10 Our caveat against strict liability i1:, the prmc1pal point of 
departure for MR. JusTICE WHITE's dissent. Post. at 16-20. He 
would hold that a publisher or broadcaster may be held liable for 
defamation of a private citizen even though the subject matter 
of the libel was an issue of public concern and even though the 
publisher or broadcaster took every conceivable precaution to ensu re 
its accuracy. In his view, one who publishes a statement that 
later turns out to be inaccurate can never by "without fault" in any 
meaningful sense, for "[i]t is he who circulated a falsehood that 
he was not required to publish." Post, at 19 (emphasis added) . 
1IR . .JuH'I'ICE ~ 7HJ'l'E charartenzp:,; iVetr l'od· Tones a~ sunply 
a case of seditious libel. Post, at H. But thr rat1onalP of ::;ed1tiou:-
libel is certain!~· inapplirable 1o Curtis Pubh~h111g Co. ,·. Butts. supm. 
In that ca:-<e five .:\Iembrrs of the Court. mrludmg '.\IR. ,JunrcE 
WHr'l'E, voted to extend the full protcrt1011 of the knowing-or-rrrkles" 
falsi ty standnrd to media defamC'rs of prr:;on:< identifi etl at' public 
figu res even though the~· have no ronnect 1011 with the Gowrnment 
Alt hough ;\IR. Jus'l'ICE WHJTE suggest" at one pomt that hr wonld 
continue to abide by the extension of the Neu• l'urk Times priv11Pge 
to public figu res, post, at 2G, the full thru::<t of the dis:;ent-a,; wr read 
it-contradicts that 15ugge::;t1on . Fmally m Rosc11b!oo111 \ ;ifrtro-
media, Inc ., supra, '.\IH .. JusTJCE WHITE ':-< ('011curn11g opm1on would 
have applird the New rvrk Times pr1vilrgc to media ddamation of 
an md1v1cl11al who wal:' neither a public oliirial nor a p11blir figure 
Hi;; opinion ::;tate,; that the knowing-or-rPrkles;:;-fal:,nt~· :;tandarcl 
should apply to media "comment upon the offirml action~ of public 
,;ervantf'," induding mere arre::;ts by po!Jcp-a conclu,-1011 that would 
~igmficantly extend Neu; York Times. 
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tial danger to reputation apparent." n This phrase places 
in perspective the conclusion we announce today. Our 
inquiry would involve considerations somewhat different 
from those discussed above if a State purported to condi-
tion civil liability on a factual misstatement whose 
content did not warn a reasonably prudent editor or 
broadcaster of its defamatory potential. Cf. Time, Inc. 
v. Hill, 385 U. S. 374 ( 1967). Such a case is not now 
before us, and we intimate no view as to it~ proper 
resolution. 
IV 
Our accommodation of the conqwting values at stake 
• in defamation suits by private individuals allows the 
tates to impose liability on the publisher or broadcaster 
of defamatory falsehoods on a less demanding showing 
than that required by New York Times. This conclusion 
is not based on a belief that the considerations which 
prompted the adoption of the New York Times privilege 
for defamation of public offiwdc;; ·rn l its exte11s10n to 
public figures are wholly inapplicable to the context of 
private individuals. Rather, we endorse this approach 
in recognition of the strong and legitimate state interest 
in compensating private 111d1v1dua]s for injury to reputa-
tion. But this countervailing state interest , extends no 
further than compensation for actual injury. For the 
reasons stated below, we hold that the States may not 
· permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at 
least when liability is not based on a showing of 
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. 
The common law of defamation is an oddity of tort 
law, for it allows recovery of purportedly compensatory 
damages without evidence of actual loss. Under the 
traditional rules pertaining to actions for libel, the exist~ 
;n Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 r S. 130, 155 {1967). 
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ence of injury is presumed from the fact of publication. 
Juries may award substantial sums as compensation for 
supposed damage to reputation without any proof that 
such harm actually occurred. The largely uncontrolled 
discretion of juries to award damages where there is no 
loss unnecessarily compounds the potential of any sys-
tem of liability for defamatory falsehood to inhibit the 
vigorous exercise of First Amendment freedoms. Addi-
tionally, the doctrine of presumed damages invites juries 
to punish unpopular opinion rather than to compensate 
individuals for injury sustained by the publication of a 
false fact . More to the point, the States have no sub-
stantial interest in securing for plaintiffs such as this 
petitioner gratuitous awards of money damages far in 
excess of any actual injury. 
We would not, of course, invalidate state law simply 
because we doubt its wisdom, but here we are attempting 
to reconcile state la\\ with a competing i11terest grounded 
m the constitutional command of the First Amendment. 
It is therefore appropriate to require that state remedies 
for defamatory falsehood reach no farther than is 
necessary to protect the legitimate interest involved. 
It is necessary to restrict defamation plaintiffs who 
do not prove knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard 
for the truth to compensation for actual injury. We 
need not define ''actual mjury_" as trial courts have 
wide experience in framing appropriate Jury instruc-
tions in tort action. Suffice it to say that actual 
injury is 11ot limited to out-of-pocket loss. Indeed, the 
more customary types of actual harm wflicted by defam .. 
atory falsehood include impairment of reputation and 
standing in the community, personal humiliation, and 
mental anguish and suffering. Of course, juries must be 
limited by appropriate mstrnctions and all awards must 
be supported by com1wte11t e,·idC'111•<c <'OtH'erning; tlw in-. 
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jury, although there need be no evidence which assigns 
an actual dollar value to the injury. 
We also find no justification for allowing awards of 
punitive damages against publishers and broadcasters held 
liable under state-defined standards of liability for 
defamation. In most jurisdictions jury discretion over 
the amounts awarded is limited only by the gentle 
rule that they not be excessive. Consequently, juries 
assess punitive damages in wholly unpredictable amounts 
bearing no necessary relation to the actual harm 
caused. And they remain free to use their discre-
tion selectively to punish expresswns of unpopular 
views. Like the doctrine of presumed damagef:i, jury dis-
cretion to award punitive damages unnecessarily exacer-
bates the danger of media self-censorship, but, unlike the 
former rule, punitive damages are wholly irrelevant to the 
state interest that justifies a negligence standard for pri-
vate defamation actions. They are not compensation for 
injury. Instead, they are private fines levied by civil 
juries to punish reprehensible conduct aud to deter its 
future occurrence. In short, the private defamat10n 
plaintiff who establishes liability under a less demanding 
standard than that stated by New Yark Times may 
recover only such damages as are sufficient to compensate 
him for actual injury. 
V 
Notwithstanding our refusal to extend the New York 
Times privilege to defamation of private individuals, 
respondent contends that we should aHirm the Judgment 
below on the ground that petitioner is either a public 
official or a public figure. There is little basis for the 
former assertion. Several years prior to the present m-
cident, petitioner had served briefly on housing commit-
·tees appointed by the mayor of Chicago, but at the 
72-617-0PINION 
GERTZ v. WELCH 27 
time of publication he had never held any remunera-
tive governmental position. Respondent admits this 
but argues that petitioner's appearance at the coroner's 
inquest rendered him a "de facto public official." Our 
cases recognize no such concept. Respondent's sugges-
tion would sweep all lawyers under the New Yark Times 
rule as officers of the court and distort the plain meaning 
of the "public official" category beyond all recognition. 
We decline to follow it. 
Respondent's characterization of petitioner as a public 
figure raises a different question. That designation may 
rest on either of two alternative bases. In some in-
stances an individual may achieve such pervasive fame 
or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all pur-
poses and in all contexts. More commonly, an individual 
voluntary injects himself or is drawn into a particular 
public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure 
for a limited range of issues. In either case such persons 
assume special prominence in the resolution of public 
questions. 
Petitioner has long been active in community and 
professional affairs. He has served as an officer of local 
civil groups and of various professional organizations, 
and he has published several books and articles on legal 
subjects. Although petitioner was consequently well-
known in some circles, he had achieved no general fame 
or notoriety in the community. None of the prospective 
jurors called at the trial had ever heard of petitioner 
prior to this litigation, and respondent offered no proof 
that this response was atypical of the local population. 
We would not lightly assume that a citizen's participa-
tion in community and professional affairs rendered him 
a public figure for all purposes. Absent clear evidence 
of general fame or notoriety in the community, and per-
vasive involvement in the affairs of society, an individual 
28 
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should not be deemed a public personality for all aspects 
of his life. It is preferable to reduce the public figure 
question to a more meaningful context by looking to the 
nature and extent of an individual's participation in the 
particular controversy giving rise to the defamation. 
In this context it is plain that petitioner was not a 
public figure. He played a minimal role at the coroner's 
inquest, and his participation related solely to his repre-
sentation of a private client. He took no part in the 
criminal prosecution of officer Nuccio. Moreover, he 
never discussed either the criminal or civil litigation with 
the press and was never quoted as having done so. He 
plainly did not thrust himself into the vortex of this 
public issue, nor did he engage the public's attention in 
an attempt to influence its outcome. We are persuaded 
that the trial court did not err in refusing to characterize 
petitioner as a public figure for the purpose of this 
· litigation. 
We therefore conclude that the New York Times stand-
ard is inapplicable to this case and that the trial court 
erred in entering judgment for respondent. Because the 
jury was allowed to impose liability without fault and 
was permitted to presume damages without proof of 
injury, a new trial is necessary. We reverse and remand 
ior further proceedings in accord with this opinion. 
U is so ordered .. 
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This Court has struggled for nearly a decade to define 
the proper accommodation between the law of defama-
tion and the freedoms of speech and press protected by 
the First Amendment. With this decision we return to 
that effort. We granted certiorari to reconsider the ex-
tent of a publisher's constitutional privilege against lia-
bility for defamation of a private citizen. 410 U. S. 925 
(1973)0 
I 
In 1968 a Chicago policeman named Nuccio shot and 
killed a youth named Nelson. The state authorities prose-
cuted Nuccio for the homicide and ultimately obtained 
a conviction for murder in the second degree. The Nel-
son family retained petitioner Elmer Gertz, a reputable 
attorney, to represent them in civil litigation against 
Nuccioo 
Respondent publishes American Opinion, a monthly 
outlet for the views of the John Birch Society. Early in 
the 1960's the magazine began to warn of a nationwide 
conspiracy to discredit local law enforcement agencies 
and create in their stead a national police force capable 
9f supporting a communist dictatorship. As part of the 
~ 
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continuing effort to alert the public to this assumed 
danger, the managing editor of American Opinion com-
missioned an article on the murder trial of officer Nuccio, 
For this purpose he engaged a regular contributor to the 
magazine. In March of 1969 respondent published the 
resulting article under the title "FRAME-UP: Richard 
Nuccio And The War On Police." The article purports 
to demonstrate that the testimony against Nuccio at 
his criminal trial was false and that his prosecution was 
part of the communist campaign against the police. 
In his capacity as counsel for the Nelson family in 
the civil litigation, petitioner attended the coroner's in--
quest into the boy's death and initiated actions for-
damages, but he neither discussed officer Nuccio with the 
press nor played any part in the criminal proceeding. 
Notwithstanding petitioner's remote connection with the 
prosecution of Nuccio, respondent's magazine portrayed 
him as an architect of the "frame~up." According to· 
the article, the police file on petitioner took "a big, Irish 
cop to lift." The article stated that petitioner had been 
an official of the "Marxist League for Industrial Democ-
racy, originally known as the Intercollegiate Socialist 
Society, which has advocated the violent seizure of our 
government." It labelled Gertz a "Leninist" and a 
"Communist-fronter." It also stated that Gertz had 
been an officer of the National Lawyers Guild, described 
as a communist organization that "probably did morn 
.than any other outfit to plan the Communist attack 
on the Chicago police during the 1968 Democratic· 
convention. " 
These staten1ents contained serious inaccuracies. The 
implication that petitioner had a criminal record was· 
false. Petitioner had been a member and officer of the 
National Lawyers Guild some 15 years earlier, but there-
was no evidence that he or that organization had taken 
.any part in planning the 1968 demonstrations in Chicago. 
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There was also no basis for the charge that petitioner was 
a "Leninist'' or a "Communist-fronter." And he had 
never been a member of the "Marxist League for In-
dustrial Democracy'' or the "Intercollegiate Socialist 
Society." 
The managing editor of American Opinion made no 
effort to verify or substantiate the charges against peti-
tioner. Instead, he appended an editorial introduction 
stating that the author had "concluded extensive re-
search into the Richard Nuccio case." And he included 
in the article a photograph of petitioner and wrote the 
caption that appeared under it: "Elmer Gertz of the 
Red Guild harrasses Nuccio." Respondent placed the 
issue of American Opinion containing the article on sale 
at newsstands throughout the country and distributed 
reprints of the article on the streets of Chicago. 
Petitioner filed a diversity action for libel in the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. 
He claimed that the falsehoods published by respondent 
injured his reputation as a lawyer and a citizen. Before 
filing an answer, respondent moved to dismiss the com-
plaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could 
be granted, apparently on the ground that petitioner 
failed to allege special damages. But the court ruled 
that statements contained in the article constituted libel 
per se under Illinois law and that consequently petitioner 
need not plead special damages. 306 F . Supp. 310 (ND 
Ill. 1969), 
After answering the complaint, respondent filed a pre~ 
trial motion for summary judgment, claiming a constitu .. 
tional privilege against liability for defamation.1 It 
asserted that petitioner was a public official or a public 
1 Petitioner filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on grounds 
not specified in the record. The Court denied petitioner's cross~ 
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figure and that the article concerned an issue of public 
interest and concern. For these reasons, respondent 
· argued, it was entitled to invoke the privilege enunciated 
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
Under this rule respondent would escape liability unless 
petitioner could prove publication of defamatory false-
hood "with 'actual malice'-that is, in the knowledge that 
it was false or with reckless disregard for whether it was 
true or not." Id., at 279-280. Respondent claimed 
that petitioner could not make such a showing and 
submitted a supporting affidavit by the magazine's man-
aging editor. The editor denied any knowledge of the 
falsity of the statements concerning petitioner and stated 
that he had relied on the author's reputation and on his 
prior experience with the accuracy and authenticity of 
his contributions to American Opinion. 
The District Court denied respondent's motion for 
summary judgment in a memorandum opinion of Sept. 16, 
1970. The court did not dispute respondent's claim to 
the protection of the New York Times standard. Rather, 
it concluded that petitioner might overcome the consti-
tutional privilege by making a factual showing sufficient 
to prove publication of defamatory falsehood in reckless 
disregard of the truth. During the course of the trial, 
however, it became clear that the trial court had not ac-
cepted all of respondent's asserted grounds for applying 
the New York Times rule to this case. It thought that 
respondent's claim to the protection of the constitutional 
privilege depended on the contention that petitioner was 
either a public official under the New Yark Times deci~ 
sion or a public figure under Curtis Publishing Co. v. 
Butts, 388 U. S. 130 (1967), apparently discounting the 
argument that a privilege would arise from the presence 
of a public issue. After all the evidence had been pre .. 
sented but before submission of the case to the jury, the 
court ruled in effect that petitioner was neither a public 
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official nor a public figure . It added that, if he were, the 
resulting application of the New York Timl3s standard 
would require a directed verdict for respondent. Because 
some statements in the article constituted libel per se 
under Illinois law, the court submitted the case to the 
jury under instructions that withdrew from its considera-
tion all issues save the meas:ure of damages. The jury 
awarded $50,000 to petitioner. 
Following the jury verdict and on further reflection, 
the District Court concluded that the New York Times 
standard should gqvern this case · even though petitioner 
was not a public official or public figure. It accepted re-
spondent's contention that that privilege protected dis-
cussion of any public issue without regard to the status 
of a person defamed therein. Accordingly, the court 
entered judgment for respondent notwithstanding the 
jury's verdict.2 This conclusion anticipated the reason-
2 322 F. Supp. 997 (ND Ill ., Dec. 8, 1970). Petitioner asserts that 
the entry of judgment n. o. v. on the basis of his failure to show 
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth constituted 
unfair surprise and deprived him of a full and fair opportunity to 
prove "actual malice" on the part of respondents. This contention 
is not supported by the record. It is clear that the trial court 
gave petitioner no reason to assume that the New York Times 
privilege would not be available to respondent. The court's memo-
randum opinion denying respondent's pretrial motion for summary 
judgment does not state that the New York Times standard was 
inapplicable to this case. Rather, it reveals that the trial judge 
thought it possible for petitioner to make a factual showing sufficient 
to overcome respondent's claim of constitutional privilege. It states 
in part : 
"When there is a factual dispute as to the existence of actual 
malice, summary judgment is improper. 
0 0 O O 0 
"In the instant case a jury might infer from the evidence that 
[respondent's] failure to investigate the truth of the allegations, 
coupled with its receipt of communications challenging the factual 
llCcuracy of this author in the past amounted to actual malice, that 
el 
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ing of a plurality of this Court in Rosenbloom v. M etr<J= 
media, 403 U. S. 29 (1971). 
Petitioner appealed to contest the applicability of the 
New York Times standard to this case. Although the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit doubted the 
correctness of the District Court's determination that 
petitioner was not a public figure, it did not overturn 
that finding. 8 It agreed with the District Court that 
respondent could assert the constitutional privilege be-
cause the article concerned a matter of public interest, 
citing this Court's intervening decision in Rosenbloom v. 
Metromedia, Inc., supra. The Court of Appeals read 
Rosenbloom to require application of the New York 
is, 'reckless disregard' of whether the allegations were true or not. 
N ew York Times [ Co.] v. Sullivan, supra, at 219-280." Mem. Op.1 
Sept. 16, 1970. 
, Thus, petitioner knew or should have known that the outcome of 
the trial might ·hinge on his ability to show by clear and convincing 
evidence that respondent acted with reckless disregard for the truth, 
And this question remained open throughout the trial. Although 
the court 1mtially concluded that the applicability of New York Times 
rule depended on petitioner's status as a public figure, the court 
did not decide that petitioner was not a public figure until all 
the evidence had been presented. Thus 'petitioner had every 
opportunity, indeed incentive, to prove ''reckless disregard" if he 
, could, and he in fact attempted to do so. The record supports the 
observation by the Court or' Appeals that petitioner "did present 
evidence of malice (both the 'constitutional' and the 'ill-will' type) 
to support his damage claim and no such evidence was excluded .. . . 11 
471 F. 2d801,at807,n. 15. 
s The court stated : 
"[Petitioner's] considerable stature as a lawyer, author, lecturer, 
and participant in matters of public import undermine the validity 
of the assumption that he is not a 'public figure' as that term has 
been used by the progeny of New York Times. Nevertheless, for 
purposes of decision we make that assumption and test the avail,. 
_ability of the claim of privilege by the subject matter of the article." 
4:71 F, 2d, at 805, 
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Times standard to any publication or broadcast about 
an issue of significant public interest, without regard 
to the position, fame, or anonymity of the person 
defamed, and it concluded that respondent's statements 
concerned such an issue.4 After reviewing the record, 
4 In the Court of Appeals petitioner made an ingenious but un-
availing attempt to show that respondent's defamatory charge against 
him concerned no issue of public or general interest. He asserted 
that the subject matter of the article was the murder trial of. Officer 
Nuccio and that he did not participate in that proceeding. There-
fore, he argued, even if the subject matter of the article generally 
were protected by the New York Times privilege, under the opinion 
of the Rosenbloom plurality, the defamatory statements about him, 
were not. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument. It noted 
that the accusations against petitioner played an integral pa.rt in' 
respondent's general thesis of a nationwide conspiracy to harass the 
police: 
"[W]e may also assume that the article's basic thesis is false. Never• 
theless, under the reasons of New York Times v . .Sullivan, even a 
false statement made in support of a false thesis is protected unless 
made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of .its 
truth or falsity. It would undermine the rule of that case to permit 
the actual falsity of a statement to determine whether or not its 
publisher is entitled to the benefit of the rule. 
"If, therefore, we put to one side the false oharacter of the article 
and treat it as though its contents were entirely true, it cannot be 
denied that the comments about [petitioner] were integral to its 
thesis. They must be tested under the New York ~im~ standard." 
471 F . 2d, at 806 
We think that the Court of Appeals correctly rejected ~ti'tioner's 
argument. Its acceptance might lead to arbitrary imposition of 
liability on the basis of an unwise differentiation among kinds 
of factual misstatements. The present case illustrates the ,point. 
Respondent falsely portrayed petitioner as an architect of the 
criminal prosecution against Nuccio. On its face this inaccuracy 
d<ies not appear defamatory. Respondent also falsely labelled peti .. 
tioner a "Leninst" and a "Communist-fronter." These accusations 
are generally considered defamatory. Under petitioner's interpreta-
tion of the "public or general interest" test, respondent would have 
enjoyed a constitutional privilege to publish defamatory falsehoods if 
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, the Court of Appeals endorsed the District Court's con:i 
clusion that petitioner had failed to show by , clear anq 
convincing evidence that respondent had aGted with 
"actual malice" as defined by New York Times. There 
was no evidence that the managing editor of American 
· Opinion knew of the falsity of the accusations made in 
the article. In fact, he knew nothing about peti-
tioner except what he learned from the article. The 
court correctly noted that mere proof of failure tQ investi-. 
gate, without more, cannot est~blish reckless disregard for 
the truth. Rather, the publisher must act with a "high 
degree of awareness ... of probable falsity." St. Amant 
\r. Th9mpson, 390 U. S. 727, 731 (1968). Accord : 
Beckley Newspaper Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U. S. 81, 84-85 
(1967); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 67, 75-76 (1964) . 
The evidence in this case did not reveal that respondent 
had cause for such an awareness. The Court of Appeals 
therefore affirmed 471 F. 2d 801 (1972) . For the reasons 
stated below: we reverse. 
II 
The principal issue in this case is whether a news;. 
paper or broadcaster that publishes defamatory false-
hoods about an individual who is neither a public 
official nor a public figure may claim a constitu" 
tional privilege against lfability for the injury in .. 
})etitioner had in fact been associated with the criminal prosecution. 
But this would meah that the seemingly innocuous mistake of con-
fusing petitioner's role in the litigation against officer Nuccio would 
'destroy the privilege otherwise available for calling petitioner a 
communist-fronter. Thus respondent's privilege to publish state-
ments whose content should have alerted it to the danger of injury 
to reputation would hinge on the accuracy of statements that carried 
with them no such. warning. Assuming that none of these statements 
.was published with knowledge of falsity or with reckless disregard 
tor th~ truth, we see no reason to distinguish among the inaccuracies. 
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flicted by those statements. The Court considered thi1 
question on the rather different set of facts presented in 
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U. S. 29 (1971) . 
Rosenbloom, a distributor of nudist magazines, was 
arrested for selling allegedly obscene material while mak-
ing a delivery to a retail dealer. The police obtained a 
warrant and seized his entire inventory of 3,000 books and 
magazine. He sought and obtained an injunction pro-
hibiting further police interference with his business. He 
then sued a local radio station for failing to note in two 
of its newscasts that the 3,000 items seized were only 
"reportedly" or "allegedly" obscene and for broadcasting 
references to "the smut literature racket" and to "girlie-
book peddlers'1 in its coverage of the court proceeding 
for injunctive relief. He obtained a judgment against 
the radio station, but the Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit held the New York Times privilege applicable to 
the broadcast and reversed. 415 F. 2d 892 (1969). 
This Court affirmed the decision below, but no majority 
could agree on a controlling rationale. The eight Justices 11 
who participated in Rosenbloom announced their views 
in five separate opinions, none of which commanded more 
than three votes. The several statements not only re-
veal disagreement about the appropriate result in that 
case; they also reflect divergent traditions of thought 
about the general problem of reconciling the law of 
defamation with the First Amendment. One approach 
has been to extend the New York Times test to an ex-
panding variety of situations. Another has been to vary 
the level of constitutional privilege for defamatory false-
hood with the status of the person defamed. And a third 
view would grant to the press and broadcast media abso-
lute immunity from liability for defamation. To place 
our holding in the proper context, we preface our discus. 
11 MR. JusTICE DouGLAS did not partcipate in the consideration or 
decision of Rosenbloom,. 
1(J) 
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sion of this case with a review of the several Rosenbloom 
opinions and their antecedents. 
In affirming the trial court's judgment in the instant 
case, the Court of Appeals relied on Ma. JUSTICE BREN• 
NAN's conclusion for the Rosenbloom plurality that "all 
discussion and communication involving matters of pub-
lic or general concern" warrant the protection from lia-
bility for defamation accorded by the rule originally enun-
ciated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 'U. S. 254 
(1964) . There this Court defined a constitutional privi .. 
Iege intended to free criticism of public officials from the 
restraints imposed by the common law of defamation. The 
Times ran a political advertisement endorsing civil rights 
demonstrations by black students in Alabama and im-
pliedly condemning the performance of local law enforce-
ment officials. A police commissioner established in state 
court that certain misstatements in the advertisement 
referred to him and that they constituted libel per se 
under Alabama law. This showing left the Tfmes with 
the single defense of truth, for under Alabama law 
neither good faith nor reasonable care would protect the 
newspaper from liability. This Court concluded that a 
"rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee 
the truth of all his factual assertions" would deter pro .. 
tected speech, id., at 279, and announced the constitu-
tional privilege designed to counter that effect: 
"The constitutional guarantees require, we think, 
a federal rule that prohibits a public official from 
recovery of damages for a defamatory falsehood re-
lating to his official conduct unless he proves that the 
statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, 
in the knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
disregard of whether it was true or not." Id., at 
279-280,6 
is New York Times and later cases explicated the meaning of the 
72-6i7-0PINi0N 
QE!tTZ 1J. WEtCH d 
Three years after New York Times, a majority of the 
Court agreed to extend the constitutional privilege to 
defamatory criticism of "public figures." This extension 
new standard. In New York Times the Court held that under the 
circumstances the newspaper's failure to check the accuracy of the 
advertisement against news stories in its own files did not establish 
reckless diregard for the truth . 376 U. S., at 287-288. In St . 
Amant v. Thompson, 390 U. S. 727, 731 (1968), the Court equated 
reckl ess disregard of the truth with subjective awareness of probable 
fal81ty: "There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion 
that the defendant m fact ente1iained serious doubts as to the truth 
of his publication.'1 In Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 38\:) 
tJ S. 81 (1967) , the Court emphasized the distinction between the' 
N ew York Times test of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard 
of the truth and "actual malice" in the traditional sense of ill-will. 
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) , made plain that the neW 
standard applied to crimmal libel laws as weli as to civil actions and 
that 1t governed criticism directed at "anything which might touch 
on an official 's fitness for office." Id., at 71. Finally, in Rosenblatt v, 
Baer, 383 U. S. 75 , 85 (1966) , the Court stated that "the 'pubiic 
official' designation applies at the very least to those among thll 
hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the pub-
He to have, substantial responsibility for bi' control over the conduct 
of government affairs." 
In Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S. 374 (1967), the Court applied the 
New York Times standard to actions under a.n unusual state statute. 
The statute did not create a cause of action for libel. Rather, it pro-
vided a remedy for unwanted publicity. .Although the law allowed 
recovery of damages for harm caused by exposure to public attention 
rather than by factual inaccuracies, it recognized truth as a complete 
defense. Thus, nondefamatory factual errors could render a publisher 
liable for something akin to invasion of privacy. The Court ruled that 
the defendant in such an action could· invoke the New York Times 
privilege regardless of the fame or anonymity of the plaintiff. Speak-
ing for the Court, Ma. JUSTICE BRENNAN declared that this holding . 
was not an extension of New York Times but rather a parallel line of 
reasoning applying that standard to this discrete context : 
"This is neither a libel action by a private individual nor a statu.: 
t ory action by a public official. Therefore, although the First 
Amendment principles announced in New York Times guide our -
poµcl~sion, we reach that conclusion only by applying these principles 
l.~ 
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was announced in Curt-is Publ-ishing Co. v. Butts and ite 
companion Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U. S. 130, 162 
(1967) . The first case involved the Saturday Evening 
Post's charge that Coach Wally Butts of the University 
of Georgia had conspired with Coach Bear Bryant of the 
University of Alabama to fix a football game between 
their respective schools. Walker involved an erroneous 
Associated Press account of Brigadier General Edwin 
Walker's participation in a University of Mississippi 
·campus riot. Because Butts was paid by a private alumni 
association and Walker had retired from the Army~ neither 
could be classified as a "public official" under New York 
Times. Although Mr. Justice Harlan announced the 
result in both cases, a majority of the Court agreed with 
Mr. Chief Justice Warren's conclusion that the New York 
Times test should apply to criticism of "public figures" as 
well as "public officials." 7 The Court extended the con-
in this discrete context. It therefore serves no purpose to distinguish 
the facts here from those in New York Times. Were this 
a libel action, the distinction which has been suggested b~ 
tween the relative opportunities of the public official and the 
private individual to rebut defamatory charges might be germane. 
And the additional state interest in the protection of the individual 
against damages to his reputation would be involved. Cf. Rosenblatt 
v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 91 (STEWART, J., concurring)." Id., at 390-391. 
7 Professor Kalven once introduced a discussion of these cases with 
the apt heading, "You Can't Tell the Players Without a Score Card." 
H. Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment, 1967 
Sup. Ct. Rev. 267, 275 (1961). Only three other Justices joineq 
Mr. Justice Harlan's analysis of the issues involved. In his con-
curring opinion, Mr. Chief Justice Warren stated the principle for 
which these cases stand-that the New York Times test reaches both 
public figures and public officials. Ma. JUSTICE BRENNAN and Ma, 
JusTICE WHITE agreed with the Chief Justice on that question, 
Mr. Justice Black and Ma JUSTICE DouaLAs reiterated their view 
that publishers should have an absolute immunity from liability fo1,' 
defamation, ·but they acquiesed in the Chief Justice's reasoning in 
,order to enable a majority of the Justices to agree on the question. 
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· stitutional privilege announced in that case to protect 
' defamatory criticism of nonpublic officials who "are never., 
theless intimately involved in the resolution of important 
public questions, or, by reason of their fame, shape events 
in areas of concern to society at large." Id., at 164. 
In his opinion for the plurality in Rosenbloom v. 
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U. S. 29 (1971), MR. JusTICE 
BRENN AN took the New Yark Times privilege one step 
further. He concluded that its protection should extend 
to def amatory falsehoods relating to private persons if the 
·statements concerned matters of general or public interest. 
He abjured the suggested distinction between public offi-
cials and public figures on the one hand and private indi-
viduals on the other. He focused instead on society's 
interest in learning about certain issues: "If a matter is a, 
subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly 
become less so merely because a private individual is 
involved or because in some sense the individual did not 
choose to become involved." 403 U. S., at 43. Thus, 
under the plurality opinion, a private citizen involun-
tarily associated with a matter of general interest has no 
recourse for injury to his reputation unless he can satisfy 
the demanding requirements of the New Yark Times test. 
Two members of the Court concurred in the result in 
Rosenbloom but departed from the reasoning of the 
plurality. Mr. Justice Black restated his view, long 
shared by MR. JusTICE DOUGLAS, that the First Amend-
ment cloaks the news media with an absolute and in-
defeasible immunity from liability for defamation. Id., 
at 57. MR JUSTICE WHITE concurred on a narrower 
groundo Ibid. He concluded that "the First Amend-
ment gives the press and the broadcast media a privilege 
to report and comment upon the official actions of public 
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.servants in full detail, with no requirement that the rep• 
utation or privacy of an individual involved in or affected 
by the official action be spared from public view." Id., 
at 62. He therefore declined to reach the broader ques-
tions addressed by the other Justices. 
Mr. Justice Harlan dissented. Although he had joined 
the opinion of the Court in New York Times, in Curtis 
Publishing Co. he had contested the extension of the 
privilege to public figures. There he had argued that 
. a public figure who held no governmental office should 
be allowed to recover damages for defamation "on 
a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constitut-
ing an extreme departure from the standards of in-
vestigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by 
responsible publishers." 388 U. S., at 155. In his Curtis 
Publishing Co. opinion Mr. Justice Harlan had distin-
guished New York Times primarily -on the ground that 
defamation actions by public officials "lay close to sedi..-
tious libel. . . . " / d., at 133. Recovery of damages by 
one who held no public office, however, could not "be 
viewed as a vindication of governmental policy." Id., 
at 154. Additionally, he had intimated that, because 
most public officials enjoyed absolute immunity from 
liability for their own defamatory utterances under Barr 
v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564 (1959) , they lacked a strong 
claim to the protection of the courts. 
In Rosenbloom Mr. Justice Harlan modified these 
views. He acquiesced in the application of the privilege 
to defamation of public figures but argued that a different 
rule should obtain where defamatory falsehood harmed 
a private individual. He noted that a private person 
has less likelihood "of securing access to the channels 
of communication · sufficient to rebut falsehoods concern-
ing him" than do public officials and public figures, id., 
at 70, and ha,s not voluntarily placed himself in the publie,-
72---617-0PINION 
GERTZ v. WELCH 15 
EJpotlight. Mr. Justice Harlan concluded that the States 
could constitutionally allow private individuals to re• 
cover damages for defamation on the basis of any · 
standard of care except liability without fault. 
MR. JusTICE MARSHALL dissented in Rosenbloom in an 
opinion joined by MR. JUSTICE STEWART. Id., at 78. He 
thought that the plurality's "public or general interest" 
test for determining the applicability of the New York 
Times privllege would involve the courts in the dangerous 
business of deciding "what information is relevant to self-
government." Id., at 79. He also contended that the 
plurality's position inadequately served "society's inter-
est in protecting private individuals from being thrust 
into the public eye by the distorting light of defamation." 
Ibid. MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL therefore reached the con• 
clusion, also reached by Mr. Justice Harlan, that the 
States should be "essentially free to continue the evalua-
tion of the common law of defamation and to articulate 
whatever fault standards best suits the State's need," so 
long as the States did not impose liability without fault. 
Id., at 86. The principal point of disagreement among 
the three dissenters concerned punitive charges. Whereas 
Mr. Justice Harlan thought that the States could allow 
punitive damages in amounts bearing "a reasonable and 
purposeful relationship to the actual harm done ... ," 
id., at 75, MR. JusTICE MARSHALL concluded that the 
size and unpredictability of jury awards of exemplary 
uamages unnecessarily exacerbated the problems of 
media self-censorship and that such damages should 
therefore be forbidden. 
III 
We begin with the common ground. Under the First 
Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. How ... 
ever pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its 
correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but 
16 
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on the competition of other ideas.8 But there is no coti-
stitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither 
the intentional lie nor the careless error materially ad-
vances society's interest' in "uninhibited, robust. and 
wide-open" debate on public issues. New York 'l'irnes 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S., at 270. They belong to that 
category of utterances which "are no essential part of 
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value 
as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived 
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest 
in order and morality." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 
315 u. s. 568,572 (1942) . 
Although the erroneous statement of fact is not worthy 
of constitutional protection, it is nevertheless inevitable in 
free debate. As James Madison pointed out in the Report 
on the Virginia Resolutions of 1798, "Some degree of 
abuse is inseparable from the proper use of everything; 
and in no instance is this more true than that of the 
press." 4 Elliot's Debates ( 1876), p. 571. And punish~ 
ment of error runs the risk of inducing a cautious and 
restrictive exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed 
freedoms of speech and press. Our decisions recognize 
that a rule of strict liability that compels a publisher 
or broadcaster to guarantee the accuracy of his factual 
assertions may lead to intolerable self-censorship. Al-
lowing the media to avoid liability only by proving the 
truth of all injurious statements does not accord adequate 
protection to First Amendment liberties. As the Court 
stated in New York Tirnes Co. v. Sullivan, supra, 376 
U. S., at 279, "Allowance of the defense of truth, with 
the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not mean 
8 As Thomas Jefferson made the point in his first Inaugural 
Address : "If there be any among us who wish to dissolve this union 
or change its republican form of government, let them stand undis .. 
turbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may 
be tolerate<;! where ,:eason is left free to co,mbat it." 
-
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that only false speech will be deterred." The First 
Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood irt 
order to protect speech that matters. 
The need to avoid self-censorship by the news media is, 
however, not the only societal value at issue. If it were, 
this Court would have embraced long ago the view that 
publishers and broadcasters enjoy an unconditional and 
indefeasible immunity from liability for defamation. See 
New York Times Co. v.Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,293 (1964) 
(opinion of Black, J .) ; Garrison v. Lou-isiana, 379 U.S. 64, 
'so (1964) (opinion of DOUGLAS, J.); Curt-is Publ-ishing Co. 
v. Butts, 388 U. ~. 130, 170 (1967) (opinion of Black, J.). 
Such a rule would indeed obviate the fear that the pros .. 
pect of civil liability for injurious falsehood might dis,. 
suade a timorous press from the effective exercise of 
First Amendment freedoms. Yet absolute protection for 
the communications media requires a total sacrifice of 
the competing value served by the law of defamation. 
The legitimate state interest underlying the law of libel 
is the compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted 
· on them by defamatory falsehoods. We would not lightly 
· require the State to abandon this purpose, for, as Mn, 
· JusTICE STEWART has reminded us, the individual's right 
' to the protection of his own good name 
"reflects no more than our basic concept of the essen. 
tial dignity and worth of every human being-a 
concept at the root of any decent system of ordered 
liberty. The protection of private personality, like 
the protection of life itself, is left primarily to the 
individual states under the Ninth and Tenth Amend-
ments. But this does not mean that the right is 
entitled to any less recognition by this Court as a 
basic of our constitutional system." Rosenblatt v. 
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Some tension necessarily exists between the need for 
a vigorous and uninhibited press and the legitimate in .. 
terest in redressing wrongful injury. As Mr. Justice 
Harlan stated, "some antithesis between freedom 9f 
speech and press and libel actions persists, for libel re-
mains premised on the content of speech and limits the 
freedom of the publisher to express certain sentiments, 
at least without guaranteeing legal proof of their sub-
stantial accuracy." Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 
U. S., at 152. In our continuing effort to define the 
proper accommodation between these competing con-
cerns, we have been especially anxious to assure to the 
freedoms of speech and press that "breathing space" 
essential to their fruitful exercise. NAACP v. Button, 
371 U. S. 415, 433 ( 1963) . To that end this Court has 
extended a measure of strategic protection to defamatory 
falsehood. 
The New Yark Times standard defines the level of 
constitutional protection appropriate to the context of 
defamation of a public person. Those who, by reason 
of the notoriety of their achievements or the vigor 
and success with which they seek the public's attention, 
are properly classed as public figures and those who 
hold governmental office may recover for injury to rep-
utation only on clear and convincing proof that the 
defamatory falsehood was made with knowledge of its 
falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth. This 
standard administers an extremely powerful antidote 
to the inducement to media self-censorship of the 
common law rule of strict liability for libel and 
slander. And it exacts a correspondingly high price 
from the victims of defamatory falsehood. Plainly 
many deserving plaintiffs, including some intentionally 
subjected to injury, will be unable to surmount 
the barrier of the New Yark Times test. Despite this 
substantial abridgement of the state law right to com. 
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pensation for wrongful hurt to one's reputation, the 
Court has concluded that the protection of the New 
York Times privilege should be available to publish-
ers and broadcasters of defamtory falsehoods concerrt-
ing public officials and public figures. New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 ( 1964); Curtis 
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130 (1967). We 
think that these decisions are correct, but we do not 
find their holdings justified solely by reference to the 
interest of the press and broadcast media in immunity 
from liability. Rather, we believe that the New York 
Times rule states an accommodation between this con-
•Cern and the limited state interest present in the context 
of libel actions brought by public persons. For the rea-
sons stated below, we conclude that the state interest 
in compensating injury to the reputation of private 
individuals requires that a different rule should obtain 
with respect to them. 
Theoretically, of course, the balance between the needs 
•Of the press and the individual's claim to compensation 
for wrongful injury might be struck on a case-by-case 
basis. As Mr. Justice Harlan hypothesized, "it might 
;seem, purely as an abstract matter, that the most utili-
tarian approach would be to scrutinize carefully every 
jury verdict in every libel case, in order to ascertain 
whether the final judgment leaves fully protected what-
ever First Amendment values transcend the legitimate 
·state interest in protecting the particular plaintiff who 
prevailed." Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U. S, 
'29, 63 (1971) (footnote omitted). But this approach 
would lead to unpredictable results and uncertain expecta-
tions, and it could render our duty to supervise the lower 
-courts unmanageable. Because an ad hoc resolution of 
the competing interests at stake in each particular case 
is not feasible, we must lay down broad rules of general 
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· cases involving differences as well as similarities. Th tis 
it is often true that not all of the considerations which 
justify adoption of a given rule will obtain in each par"' 
'ticular case decided under its authority. 
With that caveat we have no difficulty in distinguishing 
among defamation plaintiffs. The first remedy of any 
victim of defamation is self-help-using available oppor-
tunities to contradict the lie or correct the error and 
thereby to minimi_ze its adverse impact on reputation. 
Public officials and public figures usually enjoy signifi .. 
cantly greater access to the channels of effective commu-
nication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to 
counteract false statements than private individuals nor-
mally enjoy.9 Private individuals are therefore more 
vulnerable to injury, and the state interest in protecting 
them is correspondingly greater. 
More important than the likelihood that private indi-
viduals will lack effective opportunities for rebuttal, there 
is a compelling normative consideration underlying the 
distinction between public and private defamation plain-
tiffs. An individual who decides to seek governmental 
office must accept certain necessary consequences of that 
involvement in public affairs. He runs the risk of closer 
public scrutiny than might otherwise be the case. And 
society's interest in the officers of government is not 
strictly limited to the formal discharge of official duties. 
As the Court pointed out in Garrison v. Lou-isiana, 379 
U.S. 64, 77 (1964), the public's interest extends to "any-
thing that might touch on an official's fitness for office ... , 
Few personal attributes are more germane to fitness for 
9 Of course, an opportunity for rebuttal seldom suffices to undo 
harm of defamatory falsehood. Indeed, the law of defamation is 
rooted in our experience that the truth rarely catches up with a lie. 
But the fact that the self-help remedy of rebuttal, standing alone, 
is inadequate to its t.ask does not mean that it is irrelevant to ou, 
,inquiry. 
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office than dishonesty, malfe~sance, or improper motiva• 
tion, even though these characteristics may also affect 
the official's private character." 
Those classed as public figures stand in a similar posi-
tion. Hypothetically, it may be possible for someone to 
become a public figure through no purposeful action of 
his own, but the instances of truly involuntary public 
figures must be exceedingly rare. For the most part 
those who attain this status have assumed roles of especial 
prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy posi-
tions of such persuasive power and influence that they 
are deemed. public figures for all purposes. More com-
monly, those classed as public figures have thrust them-
selves to the forefront of particular public controversies 
in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. 
In either event, they invite attention and comment. 
Even if the foregoing generalities do not obtain in every 
instance, the communications media are entitled to act 
on the assumption that public officials and public figures 
have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk 
of injury from defamatory falsehoods concerning them. 
No such assumption is justified with respect to a private 
individual. He has not accepted public office nor as-
. sumed an "influential role in ordering society." Curtis 
Publishing Co. v. Butts, supra, 388 U. S., at 164 ( opinion 
of Warren, C. J.). He has relinquished no part of his 
interest in the protection of his own good name, and 
consequently he has a more compelling call on the 
courts for redress of injury inflicted by defamatory false• 
hood: Thus, private individuals are not only more vul. 
nerable to injury than public officials and public figures ; 
they are also more deserving of recovery. 
For these reasons we conclude that the States should 
retain substantial latitude in their efforts to enforce a 
legal remedy for defamatory falsehood injurious to the 
reputation of a private individual. The extension of the-
22 
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New York Times test proposed by the Rosenbloom plu., 
rality would abridge this legitimate state interest to a 
degree that we find unacceptable. And it would occa-, 
sion the additional difficulty of forcing state and federal 
judges to decide on an ad hoc basic which publications 
address issues of "general or public interest" and 
which do not-to determine, in the words of MR. JusTICE 
MARSHALL, "what information is relevant to self-govern-
ment." Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U. S., at 
79. We doubt the wisdom of committing this task to the 
conscience of judges. Nor does the Constitution require 
us to draw so thin a line between the drastic alternatives 
of the New York Times privilege and the common law of 
strict liability for defamatory error. The ''public or gen-
eral interest" test for determining the applicability of 
the New York Times standard to private defamation 
actions inadequately serves both of the competing values 
at stake. On the one hand, a private individual whose 
reputation is injured by defamatory falsehood that does 
concern an issue of public or general interest has no re-
course unless he can meet the rigorous requirements of 
New York Times, This is true despite the factors 
that distinguish the state interest in compensating 
private individuals from the analogous interest involved 
in the context of public persons. On the other 
hand, a publisher or broadcaster of a defamatory error 
which a court deems unrelated to an issue of public or 
general interest may be held liable in damages even if it 
took every reasonable precaution to ensure the accuracy 
of its assertions. And liability may far exceed compensa-
tion for any actual injury to the plaintiff, for the jury may 
be permitted to presume damages without proof of loss 
.and even to award punitive damages. 
We hold that, so long as they do not impose liability 
without fault, the States may define for themselves the 
• 
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Appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broad-
caster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private 
individual.10 This approach provides a more equitable 
boundary between the competing concerns involved here. 
It recognizes the strength of the legitimate state interest 
in compensating private individuals for wrongful injury 
to reputation, yet shields the press and broadcast media 
from the rigors of strict liability for defamation. At 
least this conclusion obtains where, as here, the sub-
stance of the defamatory statement "makes substan-
10 Our caveat against strict liability is the prime target of MR. Jus-
'.l'ICE WHITE'S dissent. He would hold that a publisher or broad-
caster may be required to prove the truth of a defamatory statement 
concerning a private mdividual and, failing such proof, that the 
publisher or broadcaster may be held liable for defamation everi 
though he took every conceivable precaution to ensure the accuracy 
of the offending statement prior to its dissemination. Post, at --
(slip op., at 20-24). In MR. JUSTICE WHITE'S view, one who pub-
lishes a statement that later turns out to be inaccurate can never be 
·'without fault" in any meaningful sense, for "[i]t is he who cir-
culated a falsehood that he was not required to publish." Id., at -
(slip op., at 23) (emphasis added). 
MR . .JusTrcE WHITE characterizes New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, supra, as simply a case of seditious libel. Post, at - (slip op., 
at 18). But that rationale is certainly inapplicable to Curtis Publish-
ing Co. v. Butts, supra, where MR. JUSTICE WHITE Joined four other 
Members of the Court to extend the knowmg-or-reckless-falsity ;,;tand-
ard to mecha defamation of persons identified as public figures but 
not connected with the Government. MR . .Jus-rrcE WHITE now sug-
gests that he would abide bv that vote, id, at - (slip op., at 30), 
but the full thrust of his dissent-as we read it-contradicts that 
suggestion. Finally, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia. Inc., supra, MR. 
JusTICE WHITE voted to apph· the New York Times privilege to 
media defamation of an i11dividual who was neither a public official 
nor a public figure. His opinion states that the knowing-or-reckless-
fals1ty standard should appl~· to media "comment upon the official 
actions of public servants," 403 U. S., at 62, includmg defamatory 
falsehoods about a person arrested by the police. if adopted by 
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tial danger to reputation apparent.1111 This phrase places 
in perspective the conclusion we announce today. Our 
inquiry would involve considerations somewhat different 
from those discussed above if a State purported to condi .. 
tion civil liability on a factual misstatement whose 
content did not warn a reasonably prudent editor or 
broadcaster of its defamatory potential. Cf. Time, Inc. 
v, Hill, 385 U. S. 374 (1967) . Such a case is not now 
before us, and we intimate no view as to its proper 
resolution, 
IV 
Our accommodation of the competing values at stake 
in defamation suits by private individuals allows the 
States to impose liability on the publisher or broadcaster 
of defamatory falsehoods on a less demanding showing 
than that required by New York Times, This conclusion 
is not based on a belief that the considerations which 
prompted the adoption of the New York Times privilege 
for defamation of public officials and its extension to 
'public figures are wholly inapplicable to the context of 
private individuals. Rather, we endorse this approach 
in recognition of the strong and legitimate state interest 
the Court, this conclusion would significantly extend the New Yori 
Times privilege. 
11R . .TusTrcE WHI'I'E a;;serts that ottr deci~ion today '· trivializes 
.and <lenigra1es the interest in reputat10n ,'' Miami Herald Publishing 
Co v. TorniLLo, - C. S. -, - (slip op., at 4) (WHITE, ,f., concur-
ring), that 1t ",;cuttle[s] the libel laws of the States in . •. whole-
~ale fashion" and renders ordinary citizens ·'powerless to protect 
themselves." Post, at - (slip op., at 2) . In light of the progre;;-
~ive extension of the knowmg-or-reckless-fa1sity requirement detailed 
in the preceding paragraph, one might have viewed today';,, decision 
allowing recovery under any standard save stnct liability as a more 
generous accommodatlon of the state mterest in comprehensive 
reputat10nal mJun· to prlVate mdiv1d11als than the law pre:,;ently 
nfford:, 
;u Curtis Publishing Co. v. JJutts, 388 U. S. 130, 155 (1967). 
-~ 
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in compensating private individuals for injury to reputa-
tion. But this countervailing state interest extends no 
further than compensation for actual injury. For the 
reasons stated below, we hold that the States may not 
permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at 
least when liability is not based on a showing of 
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, 
The common law of defamation is an oddity of tort 
law, for it allows recovery of purportedly compensatory 
damages without evidence of actual loss. Under the 
traditional rules pertaining to actions for libel, the exist-
ence of injury is presumed from the fact of publication, 
Juries may award substantial sums as compensation for 
supposed damage to reputation without any proof that 
such harm actually occurred. The largely uncontrolled 
discretion of juries to award damages where there is no 
loss unnecessarily compounds the potential of any sys~ 
tern of liability for defamatory falsehood to inhibit the 
vigorous exercise of First Amendment freedoms. Addi-
tionally, the doctrine of presumed damages invites juries 
to punish unpopular opinion rather than to compensate 
individuals for injury sustained by the publication of a 
false fact. More to the point, the States have no sub .. 
stantial interest in securing for plaintiffs such as this 
petitioner gratuitous awards of money damages far in 
excess of any actual injury. 
We would not, of course, invalidate state law simply 
because we doubt its wisdom, but here we are attempting 
to reconcile state law with a competing interest grounded 
in the constitutional command of the First Amendment, 
It is therefore appropriate to require that state remedies 
for defamatory falsehood reach no farther than is 
necessary to protect the legitimate interest involved. 
It is necessary to restrict defamation plaintiffs who 
do not prove knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard 
for the truth to compensation for actual injury. We 
26 
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need not define "actual injury," as trial courts have 
wide experience in framing appropriate jury instruc-
tions in tort action. Suffice it to say that actual 
injury is not limited to out-of-pocket loss. Indeed, the 
more customary types of actual harm inflicted by defam .. 
atory falsehood include impairment of reputation and 
standing in the community, personal humiliation, and 
mental anguish and suffering. Of course, juries must be 
limited by appropriate instructions, and all awards must 
·be supported by competent evidence concerning the fo_, 
jury, although there need be no evidence which assigns 
an actual dollar value to the injury. 
We also find no justification for allowing awards of 
punitive damages against publishers and broadcasters held 
liable under state-defined standards of liability for 
defamation. In most jurisdictions jury discretion over 
the amounts awarded is limited only by the gentle 
rule that they not be excessive. Consequently, juries 
assess punitive damages in wholly unpredictable amounts 
bearing no necessary relation to the actual harm 
caused. And they remain free to use their discre-
' tion selectively to punish · expressions of unpopular 
views. Like the doctrine of presumed damages, jury dis-
cretion to award punitive damages unnecessarily exacer-
bates the danger of media self-censorship, but, unlike the 
former rule, punitive 'damages are wholly irrelevant to the 
state interest that justifies a negligence standard for pri-
vate defamation actions. They are not compensation for 
injury. Instead, they are private fines levied by civil 
juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its 
future occurrence. In short, the private defamation 
. plaintiff who establishes liability under a less demanding 
.standard than that stated by New York Times may 
recover only such damages as are sufficient to compensate 
• him for 3ctual injury, 
.. 
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otwithstanding our refusal to extend the New York 
Times privilege to defamation of private individuals, 
respondent contends that we should affirm the judgment 
below on the ground that petitioner is either a public 
official or a public figure. There is little basis for the 
former assertion. Several years prior to the present in-
cident, petitioner had served briefly on housing commit-
tees appointed by the mayor of Chicago, but at the 
time of publication he had never held any remuneraM 
tive governmental position. Respondent admits this 
but argues that petitioner'·s appearance at the coroner's 
inquest rendered him a "de facto public official." Our 
cases recognize no such concept. Respondent's sugges-
tion would sweep all lawyers under the New York Times 
rule as officers of the court and diste5rt the plain meaning 
of the "public official" category beyond all recognition. 
We decline to follow it. 
Respondent's characterization of petitioner as a public 
figure raises a different question. That designation may 
rest on either of two· alternative bases. fo some in-
stances an individ.ual may achieve such pervasive fame 
0r notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all pur-
poses and in all contexts. More commonly, an individual 
voluntary injects himself or is drawn into a particular 
public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure 
for a limited range of issues. In either case such persons 
assume special prominence in the resolution of public 
questions. 
Petitioner has long been active in community and 
professional affairs. He has served as an officer of local 
civil groups and of various professional organizations, 
and he has published several books and articles on legal 
subjects. Although petitioner was consequently well• 
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·or notoriety in the community. None of the prospective 
jurors called at the trial had ever heard of petitioner 
prior to this litigation, and respondent offered no proof 
that this response was atypical of the local population. 
We would not lightly assume that a citizen's participa-
tion in community and professional affairs rendered him 
a public figure for all purposes. Absent clear evidence 
of general fame or notoriety in the community, and per=-
vasive involvement in the affairs of society, an individual 
should not be deemed a public personality for all aspects 
of his life. It is preferable to reduce the public figure 
question to a more meaningful context by looking to the 
nature and extent of an individual's participation in the 
particular controversy giving rise to the defamation. 
In this context it is plain that petitioner was not a 
public figure. He played a minimal role at the coroner's 
inquest, and his participation related solely to his repre-
sentation of a private client. He took no part in the 
criminal prosecution of officer Nuccio. Moreover, he 
never discussed either the criminal or civil litigation with 
the press and was never quoted as having done so. He 
plainly did not thrust himself into the vortex of this 
public issue, nor did he engage the public's attention in 
an attempt to influence its outcome. We are persuaded 
that the trial court did not err in refusing to characterize 
petitioner as a public figure for the purpose of this 
litigation, 
We therefore conclude that the New York Times stand-
ard is inapplicable to this case and that the trial court 
erred in entering judgment for respondent. Because the 
jury was allowed to impose liability without fault and 
was permitted to presume damages without proof of 
injury, a new trial is necessary. We reverse and remand 
for further proceedings jn accord with this opinion. 
It is so ordere<J,. 
• * (. • 
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A Chicago policeman named Nuccio was convicted of murder. The 
victim's family retained petitioner, a reputable attorney, to repre-
sent them in civil litigation against Nuccio. An article appearing· 
in respondent's magazine alleged that Nuccio's murder trial was 
part of a Communist conspiracy to discredit the local police, 
and it falsely stated that petitioner had arranged Nuccio's "frame-
up," implied that petitioner had a criminal record, and labeled him 
a "Communist-fronter." Petitioner brought this diversity libel 
action against respondent. After the jury returned a verdict for 
petitioner, the District Court decided that the standard enunci-
ated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, which 
bars media liability for defamation of a public official absent proof 
that the defamatory statements were published with knowledge of 
their falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth, should apply 
to this suit. The court concluded that that standard protects 
media discussion of a public issue without regard to whether the-
person defamed is a public official as in New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, supra, or a public figure, as in Curtis Publishing Co. v. 
Butts, 388 U. S. 130. The court found that petitioner had failed 
to prove knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth 
and therefore entered judgment n. o. v. for respondent. The· 
Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: 
1. A publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehoods about 
an individual who is neither a public official nor a public figure-
may not claim the New York Times protection against liability 
for defamation on the ground that the defamatory statements con-
cern an issue of public or general interest. Pp. 15-24. 
(a) Because private individuals characteristically have less 
effective opportunities for rebuttal than do public officials and 
II GERTZ v. WELCH 
Syllabus 
public figures, they are more vulnerable to injury from defama-
tion. Because they have not voluntarily exposed themselves to 
increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehoods, they are 
also more deserving of recovery. The state interest in compensat-
ing injury to the reputation of private individuals is therefore 
greater than for public officials and public figures. Pp. 19-21. 
(b) To extend the New York Times standard to media defa-
mation of private persons whenever an issue of general or public 
interest is involved would abridge to an unacceptable degree the 
legitimate state interest in compensating private individuals for 
injury to reputation and would occasion the additional difficulty 
of forcing courts to decide on an ad hoc basis which publications 
and broadcasts address issues of general or public interest and 
which do not. Pp. 21-22. 
(c) So long as they do not impose liability without. fault , the 
States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of lia-
bility for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood which 
injures a private individual and whose substance makes substan-
tial danger to reputation apparent. Pp. 22-24. 
2. The States, however, may not permit recovery of presumed 
or punitive damages when liability is not based on knowledge of 
falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, and the private defa-
mation plaintiff who establishes liability under a less demanding 
standard than the New York Times test may recover compen,:ation 
only for actual injury. Pp. 24-26. 
3. Petitioner was neither a public official nor a public figure . 
Pp. 26-28. 
(a) Neither petitioner's past service on certain city commit-
tees nor his appearance as an attorney at the coroner's inquest into 
the death of the murder victim made him a public official. 
Pp. 26-27. 
(b) Petitioner was also not a public figure. Absent clear 
evidence of general fame or notoriety in the community and 
pervasive involvement in ordering the affairs of society, an indi-
vidual should not be deemed a public figure for all aspects of his 
life. Rather, the public figure question should be determined by 
reference to the individual's participation in the particular con-
troversy giving rise to the defamation. Petitioner's role in the 
Nuccio affair did not make him a public figure. Pp. 27-28. 
471 F. 2d 801, reversed and remanded. 
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Robert Welch Inc Appeals for the Seventh 
' · Circuit. 
[June 25, 1974] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
This Court has struggled for nearly a decade to define 
the proper accommodation between the law of defama-
tion and the freedoms of speech and press protected by 
the First Amendment. With this decision we return to 
that effort. We granted certiorari to reconsider the ex-
tent of a publisher's constitutional privilege against lia-
bility for defamation of a private citizen. 410 U. S. 925 
(1973). 
I 
In 1968 a Chicago policeman named Nuccio shot and 
killed a youth named Nelson. The state authorities prose-
cuted Nuccio for the homicide and ultimately obtained 
a conviction for murder in the second degree. The Nel-
son family retained petitioner Elmer Gertz, a reputable 
attorney, to represent them in civil litigation against 
Nuccio. 
Respondent publishes American Opinion, a monthly 
outlet for the views of the John Birch Society. Early in 
the 1960's the magazine began to warn of a nationwide 
conspiracy to discredit local law enforcement agencies 
and create in their stead a national police force capable 
of supporting a communist dictatorship. As part of the 
~ 
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continuing effort to alert the public to this assumed 
danger, the managing editor of American Opinion com-
missioned an article on the murder trial of officer Nuccio; 
For this purpose he engaged a regular contributor to the 
magazine. In March of 1969 respondent published the 
resulting article under the title "FRAME-UP: Richard 
Nuccio And The War On Police." The article purports 
to demonstrate that the testimony against Nuccio a.t 
his criminal trial was false and that his prosecution was 
part of the communist campaign against the police. 
In his capacity as counsel for the Nelson family in 
the civil litigation, petitioner attended the coroner's in-
quest into the boy's death and initiated actions for 
damages, but he neither discussed officer Nuccio with the 
press nor played any part in the criminal proceeding. 
Notwithstanding petitioner's remote connection with the 
prosecution of Nuccio, respondent's magazine portrayed 
him as an architect of the "frame-up." According to 
the article, the police file on petitioner took "a big, Irish 
cop to lift." The article stated that petitioner had been 
an official of the "Marxist League for Industrial Democ-
racy, originally known as the Intercollegiate Socialist 
Society, which has advocated the violent seizure of our 
government." It labelled Gertz a "Leninist" and a 
"Communist-fronter." It also stated that Gertz had 
been an officer of the National Lawyers Guild, described 
as a communist organization that "probably did more 
than any other outfit to plan the Communist attack 
on the Chicago police duri11g the Hl68 Democratic 
convention." 
These statements contained serious inaccuracies. The 
implication that petitioner had a crimi11al record was 
false . Pc:>titioner had been a member and officer of the 
National Lawyers Guild some 15 years earlier. but there 
was no evidence that he or that organization had taken 
any part in planning the 1968 demoustrations in Chicago, 
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There was also no basis for the charge that petitioner was 
a "Leninist" or a "Communist-fronter." And he had 
never been a member of the "Marxist League for In-
dustrial Democracy" or the "Intercollegiate Socialist 
Society." 
The managing editor of American Opinion made no 
effort to verify or substantiate the charges against peti-
tioner. Instead, he appended an editorial introduction 
stating that the author had "concluded extensive re-
search into the Richard Nuccio case." And he included 
in the article a photograph of petitioner and wrote the 
caption that appeared under it: "Elmer Gertz of the 
Red Guild harrasses Nuccio." Respondent placed the 
issue of American Opinion containing the article on sale 
at newsstands throughout the country and distributed 
reprints of the article on the streets of Chicago. 
Petitioner filed a diversity action for libel in the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. 
He claimed that the falsehoods published by respondent 
injured his reputation as a lawyer and .a citizen. Before 
filing an answer, respondent moved to dismiss the com-
plaint for failure to state a claim upon :which relief could 
be granted, apparently on the ground that petitioner 
failed to allege special damages. But the court ruled 
that statements contained in the article constituted libel 
per se under Illinois law and that consequently P,etitioner 
need not plead special damages. 306 F. Supp. 310 (ND 
Ill. 1969). 
After answering the complaint, respondent filed a pre-
trial motion for summary judgment, claiming a constitua 
tional privilege against liability for defamation.1 It 
asserted that petitioner was a public, official or a public 
1 
Petitioner filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on grounds 
not specified m the record. The Court denied petitioner's cross-
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figure and that the article concerned an issue of public 
interest and concern. For these reasons, respondent 
argued, it was entitled to invoke the privilege enunciated 
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
Under this rule respondent would escape liability unless 
petitioner could prove publication of defamatory false .. 
hood "with 'actual malice'-that is, in the knowledge that 
it was false or with reckless disregard for whether it was 
true or not." Id., at 279-280. Respondent claimed 
that petitioner could not make such a showing and 
submitted a supporting affidavit by the magazine's man-
aging editor. The editor denied any knowledge of the 
falsity of the statements concerning petitioner and stated 
that he had relied on the author's reputation and on his 
prior experience with the accuracy and authenticity of 
his contributions to American Opinion. 
The District Court denied respondent's motion for 
summary judgment in a memorandum opinion of Sept. 16, 
1970. The court did not dispute respondent's claim to 
the protection of the New York Times standard. Rather, 
it concluded that petitioner might •overcome the consti .. 
tutional privilege by making a factual showing sufficient 
to prove publication of defamatory falsehood in reckless 
disregard of the truth. During the course of the trial, 
however, it became clear that the trial court had not ac-
cepted all of respondent's asserted grounds for applying 
the New York Times rule to this case. It thought that 
respondent's claim to the protection of the constitutional 
privilege depended on the contention that petitioner was 
either a public official under the New York Times deci-
sion or a public figure under Curtis Publishing Co. v. 
Butts, 388 U. S. 130 ( 1967), apparently discounting the 
argument that a privilege would arise from the presence 
,of a public issue. After all the evidence had been pre-
sented but before submission of the case to the jury, the 
eourt ruled in effect that petitioner was neither a publie 
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official nor a public figure. .It added that, if he were, the 
resulting application of the New York Times standard 
would require a directed verdict for respondent. Because 
some statements in the article constituted libel per se 
under Illinois law, the court submitted the case to the 
jury under instructions that withdrew from its considera-
tion all issues save the measure of damages. The jury 
awarded $50,000 to petitioner. 
Following the jury verdict and on further reflection, 
the District Court concluded that the New York Times 
standard should govern this case even though petitioner 
was not a public official or public figure. It accepted re-
spondent's contention that that privilege protected dis-
cussion of any public issue without regard to the status 
of a person defamed therein. Accordingly, the court 
entered judgment for respondent notwithstanding the 
jury's verdict.2 This conclusion anticipated the reason-
2 322 F. Supp. 997 (ND Ill., Dec. 8, 1970). Petitioner asserts that 
the entry of judgment n. o. v. on the basis of his failure to show 
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth constituted 
unfair surprise and deprived him of a full and fair opportunity to 
prove "actual malice" on the part of respondents. This contention 
is not supported by the record. It is clear that the trial court 
gave petitioner no reason to assume that the New York Times 
privilege would not be available to respondent. The court's memo-
randum opinion denying respondent's pretrial motion for summary 
judgment does not state that the New York Times standard was 
inapplicable to this case. Rather, it reveals that the trial judge 
thought it possible for petitioner to make a factual showing sufficient 
to overcome respondent's claim of constitutional privilege. It states 
in part: 
"When there is a factual dispute as to the existence of actual 
malice, summary judgment is improper. 
" . ~ "' 
"In the instant case a jury might mfer from the evidence that 
[respondent's] failure to investigate the truth of the allegations, 
coupled with its receipt of communications challenging the factual 
accuracy of this author in the past amounted to actual malice, that 
6 
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ing of a plurality of this Court in Rosenbloom v. Metro-
media, 403 U. S. 29 (1971). 
Petitioner appealed to contest the applicability of the 
New York Times standard to this case. Although the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit doubted the 
correctness of the District Court's determination that 
petitioner was not a public figure, it did not overturn 
that finding. 8 It agreed with the District Court that 
respondent could assert the constitutional privilege be-
cause the article concerned a matter of public interest, 
citing this Court's intervening decision in Rosenbloom v. 
Metromedia, Inc., supra. The Court of Appeals read 
Rosenbloom to require application of the New York 
is, ' reckless disregard' of whether the allegations were true or not. 
New York Times [Co.] v. Sullivan, supra, at 279-280." Mem. Op., 
Sept. 16, 1970. 
Thus, petitioner knew or should have known that the outcome of 
the trial might hinge on his ability to show by clear and convincing 
evidence that respondent acted with reckless disregard for the truth. 
And this question remained open throughout the trial. Although 
the court initially concluded that the applicability of New York Times 
rule depended on petitioner's status as a public figure, the court 
did not decide that petitioner was not a public figure until all 
the evidence had been presented. Thus petitioner had every 
opportunity, indeed incentive, to prove "reckless disregard" if he 
could, and he in fact attempted to do so. The record supports the 
observation by the Court of Appeals that petitioner "did present 
evidence of malice (both the 'constitutional' and the 'ill-will' type) 
to support his damage claim and no such evidence was excluded ...• " 
471 F . 2d 801, at 807, n.15. 
8 The court stated : 
" [Petitioner's] considerable stature as a lawyer, author, lecturer, 
.and participant in matters of public import undermine the validity 
of the assumption that he is not a 'public figure' as that term has 
been used by the progeny of New York Times. Nevertheless, for 
purposes of decision we make that assumption and test the avail~ 
ability of the claim of privilege by the subject matter of the article." 
.471 F. 2d, at 805. 
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Times standard to any publication or broadcast about 
an issue of significant public interest, without regard 
to the position, fame, or anonymity of the person 
defamed, and it concluded that respondent's statements 
concerned such an issue.4 After reviewing the record, 
4 In the Court of Appeals petitioner made an ingenious but un-
availing attempt to show that respondent's defamatory charge against 
him concerned no issue of public or general interest. He asserteq 
that the subject matter of the article was the murder trial of Officer 
Nuccio and that he did not participate in that proceeding. There-
fore, he argued, even if the subject matter of the article generally 
were protected by the New York Times privilege, under the opinion 
of the Rosenbloom plurality, the defamatory statements about him 
were not. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument. It notecl 
that the accusations against petitioner played an integral part in 
respondent's general thesis of a nationwide conspiracy to harass the 
police: 
" [W]e may also assume that the article's basic thesis is false. Never-
theless, under the reasons of New York Times v. Sullivan, even a 
false statement made in support of a false thesis is protected unless 
made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of its 
truth or falsity. It would undermine the rule of that case to permit 
the actual falsity of a statement to determine whether or not its 
publisher is entitled to the benefit of the rule. 
"If, therefore, we put to one side the false character of the article 
and treat it as though its contents were entirely true, it cannot be 
·denied that the comments about [petitioner] were integral to its 
thesis. They must be tested under the New York Times standard." 
471 F. 2d, at 806. 
We think that the Court of Appeals correctly rejected petitioner's 
argument. Its acceptance might lead to arbitrary imposition of 
liability on the basis of an unwise differentiation among kinds 
of factual misstatements. The present case illustrates the point. 
Respondent falsely portrayed petitioner as an architect of the 
criminal prosecution against Nuccio. On its face this inaccuracy 
does not appear defamatory. Respondent also falsely labelled peti-
tioner a "Leninst" and a "Communist-fronter." These accusations 
are generally considered defamatory. Under petitioner's interpreta-
tion of the "public or general interest" test, respondent would have 
,enjoyed a constitutional privilege to publish defamatory falsehoods if 
8 
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the Court of Appeals endorsed the District Court's con• 
clusion that petitioner had failed to show by clear and 
convincing evidence that respondent had acted with 
"actual malice" as defined by New York Times. There 
was no evidence that the managing editor of American 
Opinion knew of the falsity of the accusations made in 
the article. In fact, he knew nothing about peti~ 
tioner except what he learned from the article. The 
court correctly noted that mere proof of failure to investi• 
gate, without more, cannot establish reckless disregard for 
the truth. Rather, the publisher must act with a "high 
degree of awareness ... of probable falsity." St. Amant 
v. Thompson, 390 U. S. 727, 731 (1968). Accord: 
Beckley Newspaper Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81, 84-85 
(1967); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 67, 75-76 (1964). 
The evidence in this case did not reveal that respondent 
had cause for such an awareness. The Court of Appeals 
therefore affirme<l 471 F. 2d 801 (1972). For the reasons 
stated below, we reverse. 
II 
The principal issue in this case is whether a news,. 
paper or broadcaster that publishes defamatory false-
hoods about an individual who is neither a public 
official nor a public figure may claim a constitu-
tional privilege against liability for the injury in .. 
petitioner had in fact been associated with the cruninal prosecution. 
But this would mean that the seemingly innocuous mistake of con-
fusing petitioner's role in the litigation against officer Nuccio would 
destroy the privilege otherwise available for calling petitioner a 
communist-fronter. Thus respondent's privilege to publish state-
ments whose content should have alerted it to the danger of injury 
to reputation would hinge on the accuracy of statements that carried 
with them no such warning. Assuming that none of these statements 
was published with knowledge of falsity or with reckless disregar4 
!or the truth, we see no reason to distinguish among the inaccuracies. 
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flicted by those statements. The Court considered this 
question on the rather different set of facts presented in 
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U. S. 29 (1971). 
Rosenbloom, a distributor of nudist magazines, was 
arrested for selling allegedly obscene material while mak-
ing a delivery to a retail dealer. The police obtained a 
warrant and seized his entire inventory of 3,000 books and 
magazine. He sought and obtained an injunction pro• 
hibiting further police interference with his business. He 
then sued a local radio station for failing to note in two 
of its newscasts that the 3,000 items seized were only 
"reportedly" or "allegedly" obscene and for broadcasting 
references to "the smut literature racket" and to "girlie-
book peddlers" in its coverage of the court proceeding 
for injunctive relief. He obtained a judgment against 
the radio station, but the Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit held the New Yark Times privilege appli~able to 
the broadcast and reversed. 415 F. 2d 892 (1969). 
This Court affirmed the decision below, but no majority 
could agree on a controlling rationale. The eight Justices 5 
who participated in Rosenbloom announced their views 
in five separate opinions, none of which commanded more 
than three votes. The several statements not only re-
veal disagreement about the appropriate result in that 
case; they also reflect divergent traditions of thought 
about the general problem of reconciling the law of 
defamation with the First Amendment. One approach 
has been to extend the New Yark Times test to an ex-
panding variety of situations. Another has been to vary 
the level of constitutional privilege for defamatory false-
hood with the status of the person defamed. And a third 
view would grant to the press and broadcast media abso-
lute immunity from liability for defamation. To place 
our holding in the proper context, we preface our discus-
5 Ma. JusTICE DOUGLAS did not partcipate in the consideration OJ' 
decision of Rosenbloom. 
IO 
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sion of this case with a review of the several Rosenbloom 
opinions and their antecedents. 
In affirming the trial court's judgment in the instant 
case, the Court of Appeals relied on MR. JusTICE BREN• 
NAN's conclusion for the Rosenbloom plurality that "all 
discussion and communication involving matters of pub-
lic or general concern" warrant the protection from lia-
bility for defamation accorded by the rule originally enun-
ciated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964) . There this Court defined a constitutional privi .. 
lege intended to free criticism of public officials from the 
restraints imposed by the common law of defamation. The 
Times ran a political advertisement endorsing civil rights 
demonstrations by black students in Alabama and ime 
pliedly condemning the performance of local law enforce-
ment officials. A police commissioner established in state 
court that certain misstatements in the advertisement 
referred to him and that they constituted libel per se 
under Alabama law. This showing left the Times with 
the single defense of truth, for under Alabama law 
neither good faith nor reasonable care would protect the 
newspaper from liability. This Court concluded that a 
"rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee 
the truth of all his factual assertions" would deter pro-
tected speech, id., at 279, and announced the constitu-
tional privilege designed to counter that effect : 
"The constitutional guarantees require, we think, 
a federal rule that prohibits a public official from 
recovery of damages for a defamatory falsehood re-
lating to his official conduct unless he proves that the 
statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, 
in the knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
disregard of whether it was true or not." Id., at 
279- 280.6 
41 New York Times and later cases explicated the meaning of the 
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Three years after New York Times, a majority of the 
Court agreed to extend the constitutional privilege to 
defamatory criticism of "public figures." This extension 
new standard. In New York Times the Court held that under the 
circumstances the newspaper's failure to check the accuracy of the 
advertisement against news stories in its own files did not establish 
reckless diregard for the truth . 376 U. S., at 287-288. In St. 
Amant v. Thompson, 390 U. S. 727, 731 (1968), the Court equated 
reckless disregard of the truth with subjective awareness of probable 
falsity: "There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion 
that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth 
of his publication." In Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 
U. S. 81 (1967), the Court emphasized the di,;tinction between the 
New York Times test of knowledge of falsit>' or reckless di~regard 
of the truth and "actual malice" in the traditional ,;ense of Ill-will. 
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64 (1964), made plain that the new 
standard applied to criminal libel laws as well as to civil action:; and 
that 1t governed critici::;m directed at "an>·thing which might touch 
on an official's fitness for office." Id., at 77 . Finally,. in Rosenblatt v. 
Baer, 383 U. S. 75, 85 (1966), the Court Htatrd that "the 'public 
official' designation applies at the ver>· leao:t to those among the 
hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the pub-
he to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct 
of government affairs." 
In Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S. 374 (1967), the Court applied the 
New York Times standard to actions under an unusual state statute. 
The statute did not create a cause of action for libel. Rather, it pro-
vided a remedy for unwanted publicity. Although the law allowed 
recovery of damages for harm caused by exposure to public attention 
rather than by factual inaccuracies, it recognized truth as a complete 
defense. Thus, nondefamatory factual errors could render a publisher 
liable for something akin to invasion of privacy. The Court ruled that 
the defendant in such an action could invoke the New York Times 
privilege regardless of the fame or anonymity of the plaintiff. Speak-
ing for the Court, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN declared that this holding 
was not an extension of New York Times but rather a parallel line of 
reasoning applying that standard to this discrete context : 
"This is neither a libel action by a private individual nor a statu-
tory action by a public official. Therefore, although the First 
Amendment principles announced in New York Times guide ouy 
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was announced in Curt-is Publishing Co. v. Butts and its 
companion Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U. S. 130, 162 
(1967). The first case involved the Saturday Evening 
Post's charge that Coach Wally Butts of the University 
of Georgia had conspired with Coach Bear Bryant of the 
University of Alabama to fix a football game between 
their respective schools. Walker involved an erronMUS 
Associated Press account of Brigadier General Edwin 
Walker's participation in a University of Mississippi 
campus riot. Because Butts was paid by a private alumni 
association and Walker had retired from the Army, neither 
could be classified as a "public official" under New York 
Times. Although Mr. Justice Harlan announced the 
result in both cases, a majority of the Court agreed with 
Mr. Chief Justice Warren's conclusion that the New York 
Times test should apply to criticism of "public figures" as 
well as "public officials." 1 The Court extended the con-
in this discrete context. It therefore serves no purpose to distinguish 
the facts here from those in New York Timea. Were this 
a libel action, the distinction which has been suggested be-
tween the relative opportunities of the public official and the 
private individual to rebut defamatory charges might be germane. 
And the additional state interest in the protection of the individual 
against damages to his reputation would be involved. Cf. Rosenblatt 
Vo Baer, 383 u. S. 75, 91 (STEWART, J., concurring)." Id., at 390-391. 
1 Professor Kalven once introduced a discussion of these cases with 
the apt heading, "You Can't Tell the Players Without a Score Card." 
H. Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment, 1967 
Supo Ct. Rev, 267, 275 (1967). Only three other Justices joined 
Mr. Justice Harlan's analysis of the issues involved. In his con-
curring opinion, Mr. Chief Justice Warren stated the principle for 
which these cases stand-that the New York Times test reaches both 
public figures and public officials. Ma. JUSTICE BRENNAN and Ma. 
JUSTICE WHITE agreed with the Chief Justice on that question . 
Mr. Justice Black and Ma JUSTICE DOUGLAS reiterated their view 
that publishers should have an absolute immunity from liability for 
defamation, but they acquiesed in the Chief Justice's reasoning in 
.order to enable a majority of the Justices to agree on the questioij 
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stitutional privilege announced in that case to protect 
defamatory criticism of nonpublic officials who "are never-
theless intimately involved in the resolution of important 
public questions, or, by reason of their fame, shape events 
in areas of concern to society at large." Id., at 164. 
In his opinion for the plurality in Rosenbloom v. 
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U. S. 29 (1971), MR. JUSTICE 
BRENN AN took the New York Times privilege one step 
further. He concluded that its protection should extend 
to defamatory falsehoods relating to private persons if the 
statements concerned matters of general or public interest, 
He abjured the suggested distinction between public offi-
cials and public figures on the one hand and private indi-
viduals on the other. He focused instead on society's 
interest in learning about certain issues: "If a matter is a 
subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly 
become less so merely because a private individual is 
involved or because in some sense the individual did not 
choose to become involved." 403 U. S., at 43. Thus, 
under the plurality opinion, a private citizen involun-
tarily associated with a matter of general interest has no 
recourse for injury to his reputation unle~s he can satisfy 
the demanding requirements of the New York Times test. 
Two members of the Court concurred in the result in 
Rosenbloom but departed from the reasoning of the 
plurality. Mr. Justice Black restated his view, long 
shared by MR. JusTICE DOUGLAS, that the First Amend-
ment cloaks the news media with an absolute and in-
defeasible immunity from liability for defamation. Id., 
at 57. Ma JUSTICE WHITE concurred on a narrower 
ground. Ibid. He concluded that "the First Amend-
ment gives the press and the broadcast media a privilege 
to report and comment upon the official actions of public 
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servants in full detail, with no requirement that the rep• 
utation or privacy of an individual involved in or affected 
by the official action be spared from public view." Id., 
at 62. He therefore declined to reach the broader ques-
tions addressed by the other Justices. 
Mr. Justice Harlan dissented. Although he had joined 
the opinion of the Court in New York Times, in Curtis 
Publishing Co. he had contested the extension of the 
privilege to public figures. There he had argued that 
a public figure who held no governmental office should 
be allowed to recover damages for defamation "on 
a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constitut-
ing an extreme departure from the standards of in-
vestigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by 
responsible publishers." 388 U.S., at 155. In his Curtis 
Publishing Co. opinion Mr. Justice Harlan had distin-
guished New York Times primarily on the ground that 
defamation actions by public officials "lay close to sedi-
tious libel ... . " Id., at 133. Recovery of damages by 
one who held no public office, however, could not "be 
viewed as a vindication of governmental policy." Id., 
at 154. Additionally, he had intimated that, because 
most public officials enjoyed absolute immunity from 
liability for their own defamatory utterances under Barr 
v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564 (1959), they lacked a strong 
claim to the protection of the courts. 
In Rosenbloom Mr. Justice Harlan modified these 
views. He acquiesced in the application of the privilege 
to defamation of public figures but argued that a different 
rule should obtain where defamatory falsehood harmed 
a private individual. He noted that a private person 
has less likelihood "of securing access to the channels 
of communication sufficient to rebut falsehoods co1~cern-
ing him" than do public officials and public figures , id., 
at 70, and has not voluntarily placed himself in the public 
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spotlight. Mr. Justice Harlan concluded that the States 
could constitutionally allow private individuals to re-
cover damages for defamation on the basis of any 
standard of care except liability without fault. 
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL dissented in Rosenbloom in an 
opinion joined by MR. JusTICE STEWART. Id., at 78. He 
thought that the plurality's "public or general interest" 
test for determining the applicability of the New York 
Times privilege would involve the courts in the dangerous 
business of deciding "what information is relevant to self-
government." Id., at 79. He also contended that the 
plurality's position inadequately served "society's inter-
est in protecting private individuals from being thrust 
into the public eye by the distorting light of defamation." 
Ibid. MR. JusTICE MARSHALL therefore reached the con-
clusion, also reached by Mr. Justice Harlan, that the 
States should be "essentially free to continue the evalua-
tion of the common law of defamation and to articulate 
whatever fault standards best suits the State's need," so 
long as the States did not impose liability without fault. 
Id. , at 86. The principal point of disagreement among 
the three dissenters concerned punitive charges. Whereas 
Mr. Justice Harlan thought that the States could allow 
punitive damages in amounts bearing "a reasonable and 
purposeful relationship to the actual harm done . . . ," 
id., at 75, MR. JusTICE MARSHALL concluded that the 
size and unpredictability of jury awards of exemplary 
damages unnecessarily exacerbated the problems of 
media self-censorship and that such damages should 
therefore be forbidden. 
III 
We begin with the common ground. Under the First 
Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. How-
ever pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its 
correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but 
16 
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on the competition of other ideas.8 But there is no con-
stitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither 
the intentional lie nor the careless error materially ad-
vances society's interest in "uninhibited, robust. and 
wide-open" debate on public issues. New York Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S., at 270. They belong to that 
category of utterances which "are no essential part of 
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value 
as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived 
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest 
in order and morality." Chaplinsky v. New Ha:mpshire, 
315 u. s. 568, 572 ( 1942) . 
Although the erroneous statement of fact is not worthy 
of constitutional protection, it is nevertheless inevitable in 
free debate. As James Madison pointed out in the Report 
on the Virginia Resolutions of 1798, "Some degree of 
abuse is inseparable from the proper use of everything; 
and in no instance is this more true than that of the 
press." 4 Elliot's Debates ( 1876) , p. 571. And punish-
ment of error runs the risk of inducing a cautious and 
restrictive exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed 
freedoms of speech and press. Our decisions recognize 
that a rule of strict liability that compels a publisher 
or broadcaster to guarantee the accuracy of his factual 
assertions may lead to intolerable self-censorship. Al-
lowing the media to avoid liability only by proving the 
truth of all injurious statements does not accord adequate 
protection to First Amendment liberties. As the Court 
stated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, 376 
U. S., at 279, "Allowance of the defense of truth, with 
the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not mean 
8 As Thomas Jefferson made the point in his first Inaugural 
Address: "If there be any among us who wish to dissolve this union 
or change its republican form of government, let them stand undis-
turbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may 
be tolerated where reason 1s left free to combat 1t " 
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that only false speech will be deterred." The First 
Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in 
order to protect speech that matters. 
The need to avoid self-censorship by the news media is, 
however, not the only societal value at issue. If it were, 
this Court would have embraoed long ago the view that 
publishers and broadcasters enjoy an unconditional and 
indefeasible immunity from liability for defamation. See 
New York Times Co. v.Sullivan,376 U.S. 254,293 (1964) 
(opinion of Black, J.); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 
80 (1964) (opinion of DouoLAs, J.); Curtis Publishing Co. 
v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 170 (1967) (opinion of Black, J.). 
Such a rule would indeed obviate the fear that the pros-
pect of civil liability for injurious falsehood might dis. 
suade a timorous press from the effective exercise of 
First Amendment freedoms. Yet absolute protection for 
the communications media requires a total sacrifice of 
the competing value served by the law of defamation. 
The legitimate state interest underlying the law of libel 
is the compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted 
on them by defamatory falsehoods. We would not lightly 
require the State to abandon this purpose, for, as MR. 
JusTICE STEWART has reminded us, the individual's right 
to the protection of his own good name 
"reflects no more than our basic concept of the essen-
tial dignity and worth of every human being-a 
concept at the root of any decent system of ordered 
liberty. The protection of private personality, like 
the protection of life itself, is left primarily to the 
individual states under the Ninth and Tenth Amend .. 
ments. But this does not mean that the right is 
entitled to any less recognition by this Court as a 
ha.sic of our constitutional system." Rosenblatt v. 
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Some tension necessarily exists between the need for 
a vigorous and uninhibited press and the legitimate in• 
terest in redressing wrongful injury. As Mr. Justice 
Harlan stated, "some antithesis between freedom of 
speech and press and libel actions persists, for libel re-
mains premised on the content of speech and limits the 
freedom of the publisher to express certain sentiments, 
at least without guaranteeing legal proof of their sub-
stantial accuracy." Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 
U. S., at 152. In our continuing effort to define the 
proper accommodation between these competing con-
cerns, we have been especially anxious to assure to the 
freedoms of speech and press that "breathing space" 
essential to their fruitful exercise. NAACP v. Button, 
371 U. S. 415, 433 ( 1963). To that end this Court has 
extended a measure of strategic protection to defamatory 
falsehood. 
The New York Times standard defines the level of 
constitutional protection appropriate to the context of 
defamation of a public person. Those who, by reason 
of the notoriety of their achievements or the vigor 
and success with which they seek the public's attention, 
are properly classed as public figures and those who 
hold governmental office may recover for injury to rep-
utation only on clear and convincing proof that the 
defamatory falsehood was made with knowledge of its 
falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth. This 
standard administers an extremely powerful antidote 
to the inducement to media self-censorship of the 
common law rule of strict liability for libel and 
slander. And it exacts a correspondingly high price 
from the victims of defamatory falsehood. Plainly 
many deserving plaintiffs, including some intentionally 
subjec_ted to injury, will be unable to surmount 
the barrier of the New York Times test. Despite this 
substantial abridgement of the state law right to com. 
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pensation for wrongful hurt to one's reputation, the 
Court has concluded that the protection of the N euJ 
York Times privilege should be available to publish~ 
ers and broadcasters of defamtory falsehoods concern .. 
ing public officials and public figures. New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964); Curt-is 
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130 (1967). We 
think that these decisions are correct, but we do not 
find their holdings justified solely by reference to the 
interest of the press and broadcast media in immunity 
from liability. Rather, we believe that the New York 
Times rule states an accommodation between this con-
cern and the limited state interest present in the context 
of libel actions brought by public persons. For the rea-
sons stated below, we conclude tha.t the state interest 
in compensating injury to the reputation of private 
individuals requires that a different rule should obtain 
with respect to them. 
Theoretically, of course, the balance between the needs 
of the press and the individual's claim to compensation 
for wrongful injury might be struck on a case-by-case 
basis. As Mr. Justice Harlan hypothesized, "it might 
seem, purely as an abstract matter, that the most utili-
tarian approach would be to scrutinize carefully every 
jury verdict in every libel case, in order to ascertain 
whether the final judgment leaves fully protected what-
ever First Amendment values transcend the legitimate 
state interest in protecting the particular plaintiff who 
prevailed." Rosenbloom v. Metromed-ia, Inc., 403 U. S. 
29, 63 (1971) (footnote omitted). But this approach 
would lead to unpredictable results and uncertain expecta-
tions, and it could render our duty to supervist> the lower 
courts unmanageable. Becau1:1e an ad hoc resolution of 
the competing interests at stake in each particular case 
is not feasible, we must lay down broad rules of general 
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cases involving differences as well as similarities. Thtis 
it is often true that not all of the considerations which 
justify adoption of a given rule will obtain in each par-
ticular case decided under its authority. 
With that caveat we have no difficulty in distinguishing 
among defamation plaintiffs. The first remedy of any 
victim of defamation is self-help-using available oppor-
tunities to contradict the lie or correct the error and 
thereby to minimize its adverse impact on reputation. 
Public officials and public figures usually enjoy signifi-
cantly greater access to the channels of effective commu-
nication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to 
counteract false statements than private individuals nor-
mally enjoy.9 Private individuals are therefore more 
vulnerable to injury, and the state interest in protecting 
them is correspondingly greater. 
More important than the likelihood that private indi-
viduals will lack effective opportunities for rebuttal, there 
is a compelling normative consideration underlying the 
distinction between public and private defamation plain-
tiffs. An individual who decides to seek governmental 
office must accept certain necessary consequences of that 
involvement in public affairs. He runs the risk of closer 
public scrutiny than might otherwise be the case. And 
society's interest in the officers of government is not 
strictly limited to the formal discharge of official duties. 
As the Court pointed out in Garrison v. Louiziana, 379 
U.S. 64, 77 (1964), the public's interest extends to "any-
thing that might touch on an official's fitness for office ...• 
Few personal attributes are more germane to fitness for 
·9 Of course, an opportunity for rebuttal seldom suffices to undo 
harm of defamatory falsehood. Indeed, the law of defamation is 
rooted in our experience that the truth rarely catches up with a lie. 
But the fact that the self-help remedy of rebuttal, standing alone, 
is inadequate to its task does not mean that it is irrelevant to ou_r 
inquiry. 
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office than dishonesty, malfeasance, or improper motiva-
tion, even though these characteristics may also affect 
the official's private character." 
Those classed as public figures stand in a similar posi-
tion. Hypothetically, it may be possible for someone to 
become a public figure through no purposeful action of 
his own, but the instances of truly involuntary public 
figures must be exceedingly rare. For the most part 
those who attain this status have assumed roles of especial 
prominence in the affairs of sdciety. Some occupy posi-
tions of such persuasive power and influence that they 
are deemed public :figures for all purposes. More com-
monly, those classed as public figures have thrust them-
selves to the forefront of particular public controversies 
in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. 
In either event, they invite attention and comment. 
Even if the foregoing generalities do not obtain in every 
instance, the communications media a.re entitled to act 
on the assumption that public officials and public figures 
have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk 
of injury from defamatory falsehoods concerning them. 
No such assumption is justified with respect to a private 
individual. He has not accepted public office nor as-
sumed an "influential role in ordering society." Curt-is 
Publ-ishing Co. v. Butts, supra, 388 U. S., at 164 ( opinion 
of Warren, C. J.). He has relinquished no part of his 
interest in the protection of his own good name, and 
consequently he has a more compelling call on the 
courts for redress of injury inflicted by defamatory false-
hood. Thus, private individuals are not only more vul-
nerable to injury than public officials and public figures; 
they are also more deserving of recovery. 
For these reasons we conclude that the States should 
retain substantial latitude in their efforts to enforce a 
legal remedy for defamatory falsehood injurious to the 
reputation of a private individual. The extension of the 
22 
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New Yark Times test proposed by the Rosenbloom plu• 
rality would abridge this legitimate state interest to a 
degree that we find unacceptable. And it would occa-
sion the additional difficulty of forcing state and federal 
judges to decide on an ad hoc basic which publications 
address issues of "general or public interest" and 
which do not-to determine, in the words of MR. JusTICE 
MARSHALL, "what information is relevant to self-govern-
ment." Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U. S., at 
79. We doubt the wisdom of committing this task to the 
conscience of judges. Nor does the Constitution require 
us to draw so thin a line between the drastic alternatives 
of the New Yark Times privilege and the common law of 
strict liability for defamatory error. The "public or gen-
eral interest" test for determining the applicability of 
the New Yark Times standard to private defamation 
actions inadequately serves both of the competing values 
at stake. On the one hand, a private individual whose 
reputation is injured by defamatory falsehood that does 
concern an issue of public or general interest has no re-
course unless he can meet the rigorous requirements of 
New York Times. This is true despite the factors 
that distinguish the state interest in compensating 
private individuals from the analogous interest involved 
in the context of public persons. On the other 
hand, a publisher or broadcaster of a defamatory error 
which a court deems unrelated to an issue of public or 
general interest may be held liable in damages even if it 
took every reasonable precaution to ensure the accuracy 
of its assertions. And liability may far exceed compensa .. 
tion for any actual injury to the plaintiff, for the jury may 
be permitted to presume damages without proof of loss 
and even to award punitive damages. 
We hold that, so long as they do not impose liability 
without fault, the States may define for themselves the 
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appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broad• 
caster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private 
individual.10 This approach provides a more equitable 
boundary between the competing concerns involved here. 
It recognizes the strength of the legitimate state interest 
in compensating private individuals for wrongful injury 
to reputation, yet shields the press and broadcast media 
from the rigors of strict liability for defamation. At 
least this conclusion obtains where, as here, the sub-
stance of the defamatory statement "makes substan-
10 Our caveat agamst strict liability is the prime target of MR. Jus-
TICE WHITE'S dissent. He would hold that a publisher or broad-
caster may be required to prove the truth of a defamatory statement 
concerning a private individual and, failing such proof, that the 
publisher or broadcaster may be held liable for defamation even 
though he took every conceivable precaution to ensure the accuracy 
of the offending statement pnor to its diSt;emination. Post, at -
(slip op., at 20-24). In MR. Jus1'ICE WHITE'S view, one who pub-
lishes a statement that later turns out to be maccurate can never be 
"without fault" in any meaningful ;;en;;e, for '•[i]t is he who cir-
culated a falsehood that he was not required to publish ." Id., at -
(slip op., at 23) (emphasi;; added) . 
MR. ,JUSTICE WHITE characterizes Neu· York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van. supra, a;; simply a case of sedit10u;; libel. Post, at - (;;lip op., 
at 18). But that rationale is certainly inapplicable to Curtis Publish-
ing Co. v. Butts, supra, where MR. JusncE WHITE joined four other 
Members of the Court to extend the knowing-or-reckless-falsity ,-tand-
ard to media defamation of persons identified as public figures but 
not connected with the Government. MR. ,JUSTICE WHITE now sug-
gests that he would abide by that vote, id, at - (slip op., at 30), 
but the full thrust of his dissent-as we read it-contradicts that 
suggestion. Fmally, m Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., supra, MR. 
JUSTICE WHITE voted to apply the Neu· York Times privilege to 
media defamation of an ind1v1dual who was neither a public official 
nor a public figure. His opimon states that the knowing-or-reckless-
falsity standard should applv to media "comment upon the official 
actions of public servants," 403 U. S., at 62, including defamator:v 
falsehoods about a person arre::;ted by the police. If adopted by 
24 
72-617-0PINION 
GERTZ v. WELCH 
tial danger to reputation apparent." 11 This phrase places 
in perspective the conclusion we announce today. Our 
inquiry would involve considerations somewhat different 
from those discussed above if a State purported to condi-
tion civil liability on a factual misstatement whose 
content did not warn a reasonably prudent editor or 
broadcaster of its defamatory potential. Cf. Time, Inc. 
v. Hill, 385 U. S. 374 (1967). Such a case is not now 
before us, and we intimate no view as to its proper 
resolution, 
IV 
Our accommodation of the competing values at stake 
in defamation suits by private individuals allows the 
States t.o impose liability on the publisher or broadcaster 
of defamatory falsehoods on a less demanding showing 
than that required by New York Times. This conclusion 
is not based on a belief that the considerations which 
prompted the adoption of the New York Times privilege 
for defamation of public officials and its extension to 
public figures are wholly inapplicable to the context of 
private individuals. Rather, we endorse this approach 
in recognition of the strong and legitimate state interest 
the Court, this conclusion would significantly extend the New York 
Times privilege. 
MR. ,fusTrcE WHrrE assert::; that our decision today "trivializes 
and denigrate::; the interest in reputation," Miami Herald Publishing 
Co. v. Tornillo , - U.S. -, - (slip op., at 4) (WHITE, .J., concur-
ring), that it "scuttle[ s] the libel law:, of the State::; in ... whole-
~ale fa;.;h1on" and renders ordinary citizen1< ·'powerles,: to protect 
themselve:::.'' Post. at - (slip op., at 2). In light of the progre"-
sive extension of the knowing-or-reckless-fabit~· requirement detailed 
in the precedmg paragraph, one might haw dewed today's deci:;ion 
allowmg recovery under an~· standard ><ave 1<trict liability a1< a more 
generous accommodation of the state mterest m comprehensive 
reputational injury to private individuals than the law presently 
!l ffords 
11 Curti8 Publuihing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. So 130, 155 (1967), 
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fo compensating private individuals for injury to reputa-
. tion. But this countervailing state interest extends no 
further than compensation for actual injury. For the 
reasons stated below, we hold that the States may not 
permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at 
least when liability is not based on a showing of 
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, 
The common law of defamation is an oddity of tort 
law, for it allows recovery of purportedly compensatory 
damages without evidence of actual loss. Under the 
traditional rules pertaining to actions for libel, the exist-
ence of injury is presumed from the fact of publication. 
Juries may award substantial sums as compensation for 
supposed damage to reputation without any proof that 
such harm actually occurred. The largely uncontrolled 
discretion of juries to award damagee where there is no 
loss unnecessarily compounds the potential of any sys• 
tern of liability for defamatory falsehood to inhibit the 
vigorous exercise of First Amendment freedoms. Addi-
tionally, the doctrine of presumed damages invites juries 
to punish unpopular opinion rather than to compensate 
individuals for injury sustained by the publication of a 
false fact. More to the point, the States have no sub-
stantial interest in securing for plaintiff's such as this 
petitioner gratuitous awards of money damages far in 
excess of any actual injury. 
We would not, of course, invalidate state law simply 
because we doubt its wisdom, but here we are attempting 
to reconcile state law with a competing interest grounded 
in the constitutional command of the First Amendment. 
It is therefore appropriate to require that state remedies 
for defamatory falsehood reach no farther than is 
necessary to protect the legitimate interest involved . 
It is necessary to restrict defamation plaintiffs who 
do not prove knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard 
for the truth to compensation for actual injury. We 
26 
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need not define "actual injury/' as trial courts have 
wide experience in framing appropriate jury instruc-
tions in tort action. Suffice it to say that actual 
injury is not limited to out-of-pocket loss. Indeed, the 
more customary types of actual harm inflicted by defam-
atory falsehood include impairment of reputation and 
standing in the community, personal humiliation, and 
mental anguish and suffering. Of course, juries must be 
limited by appropriate instructions, and all awards must 
be supported by competent evidence concerning the in-
jury, although there need be no evidence which assign~ 
an actual dollar value to the injury. 
We also find no justification for allowing awards of 
punitive damages against publishers and broadcasters held 
liable under state-defined standards of liability for 
defamation. In most jurisdictions jury discretion over 
the amounts awarded is limited only by the gentle 
rule that they not be excessive. Consequently, juries 
assess punitive damages in wholly unpredictable amounts 
bearing no necessary relation to the actual harm 
caused. And they remain free to use their discre-
tion selectively to punish expressions of unpopular 
views. Like the doctrine of presumed damages, jury dis-
cretion to award punitive damages unnecessarily exacer-
bates the danger of media self-censorship, but, unlike the 
former rule, punitive damages are wholly irrelevant to the 
state interest that justifies a negligence standard for pri-
vate defamation actions. They are not compensation for 
injury. Instead, they are private fines levied by civil 
juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its 
future occurrence. In short, the private defamation 
plaintiff who establishes liability under a less demanding 
.standard than that stated by New York Times may 
recover only such damages as are sufficient to compensate 
him for actual injury. 
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Notwithstanding our refusal to extend the New York 
Times privilege to defamation of private individuals, 
respondent contends that we should affirm the judgment 
below on the ground that petitioner is either a public 
official or a public figure. There is little basis for the 
former assertion. Several years prior to the present in-
cident, petitioner had served briefly on housing commit-
tees appointed by the mayor of Chicago, but at the 
time of publication he had never held any remunera-
tive governmental position. Respondent admits this 
but argues that petitioner's appearance at the coroner's 
inquest rendered him a "de facto public official." Our 
cases recognize no such concept. Respondent's sug0 es-
tion would sweep all lawyers under the New York Times 
rule as officers of the court and distort the plain meaning 
of the "public official" category beyond all recognition. 
We decline to follow it. 
Respondent's characterization of petitioner as a public 
figure raises a different question. That designation may 
rest on either of two alternative bases. In some in-
stances an individual may achieve such pervasive fame 
or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all pur-
poses and in all contexts. More commonly, an individual 
voluntary injects himself or is drawn '1to a particular 
public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure 
for a limited range of issues. In either case such persons 
assume special prominence in the resolution of public 
questions. 
Petitioner has long been a.ctive in community and 
professional affairs. He has served as an officer of local 
civil groups and of various professional organizations, 
and he has published several books and articles on legal 
subjects. Although petitioner was consequently well-
known in some circles, he had achieved no general fame 
2 
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or notorietv in the community. None of the prosnective 
jurors called Rt the trial had ever heard of petitioner 
prior t.o this litigation, and rem0nrlent offererl no nroof 
that this response was atypical of the loral population. 
We would not lightly assume th::it a <'itizen's participa-. 
tion in <'Ommunity and professional affairs rendered him 
a public figure for all purposes. Absent clear evidence 
of general fame or notoriety in the community. and per-
vasive involvement in the affairs of society. :m individual' 
should not be deemed a puhlic personalitv for all asnects 
of his life. It is preferablf~ to reduce the puhlic figure 
question to a more meaningful context bv looking to the 
nature and extent of an individual's participation in the 
particula.r controversy giving rise to the defamation. 
In this context it is plain that petitioner was not a 
public figure. He plaved a minimal role at the coroner's 
inquest. and his participation related solely to his repre-
sentation of a private client. He took no part in the 
crimrnal prosecution of officer Nuccio. Moreover, he 
never discussed either the criminal or civil litigation with 
the press and was never quoted as having done so. He 
plainly did not thrust himself into the vortex of this 
public issue, nor did he engage the public's attention in 
an attempt to influence its outcome. We are persuaded· 
that the trial court did not err in refusing to characterize 
petitioner as a public figure for the purpose of this 
litigation. 
We therefore conclude that the New York Times stand-
ard is inapplicable to this case and that the trial court 
erred in entering judgment for respondent. Because the 
jury was allowed to impose liability without fault and· 
was permitted to presume damages without proof of 
injury, a new trial is necessary. We reverse and remand 
fpr forther proceedings in accord with this opinion. 
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